Sixth Street Specialty Lending Inc (TSLX) 2019 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, and welcome to TPG Specialty Lending, Inc.'s Fourth Quarter and Full Year ended December 31, 2019 Earnings Conference Call.

早安，歡迎參加 TPG Specialty Lending, Inc. 截至 2019 年 12 月 31 日的第四季和全年收益電話會議。

Before we begin today's call, I would like to our listeners that remarks made during the call may contain forward-looking statements. Statements other than statements of historical facts made during this call may constitute forward-looking statements and are not guarantees of future performance or results and involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements as a result of a number of factors, including those described from time to time in TPG Specialty Lending, Inc.'s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The company assumes no obligation to update any such forward-looking statements.

在我們開始今天的電話會議之前，我想提醒我們的聽眾，電話會議期間的言論可能包含前瞻性陳述。本次電話會議中除歷史事實陳述外的其他陳述可能構成前瞻性陳述，不能保證未來業績或結果，並涉及許多風險和不確定性。由於多種因素，包括 TPG Specialty Lending, Inc. 向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件中不時描述的因素，實際結果可能與前瞻性陳述中的結果有重大差異。該公司不承擔更新任何此類前瞻性陳述的義務。

Yesterday, after the market closed, the company issued its earnings press release for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31, 2019, and posted a presentation to the Investor Resources section of its website, www.tpgspecialtylending.com. The presentation should be reviewed in conjunction with the company's Form 10-K filed yesterday with the SEC.

昨天，收盤後，該公司發布了截至 2019 年 12 月 31 日的第四季度和全年收益新聞稿，並在其網站 www.tpgspecialtylending.com 的投資者資源部分發布了簡報。該演示文稿應與該公司昨天向 SEC 提交的 10-K 表格一起進行審查。

TPG Specialty Lending, Inc.'s earnings release is also available on the company's website under the Investor Resources section. Unless noted otherwise, all performance figures mentioned in today's prepared remarks are as of and for the fourth quarter and full year December 31, 2019. As a reminder, this call is being recorded for replay purposes.

TPG Specialty Lending, Inc. 的收益報告也可在該公司網站的投資者資源部分找到。除非另有說明，今天準備好的評論中提到的所有業績數據均截至 2019 年 12 月 31 日第四季和全年。謹此提醒，本次通話將會被錄音以供重播。

I will now turn the call over to Joshua Easterly, Chief Executive Officer of TPG Specialty Lending, Inc.

我現在將把電話轉給 TPG Specialty Lending, Inc. 執行長 Joshua Easterly。

Thank you. Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining us today. Let me start off by reviewing our full year and fourth quarter 2019 highlights, and then I'll hand it off to my partner and our president, Bo Stanley to discuss our portfolio activity and metrics. Our CFO, Ian Simmonds, will review our financial results in more detail. And I will conclude with final thoughts before opening the call to Q&A.

謝謝。大家早安，感謝您今天加入我們。首先，我回顧 2019 年全年和第四季度的亮點，然後將其交給我的合作夥伴兼總裁 Bo Stanley 討論我們的投資組合活動和指標。我們的財務長 Ian Simmonds 將更詳細地審查我們的財務表現。在開始問答環節之前，我將總結最後的想法。

After the market closed yesterday, we reported fourth quarter net investment income per share of $0.51 and net income per share of $0.57. This resulted in full year net investment income per share of $1.94, which corresponds to a return of equity of 12.0% and the full year net income per share of $2.34, which corresponds to a return on equity of 14.5%. Supported by the earnings power of our portfolio, we generated earnings in excess of our base dividend. More on this in a moment.

昨天收盤後，我們報告第四季每股淨投資收益為 0.51 美元，每股淨利潤為 0.57 美元。這導致全年每股淨投資收益為 1.94 美元，相當於 12.0% 的股本回報率；全年每股淨收益為 2.34 美元，相當於 14.5% 的股本回報率。在我們投資組合獲利能力的支持下，我們產生的收益超過了基本股息。稍後會詳細介紹這一點。

The difference between this quarter's net investment income and net income per share was primarily driven by unrealized gains from both the impact of net tightening credit spreads on the valuation of our portfolio and portfolio company-specific events. At year-end, our reported net asset value per share reached another high record of $16.83, compared to $16.72 in the prior quarter and $16.25 at year-end 2018.

本季淨投資收益與每股淨收益之間的差異主要是由於淨信貸利差緊縮對我們投資組合估值的影響以及投資組合公司特定事件的影響而產生的未實現收益。截至年底，我們報告的每股淨值再創新高，達到 16.83 美元，而上一季為 16.72 美元，2018 年底為 16.25 美元。

Yesterday, our Board approved a 5% increase from our quarterly base dividend from $0.39 to $0.41 per share to shareholders of record as of March 13, payable on April 15. Our Board also declared a Q4 supplemental dividend of $0.06 per share to shareholders of record as of February 28, payable on March 31. Finally, our Board declared aggregate special cash dividends of $0.50 per share that will be paid to shareholders during Q2. Specifically, $0.25 per share will be payable on April 30 to shareholders of record as of April 15 and $0.25 per share will be payable on June 30 to shareholders of record as of June 15.

昨天，我們的董事會批准將向截至 3 月 13 日登記在冊的股東派發的季度基本股息從每股 0.39 美元增加 5%，並於 4 月 15 日支付。我們的董事會也宣布向截至 2 月 28 日在冊股東派發每股 0.06 美元的第四季補充股息，並於 3 月 31 日支付。最後，我們的董事會宣布將在第二季向股東支付每股 0.50 美元的特別現金股利。具體而言，每股 0.25 美元將於 4 月 30 日支付給截至 4 月 15 日在冊的股東，每股 0.25 美元將於 6 月 30 日支付給截至 6 月 15 日在冊的股東。

There's been a couple of changes to our dividend policy this quarter, so let me take a few moments to discuss these in detail, starting with the increase in our base dividend. As we've said many times in the past, we view our base dividend as an ongoing cash liability, and therefore, we set it at a level that we believe with a high degree of confidence will be supported by the earnings power of our portfolio. This is evidenced by our track record of strong base dividend coverage to net investment income, which through the end of 2019 has averaged 127% since our March 2014 IPO. And nearly 3 years ago, in May 2017, we introduced a variable supplemental dividend framework as a way to enhance cash distributions to our shareholders and slow the growth of our excise tax, while preserving the stability of our net asset value. Since that time, and given the change of the regulatory framework in the form of lower asset coverage requirement, we believe the fundamental earnings power of our business has increased, slightly offset by the decrease in LIBOR over the course of 2019. Taking into account our go-forward expectations for balance sheet leverage, asset-level yields and potential for credit losses, we believe, again, with a high degree of confidence, that our portfolio will be able to support a higher base dividend.

本季我們的股利政策發生了一些變化，所以讓我花一些時間詳細討論這些變化，首先是增加我們的基本股利。正如我們過去多次說過的那樣，我們將基本股息視為持續的現金負債，因此，我們將其設定在一個我們充滿信心的水平，該水平將得到我們投資組合盈利能力的支持。我們對淨投資收入的基礎股利覆蓋率強勁，這項紀錄證明了這一點，自 2014 年 3 月 IPO 以來，截至 2019 年底，基本股利覆蓋率平均為 127%。近三年前，在 2017 年 5 月，我們引入了可變補充股息框架，作為加強對股東的現金分配並減緩消費稅增長的方式，同時保持資產淨值的穩定性。自那時起，鑑於監管框架以降低資產覆蓋率要求的形式發生變化，我們認為我們業務的基本盈利能力有所增強，但被 2019 年倫敦銀行同業拆借利率 (LIBOR) 的下降所略微抵消。考慮到我們對資產負債表槓桿、資產水平收益率和信貸損失潛力的未來預期，我們再次充滿信心地相信，我們的投資組合將能夠支持更高的基礎股息。

As for the $0.50 per share of special dividend that our Board had just declared, those who know us know we've historically stayed away from paying specials, given our focus on building net asset value and our desire to foster a long-term shareholder base. While our philosophy hasn't changed, our consistent overearning of our dividends, combined with our expectation of near-term capital gains from portfolio realizations will likely result in RIC distribution requirement issues that we wanted to proactively address. While these special dividends were a tax-driven decision, holding all else equal, we expect that our return on equity will experience a slight uplift as a result of capital efficiency gains from the reduction in excise tax on our undistributed income and the slight increase in financial leverage. Since we've recalibrated our base dividend to correspond with our view of earnings power of the portfolio in the intermediate term, we don't expect any RIC distribution requirement issues for the foreseeable future.

至於我們董事會剛剛宣布的每股 0.50 美元的特別股息，了解我們的人都知道，鑑於我們專注於建立資產淨值並希望培養長期股東基礎，我們歷來都避免支付特別股息。雖然我們的理念沒有改變，但我們持續超額賺取股息，加上我們對投資組合實現的近期資本利得的預期，可能會導致我們希望主動解決的 RIC 分配要求問題。雖然這些特別股息是稅收驅動的決定，但在其他條件相同的情況下，我們預計我們的股本回報率將略有上升，因為我們的未分配收入的消費稅減少以及資本支出的小幅增加帶來了資本效率的提升。財務槓桿。由於我們已經重新調整了基本股息，以符合我們對投資組合中期盈利能力的看法，因此我們預計在可預見的未來不會出現任何 RIC 分配要求問題。

For avoidance of doubt, there will be no changes to the calculation of our quarterly variable supplemental dividends, except to note that the impact of the special dividend will be excluded for the purposes of the NAV constraint, which ensures that our NAV declines by no more than $0.15 per share over the current and preceding quarter pro forma for the impact of the supplemental dividends.

為避免疑義，我們的季度可變補充股息的計算不會發生變化，但需要注意的是，出於資產淨值限制的目的，將排除特別股息的影響，這確保我們的資產淨值不會再下降由於補充股息的影響，本季和上一季預計每股收益將低於0.15 美元。

Before passing it over to Bo to talk about our portfolio activity, I'd like to quickly highlight the broader market backdrop and its impact on how we think about our business. This past year was characterized by periods of volatility and divergence in sector performance and their corresponding credit spreads. Investor preference for high-quality paper was driven by a mixed macro backdrop, deteriorating underwriting standards and growing concerns around loan downgrades. A flight to quality was observable in rising LCD spreads delta between first lien and second lien loans, between BB and B credits -- rated credits, and between cyclical and noncyclical industries. This trend was particularly notable in the second half of the year, hitting it's peak in November before moderating at year-end. As shared on our last call, given the low cyclical exposure in our portfolio, the volatility in credit spread movements throughout the year had a relatively muted impact on the valuation of our portfolio when we took in account -- we took into industry-specific comps for each of our investments.

