Redwood Trust, Inc. (RWT) 2026 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Greetings and welcome to the Redwood Trust Inc., second quarter 2026 financial results conference call. (Operator Instructions) As a reminder, this conference is being recorded.

各位好，歡迎參加 Redwood Trust Inc. 2026 年第二季財務業績電話會議。(接線員指示) 提醒各位，本次會議將被錄音。

It is now my pleasure to introduce your host, [Natasha Fatheree], FP&A leader. Thank you. You may begin.

現在我很榮幸介紹本次會議主持人，[Natasha Fatheree]，財務規劃與分析（FP&A）負責人。謝謝。您可以開始了。

Thank you, operator. Hello, everyone, and thank you for joining us today for Redwood's second quarter 2026 earnings conference call.

謝謝，接線員。各位好，感謝今天加入我們參加 Redwood 2026 年第二季財報電話會議。

With me on today's call are Chris Abate, Chief Executive Officer; Dash Robinson, President; Brooke Carillo, Chief Financial Officer; and Abhinav Asthana, our Chief Technology Officer.

今天與我一同出席的有：執行長 Chris Abate；總裁 Dash Robinson；財務長 Brooke Carillo；以及技術長 Abhinav Asthana。

Before we begin today, I want to remind you that certain statements made during management's presentation today with respect to future financial and business performance may constitute forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are based on current expectations, forecasts, and assumptions, which include risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially.

在我們開始之前，我想提醒各位，管理層今天簡報中關於未來財務與業務表現的某些陳述，可能構成前瞻性陳述。前瞻性陳述係基於目前的預期、預測與假設，其中包含可能導致實際結果出現重大差異的風險與不確定性。

We encourage you to read the company's annual report on Form 10-K and quarterly report on Form 10-Q, which provide a description of some of the factors that could have a material impact on the company's performance and cause actual results to differ from those that may be expressed in forward-looking statements.

我們鼓勵各位閱讀公司 Form 10-K 年度報告與 Form 10-Q 季度報告，其中說明了可能對公司表現造成重大影響、並使實際結果與前瞻性陳述所表達內容不同的部分因素。

On this call, we may also refer to both GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures. The non-GAAP financial measures provided should not be utilized in isolation or considered as a substitute for measures of financial performance prepared in accordance with GAAP. Reconciliation between GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures are provided in our second quarter Redwood Review, which is available on our website, redwoodtrust.com.

在本次電話會議中，我們也可能同時提及 GAAP 與非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。所提供的非 GAAP 財務衡量指標不應單獨使用，亦不應視為依 GAAP 編製之財務績效衡量指標的替代。GAAP 與非 GAAP 財務衡量指標之調節表載於我們的第二季 Redwood Review，可於我們網站 redwoodtrust.com 取得。

Also note that the contents of today's conference call contain time-sensitive information that are accurate only as of today. We do not intend and undertake no obligation to update this information to reflect subsequent events or circumstances. Finally, today's call is being recorded. It will be available on our website later today.

另請注意，今天電話會議內容包含具時效性的資訊，僅截至今日為準且為正確。我們無意且不承擔任何義務更新該等資訊以反映後續事件或情況。最後，今天的電話會議將被錄音。錄音將於今日稍晚在我們網站提供。

With that, I'll turn the call over to Chris for opening remarks.

接下來，我將把電話交給 Chris 進行開場致詞。

Thank you, and good morning, everyone. Redwood exceeded $8 billion of mortgage banking volume for the second straight quarter. We did over 20 securitizations for the first half of the year. We ended the quarter pricing three securitizations in a single week, one for each of our operating platforms, a first for Redwood in our 32-year history. That makes us happy and a little nostalgic at how productive the company operates these days relative to the past, when two to four securitizations a year was deemed just fine by market standards.

謝謝，各位早安。Redwood 連續第二個季度按揭銀行業務量突破 80 億美元。今年上半年我們完成了超過 20 宗證券化交易。本季結束時，我們在同一週內完成三宗證券化定價，分別對應我們三個營運平台；這是 Redwood 32 年歷史上的首次。這讓我們既開心，也對公司如今相較過去的高效率運作感到些許懷舊——在過去，市場標準認為一年做兩到四宗證券化就已相當不錯。

Broadly speaking, it's no secret the housing finance business has been a lot less forgiving for this current generation of mortgage practitioners. First in over 40 years not to benefit from a long-term bull market in interest rates, which served as an invisible tailwind for both the lucky and the smart.