在交給 Bo 討論我們的投資組合活動之前，我想快速強調一下更廣泛的市場背景及其對我們如何看待我們的業務的影響。過去一年的特點是行業表現及其相應的信用利差出現波動和分化。複雜的宏觀背景、不斷惡化的承銷標準以及對貸款降級的擔憂日益加劇，推動了投資者對高品質紙張的偏好。第一留置權貸款和第二留置權貸款之間、BB 信貸和B 信貸（評級信貸）之間以及週期性行業和非週期性行業之間的LCD 利差Delta 不斷上升，可以觀察到人們對質量的追求。這一趨勢在下半年尤為明顯，在 11 月達到頂峰，然後在年底有所放緩。正如我們在上次電話會議中所分享的，鑑於我們的投資組合的周期性風險較低，當我們考慮到特定行業的比較時，全年信用利差變動的波動對我們投資組合的估值影響相對較小。對於我們的每一項投資。

Looking ahead, although we may see spots of volatility related to the U.S. presidential election and the unfolding economic impact of the coronavirus, fundamentally, we think the near-term U.S. economy remains in good shape, supported by deescalating trade tensions, accommodative monetary policy and low inflation. However, we believe economic cycles do exist. As such, we will continue to focus on staying at the top of the capital structure, limiting our exposure of cyclicals and finding strong risk-adjusted returns with secondary sources of repayment.

展望未來，儘管我們可能會看到與美國總統大選和冠狀病毒對經濟影響不斷顯現相關的波動，但從根本上講，我們認為在貿易緊張局勢緩和、寬鬆的貨幣政策和低通膨。然而，我們相信經濟週期確實存在。因此，我們將繼續專注於維持資本結構的頂端，限制我們的週期性風險敞口，並透過第二還款來源尋找強勁的風險調整回報。

As it relates to our financial policy, given the competitive late cycle environment, we expect that we will continue to operate below the top end of our target leverage range of 0.9x to 1.25x. This allows us to preserve our reinvestment option to create higher risk-adjusted returns in the next market dislocation. As a result of our recent efforts on the liability management side, which Ian will discuss in detail, we have ample and diverse funding sources with long-dated maturities to support our capital needs across market cycles.

由於這與我們的財務政策有關，考慮到競爭激烈的後期週期環境，我們預計我們將繼續在低於 0.9 倍至 1.25 倍目標槓桿範圍上限的情況下運作。這使我們能夠保留再投資選擇，以便在下一次市場混亂中創造更高的風險調整回報。由於我們最近在負債管理方面所做的努力（伊恩將詳細討論這一點），我們擁有充足且多樣化且期限較長的資金來源，可以支持我們跨市場週期的資本需求。

With that, I'd like to turn the call over to Bo, who will walk you through our portfolio activity and metrics in more detail.

接下來，我想將電話轉給 Bo，他將帶您更詳細地了解我們的投資組合活動和指標。

Thanks, Josh. The competitive environment for direct lending in 2019 continued to be challenging, though we're starting to see signs of stabilization. Compared to record 2018 levels, capital raised for middle-market direct lending in 2019 was down over 35% and private debt dry powder at year-end, albeit still elevated at nearly $260 billion, was down over 10% from the prior year. Given this ample dry powder and the credit bifurcation in the broadly syndicated market that Josh mentioned, one of the main themes over the past few quarters has been the growing market share of direct lenders in large syndicated sponsor financings. Our decision on whether to pursue a particular opportunistic investment strategy is informed by the risk/reward dynamics in that market. For us, we found that in the current environment, the best risk-adjusted returns continue to transpire from our sector themes. By partnering with sponsors and companies only in situations where we have a differentiated view of the business or the sector or the ability to provide creative solutions for complex situations, we've been able to command better pricing and terms compared to the broadly syndicated markets.

謝謝，喬許。2019 年直接貸款的競爭環境仍然充滿挑戰，但我們開始看到穩定的跡象。與 2018 年創紀錄的水平相比，2019 年中間市場直接貸款籌集的資金下降了 35% 以上，年底私人債務乾粉雖然仍高達近 2600 億美元，但比前一年下降了 10% 以上。鑑於喬希提到的充足的乾粉和廣泛銀團市場的信貸分歧，過去幾季的主題之一是直接貸款人在大型銀團贊助商融資中的市場份額不斷增長。我們決定是否採取特定的機會主義投資策略是根據該市場的風險/回報動態來決定的。對我們來說，我們發現在當前環境下，最佳的風險調整回報繼續從我們的行業主題中顯現出來。透過僅在我們對業務或部門有不同看法或有能力為複雜情況提供創意解決方案的情況下與贊助商和公司合作，與廣泛的聯合市場相比，我們能夠獲得更好的定價和條款。

To give you a flavor of our investment activity, over 25% of total commitments this year on a dollar basis were in retail asset-based loans that we underwrite based on liquid collateral values instead of enterprise values, which tend to fluctuate with market cycles. Our robust deal activity in retail ABL in 2019 is reflective of the particularly challenging year for brick-and-mortar retailers, which saw a record high 9,300 store closings. We believe there will be -- there will continue to be disruptions in the traditional retail model, and therefore, the ongoing need for capital solutions in the space. Given our platform's relationships and core expertise in retail ABL, as illustrated by an average gross unlevered IRR of 23% on fully realized retail ABL investments, we expect this to continue to be one of our investment themes for the period ahead.

為了讓您了解我們的投資活動，今年以美元計的總承諾中超過25% 是基於零售資產的貸款，我們根據流動抵押品價值而不是企業價值承保這些貸款，而企業價值往往會隨著市場週期而波動。2019 年零售 ABL 交易活動強勁，反映出實體零售商面臨特別挑戰的一年，該年有 9,300 家門市關閉，創歷史新高。我們相信，傳統零售模式將繼續受到顛覆，因此該領域持續需要資本解決方案。鑑於我們平台在零售 ABL 方面的關係和核心專業知識（如完全實現的零售 ABL 投資的平均總無槓桿 IRR 為 23% 所示），我們預計這將繼續成為我們未來一段時間的投資主題之一。

Outside of retail, just under 50% of total commitments in 2019 were sponsored transaction within our specialized sector subthemes, such as business services and fintech, where we believe we have a competitive advantage and where the underlying businesses have attractive revenue characteristics, high-quality customer bases and strong returns on invested capital.

除零售之外，2019 年總承諾的近50% 是我們專業部門子主題內的贊助交易，例如商業服務和金融科技，我們相信我們在這些領域具有競爭優勢，並且基礎業務具有有吸引力的收入特徵、高品質客戶群和強勁的投資回報。

Overall, we had a productive Q4 with total commitments of $329 million and total fundings of $289 million across 9 new investments and upsizes to 4 existing investments. This quarter, we were agent on 8 of 9 of our new investments, which we believe is valuable in our ability to control the loan structuring and monitoring process. Compared to the record repayment activity of $383 million in Q4 of last year, this quarter was relatively quiet with $104 million of repayments from 1 full and 6 partial investment realizations, resulting in net portfolio growth of $185 million for Q4.

總體而言，我們第四季的業績富有成效，9 項新投資和 4 項現有投資的總承諾額為 3.29 億美元，融資總額為 2.89 億美元。本季度，我們代理了 9 項新投資中的 8 項，我們認為這對我們控制貸款結構和監控流程的能力非常有價值。與去年第四季創紀錄的3.83 億美元還款活動相比，本季相對平靜，1 筆全額投資和6 筆部分投資變現的還款額為1.04 億美元，導致第四季度投資組合淨增長1.85 億美元。

For full year 2019, we generated $1.2 billion of commitments and $1.1 billion of fundings. We had total repayments of $575 million for the year resulted in net portfolio growth of $512 million. To get a more accurate snapshot of our portfolio's growth trend, it's best to look at it over a longer 18-month period given the strong repayment levels we experienced in late 2018. Over the last 18 months, our portfolio grew by $291 million or a modest 10% on an annualized basis.

2019 年全年，我們獲得了 12 億美元的承諾和 11 億美元的資金。我們當年的還款總額為 5.75 億美元，投資組合淨成長為 5.12 億美元。為了更準確地了解我們投資組合的成長趨勢，考慮到我們在 2018 年底經歷的強勁還款水平，最好在更長的 18 個月期間進行觀察。在過去 18 個月中，我們的投資組合成長了 2.91 億美元，年化成長率為 10%。

Looking at the year-over-year portfolio trends, as the portfolio grew in 2019, we kept our average investment size steady, resulting in an improvement in the diversification of our portfolio. Our top 10 borrower exposure decreased to 33% of portfolio at fair value, down from 39% in the prior year. Similarly, our portfolio of cyclical exposure, which excludes our asset-based loans in retail, and our reserve and asset-based loans in energy decreased from 4.1% to 2.9% of the portfolio year-over-year on a fair value basis. At December 31, our top 2 industry exposures on a fair value basis were business services at 16.8%, and retail and consumer products, consisting predominantly of retail asset-based loans at 14.9%.

從投資組合年比趨勢來看，隨著2019年投資組合的成長，我們維持平均投資規模穩定，投資組合多元化程度也有所改善。我們的十大借款人風險敞口從上一年的 39% 下降至以公允價值計算的投資組合的 33%。同樣，我們的週期性創投組合（不包括零售領域的資產型貸款）以及能源領域的儲備和資產型貸款以公允價值計算，佔投資組合的比例從 4.1% 年減至 2.9%。截至 12 月 31 日，我們以公允價值計算的前 2 大產業風險敞口是商業服務（16.8%）以及零售和消費品（主要包括零售資產貸款）（14.9%）。

From a credit statistic standpoint, we continued to improve the interest coverage and net leverage profile of our portfolio. At year-end, across our core portfolio companies our average net attachment point was 0.2x, and our average last dollar leverage was 4.2x compared to 0.4x and 4.4x a year ago. And the average interest coverage ratio for our core portfolio companies improved from 2.8x to 3.2x year-over-year. We had no investments on nonaccrual status at year-end and the overall performance of our portfolio remained steady at 1.15 on our assessment scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being the highest, compared to 1.14 in Q4 of last year. We continue to have limited junior capital exposure, with 96% of first lien exposure at year-end.

從信用統計來看，我們持續改善投資組合的利息覆蓋率和淨槓桿狀況。截至年底，我們的核心投資組合公司的平均淨附著點為 0.2 倍，平均最後美元槓桿為 4.2 倍，而一年前為 0.4 倍和 4.4 倍。我們核心投資組合公司的平均利息保障倍數年減至 2.8 倍至 3.2 倍。截至年底，我們沒有非應計狀態的投資，在 1 至 5 的評估等級中，我們的投資組合整體表現穩定在 1.15，其中 1 為最高，而去年第四季為 1.14。我們的初級資本風險仍然有限，年底時第一留置權曝險佔 96%。

On the underwriting side, we sourced 99% of our portfolio through non-intermediated channels. This has supported our ability to structure effective voting control on 80% of our debt investments and an average 2 financial covenants per credit agreement. It has also supported our ability to structure call protection across our debt portfolio, which provides fee income in periods of high portfolio turnover to support our ROEs.

在承銷方面，我們99%的投資組合都是透過非中介管道採購的。這支持了我們對 80% 的債務投資建立有效投票控制的能力，並且每個信貸協議平均有 2 個財務契約。它還支持我們在整個債務投資組合中建立贖回保護的能力，這在投資組合週轉率高的時期提供費用收入，以支持我們的淨資產收益率。

As for portfolio yields at year-end, the weighted average total yield on our debt and income-producing securities at amortized cost was 10.7% compared to 10.8% in the prior quarter. Breaking down the drivers of this yield movement, there was 30 basis points of downward impact from the decrease in the effective LIBOR across our debt investments, which was partially offset by 20 basis points of uplift from the yield impact of new versus exited investments. The yield at amortized cost on new investments this quarter was 12.3% and compared to 12.0% on exited debt investments.