整體而言，眾所周知，住房金融業對當代這一代按揭從業者而言要嚴苛得多。這是 40 多年來首次無法受惠於利率長期牛市；那段時期對幸運者與聰明者而言，都是一股看不見的順風。

Home affordability and supply headwinds, both closely linked to high interest rates and regulation, have impacted the addressable mortgage market and how mortgage businesses fundamentally operate. Today's environment requires higher operating efficiency and capital turnover and a deep strategic mode that can drive growth despite home sales activity still coming in at multi-decade lows. As investors seek to align with the long-term winners of this extended rate cycle, we're prioritizing a few key differentiators that are worth mentioning.

住房可負擔性與供給面的逆風——兩者都與高利率及監管密切相關——已影響可觸及的按揭市場規模，以及按揭業務的根本運作方式。當前環境要求更高的營運效率與資本周轉，並需要深度的策略模式，即使房屋銷售活動仍處於數十年低點，也能推動成長。隨著投資人尋求與此延長利率循環下的長期贏家對齊，我們正優先聚焦幾項值得一提的關鍵差異化因素。

Let's start with technology. We are rebuilding Redwood as an AI-native housing finance platform with proprietary systems developed by our own engineers and embedded directly into our workflows. Our multi-agent AI systems help teams retrieve answers quickly and apply the same intelligence to complex tasks, including seller financial reviews, guideline comparisons, and contract analysis.

先從科技談起。我們正將 Redwood 重建為一個 AI 原生的住房金融平台，採用由自家工程師開發的專有系統，並直接嵌入我們的工作流程。我們的多代理（multi-agent）AI 系統可協助團隊快速取得答案，並將同樣的智慧應用於複雜任務，包括賣方財務審查、準則比較與合約分析。

Result has been faster expert reviews, greater consistency, and greater scale. There are people in the loop on every key decision. This is still early innings, but the capabilities we are deploying are proprietary, compounding, and changing how we operate.

成果是更快速的專家審查、更高的一致性，以及更強的規模化能力。每一項關鍵決策都有人員參與把關。目前仍在早期階段，但我們正在部署的能力是專有的、可累積增強的，並正在改變我們的營運方式。

Early indications of the operating leverage from technology are already visible. Direct expenses were 64 basis points as a percentage of volume for the first half of 2026, already a 28% improvement from full year 2025. Annualized time savings from our 2026 AI-enabled automation initiatives increased to approximately 23,600 hours, up more than 50% from the first quarter of 2026 baseline, with meaningful impacts on due diligence costs, rate sheet pricing, and guideline analysis. We also extended our unified technology platform supporting Sequoia and Aspire to enable HELOCs as a new Sequoia product.

科技帶來的營運槓桿，早期跡象已經可見。2026 年上半年，直接費用占業務量的比例為 64 個基點，較 2025 全年已改善 28%。我們 2026 年 AI 賦能自動化計畫所帶來的年化節省時間提升至約 23,600 小時，較 2026 年第一季基準增加逾 50%，並對盡職調查成本、利率表定價與準則分析產生顯著影響。我們也擴展支援 Sequoia 與 Aspire 的統一技術平台，使 HELOC（房屋淨值信用額度貸款）成為 Sequoia 的新產品。

The bottom line is this, if you're wondering who the AI winners and losers are going to be in housing finance, we'll put 90% annual volume growth with consistent margins up against anyone operating in the housing market today, a market that has been operating at overall volumes down 50% from 2021 levels.

結論是：如果你在思考住房金融領域的 AI 贏家與輸家會是誰，我們願意拿年化業務量成長 90% 且利潤率穩定的表現，與當今住房市場中的任何營運者一較高下——而該市場的整體業務量相較 2021 年水準已下滑 50%。

As many of you know, our RWT Horizons venture fund complemented, in certain ways, significantly accelerated our growth in mortgage banking in recent years. Representing less than 2% of our capital, Horizons gives us access to more than 25 early-stage companies across the mortgage and AI ecosystem.

如各位所知，我們的 RWT Horizons 創投基金在某些方面形成互補，並在近年顯著加速了我們按揭銀行業務的成長。Horizons 代表的資本占比不到 2%，卻讓我們得以接觸按揭與 AI 生態系中超過 25 家早期公司。

During the quarter, we invested in Prometheus, an artificial intelligence company developing an artificial general engineer, while another AI company in our portfolio priced a financing round that values our initial seed investment at approximately 27 times our cost. Our dual approach of adopting AI inside Redwood and investing directly at the frontier of technology remains a long-term strategic initiative.

本季度，我們投資了 Prometheus——一家人工智慧公司，正在開發「通用人工工程師」（artificial general engineer）；同時，我們投資組合中的另一家 AI 公司完成一輪融資定價，使我們最初的種子投資估值約為成本的 27 倍。我們一方面在 Redwood 內部導入 AI，另一方面直接投資於科技前沿的雙軌策略，仍將是長期的策略性計畫。

Product depth and distribution are another important part of the story. At Sequoia, newly launched products now represent more than 30% of our quarterly lock volume. Aspire also grew more than 30% sequentially in the non-QM space, while CoreVest is building momentum in its smaller balance offerings for experienced housing investors.

產品深度與通路分銷也是故事的另一個重要部分。在 Sequoia，新推出的產品目前已占我們季度鎖定量（lock volume）的 30% 以上。Aspire 在非 QM（非合格按揭）領域亦較前一季成長逾 30%，而 CoreVest 正在其面向資深住房投資人的小額餘額產品上累積動能。

Taken together, Redwood today is materially less dependent on any one product or on any mortgage re-fi cycle. It also differentiates our earnings model in comparison to monoline operators with revenues more tied to MSR values and associated customer retention. Our model, conversely, is built around efficiently aggregating loans from across our broad network and distributing them to long-term investors through securitizations, whole loan sales, and strategic partnerships. Our bank relationships further strengthen that position.

綜合來看，如今的 Redwood 對任何單一產品或任何按揭再融資循環的依賴程度已大幅降低。相較於營收更與 MSR（按揭服務權）價值及相關客戶留存高度連動的單一產品線業者，這也使我們的獲利模式更具差異化。相對地，我們的模式是以高效率地從廣泛網絡彙集貸款，並透過證券化、整筆貸款出售（whole loan sales）及策略合作夥伴關係，分銷給長期投資人為核心。我們與銀行的合作關係進一步強化了這一定位。

Large depositories leaned into mortgage volume during the second quarter, even at the expense of margins, underscoring that bank behavior is already evolving as the Basel III endgame is finalized. Lower capital charges and high-quality mortgages may have been a necessary regulatory impediment for banks to reengage, but they are certainly not the only constraint. The ultimate decision by banks to boost origination activity remains risk-based, and to repeat ourselves, the mortgage risk that bank C-suites most consistently cite to us as top of mind is convexity, not credit.

大型存款機構在第二季加大按揭業務量，即使以犧牲利潤率為代價，凸顯隨著《巴塞爾協定 III》最終方案（Basel III endgame）定案，銀行行為已在演變。較低的資本計提與高品質按揭，或許曾是促使銀行重新投入的必要監管障礙被移除，但這絕非唯一限制。銀行最終是否提升承作活動仍取決於風險考量；重申我們的觀察，銀行高層（C-suite）最一貫向我們提及、最關切的按揭風險是「凸性」（convexity），而非信用風險。

Redwood enables our bank partners to generate fee income and retain their clients while transferring their interest rate exposure to us while they retain and continue to grow the customer relationship. At June 30, Redwood acted as a dedicated capital partner to 70% of the top 50 banks in the United States. Our ability to help banks manage ongoing mortgage exposures differentiates Redwood and reinforces our essential role throughout the banking system.

Redwood 讓我們的銀行合作夥伴在移轉其利率曝險給我們的同時，仍能創造手續費收入並留住客戶，並在其保留且持續深化客戶關係的同時完成風險轉移。截至 6 月 30 日，Redwood 作為專屬資本合作夥伴，服務了美國前 50 大銀行中的 70%。我們協助銀行管理持續性按揭曝險的能力，使 Redwood 脫穎而出，並強化我們在整個銀行體系中的關鍵角色。

In summary, the business we operate today is fundamentally different than it was 20, 10, or even 2 years ago. Advanced technology and operating efficiency, more comprehensive products, diversified distribution, premier institutional capital partnerships, and a shrinking legacy portfolio position us to grow going forward through a wide range of market environments to create long-term value for shareholders. Not just when all boats are rising, as they do when interest rates fall, but through challenging rate cycles where hard work and innovation make the difference.