至於年末投資組合收益率，我們的債務和創收證券以攤餘成本計算的加權平均總收益率為 10.7%，而上一季為 10.8%。細分收益率變動的驅動因素來看，我們債務投資的有效 LIBOR 下降造成了 30 個基點的下行影響，但新投資與退出投資的收益率影響上升了 20 個基點，部分抵消了這一影響。本季新投資的攤餘成本收益率為 12.3%，而已退出債務投資的攤餘成本收益率為 12.0%。

With that, I'd like to turn it over to Ian.

有了這個，我想把它交給伊恩。

Thanks, Bo. As Josh and Bo mentioned, this quarter was strong from both an earnings and originations perspective, in Q4, we generated net investment income per share of $0.51, which put our 2019 full year net investment income per share at $1.94. At year-end, we had total investments of $2.2 billion, total debt outstanding of $1.1 billion and net assets of $1.1 billion or $16.83 per share, which is prior to the impact of the $0.06 per share supplemental dividend that will be paid during Q1.

謝謝，博。正如Josh 和Bo 所提到的，從收益和發起的角度來看，本季都表現強勁，在第四季度，我們產生了每股0.51 美元的淨投資收益，這使得我們2019 年全年的每股淨投資收益為1.94 美元。截至年底，我們的總投資為22 億美元，未償債務總額為11 億美元，淨資產為11 億美元，即每股16.83 美元，這是在第一季支付的每股0.06 美元補充股息影響之前的。

Given our increased net funding activity this quarter, our average debt-to-equity ratio moved into our revised target leverage range for the first time, increasing from 0.86x in the prior quarter to 0.97x. Our average debt-to-equity ratio for the full year was 0.84x, consistent with our prior year, and our leverage at December 31 was 1.0x.

鑑於本季淨融資活動增加，我們的平均負債股本比率首次進入修訂後的目標槓桿範圍，從上一季的 0.86 倍增至 0.97 倍。我們全年的平均負債股本率為 0.84 倍，與前一年一致，截至 12 月 31 日的槓桿率為 1.0 倍。

Following our inaugural index eligible unsecured notes offering in Q4 that we discussed on our November earnings call, last month, we made further enhancements to our capital structure and liquidity profile by increasing the commitments under our revolving credit facility from $1.245 billion to $1.315 billion and extending the final maturity by approximately a year to January 2025.

繼我們在上個月的11 月財報電話會議上討論了第四季度首次發行符合指數的無擔保票據後，我們透過將循環信貸安排下的承諾從12.45 億美元增加到13.15 億美元並延長了我們的資本結構和流動性狀況，進一步增強了我們的資本結構和流動性狀況。最終到期日大約為一年，即 2025 年 1 月。

In addition, in January, we opportunistically reopened our 2024 notes, increasing the total principal amount outstanding from $300 million to $350 million. We were able to execute the reopening at a price above par, which implied a spread to 5-year treasuries of 195 basis points, 50 basis points tighter than the implied spread on our original transaction. This reopening allowed us to increase our unsecured funding mix with negligible impact on our weighted average cost of debt and therefore, our ROE. Given our risk management principle of mitigating interest rate risk across our floating rate portfolio, we entered into a fixed to floating interest rate swap on the $50 million of new notes, consistent with the rest of our fixed-rate debt. Pro forma for the revolver amendment and the use of net proceeds from the notes reopening, we had $870 million of undrawn revolver capacity at year-end. We feel very good about our capital position and the significant amount of liquidity we have to support our reinvestment option in environments where we can generate outsized ROEs for our shareholders.

此外，一月份，我們趁機重新發行了 2024 年票據，將未償本金總額從 3 億美元增加到 3.5 億美元。我們能夠以高於面額的價格執行重新開放，這意味著與 5 年期公債的利差為 195 個基點，比我們原始交易的隱含利差窄 50 個基點。這次重新開放使我們能夠增加無擔保融資組合，而對我們的加權平均債務成本以及股本回報率的影響可以忽略不計。鑑於我們的風險管理原則是降低浮動利率投資組合的利率風險，我們對 5000 萬美元的新票據進行了固定利率與浮動利率互換，與我們其餘的固定利率債務保持一致。根據左輪手槍修正案和重新發行票據所得淨收益的使用情況，截至年底，我們有 8.7 億美元的未提取左輪手槍容量。我們對我們的資本狀況感到非常滿意，我們擁有大量的流動性來支持我們的再投資選擇，在我們可以為股東創造超額股本回報率的環境中。

Turning to our presentation materials. Slide 9 is the NAV bridge for the quarter. Walking through the main drivers of this quarter's NAV growth, we added $0.51 per share from net investment income against the base dividend of $0.39 per share. There was a positive $0.04 per share impact from credit spread movement on the valuation of our portfolio and a negative $0.03 per share impact from net unrealized mark-to-market losses on the interest rate swaps on our fixed rate securities given movements in the forward LIBOR curve. Other changes in net realized and unrealized gains, primarily driven by portfolio specific events, contributed a positive $0.07 per share impact to this quarter's NAV.

轉向我們的簡報材料。投影片 9 是本季的資產淨值橋。回顧本季資產淨值成長的主要驅動因素，我們從淨投資收益中增加了每股 0.51 美元，而基礎股息為每股 0.39 美元。信用利差變動對我們投資組合的估值產生每股0.04 美元的正影響，考慮到遠期倫敦銀行間同業拆借利率(LIBOR) 的變動，未實現按市值計價的淨損失對我們固定利率證券的利率掉期產生每股0.03 美元的負影響曲線。主要由投資組合特定事件驅動的已實現淨收益和未實現淨收益的其他變化為本季度的資產淨值帶來了每股 0.07 美元的積極影響。

Moving onto our operating results detailed on Slide 11. Total investment income for the fourth quarter was $66.5 million compared to $70.1 million from the previous quarter. Breaking down the components of income, "interest and dividend income" was $57.6 million, up $1.5 million from the previous quarter as a result of the increase in the average size of our debt portfolio. "Other fees," which consists of prepayment fees and accelerated amortization of upfront fees from unscheduled pay downs, were lower at $1.8 million, compared to $11.2 million in Q3 given quieter prepayment activity this quarter. "Other income" was $7.1 million, compared to $2.7 million in the prior quarter.

前往投影片 11 中詳細介紹的我們的營運結果。第四季總投資收入為 6,650 萬美元，上一季為 7,010 萬美元。以收入組成來看，「利息和股息收入」為 5,760 萬美元，比上一季增加 150 萬美元，這是由於我們債務投資組合平均規模的增加。鑑於本季預付款活動較為平靜，「其他費用」（包括預付款費用和計劃外付款預付款的加速攤銷）下降至 180 萬美元，而第三季為 1,120 萬美元。「其他收入」為 710 萬美元，上一季為 270 萬美元。

Net expenses, excluding management and incentive fees for the quarter were $16.5 million, up from $16.1 million in the prior quarter due to higher interest expense from an increase in the average quarterly debt outstanding. Our weighted average interest rate on average debt outstanding decreased 24 basis points quarter-over-quarter, primarily from the decrease in the effective LIBOR across our debt instruments. Given the one quarter timing lag on the LIBOR reset date on our interest rate swaps and the downward movement in LIBOR during Q4, we expect a continued tailwind to our weighted average cost of debt in next quarter's results.

本季不包括管理費和激勵費的淨支出為 1,650 萬美元，高於上一季的 1,610 萬美元，原因是平均季度未償債務增加導致利息支出增加。我們的平均未償債務加權平均利率較上月下降 24 個基點，主要是由於我們債務工具的有效 LIBOR 下降。鑑於我們的利率掉期 LIBOR 重置日期存在一個季度的時間滯後以及第四季度 LIBOR 的下行走勢，我們預計下季度業績的加權平均債務成本將繼續受到推動。

Let me take a moment to wrap up on the ROEs of our business. After record repayments at the end of 2018, we steadily rebuilt the portfolio, increasing our financial leverage from 0.59x to 1x, while maintaining a strong return on assets of 12.5%. With an average debt-to-equity ratio that was consistent with the prior year at 0.84x, we generated ROE on net investment income of 12.0% and an ROE on net income of 14.5%. Looking at year-over-year trends, our ROE on net investment income decreased from 14.0% in 2018, mostly resulting from record 2018 repayment levels, which corresponded with elevated activity-related fees. The increase in our ROE on net income from 11.6% in the prior year to 14.5% was partially driven by an increase in portfolio valuations, resulting from a reversal of the Q4 2018 credit spread widening. It was also driven by net unrealized gains related to certain portfolio investments and net unrealized gains on our interest rate swaps resulting from changes in the shape of the forward LIBOR curve.

讓我花點時間來總結一下我們業務的淨資產收益率。在 2018 年底創紀錄的還款後，我們穩步重建投資組合，將財務槓桿從 0.59 倍提高到 1 倍，同時保持 12.5% 的強勁資產回報率。平均負債股本比率與上年一致，為 0.84 倍，淨投資收益的 ROE 為 12.0%，淨利的 ROE 為 14.5%。從同比趨勢來看，我們的淨投資收益 ROE 較 2018 年的 14.0% 有所下降，這主要是由於 2018 年創紀錄的還款水平，這與活動相關費用的增加相對應。我們的淨利潤 ROE 從前一年的 11.6% 上升至 14.5%，部分原因是投資組合估值上升，這是由於 2018 年第四季信用利差擴大的逆轉所致。它也受到與某些投資組合投資相關的淨未實現收益以及因遠期 LIBOR 曲線形狀變化而導致的利率互換的未實現淨收益的推動。

I'd like to quickly flag that per our adoption of recent hedge accounting guidance, we've applied hedge accounting treatment to our 2024 unsecured notes and the related interest rate swaps. As a result, changes in the fair value of this particular interest rate swap will be offset by changes in the carrying value of the 2024 notes. There will be no unrealized gains or losses recognized in our income statement related to this hedging relationship and therefore, changes in the fair value of the swap will not impact our ROE on net income going forward.

我想快速指出，根據我們採用的最新對沖會計指南，我們已對 2024 年無擔保票據和相關利率掉期應用了對沖會計處理。因此，此特定利率互換的公允價值變動將被 2024 年票據帳面價值的變動所抵銷。我們的損益表中不會確認與這種對沖關係相關的未實現收益或損失，因此，掉期公允價值的變動不會影響我們未來淨利的淨資產收益率。

As we look ahead to full year 2020, based on our expectations over the intermediate term for our net asset level yields, cost of funds and financial leverage, we expect to target a return on equity of 11.0% to 12.0%. Based on our pro forma year-end book value per share of $16.77, which includes the impact of the Q4 supplemental dividend, this corresponds to a range of $1.84 to $2.01 for full year 2020 net investment income per share.

展望2020年全年，根據我們對淨資產水準收益率、資金成本和財務槓桿的中期預期，我們預期股本回報率目標為11.0%至12.0%。根據我們預計的年末每股帳面價值 16.77 美元（包括第四季度補充股息的影響），這相當於 2020 年全年每股淨投資收益在 1.84 美元至 2.01 美元之間。

With that, I'd like to turn it back to Josh for concluding remarks.

說到這裡，我想把它轉回給喬許做總結發言。

Thank you, Ian. Our fourth quarter results supported another year of strong ROEs for our shareholders. For the year ahead, our objective continues to be generating attractive risk-adjusted returns for our shareholders through our direct origination strategy, the differentiated human capital expertise across our platform, and capital allocation decisions that serve in the best long-term interest of our stakeholders.

謝謝你，伊恩。我們第四季的業績為我們的股東帶來了另一年強勁的股本回報率。未來一年，我們的目標繼續是透過我們的直接起源策略、整個平台差異化的人力資本專業知識以及符合利益相關者最佳長期利益的資本配置決策，為股東創造有吸引力的風險調整回報。

Before moving to Q&A, I'd like to address the pending topic regarding our broader TPG Sixth Street Partners investment platform's relationship with TPG Holdings. Our Sixth Street business was started in 2009 as a strategic partnership with TPG. Sixth Street currently manages $33 billion across the platform with over 250 people and 9 global offices. In the past 10 years, our Sixth Street business and TPG have each grown and evolved, thoughtfully and in productive ways. Likewise, so has our relationship with TPG. My partners and I at Sixth Street have been having a series of discussions with TPG about the next step in the evolution of our relationship, including the option of operating as independent organizations, with TPG continuing to maintain a minority stake in the Sixth Street business.

在進行問答之前，我想先談談有關我們更廣泛的 TPG Sixth Street Partners 投資平台與 TPG Holdings 之間關係的懸而未決的話題。我們的第六街業務始於 2009 年，與 TPG 建立了策略合作夥伴關係。Sixth Street 目前在整個平台上管理著 330 億美元的資產，擁有 250 多名員工和 9 個全球辦事處。在過去的 10 年裡，我們的第六街業務和 TPG 都經過深思熟慮和富有成效的方式成長和發展。同樣，我們與 TPG 的關係也是如此。我和第六街的合夥人一直在與 TPG 就我們關係發展的下一步進行一系列討論，包括選擇作為獨立組織運營，同時 TPG 繼續保留第六街業務的少數股權。

Given Sixth Street's scale, sector expertise, market presence, and the fact that we have already been operating autonomously, a potential next phase as an independent organization is going to be business as usual. For TSLX, there would be no changes to the dedicated management personnel of our business and our shareholders will continue to benefit from the same sourcing, underwriting and operational capabilities of the platform they have experienced with TSLX since inception.

考慮到第六街的規模、行業專業知識、市場影響力以及我們已經自主運作的事實，作為獨立組織的下一階段可能會照常營業。對於 TSLX 而言，我們業務的專門管理人員不會發生變化，我們的股東將繼續受益於他們自成立以來在 TSLX 所經歷的相同的採購、承銷和營運能力。

As of today, no formal agreement has been finalized, and there's no guarantee that one will be reached. In either case, it will be business as usual for us. Those who know us know that our North Star is always to make decisions in the best interest of our shareholders.

截至今天，尚未敲定正式協議，也不能保證一定會達成。無論哪種情況，我們都會一切如常。了解我們的人都知道，我們的北極星始終以股東的最佳利益為出發點來做決策。

With that, I'd like to thank you, and your continued interest and for your time today. Operator, please open up the line for questions.

在此，我要感謝您以及您持續的關注和今天抽出寶貴的時間。接線員，請開通提問線。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question comes from Rick Shane with JPMorgan.

（操作員指示）我們的第一個問題來自摩根大通的 Rick Shane。

Josh, you partially addressed my first question in your final comments related to the separation of Sixth Street from TPG. But I am curious, do you think -- one of the things that has worked well at TSLX over the years is good response to incentives. Do you think your incentives are going to change as you separate from TS -- from TPG?

喬希，您在最後評論中部分回答了我關於第六街與 TPG 分離的第一個問題。但我很好奇，您是否認為 - 多年來 TSLX 運作良好的事情之一就是對激勵措施的良好反應。您認為當您從 TS 或 TPG 離職後，您的激勵措施會改變嗎？

Rick, thanks for that question. I think we're both on the same time schedule, which is pretty early in the morning, so excuse if, and I'm having a little bit of the cold. Look, the incentives remain exactly the same. All the team's economic grew based in the Sixth Street business. And the focus of the team has always been able to create long-term value for both our private LPs and our public shareholders. And we effectively had very limited economics coming from the activities across the firm. So I think the incentives remain exactly the same and actually probably a little bit stronger on a go-forward basis if we come to a conclusion that we're going to operate as independent entities. But it's basically business as usual and the focus was again, has always been, if you take care of your shareholder, you take care of your private LP, everything else kind of falls in place. Focus on your client, focus on your customer.

里克，謝謝你提出這個問題。我想我們的時間安排是一樣的，而且都是一大早，所以請原諒，而且我有點感冒。看，激勵措施仍然完全相同。球隊的所有經濟成長都以第六街業務為基礎。團隊的重點始終是能夠為我們的私人有限合夥人和公眾股東創造長期價值。事實上，我們從整個公司的活動中獲得的經濟效益非常有限。因此，我認為激勵措施仍然完全相同，而且如果我們得出我們將作為獨立實體運作的結論，那麼在未來的基礎上實際上可能會更強一些。但基本上一切如常，焦點始終是，如果你照顧好你的股東，照顧好你的私人有限合夥人，其他一切都會到位。專注於你的客戶，專注於你的客戶。

Got it. And then sort of on a more portfolio-related question. When we look at the portfolio on a year-over-year basis, of the top 10 investments today for our new investments, 2 of those being ABLs, which typically are shorter -- have a shorter time on the balance sheet. Is that the type of rotation that we should continue to expect on an ongoing basis? And the reason I asked that is that as you -- as the company continues to scale, do you expect to do slightly larger transactions and drive a higher rotation of that top 10?

知道了。然後是一個與投資組合更相關的問題。當我們逐年檢視投資組合時，在今天新投資的前 10 項投資中，其中 2 項是 ABL，通常較短，在資產負債表上的時間也較短。這是我們應該持續期待的輪換類型嗎？我問這個問題的原因是，隨著公司不斷擴大規模，您是否期望進行稍大的交易並推動前 10 名的輪換率更高？

Yes. Those are very good questions. So I -- let me break it down. I think there's been a -- part of our late cycle focus has always been -- you can manage to be in the late cycle, on our mind, kind of 4 different ways. One is move up the capital structure. The second is be in defensive industries where you have sources of repayment that are not related to the economic cycle. The third is to create more diversity in your portfolio. And the fourth is to have run lower balance sheet leverage. So I think the -- we've created year-over-year a lot more diversity in our top 10 investments. And you'll also see things that have less correlation to the economic cycle. And that could be things that have strong secondary sources of repayment from asset values that are not related to the economic cycle or shorter-duration investments. So I think that will be a continued theme for us on managing how we think about beating the late cycle. So I don't know if I answered your question, I hope I did.

是的。這些都是非常好的問題。所以我——讓我來分解一下。我認為，我們後期週期重點的一部分一直是——在我們看來，你可以透過四種不同的方式設法進入後期週期。一是資本結構升級。第二個是防禦性產業，您的還款來源與經濟週期無關。第三是讓你的投資組合更加多元化。第四是降低資產負債表槓桿比率。所以我認為，我們的十大投資逐年創造了更多的多樣性。您還會看到與經濟週期相關性較小的事情。這可能是那些具有與經濟週期或短期投資無關的資產價值的強大次要還款來源的東西。因此，我認為這將是我們管理如何戰勝後期週期的一個持續主題。所以我不知道我是否回答了你的問題，我希望我回答了。

No, you did. I mean, I think I would have, in some ways, expected greater concentration of new investments in the top 10, typically, that sort of ratchets up over time. But I was, in part, curious if it was not increasing is a function of that sort of late cycle depends more defensive approach?

不，你做到了。我的意思是，我認為在某種程度上，我預計新投資會更加集中在前十名中，通常情況下，這種情況會隨著時間的推移而逐漸增加。但我部分地好奇，如果它沒有增加，是否是那種後期週期依賴更多防禦方法的函數？

That is correct.

那是對的。

Correct.

正確的。

Our next question comes from Fin O'Shea with Wells Fargo.

我們的下一個問題來自富國銀行的 Fin O'Shea。

Just a couple on portfolio names. I'll start with a small investment, AvidXchange, which was recapitalized this quarter, you're in the debt and equity now. But can you give context on how this fits into your platform structure? There was a post quarter announcement that you led a funding round. I don't know if that news was in January. I don't know if that was the same deal. But I'm mainly asking in the purpose of, is this a name that sort of migrates to your -- from the debt platform to the capital solutions strategy?

只是投資組合名稱上的幾個。我將從一項小額投資 AvidXchange 開始，該投資於本季度進行了資本重組，現在您處於債務和股權之中。但您能否介紹一下它如何適應您的平台結構？季度後宣布您領導了一輪融資。不知道這個消息是不是一月的。我不知道這是否是同一筆交易。但我主要問的目的是，這個名稱是否會遷移到您的—從債務平台到資本解決方案策略？

Yes. Fin, let me start off first with the industry, and then I'll put -- I'll turn it over to Bo to talk about the investment. So AvidXchange, we've been around, I guess, probably from 4 or 5 years. It fits squarely in our theme of B2B payment and payment ecosystems. So it provides -- it's a company that has an ecosystem that provides payments across that ecosystem, mostly in property management -- in the property management sector. So it fits squarely in our theme. The business has continued to grow significantly. It has -- it continues to reinvest and grow at a significant rate. The latest investment we did quite frankly, was -- had a larger -- we have a larger structured equity investment. And so we derisked because it was less appropriate to fit inside the TSLX platform. In that series of transactions where they raised junior equity to our structured equity, they also redeemed us out of our original equity investment. I'll turn it over to Bo, if I missed anything.

是的。Fin，讓我先從行業開始，然後我會把它交給 Bo 來談論投資。所以 AvidXchange，我猜我們已經存在了 4 到 5 年了。它完全符合我們 B2B 支付和支付生態系統的主題。因此，它是一家擁有生態系統的公司，可以在整個生態系統中提供支付服務，主要是在物業管理領域。所以它完全符合我們的主題。該業務持續大幅成長。它繼續進行再投資並以顯著的速度成長。坦白說，我們最近進行的投資是——規模更大——我們擁有更大的結構性股權投資。因此我們避免了風險，因為它不太適合安裝在 TSLX 平台中。在這一系列交易中，他們將初級股權提高到我們的結構性股權，他們也贖回了我們原來的股權投資。如果我遺漏了什麼，我會把它交給 Bo。

No. I think you touched on everything. This has been a long-term relationship and part of the theme that we've been pursuing over the last 5 years in the emergence of B2B payments. You picked up the announcement of the -- there was the junior capital raise, a series F raise of $125 million in late December in addition to our debt and our pref solution. So that's what was picked up in the press.

不。我認為你觸及了一切。這是一種長期關係，也是我們在過去 5 年 B2B 支付出現過程中一直追求的主題的一部分。你看到了關於初級資本籌集的公告，除了我們的債務和我們的首選解決方案之外，12 月底還有 1.25 億美元的 F 輪融資。這就是媒體報道的內容。

Okay. Thanks for the context on that. And some -- a question on Forever 21 being an ABL. That's a very rich spread you attained. And I think as we speak, it might have been paid off, given the acquisition of the brand by strategics. But can you give us context on was that -- given we don't see an ABL spread that deep these days? How much of that was for just the short amount of time you would hold it? Or the risk of going probably a deep stretch second lien ABL, for example?