總結而言，我們今日所經營的業務，與20年前、10年前，甚至2年前相比，已在本質上截然不同。先進科技與營運效率、更全面的產品、更多元的通路、頂尖的機構資本合作夥伴關係，以及持續縮減的傳統遺留投資組合，使我們得以在各種市場環境下持續成長，為股東創造長期價值。不僅是在利率下行、萬船齊漲之時，更能在充滿挑戰的利率循環中，憑藉努力與創新拉開差距。

With that, I'll turn the call over to Dash to discuss our operating results.

接下來，我把電話交給Dash，請他說明我們的營運成果。

Thank you, Chris. Our second quarter operating performance reflected the combined benefits of product diversification, capital-efficient distribution channels, and an operating framework that's fully integrated with core AI initiatives at the center of our strategic blueprint. The result was an eighth consecutive quarter of mortgage banking returns north of 20%, increasingly fertile ground for continued capital redeployment away from our non-core portfolio holdings.

謝謝你，Chris。我們第二季的營運表現，反映了產品多元化、資本效率更高的通路，以及以核心AI計畫為中心、並已完全整合至我們策略藍圖的營運架構所帶來的綜合效益。其結果是，房貸銀行業務報酬率連續第八季維持在20%以上，並為持續將資本自非核心投資組合持有部位再配置提供了更肥沃的土壤。

At Sequoia, second quarter lock volume totaled $5.6 billion alongside several noteworthy product and distribution benchmarks. Gain-on-sale margins were 92 basis points overall, in line with the first quarter's 96 basis points, despite substantial macro headwinds in April and May and broader indications of pronounced margin compression across the industry. Distribution remained well-aligned with production, most notably with a Castlelake joint venture coming online in late June, nine Sequoia securitizations, and $1.2 billion of whole loan sales, almost all to banks. Sequoia's production mix included over 65% purchase money loans.

在Sequoia，第二季鎖定量（lock volume）合計為56億美元，並達成數項值得關注的產品與通路里程碑。整體售出利得（gain-on-sale）利差為92個基點，與第一季的96個基點大致一致，儘管4月與5月面臨顯著的總體環境逆風，且業界普遍顯示利差明顯遭到壓縮。通路配置仍與產量高度匹配，最突出的是：6月底一項與Castlelake的合資企業正式上線、完成9筆Sequoia證券化，以及12億美元的整筆貸款（whole loan）出售，幾乎全部賣給銀行。Sequoia的生產組合中，超過65%為購屋貸款（purchase money loans）。

The strategic positioning Chris referenced has emerged as an important buffer against profitability headwinds for non-bank operators that are often coupled with reduced housing activity and renewed vigor for bank portfolios. This is in large part attributable to how our platform as a non-bank has positioned itself within the depository ecosystem.

Chris所提到的策略定位，已成為非銀行業者在獲利逆風下的重要緩衝，這些逆風往往伴隨住宅活動降溫，以及銀行投資組合再度轉趨積極。這在很大程度上歸因於我們作為非銀行平台，如何在存款機構生態系中完成定位。

When business drivers, including those influenced by capital rules, need a bank to buy or sell mortgage loans, we are most often the first call. That deep bank relationship drove the launch of our medical professional loan program, now offered broadly to our seller network with great early success, including a second Med Pro securitization earlier in July that priced well inside of our inaugural issuance.

當業務驅動因素（包括受資本規則影響者）需要銀行買入或賣出房貸時，我們往往是第一通電話。這種深厚的銀行關係促成我們推出醫療專業人士貸款（medical professional loan）計畫，目前已廣泛提供給我們的賣方網絡，且早期成效極佳；其中包括7月稍早完成的第二筆Med Pro證券化，其定價較我們首筆發行明顯更佳。

The recent launch of our HELOC program builds on our optimism that deeper product offerings will continue to drive resilience during periods of upward pressure on rates and volatility through stable margins, increased relevance to our deep seller network, and our ability to support two-way flow between bank portfolios.

近期推出的HELOC（房屋淨值信用額度）計畫，建立在我們的樂觀預期之上：更深、更完整的產品供給，將在利率上行壓力與波動期間，透過穩定利差、提升我們在深厚賣方網絡中的相關性，以及支援銀行投資組合之間的雙向流動能力，持續帶來韌性。

Also key to this positioning is Aspire, whose establishment 18 short months ago was designed to leverage existing strengths by offering a well-underwritten, flexible suite of expanded products to a broader network of originators. Aspire delivered over $2 billion of lock volume during the second quarter, another record for the platform, up 31% from Q1. Market observers expect non-QM originations to reach $150 billion in 2026, up 20% from last year and reflective of a growing cohort of high-quality borrowers that access credit differently than the traditional W-2 employee.

同樣對此定位至關重要的是Aspire。Aspire於18個月前成立，旨在運用既有優勢，向更廣泛的起貸機構網絡提供一套承作嚴謹、彈性高的擴展型產品組合。Aspire在第二季交出超過20億美元的鎖定量，為該平台再創新高，較第一季成長31%。市場觀察人士預期，非QM（non-QM）起貸規模將在2026年達到1,500億美元，較去年成長20%，反映出一群日益擴大的高品質借款人，其取得信貸的方式不同於傳統W-2受薪員工。

This implies a run rate market share for Aspire of approximately 5% to 6% that we seek to grow to 10% by year-end 2026 through a relentless commitment to product innovation, accretive distribution, and technology, including recently announced progress with AI-powered pricing and guideline analysis tools.

這意味著Aspire的年化市占率約為5%至6%；我們希望透過對產品創新、增益型通路拓展與科技的持續投入，在2026年底前將其提升至10%，其中也包括近期公布的AI驅動定價與承作準則分析工具的進展。

Institutional investor demand continues to support the non-QM sector's growth in general and Aspire's in specific. The business completed its second and third securitizations issued under the Aspire shelf during the second quarter, with the risk retention and support in the tranches once again syndicated profitably to third-party investors. At June 30, 60-plus day delinquencies within Aspire's securitized population were less than 10 basis points.

機構投資人需求持續支持非QM領域整體成長，並特別支持Aspire的成長。該業務於第二季完成在Aspire貨架（shelf）下發行的第二與第三筆證券化，風險保留（risk retention）與各分層（tranches）中的支持部位再次以獲利方式分銷給第三方投資人。截至6月30日，Aspire已證券化族群中逾60天的逾期率低於10個基點。

Subsequent to quarter end, we executed definitive documentation for an Aspire-dedicated joint venture with Crayhill Capital Management, a leading structured credit investor. Through time, the vehicle has the potential purchasing power of up to $8 billion of loans, underscoring demand for Aspire's products and an important early validation for the business. Similar to our other joint ventures, it provides a source of recurring revenues with added performance fees upon reaching stated return thresholds.

在季末之後，我們與Crayhill Capital Management（領先的結構性信用投資人）就一項Aspire專屬合資企業簽署最終文件。隨時間推進，該載體具備最高可達80億美元貸款的潛在購買力，凸顯市場對Aspire產品的需求，亦是對該業務的重要早期驗證。與我們其他合資企業類似，它提供可重複的經常性收入來源，並在達到既定報酬門檻後，另有額外的績效費用。

Each of our platforms now operates with a dedicated joint venture with key benefits to our operating leverage and revenue durability going forward. CoreVest, our direct originator focused on lending to housing investors, funded $410 million of loans during the second quarter, down approximately 5% from Q1 as higher rates weighed on portions of the pipeline and legislative uncertainty, now largely settled, impacted certain key pockets of market activity. We remain disciplined while borrowers and developers assess the evolving regulatory and legislative landscape.

我們各平台目前皆與專屬合資企業搭配運作，為未來的營運槓桿與收入耐久性帶來關鍵效益。CoreVest為我們的直接起貸平台，專注於向住宅投資人放款；第二季撥款額為4.10億美元，較第一季約下降5%，主因利率走高壓抑部分管線，且立法不確定性（目前多已落定）影響了若干市場活動的關鍵區塊。在借款人與開發商評估持續演變的監管與立法環境之際，我們仍維持紀律。

With the landmark housing bill now passed and build-for-rent carved out from institutional ownership limitations, activity is beginning to reopen in areas that had largely paused. CoreVest remains well-positioned, supported by its longstanding focus on experienced sponsors below the largest institutional segment.