好的。感謝您提供相關背景。還有一些關於 Forever 21 是否屬於 ABL 的問題。這是您獲得的非常豐富的傳播。我認為，正如我們所說，考慮到透過策略收購該品牌，它可能已經得到了回報。但您能否為我們介紹相關背景——鑑於目前我們沒有看到 ABL 傳播那麼深？其中有多少是你持有的短暫時間？或者，例如，可能會存在進一步延長第二留置權 ABL 的風險？

Yes. So great question. And Forever 21, I would say is, at this point, 97%, 98% resolved. But I'll walk through it. So first of all, you can't eat IRR. And people don't understand when I say that. But look, if you hold -- if you have a 30% IRR and you it hold for a day, you really have no MOM to compensate you for a risk to the downside. So the spread was to compensate for a minimum return, given that we were actually allocating real capital to the situation.

是的。很好的問題。而 Forever 21，我想說的是，在這一點上，97%、98% 已經解決了。但我會逐步介紹它。所以首先，你不能吃IRR。當我這麼說時，人們不明白。但看，如果你持有——如果你有 30% 的 IRR 並且持有一天，你真的沒有 MOM 來補償你的下行風險。因此，考慮到我們實際上是在根據情況分配實際資本，價差是為了補償最低迴報。

It was a DIP financing, and where our thesis was, you had asset value in the brand, you had 2 core real estate warehouses in the center of LA that we thought were very, very valuable and that we had a real view on and then you had the inventory. What I would say is, Forever 21, if you -- it's pretty well noted in the press, had a very, very rocky December. We -- as of December 31, we actually had kept our mark basically consistent with our -- with the cost basis versus what you would have expected, you would have expected it to migrate up to the -- effectively the call price or call plus the exit fee. That would obviously -- we will get our exit fee, and we would get all of our economics. And in retrospect, that mark was very conservative, but it was a very difficult December for the company. But look, our thesis was, it was a little bit too big to fail. It was one of the biggest rent payers in the mall ecosystem. I think the Calvin Centers was 2.5% or 2%, 2.5% of the rents. And so it was a little bit too big to fail, that it had a real brand name and then it had real underlying asset value in the form of inventory and real estate. As of yesterday, with the proceeds, we have about $9 million outstanding against a real estate property that's basically under contract for, I think, $19.5 million. So again, it's basically resolved. But in December, it was -- we had a very conservative mark. And again, it goes to the expertise of our platform of understanding component parts of underlying asset values of these companies.

這是一次 DIP 融資，我們的論點是，你的品牌擁有資產價值，你在洛杉磯市中心擁有 2 個核心房地產倉庫，我們認為它們非常非常有價值，並且我們對此有真正的看法，然後你有庫存。我想說的是，《Forever 21》，如果你——媒體已經充分報道過，度過了一個非常非常不穩定的 12 月。截至 12 月 31 日，我們實際上保持了我們的標記與我們的成本基礎與您的預期基本一致，您會預期它會遷移到有效的看漲期權價格或看漲期權加值退出費。顯然，我們將獲得退出費，並且我們將獲得所有經濟利益。回想起來，這個數字非常保守，但對公司來說這是一個非常困難的 12 月。但是看，我們的論點是，它有點太大而不能失敗。它是購物中心生態系統中最大的租金支付者之一。我認為卡爾文中心的租金是2.5%或2%、2.5%。所以它有點太大而不能倒，它有一個真正的品牌名稱，然後它以庫存和房地產的形式擁有真正的基礎資產價值。截至昨天，我們還有約 900 萬美元的未償付款，而該房地產的合約價格基本上為 1,950 萬美元。如此一來，基本上就解決了。但在 12 月，我們的表現非常保守。再說一次，這取決於我們平台的專業知識，了解這些公司的基礎資產價值的組成部分。

Our next question comes from Mickey Schleien with Ladenburg.

我們的下一個問題來自拉登堡的米奇·施萊恩 (Mickey Schleien)。

And Josh, thanks for getting up early and battling through your cold. I wanted to ask a high-level question. To what extent do you believe the volatility in the more liquid loan markets may benefit your direct lending platform going forward, given that we're hearing more and more borrowers are migrating away from BSL toward direct lending?

喬什，謝謝你早起並與感冒作鬥爭。我想問一個高層次的問題。鑑於我們聽說越來越多的借款人正在從 BSL 轉向直接貸款，您認為流動性更強的貸款市場的波動在多大程度上可能有利於您的直接貸款平台的發展？

Yes. So it's a great question, Mickey. Look, I think that the -- I would start off by saying that the -- there's been some volatility in the broadly syndicated market, that the broadly syndicated markets have been really differentiated by the have and have nots. That, that kind of reversed course, so the correlations were no longer one across credit spreads. That's reversed course a little bit. And there's -- the correlations are getting tighter. My deep overall concern is that for the industry, is that, given where the industry sits on the cost curve, i.e., when you look they're -- our base management fees and our incentive fees, that we better be a little careful or better be a lot careful of being a pure substitute to the broadly syndicated market, where people can access the broadly syndicated market at 50 basis -- 25 to 50 basis points through a closed-end fund or a CLO structure and us effectively creating the same risk/return and -- because we sit so much higher on the cost curve. This has actually been a theme for me, Mickey, that you and I have discussed probably now over 5 or 6 years, which was my problem with TICC, which was they basically bought broadly syndicated loans and bought other people's CLO equity and didn't manufacture their own and so where they sell in the cost curve, they were basically taking $1 and destroying the $1 -- providing something less than $1 value to their shareholders given where they sit on the cost curve. So my hope is that if the industry will see volatility as a way to create solutions and certainty and get paid for that, providing that certainty to issuers if the industry is effectively substituting and providing the same risk/reward at higher on the cost curve, the industry is going to be in deep trouble.

是的。所以這是一個很好的問題，米奇。聽著，我認為——我首先要說——廣泛的銀團市場存在一些波動，廣泛的銀團市場確實因有者和無者而有所不同。那是一種相反的過程，因此信用利差之間的相關性不再存在。這有點顛倒了方向。而且相關性正變得越來越緊密。我深切的總體擔憂是，對於這個行業來說，考慮到該行業在成本曲線上的位置，即，當你看它們時——我們的基本管理費和激勵費，我們最好小心一點，或者最好要非常小心，不要成為廣泛銀團市場的純粹替代品，人們可以透過封閉式基金或CLO 結構以50 個基點——25 至50 個基點進入廣泛銀團市場，而我們有效地創建了相同的市場風險/回報－因為我們的成本曲線要高得多。這實際上是我的一個主題，米奇，你和我可能已經討論了超過5 或6 年了，這是我對TICC 的問題，他們基本上購買了廣泛的銀團貸款併購買了其他人的CLO 股權，但沒有他們自己製造，所以在成本曲線上銷售的地方，他們基本上拿走了1 美元並銷毀了1 美元——考慮到他們在成本曲線上的位置，為股東提供了低於1 美元的價值。因此，我的希望是，如果該行業將波動視為創造解決方案和確定性的一種方式，並為此獲得報酬，如果該行業有效地替代並在成本曲線上的較高位置提供相同的風險/回報，則為發行人提供這種確定性，這個行業將陷入深深的麻煩。

I understand. And I thank you for that color. That's really helpful. Josh, your firm is well-known for doing deep dives on a sector basis and obviously, with some particular specialties. I'm curious to understand what you're thinking in terms of the alternative energy sector. We get -- everybody talks about oil and gas and how out of favor it is, but there's a flip side, obviously, as to what's going to replace that. So are there borrowers in that space that are of the right size, with the right balance sheets and cash flow profiles that are starting to look interesting to you?

我明白。我感謝你給我這種顏色。這真的很有幫助。喬什，您的公司以在行業基礎上進行深入研究而聞名，顯然，還有一些特定的專業。我很想了解您對替代能源領域的想法。我們知道——每個人都在談論石油和天然氣，以及它是如何失寵的，但顯然，還有一個反面，即什麼將取代它。那麼，該領域是否有規模合適、資產負債表和現金流狀況合適的借款人，這些都讓您開始感興趣？

Yes. So good question. So as you -- I think you're exactly right. I think there's going to be quite frankly, given the disruption in energy and how much capital has been destroyed and upstream E&P and quite frankly, the demand probably for traditional carbon products is going down. There's going to be opportunity for people who have deep knowledge of where asset sit on the cost curve, what their decline is, what their unit economics are. There's going to be opportunity, given the lack of capital of the industry, the energy industry will attract over time for people who earn that excess return.

是的。好問題。所以對你來說——我認為你是完全正確的。坦白說，我認為考慮到能源的破壞以及上游勘探與生產的資本被破壞，坦白說，對傳統碳產品的需求可能正在下降。對於那些深入了解資產在成本曲線上的位置、資產的下降程度以及單位經濟效益的人來說，將有機會。鑑於該行業缺乏資本，能源產業將有機會吸引那些賺取超額回報的人。

As it relates to the alternative energy space, the answer -- we actually have a very -- we have a great team sitting in New York, focused -- on alt energy and infrastructure projects. On energy, they typically fit better in a private fund format because they typically -- we're typically buying assets or cash flow from assets versus lending to corporate borrowers. And so we've done a lot of stuff in renewables in Spain and Italy, where there's take-or-pay contracts. And so they typically have not fit the typical corporate loan that is required under the '40 Act as a good asset. And they've typically taken another form, which is buying -- (inaudible) the cash flows or buying asset with little or no merchant risk. That being said, we have the expertise. And so if a corporate loan does pop up, that will be a great opportunity for us. But your instincts, again, are, I think, are right. I think, generally, the energy space is a little bit of a mess. Started back in 2015, I guess, but it's continued. Most borrowers in it restructure enough, people got the decline curve wrong. Demand for carbon products are going down, the equity markets and high-yield markets have felt burned. And then you have the emerging disruptive technologies in alt energy. And so I think over a period of time, that it can be a unique spot for us to take the expertise of our platform and create value. That being said, we have -- you have some commodity price risk. And so we're going to be very careful when we do that.

因為它涉及替代能源領域，答案是——我們實際上有一個非常——我們在紐約有一個很棒的團隊，專注於——替代能源和基礎設施項目。在能源方面，它們通常更適合私募基金形式，因為它們通常是購買資產或從資產中獲取現金流，而不是向企業借款人提供貸款。因此，我們在西班牙和義大利的再生能源領域做了很多工作，那裡有照付不議的合約。因此，它們通常不符合「40 法案」所要求的典型企業貸款作為良好資產的要求。他們通常採取另一種形式，即購買（聽不清楚）現金流或購買商業風險很小或沒有的資產。話雖如此，我們擁有專業知識。因此，如果企業貸款確實出現，這對我們來說將是一個很好的機會。但我認為你的直覺是正確的。我認為，總的來說，能量空間有點混亂。我猜從 2015 年就開始了，但現在還在繼續。大多數借款人重組得足夠多，但人們弄錯了下降曲線。對碳產品的需求正在下降，股票市場和高收益市場受到了傷害。然後是替代能源領域新興的顛覆性技術。因此，我認為在一段時間內，它可以成為我們利用我們平台的專業知識並創造價值的獨特場所。話雖如此，我們仍然面臨一些商品價格風險。因此，我們在這樣做時會非常小心。

And if I could just finish with a couple of sort of housekeeping questions. Just to gauge risk in the portfolio, can you give us a sense of what the portfolio's average debt-to-EBITDA ratio is?