隨著具里程碑意義的住宅法案已通過，且「以租代售」（build-for-rent）被排除在機構持有上限之外，先前大多暫停的區域正開始重新恢復活動。CoreVest仍具備良好定位，並受惠於其長期聚焦於最大型機構區隔以下、具經驗的贊助商（sponsors）。

A key milestone for CoreVest during the quarter was its first term loan securitization since 2023, since which time our term loan production has largely been sold in whole loan form. The $268 million transaction priced accretively to loan sale economics and was placed with close to two dozen discrete investors, a market response that underscores the deep demand for the platform's origination activities. The team also entered into a new servicing arrangement later in the second quarter designed to reduce administrative demands and lower servicing costs over time and launched a targeted business development initiative to expand lead generation.

CoreVest在本季的一項關鍵里程碑，是自2023年以來首次進行定期貸款（term loan）證券化；自那之後，我們的定期貸款產出多以整筆貸款形式出售。這筆2.68億美元交易的定價相較於貸款出售經濟性更具增益，並配置給近24位不同投資人；市場反應凸顯對該平台起貸活動的深厚需求。團隊亦於第二季後段簽訂新的服務（servicing）安排，旨在降低行政負擔並隨時間推進降低服務成本，同時啟動一項聚焦的業務開發計畫以擴大線索來源。

As immediately realizable returns in mortgage banking continue to sit well above 20%, the value of continued reallocation away from our legacy investment segment remains significant. At quarter end, allocation to this portfolio totaled 12% of overall capital, down from 15% on March 31 and 63% lower than one year ago, when we announced the accelerated wind down of this position.

在房貸銀行業務可即時實現的報酬率持續遠高於20%的情況下，持續將資源自我們的傳統遺留投資部門再配置的價值仍然顯著。截至季末，該投資組合占整體資本配置為12%，低於3月31日的15%，且較一年前（我們宣布加速縮減該部位時）下降63%。

Early in the third quarter, we commenced formal marketing of a substantial portion of our remaining legacy bridge loans and continued to progress individual line items through to resolutions, unlocking capital and reducing associated secured debt. Thus far in the third quarter, we also priced a new financing arrangement for the remainder of our home equity investment portfolio that pro forma we expect to reduce segment capital to below 10%.

第三季初，我們開始對剩餘傳統遺留過橋貸款（bridge loans）中的相當大一部分進行正式行銷，並持續推進個別項目至解決方案，以釋放資本並降低相關擔保負債。截至目前第三季，我們也為剩餘的房屋淨值投資組合敲定一項新的融資安排；按備考（pro forma）基礎，我們預期可將該部門資本降至10%以下。

90-day-plus delinquencies in the unsecuritized legacy bridge portfolio were roughly flat versus March 31. The priority remains fully moving on from this position as quickly and efficiently as possible to support further growth of our core activities.

未證券化的傳統遺留過橋貸款投資組合中，逾期90天以上的比率相較3月31日大致持平。我們的優先事項仍是以最快且最高效率，徹底退出該部位，以支持核心業務的進一步成長。

I will now turn the call over to Brooke to discuss our financial results.

接下來我把電話交給Brooke，請她說明我們的財務結果。

Thank you, Dash. Turning to our second quarter results, we reported a GAAP net loss of $3 million, or $0.03 per share, compared with a $0.07 per share loss in the first quarter. Book value per common share was $6.90 at June 30. The 3% decline from $7.12 at March 31 was primarily driven by marked-to-market changes and ongoing carry costs within our legacy investments portfolio, as well as the $0.18 dividend paid to common shareholders.

謝謝你，Dash。談到第二季業績，我們依GAAP認列淨損300萬美元，或每股虧損0.03美元，相較第一季每股虧損0.07美元。截至6月30日，每股普通股帳面價值為6.90美元。相較3月31日的7.12美元下滑3%，主要受我們傳統遺留投資組合的按市價評價（marked-to-market）變動與持續持有成本影響，另包含支付給普通股股東的每股0.18美元股利。

On a non-GAAP basis, consolidated earnings available for distribution, or EAD, was $20 million or $0.15 per share, compared to $0.21 per share in the first quarter. The quarter again reflected two distinct trends. Our core segments remained highly profitable, generating $34 million of earnings available for distribution, representing an 18.5% annualized ROE, while legacy investments generated a $14 million EAD loss.