如果我能回答一些內務問題就好了。為了衡量投資組合的風險，您能否讓我們了解投資組合的平均負債與 EBITDA 比率是多少？

Yes. I think, Bo covered in the prepared remarks, I think it's gone down year-over-year. So our last -- on average, our last dollar attachment point is 4.2x. That compares to that on average last year of 4.5x. On an interest coverage basis, it's, I think, also got better, that's effectively -- and I'm getting exact numbers. I think it was 3.2x this year compared to 2.8x last year. I mean, and some of that, quite frankly, is earnings -- a mix between areas growth and continue to be having an accommodative Fed.

是的。我認為，博在準備好的演講中提到，我認為它比去年同期有所下降。因此，我們最後的——平均而言，我們最後的美元附著點是 4.2 倍。相比之下，去年的平均成長率為 4.5 倍。我認為，在利息覆蓋率的基礎上，它也變得更好，這是有效的——而且我得到了確切的數字。我認為今年是 3.2 倍，而去年是 2.8 倍。我的意思是，坦白說，其中一些是收益——領域成長和聯準會繼續寬鬆之間的結合。

Okay. And lastly, maybe for Ian. Just at a high level, Ian, on a portfolio company basis, what were the main drivers of the realized loss and the unrealized gains this quarter?

好的。最後，也許對伊恩來說。伊恩，從較高的層面來看，在投資組合公司的基礎上，本季已實現虧損和未實現收益的主要驅動因素是什麼？

On the unrealized, there was (inaudible) there's no major driver. It's -- I don't want to describe it as cats and dogs, but there's probably about 12 names that contribute to that overall. So nothing specific stands out. It was small realized gain on a liquid name that we had, but it's less than half a penny. There's really nothing major to highlight.

在未實現的情況下，（聽不清楚）沒有主要驅動因素。我不想將其描述為貓和狗，但大概有 12 個名字可以概括這一點。所以沒有什麼具體的突出之處。我們擁有的流動性名稱的實現收益很小，但還不到半美分。確實沒有什麼值得強調的重大內容。

Yes. I mean, look, I think Curriculum, which I think has publicly announced that it got refinanced in Q1, so that the mark was basically up to the call price, that was $0.02. But there was nothing that would contribute more than $0.02 on a single basis.

是的。我的意思是，看，我認為 Curriculum 已經公開宣佈在第一季進行了再融資，因此該價格基本上達到了贖回價格，即 0.02 美元。但單次捐款不會超過 0.02 美元。

Right.

正確的。

And that's also the case with the realized loss?

已實現損失也是如此嗎？

Yes.

是的。

Our next question comes from Chris York with JMP Securities.

我們的下一個問題來自 JMP 證券公司的 Chris York。

This one maybe for Ian. So "other income" was a record this quarter. Can you break down some of the drivers there? Whether that was led by higher structuring or syndication piece?

這可能是給伊恩的。因此，本季「其他營收」創歷史新高。你能分解那裡的一些驅動程式嗎？這是否是由更高的結構或聯合組織主導的？

Yes. So we actually didn't have any syndication fees in the quarter, Chris. And I'll just give you a little bit of context. If you look at our, call it, activity-based fee, so accelerated OID from prepayments, which there wasn't that much of this quarter. And obviously, we didn't have that many prepayments in general. If you look at that plus syndication fees, which was zero and then our other income. Collectively, those items were $0.14 per share for the quarter. If I look at what those items collectively have been over the last 4 years, the average has also been $0.14 per share. So in aggregate, we're basically the same as what we've experienced historically. In the "other income" items this particular quarter, it was really driven by an amendment that I think was known to the market with Ferrellgas, and then we had a couple of other items that we're calling them "work fees" because they indulge some service and input on our part that drove that other income line.

是的。所以克里斯，我們實際上在本季沒有任何联合費用。我只會向您提供一些背景資訊。如果你看看我們的基於活動的費用，那麼預付款加速了 OID，而本季的預付款並不多。顯然，我們總體上沒有那麼多預付款。如果你看一下，加上銀團費用，這是零，然後是我們的其他收入。總的來說，本季這些項目的每股收益為 0.14 美元。如果我看看過去 4 年這些項目的總價值，平均價格也是每股 0.14 美元。所以總的來說，我們與歷史上經歷的情況基本上相同。在這個特定季度的“其他收入”項目中，它實際上是由Ferrellgas 的一項修正案推動的，我認為該修正案為市場所熟知，然後我們還有其他一些項目，我們將其稱為“工作費”，因為它們我們提供了一些服務和投入，從而推動了其他收入線的發展。

Very helpful. I noticed that you did put in the K that it was an amendment fee. So how much was that amendment fee, specifically in the fourth quarter?

很有幫助。我注意到你確實輸入了K，這是修改費。那麼修改費是多少，特別是在第四季？

Look, Ferrell is a publicly traded company. I don't want to get into details. I think the total "other income" is dollar-wise...

看，Ferrell 是一家上市公司。我不想透露細節。我認為“其他收入”總額是按美元計算的...

It was $7 million.

這是 700 萬美元。

It was $7 million, and Ferrell was, it was a smallish piece of that. So -- but people should look at the Ferrell K or their public reporting and what they disclose.

這是 700 萬美元，而費雷爾是，這只是其中的一小部分。所以——但是人們應該看看 Ferrell K 或他們的公開報告以及他們披露的內容。

Got it. Okay. And then in your prepared remarks, you said that some of your decision to issue a special dividend this year was driven by expected gains, I think, in maybe the first half of this year. Does that include Ferrellgas or Curriculum? Or what are the specific drivers there?

知道了。好的。然後，在您準備好的演講中，您說，今年發放特別股息的部分決定是受到預期收益的推動，我認為，也許是今年上半年的收益。這包括 Ferrellgas 或課程嗎？或者說具體的驅動因素是什麼？

Let's take a -- if we take a step back, and I'm going to turn this over to Ian because I'm not the greatest tax person, but I do kind of play one every once a while. We had about $1.60 per share in undistributed income. And the -- we barely made -- and by the way, this is all manageable. But our tax year ends in March, and we were -- basically only had about $1.8 million or $2 million of room against the minimum distribution requirement of $0.90 -- 90%. And so -- and again, that could have been -- that's all solvable and would have been solved. But if you look forward at where our base dividend is and where our kind of recurring special -- no, we don't call them special...

讓我們退一步，我會把這個交給伊恩，因為我不是最偉大的稅務人員，但我確實每隔一段時間就會玩一次。我們每股未分配收入約為 1.60 美元。而且——我們幾乎沒有做到——順便說一句，這一切都是可控的。但我們的納稅年度於 3 月結束，而我們基本上只有大約 180 萬美元或 200 萬美元的空間，而最低分配要求為 0.90 美元，佔 90%。所以——再說一次，這本來是可能的——這一切都是可以解決的，而且本來就可以解決。但如果你期待我們的基本股息在哪裡以及我們的經常性特別股息在哪裡——不，我們不稱它們為特別股息…

Supplemental.

補充。

Supplemental dividends are, through the year, effectively, on an accrual basis in Q1, we would have been out of compliance with the minimum distribution requirements. Now we have until March '20 to March '21 to solve that. But on an accrual basis, we would no longer be -- and that's a function of both net investment income and cap gains. And so that played a big part of it, which is we knew we are going to have to make a large special dividend by March '20, '21. It was known, we're on an effective accrual basis, we would have been out of compliance in Q1. We barely made it. And in Q -- for this tax year. So that's one piece of it. The second piece of it is that the excise tax was continuing to grow and continuing to burden shareholder returns and was just a pure friction cost. And so we were able to minimize -- we basically are reducing that by 1/3 on a pro forma basis. And that will grow again, quite frankly. But we're reducing that by 1/3. And so -- and then the third piece of it was that, there is capital efficiency in that we're saving -- we're effectively reducing our equity and that has an associated cost of capital and borrowing, which has an associated cost of capital that's a lot less. And so when you put all those 3 things together, which is, we knew we were going to have to be in compliance on a RIC basis in 2021. We knew we weren't going to be in compliance in 2021, that the -- that this is actually on a net income basis accretive because you're saving the excise tax, you're saving a little bit of management fee, given that you go into the break, which has been reduced by interest expense, and reduced by a little bit of incentive fee, but it's positive about $0.01 a share on a net income basis given the excise tax. And you're generating higher ROEs, it seems like, although it was not consistent with the past actions, the fact that, that -- the fact that circumstances have changed.

全年的補充股息實際上是在第一季按權責發生製計算的，如果我們不遵守最低分配要求。現在我們需要在 20 日至 21 日之間解決這個問題。但在權責發生製基礎上，我們將不再是──這是淨投資收入和上限收益的函數。因此，這發揮了重要作用，我們知道我們將必須在 21 年 3 月 20 日之前派發大量特別股息。眾所周知，我們採用有效的權責發生製為基礎，我們在第一季就會不合規。我們勉強做到了。在 Q 中－本納稅年度。這就是其中的一部分。第二個問題是，消費稅持續成長，並持續為股東回報帶來負擔，這只是純粹的摩擦成本。因此，我們能夠最大限度地減少——我們基本上在預計的基礎上將其減少了 1/3。坦白說，這一數字將會再次成長。但我們正在將其減少 1/3。因此，第三點是，我們正在儲蓄，從而提高了資本效率，我們有效地減少了我們的股本，這會帶來相關的資本和借貸成本，而這會帶來相關的資本成本和借貸成本。資本就少了很多。因此，當你將所有這三件事放在一起時，我們知道我們必須在 2021 年遵守 RIC 的要求。我們知道我們不會在 2021 年遵守規定，這實際上是在淨利潤的基礎上增加的，因為你節省了消費稅，你節省了一點管理費，考慮到你進入休息期，利息支出減少了，並減少了一點激勵費，但考慮到消費稅，每股淨利潤約為0.01 美元。你正在產生更高的股本回報率，儘管這與過去的行動不一致，但事實是，情況已經改變了。

That color is extremely helpful. And Josh, you played the role well as a RIC expert.

這種顏色非常有幫助。Josh，你很好地扮演了 RIC 專家的角色。

Did I miss anything, Ian?

我錯過了什麼嗎，伊恩？

Well, the only thing I would add, Chris, and we read your report that came out last night, and you referenced the growth in undistributed income year-over-year. And I think that was actually pretty good as a way to think about one of the inputs into how we sized the special dividend. So this time last year, our undistributed income was, we estimated at about $1.22. Fast forward a year, we're now at $1.60. So there's $0.38 of growth over that period. So that was one of the inputs into how we sized it. Josh referenced the potential to save excise tax, which was important to us because that's the amount that's lost to the system. And then we're also very focused on preserving NAV. And so the other way we thought about sizing of specials, they looked at our year-on-year growth that we had achieved through operating results in 2019. We backed off the impact of the swaps with the tailwind that we got from mark-to-market movements in the swaps. So that sort of triangulated to a $0.50 special dividend. So that's what we're thinking behind it as we had discussions with the Board.