以非 GAAP 基礎計算，可供分配的合併收益（EAD）為 2,000 萬美元，或每股 0.15 美元，較第一季的每股 0.21 美元下降。本季再次反映兩個截然不同的趨勢。我們的核心業務分部仍維持高度獲利，產生 3,400 萬美元的可供分配收益，代表年化股東權益報酬率（ROE）18.5%，而傳統投資則產生 1,400 萬美元的 EAD 虧損。

Turning to our segment results, aggregate mortgage banking net revenue remained essentially flat despite a roughly 6% decline in production, reflecting stable to improving margins across the platforms while direct expenses declined. The result was a 33% annualized return on average capital for our operating platforms, with capital efficiency continuing to improve.

接著看各分部表現，整體房貸銀行業務淨收入在產量約下滑 6% 的情況下仍大致持平，反映各平台利差穩定至改善，同時直接費用下降。因此，我們營運平台的平均資本年化報酬率為 33%，資本效率持續提升。

Average capital required per dollar of production fell to roughly 2.6% in the first half of 2026 from about 3% a year ago, underscoring the scalability of our mortgage banking platforms as volumes grow. Prior to corporate allocations, Sequoia generated $32 million of GAAP net income compared with $38 million in the first quarter. The sequential decline was primarily volume driven as purchase commitments declined 9%, while the 92-basis point gain on sale margin remained near the high end of our historical target range.

2026 年上半年，每 1 美元產量所需的平均資本降至約 2.6%，低於一年前約 3%，凸顯隨著規模成長，我們房貸銀行平台具備可擴展性。在公司層級分攤前，Sequoia 產生 3,200 萬美元 GAAP 淨利，較第一季的 3,800 萬美元下降。此一季對季下滑主要由量能驅動，因購屋承諾量下降 9%；同時，92 個基點的出售收益率（gain on sale margin）仍接近我們歷史目標區間的高端。

Cost per loan improved to 17 basis points from 18 basis points, demonstrating that we maintained operating discipline as volumes moderated. Initial loan transfers to Castlelake occurred near quarter end, and therefore we expect the partnership to begin affecting capital velocity and fee economics more visibly in the second half of the year.

每筆貸款成本由 18 個基點改善至 17 個基點，顯示在量能放緩時我們仍維持營運紀律。向 Castlelake 的初始貸款移轉發生在季末附近，因此我們預期該合作關係將在下半年更明顯地影響資本周轉速度與費用經濟效益。

Aspire generated $7 million of GAAP net income, up $5 million sequentially. Lock volume increased 31% to a record $2.1 billion, while gain on sale margins increased to 101 basis points from 73 basis points as securitization spreads normalized and hedge performance improved relative to the first quarter. Importantly, this growth was achieved with improving capital efficiency, resulting in a 33% annualized return on capital for the segment. CoreVest generated $1 million of GAAP net income, compared with a $3 million loss in the first quarter, which had included approximately $5 million of restructuring charges.

Aspire 產生 700 萬美元 GAAP 淨利，較前一季增加 500 萬美元。鎖定量（lock volume）增加 31% 至創紀錄的 21 億美元；同時，出售收益率由 73 個基點升至 101 個基點，因證券化利差回歸常態，且避險表現相較第一季改善。重要的是，此成長是在資本效率提升下達成，使該分部資本年化報酬率達 33%。CoreVest 產生 100 萬美元 GAAP 淨利，相較第一季 300 萬美元虧損；第一季包含約 500 萬美元的重組費用。

Excluding acquisition-related expenses, EAD contribution for the segment increased to $3 million. Net revenue rose 8%, reflecting improved term loan execution, while direct operating expense declined meaningfully following the actions taken earlier this year. Net cost to originate was 96 basis points in the second quarter, up from 79 basis points in the first quarter, reflecting modestly lower fee and income relative to expenses, along with 5% lower quarter-over-quarter volume.

若排除併購相關費用，該分部對 EAD 的貢獻提升至 300 萬美元。淨收入成長 8%，反映定期貸款（term loan）執行改善；同時，因今年稍早採取的措施，直接營運費用明顯下降。第二季的淨承作成本為 96 個基點，高於第一季的 79 個基點，反映費用與收入相對於支出略為降低，且季對季量能下降 5%。

Redwood Investments generated approximately $1 million of GAAP net income, compared with an $8 million loss in the first quarter. The improvement reflected a more constructive valuation backdrop across portions of the retained portfolio and lower expenses. Although the segment continued to experience fair value pressure in selected bridge and SFR investments. We deployed $72 million of capital into investments sourced from second quarter securitizations.