好吧，我唯一要補充的是，克里斯，我們閱讀了您昨晚發布的報告，您提到了未分配收入的同比增長。我認為這實際上是一種很好的方式來思考我們如何調整特別股息的投入之一。所以去年這個時候，我們估計我們的未分配收入約為 1.22 美元。快進一年，我們現在的價格為 1.60 美元。因此，在此期間增長了 0.38 美元。所以這是我們如何調整規模的輸入之一。喬許提到了節省消費稅的潛力，這對我們很重要，因為這是系統損失的金額。然後我們也非常注重保護資產淨值。因此，我們以另一種方式考慮特價商品的規模，他們則著眼於我們透過 2019 年的經營業績實現的同比增長。我們利用掉期的以市價變動帶來的順風，抵銷了掉期的影響。這樣就可以得到 0.50 美元的特別股息。這就是我們與董事會討論時的想法。

Sure. Makes a lot of sense. I was just trying to -- I mean, when I was looking at undistributed income growth, the comments you had in the prepared remarks were just what I was focused on.

當然。很有道理。我只是想——我的意思是，當我在研究未分配的收入成長時，你在準備好的評論中的評論正是我所關注的。

So I'll switch gears. The last one was on your potential separation agreement. So I think investors had generally thought the BDC and then TSSP had received some halo benefits from its association with TPG. So given the recent change at the adviser with TPG, why would it be wrong for investors to think either the informational advantages or maybe even the future capital raising with LPs who seem to be consolidating relationships could be impacted going forward?

所以我要換個方向。最後一份是關於你們潛在的分居協議的。因此，我認為投資者普遍認為 BDC 和隨後的 TSSP 從與 TPG 的合作中獲得了一些光環好處。因此，考慮到 TPG 顧問最近的變化，為什麼投資者認為資訊優勢甚至與似乎正在鞏固關係的有限合夥人的未來融資可能會受到影響的想法是錯誤的？

Yes. Look, I mean, I think if there was a halo benefit, if you look back 9 years ago, today, the TSSP platform is $33 billion of AUM. These conversations -- we had conversations, obviously, with our private LPs. They've known about the changing relationship over the last 9 years. When we started the business, there was 10 people. Today, there's 250 people. We've built out industry expertise. We haven't relied on the firm for any informational advantages for years. So I don't -- again, I think it's business as usual. That cap, again, all I want to say that nothing is done, but it was in the press. And surely, that -- our revolver lenders, the amendment was done post to being in press, the revolving lenders didn't care, our cost of capital didn't changed. We did a tap on the bond deal, our cost of capital didn't change, quite frankly, went down, and so it is -- and it's been very well-known in both the LP market and I think with our shareholders, this has really been a JV controlled by the TSSP/Sixth Street Partners and managed, nobody has ever sat our investment committee, nobody's ever referred the deal to us in the BDC. And so it is really just business as usual.

是的。你看，我的意思是，我認為如果有光環效益的話，如果你回顧 9 年前，今天，TSSP 平台的 AUM 是 330 億美元。這些對話——顯然，我們與我們的私人有限合夥人進行了對話。他們知道過去九年來關係的變化。剛開始創業的時候，有10個人。今天，有 250 人。我們已經累積了行業專業知識。多年來我們一直沒有依賴該公司獲得任何資訊優勢。所以我不——再說一遍，我認為一切照舊。那個帽子，我想說的是，什麼也沒做，但已經在媒體上報道了。當然，我們的循環貸款人，修正案是在印刷後完成的，循環貸款人並不關心，我們的資本成本沒有改變。我們進行了債券交易，我們的資本成本沒有改變，坦率地說，下降了，所以它是 - 而且它在有限合夥人市場上非常眾所周知，我認為我們的股東，這實際上是一家由TSSP/Sixth Street Partners 控制和管理的合資企業，沒有人參加過我們的投資委員會，也沒有人在BDC 中向我們推薦過該交易。所以一切都一切如常。

Yes, it's a good answer. And obviously, your comments on the debt capital mitigate our concerns there. So good perspective. Last one, just following up on that. So I know the fee was very nominal, but -- and the separation agreement is pending right now. But will there be a suspension of the licensing fee to TPG for the use of your name, would that expire?

是的，這是一個很好的答案。顯然，您對債務資本的評論減輕了我們的擔憂。這麼好的視角。最後一篇，只是跟進。所以我知道這筆費用只是像徵性的，但是——而且分居協議目前正在懸而未決。但是，TPG 使用您的名字的許可費是否會暫停，會過期嗎？

Yes. So there is -- look, again, there is no -- there hasn't been any actual fees related to the "TPG" in specialty lending. So -- and that either the management company has paid or the shareholders have paid, obviously. On a go-forward basis, I think to be determined, but quite frankly, it's really Sixth Street Partners branded business, Sixth Street Partners managed business, and again, there hasn't been a deal. We haven't come to a deal about what that would play.

是的。所以，再一次看，沒有——專業貸款中沒有任何與「TPG」相關的實際費用。因此，顯然，要么管理公司已經付款，要么股東已經付款。在未來的基礎上，我認為有待確定，但坦白說，這實際上是第六街合作夥伴的品牌業務，第六街合作夥伴管理的業務，而且，還沒有達成任何交易。我們還沒有就該播放什麼內容達成一致。

Our next question comes from Kenneth Lee with RBC Capital.

我們的下一個問題來自 RBC Capital 的 Kenneth Lee。

Wondering if you could talk about the key factors driving the -- you mentioned an increase in the potential earnings power that is supporting the increase in the base quarterly dividends this year? And how much of that would be dependent on any movement within the LIBOR rates?

想知道您是否可以談談推動這一趨勢的關鍵因素——您提到了支持今年基本季度股息增加的潛在盈利能力的增加？其中有多少取決於 LIBOR 利率的變動？

Yes, it's a good question. So first of all, let's take a step back. I don't think -- the increase in the dividend from $0.39 to $0.41 is more of a resetting what the dividend should have been years back. I think on a -- last year in supplemental dividends, we paid out $0.19. And so there was -- and by the way, and we grew NAV even though we paid out $0.19. And so if you divide to simple math $0.19/4, that's what, $0.047, $0.046 a quarter, and on $0.39. And so the business last year, which was slightly a little bit of a higher LIBOR environment, would have supported with still growing NAV a -- basically a dividend around $0.44 to $0.45 per share.

是的，這是一個好問題。首先，讓我們退後一步。我不認為股息從 0.39 美元增加到 0.41 美元更多的是重置幾年前應有的股息。我認為去年我們支付了 0.19 美元的補充股息。順便說一下，儘管我們支付了 0.19 美元，但資產淨值卻成長了。因此，如果您除以 0.19 美元/4 美元，即是 0.047 美元、每季 0.046 美元以及 0.39 美元。因此，去年的業務在倫敦銀行同業拆借利率(LIBOR)略高的環境下，將得到仍在增長的資產淨值a的支持——基本上每股股息約為0.44至0.45美元。

We're still overearning on top of that.

除此之外，我們仍然獲得超額收益。

With still growing NAV. So it's more a function of that the dividend was undersized for years and years and years. And then there was a change in the asset coverage ratio, which would allow for greater financial leverage, which obviously boosted ROEs. And so it's the combination of those 2 things, when we look at the -- when we look at our ability to earn the dividend or even our ability to earn the dividend with coverage, which is how we think about it, we take the dividend as a cash liability. We don't look at spot LIBOR today, we look at the forward LIBOR curve. That will be a headwind. But the earnings of a business, the -- we've already massively overearning the dividend. And so even if you walk forward a year or 2 years out and look at the spot LIBOR curve, you still feel very good about the newly sized dividend for the existing earnings power of the business.

資產淨值仍在成長。因此，這更多是因為股息多年來一直偏低。然後資產覆蓋率發生了變化，這將允許更大的財務槓桿，這顯然會提高ROE。因此，這是這兩件事的結合，當我們審視我們賺取股息的能力，甚至我們賺取保險範圍股息的能力時，這就是我們的想法，我們接受股息作為現金負債。我們今天不關注即期 LIBOR，而是關注遠期 LIBOR 曲線。這將是一個逆風。但企業的獲利——我們已經大幅超額獲得了股息。因此，即使您提前一年或兩年查看即期 LIBOR 曲線，您仍然對企業現有盈利能力的新股息規模感到非常滿意。

Got you. That's very helpful. Just one follow-up, if I may. You mentioned within your prepared remarks, seeing a slight uplift in asset yields on new investments. Wondering if you could just elaborate what's driving the uplift in yields despite the movement in LIBOR rates in the quarter?

明白你了。這非常有幫助。如果可以的話，我只想做一個後續行動。您在準備好的發言中提到，新投資的資產收益率略有上升。想知道您是否可以詳細說明儘管本季度 LIBOR 利率發生變化，但推動收益率上升的因素是什麼？

Yes. Look, I think it's pretty idiosyncratic quarter-to-quarter, things bump around. So what I would say is, the overall trend of the industry continues to remain super competitive. I mean, I think, yields on new investments were 12.3% in Q4, that -- a large function of that was Forever 21 and Q3 was 10.4%, and Q2 was 11.4%, and Q1 was 10.7%. So, again, I think the -- as idiosyncratic, the industry continues to be very, very competitive. But my hope is that the industry is going to start trying to take spread back as LIBOR falls and realize that they need to provide an acceptable return given where we sit the cost structure to shareholders.

是的。聽著，我認為每個季度的情況都非常特殊，事情會改變。所以我想說的是，產業的整體趨勢持續保持超級競爭。我的意思是，我認為第四季新投資的收益率為 12.3%，其中很大一部分是 Forever 21，第三季為 10.4%，第二季為 11.4%，第一季為 10.7%。因此，我再次認為，由於行業的特殊性，該行業的競爭仍然非常非常激烈。但我希望，隨著倫敦銀行同業拆借利率（LIBOR）下跌，該行業將開始嘗試收回利差，並意識到考慮到股東的成本結構，他們需要提供可接受的回報。

Our next question comes from Robert Dodd with Raymond James.

我們的下一個問題來自羅伯特·多德和雷蒙德·詹姆斯。

My thought was exactly the point you just made, Josh, in terms of the industry -- the hope maybe the industry will try and take spread back. For lack of a better term, is it you intend to kind of put a stake in the ground on spread on your front because right now, it looks like the industry really isn't doing that. Forward curve is down, spreads don't really seem to be widening, and the broader markets are still tightening. So I mean, any color you can give us on your willingness to hold that ground if everybody else loses their minds around you, if you will?

我的想法正是你剛才提出的觀點，喬什，就產業而言——希望產業能夠嘗試恢復傳播。由於缺乏更好的術語，您是否打算在您的戰線上投入股份，因為現在看來該行業確實沒有這樣做。遠期曲線向下，利差似乎並未真正擴大，大盤仍在收緊。所以我的意思是，如果你周圍的人都失去了理智，你可以給我們什麼顏色來表明你願意堅持這個立場嗎？

Yes. Look, we're willing to give up growth for the manager and for the platform to protect shareholder economics. And the -- again, it has to work for shareholders, it has to work for private LPs. That the watch out is, is that, I think people are ignoring the forward LIBOR curve. Either they're ignoring it or they're making a bet against the forward LIBOR curve. The -- overall, the industry earnings power, if they don't take back spread is going to go down absent massive changes of leverage given the forward LIBOR curve. That, compounded with a lot of people fix their funding cost, and so that's going to compound the issue. And so you can't manage the business here. In the moment, you've got to manage the business and look at your cost of capital and look at shareholders' expectations and what the market is telling you about interest rates and your cost of funding. And quite frankly, we're positioned much better because we have LIBOR floors and floating rate -- LIBOR floors on our assets and floating rate liabilities and so at some point, if you continue to see LIBOR drift below our floors, we'll have net interest margin expansion. But I think the watch out for the industry is, people better -- people should start thinking about that forward LIBOR curve and thinking about what that means for their economic reality and overlay that into what their funding mix looks like.

是的。看，我們願意為了經理人和平台而放棄成長，以保護股東經濟。再說一遍，它必須為股東服務，必須為私人有限合夥人服務。值得注意的是，我認為人們忽略了遠期倫敦銀行間同業拆借利率(LIBOR)曲線。他們要么忽視它，要么做空遠期倫敦銀行同業拆借利率曲線。整體而言，鑑於遠期倫敦銀行同業拆借利率曲線，槓桿率沒有發生大規模變化，如果不收回利差，產業獲利能力將會下降。再加上很多人固定他們的融資成本，這將使問題變得更加複雜。所以你無法管理這裡的業務。目前，您必須管理業務並考慮您的資本成本並考慮股東的期望以及市場告訴您有關利率和融資成本的資訊。坦白說，我們的定位要好得多，因為我們有LIBOR 下限和浮動利率——我們的資產和浮動利率負債的LIBOR 下限，所以在某個時候，如果你繼續看到LIBOR 低於我們的下限，我們將淨息差擴張。但我認為該行業需要警惕的是，人們應該開始思考遠期倫敦銀行同業拆借利率曲線，思考這對他們的經濟現實意味著什麼，並將其疊加到他們的融資組合中。

Got it. I appreciate that. So one more, if I can. Sort of on the ABL side, obviously, you've got a ton of experience. The ABL brick-and-mortar problem has been going on a while. You've gotten great returns out of that. One of the newer areas of softness, if you will, I think, is in grocery food retail, things like that, where I think people thought grocery stores were more defensive and against some of the brick-and-mortar retail trends and that's not working out. Can you give us any color on your appetite to do those kind of deals, given a perishable versus nonperishable collateral, if that changes the dynamic? So if you'd be willing to look at those kind of deals?

知道了。我很感激。如果可以的話，再來一張。顯然，在 ABL 方面，您擁有豐富的經驗。ABL 實體問題已經持續了一段時間。您從中獲得了豐厚的回報。我認為，如果你願意的話，新的疲軟領域之一是雜貨食品零售，類似的事情，我認為人們認為雜貨店更具防禦性，並且針對一些實體零售趨勢，但事實並非如此鍛煉。如果這會改變動態，您能否告訴我們您對進行此類交易的興趣，考慮到易腐爛的抵押品與不易腐爛的抵押品？那麼您是否願意考慮此類交易？

Yes. So look, you're exactly right, that they -- it's a very good point. So we did Great American & Pacific Tea (sic) [Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company] back in 2014, which was a grocery store deal. And there are PACA lien considerations, typically don't impact grocery, but there are PACA lien considerations, there are also the perishable -- and so you have to be much more conservative and be more -- much more constructive in the borrowing -- in your borrowing base and how that works. Right now, we have Save-a-Lot, but that has some of those similar dynamics. But -- well, I think people didn't realize about the grocery segment was -- it was much -- it was levered to inflation, given the large fixed cost structure. And so I think people were pretty bullish on the space because they thought inflation was coming. And when you have a fixed cost structure, that's good. You've had deflation, and you've had a lot of disruptive competition. And so there will be some opportunities, but I think we'll be very careful.

是的。所以看，你是完全正確的，他們——這是一個非常好的觀點。因此，我們在 2014 年做了 Great American & Pacific Tea（原文如此）[Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company]，這是一筆雜貨店交易。還有 PACA 留置權的考慮，通常不會影響雜貨店，但有 PACA 留置權的考慮，還有易腐爛的東西——所以你必須在藉款中更加保守，更具建設性——您的借貸基礎及其運作方式。現在，我們有 Save-a-Lot，但也有一些類似的動力。但是——嗯，我認為人們沒有意識到雜貨部門——它在很大程度上——考慮到龐大的固定成本結構，它受到通貨膨脹的影響。所以我認為人們非常看好這個領域，因為他們認為通膨即將到來。當你有固定的成本結構時，那就很好了。你經歷了通貨緊縮，也經歷了許多破壞性的競爭。所以會有一些機會，但我認為我們會非常小心。

Our next question comes from Ryan Lynch with KBW.

我們的下一個問題來自 KBW 的 Ryan Lynch。

Just have a couple remaining. As part of -- at least from my understanding, as part of the partnership ending between TPG and Sixth Street. From my understanding, you guys are not able -- each of those the parties are not able to start-up competing businesses or overlapping strategies for one year. But then after that, you are free to do such. Just curious, has Sixth Street thought about once that one year clause period lapses that you guys will look to pursue other strategies besides credit?

只剩下幾個了。作為——至少從我的理解來看，作為 TPG 和第六街之間合作關係的一部分。據我了解，你們無法──每一方都無法在一年內啟動競爭業務或重疊策略。但在那之後，你就可以自由地這麼做了。只是好奇，第六街有沒有想過，一旦一年的條款期限過去，你們會尋求除信貸之外的其他策略？

Yes. And thanks, Ryan. So look, again, there's been no agreement reached. And so I know there's been stuff reported out there. I think it's a little bit premature. I think your construct is probably roughly right. I don't think this decision was driven by the desire to, for either party to expand into white space that belongs with the other party. And so I think this decision, if it does come to fruition, was just about the natural evolution and that people will have their own relationships with LPs, and people were managing their own separate businesses, and there wasn't synergies that existed any longer given the evolution of both businesses. So I think your construct was roughly right, although no agreement has been reached. I would also say that, that wasn't the primary factor of this process.

是的。謝謝，瑞安。所以，再看一次，尚未達成任何協議。所以我知道那裡有一些報導。我認為現在有點為時過早。我認為你的構造可能大致正確。我不認為這項決定是出於任何一方想要擴展到屬於另一方的空白區域的願望。因此，我認為這個決定，如果它確實實現的話，只是自然的演變，人們將與有限合夥人建立自己的關係，人們管理自己獨立的業務，並且不再存在協同效應鑑於這兩項業務的發展。所以我認為你的構想大致是正確的，儘管尚未達成一致。我還要說，這不是這個過程的主要因素。

Okay, makes sense. And then I wanted to follow up on your response to Chris' question regarding the dividend and the special dividend payment. I think you mentioned 3 reasons. One of the reasons were for paying a special dividend is that you guys were potentially going to bump up to some of these RIC payout requirements in 2021. You also mentioned that you don't love paying special dividends. So I'm curious as you guys still kept the supplemental dividend policy at a 50% payout ratio. It feels like you guys could run into the same issue, again, a year or 2 from now, as you guys have put up really strong results. So is there any consideration to increasing the supplemental payout ratio to something higher, like 75% or 100% to avoid these special dividends, which you guys said, you don't really love paying?

好吧，有道理。然後我想跟進您對克里斯關於股息和特別股息支付問題的答复。我想你提到了3個原因。支付特別股息的原因之一是，你們可能會在 2021 年達到其中一些 RIC 支付要求。您也提到您不喜歡支付特別股息。所以我很好奇你們仍然維持50%派息率的補充股利政策。感覺你們可能會在一年或兩年後再次遇到同樣的問題，因為你們已經取得了非常出色的成果。那麼有沒有考慮將補充派息率提高到更高的水平，例如75%或100%，以避免這些你們說的你們不太喜歡派發的特別股息？

Yes. Were you on our Board meeting by the way? No, I'm joking-- you, you hit it on the head, which was, look, we're only to have a RIC problem even if we had the -- running the supplemental at 75%, or we're at 100%, quite frankly, because how the supplemental was calculated was based on NII and didn't pick up realized cap gains. And so we were going to have the RIC issue no matter what. And quite frankly, on an accrual basis, although you had until 2021 to solve it, you were going to have it effectively in Q1 this year. So we did think about the other levers, increasing it to 75%. That's on the table, quite frankly, if the business continues to perform, we'll have this issue again. The excise tax kills me because it's pure friction. And so those things will continue to be on the table as we go forward. But quite frankly, it was a combination of the size of the special, not if you could -- if you needed to do the special, the percentage of the supplemental and the base dividend. And what we did was, we hit 2 of the 3. We want to continue to build NAV. And so we didn't change the percentage, but we hit 2 of the 3 levers.

是的。順便問一下，您參加了我們的董事會嗎？不，我在開玩笑 - 你，你擊中了它的頭，那就是，看，我們只會遇到 RIC 問題，即使我們有 - 以 75％ 運行補充，或者我們在坦率地說，100%，因為補充額的計算方式是基於NII，並沒有考慮已實現的上限收益。所以無論如何我們都會遇到 RIC 問題。坦白說，在權責發生製基礎上，儘管你必須在 2021 年之前解決這個問題，但你將在今年第一季有效地解決它。所以我們確實考慮了其他槓桿，將其提高到 75%。坦白說，這是擺在桌面上的，如果業務繼續表現，我們將再次遇到這個問題。消費稅讓我喪命，因為這純粹是摩擦。因此，隨著我們的前進，這些事情將繼續擺在桌面上。但坦白說，這是特別股息規模的組合，而不是你是否可以——如果你需要做特別股息、補充股息和基本股息的百分比。我們所做的是，我們達到了 3 個中的 2 個。我們希望繼續建立 NAV。所以我們沒有改變百分比，但我們按下了 3 個槓桿中的 2 個。

And I'm currently showing no further questions at this time. I'd like to turn the call back over to Joshua Easterly for closing remarks.

目前我沒有提出任何進一步的問題。我想將電話轉回給約書亞·伊斯特利（Joshua Easterly），讓其結束語。

Great. Well, thank you very much for people's continued interest. The funny thing about the Q4 earnings call, given the additional time we had to get out our 10-K, we will be talking to you soon for Q1. Please feel free to reach out if you people have any questions, and please enjoy the spring holidays with your family. And again, please feel free to reach out with any questions. Thanks.

偉大的。嗯，非常感謝大家的持續關注。關於第四季財報電話會議的有趣之處在於，考慮到我們需要額外的時間來製定 10-K，我們很快就會與您討論第一季的情況。如果您有任何疑問，請隨時與我們聯繫，並祝您與家人一起享受春節假期。再次強調，如有任何問題，請隨時與我們聯繫。謝謝。

Thanks, all.

謝謝大家。

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes today's conference call. Thank you all for participating. You may now disconnect.

女士們、先生們，今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝大家的參與。您現在可以斷開連線。