Redwood Investments 產生約 100 萬美元 GAAP 淨利，較第一季 800 萬美元虧損改善。此改善反映保留投資組合部分資產的估值環境更為有利，以及費用降低。儘管該分部在部分過渡性（bridge）與 SFR（單戶出租住宅）投資上仍持續承受公允價值壓力。我們將 7,200 萬美元資本投入於第二季證券化所取得的投資。

Because much of that deployment occurred late in the quarter, its earnings contribution should be more impactful in the third quarter. During the second quarter, we refinanced a portfolio of retained securities at an all-in cost of funds approximately 150 basis points below the prior financing. With approximately $1.5 billion of secured portfolio debt callable over the next 12 months, we retain a meaningful optionality to reduce funding costs as opportunities arise.

由於多數部署發生在季末，其對獲利的貢獻預期在第三季更為顯著。第二季期間，我們以較先前融資低約 150 個基點的整體資金成本，為一組保留證券投資組合完成再融資。未來 12 個月內約有 15 億美元的擔保投資組合負債可被提前償還（callable），使我們在機會出現時具備顯著的選擇權以降低資金成本。

Legacy investments generated a $23 million GAAP loss, which included $12 million of negative fair value changes, primarily on legacy bridge loans inclusive of realized resolution activity. The financing, marketing and structured sale initiatives Dash discussed are intended to release capital for higher returning uses and reduce the negative carry still embedded in consolidated EAD.

傳統投資產生 2,300 萬美元 GAAP 虧損，其中包含 1,200 萬美元的負向公允價值變動，主要來自傳統過渡性（bridge）貸款，並包含已實現的處置／解決活動。Dash 所提到的融資、行銷與結構性出售方案，旨在釋放資本以投入更高報酬用途，並降低合併 EAD 中仍存在的負利差（negative carry）。

Based on the current return differential between Legacy and our core segments, we estimate that each $100 million of capital successfully redeployed could improve consolidated EAD ROE by approximately 200 to 400 basis points through reinvestment in our operating platforms or potentially share repurchases at appropriate levels. Total operating expenses were down 21% on the quarter, with G&A declining to $38 million from $49 million. Approximately $7 million of the reduction reflected restructuring charges recorded in the first quarter, with the remainder primarily attributable to lower compensation and variable expenses.

基於傳統投資與核心分部之間目前的報酬差異，我們估計每成功重新部署 1 億美元資本，透過再投資於營運平台或在適當水準進行庫藏股回購，可能使合併 EAD 的 ROE 提升約 200 至 400 個基點。本季總營運費用季對季下降 21%，其中一般及行政費用（G&A）由 4,900 萬美元降至 3,800 萬美元。約 700 萬美元的降幅來自第一季認列的重組費用，其餘主要歸因於薪酬與變動費用降低。

More importantly, first half adjusted expenses represented 64 basis points of production, compared with 88 basis points for the full year 2025 as volume growth continues to outpace expense growth. We expect some natural variability in quarterly expenses, but the structural efficiency gains reflected in cost per loan trends and expenses relative to volume remain intact.

更重要的是，上半年調整後費用占產量的 64 個基點，低於 2025 全年的 88 個基點，因量能成長持續快於費用成長。我們預期季度費用會有一定的自然波動，但每筆貸款成本趨勢以及費用相對於量能所反映的結構性效率提升仍然維持。

Recourse debt declined by approximately $150 million to $4.5 billion, while recourse leverage declined modestly to five times. More than half of recourse debt supports mortgage banking inventory that turns rapidly through securitizations or loan sales and joint ventures, with loans held for an average of approximately 26 days in June. We ended the quarter with $192 million of unrestricted cash, approximately $100 million of unencumbered assets, and $3.7 billion of excess warehouse capacity. In the last year, we have renewed or added approximately $4.4 billion of capacity, and the senior notes issued in the quarter further extended our unsecured maturity profile.

追索權負債（recourse debt）約減少 1.5 億美元至 45 億美元，而追索權槓桿倍數小幅下降至 5 倍。超過一半的追索權負債用於支持房貸銀行業務庫存，該庫存會透過證券化、貸款出售與合資企業快速周轉；6 月份貸款平均持有天數約 26 天。本季末我們持有 1.92 億美元不受限制現金、約 1 億美元未設質資產，以及 37 億美元的額外倉儲融資額度（warehouse capacity）。過去一年，我們已續約或新增約 44 億美元的額度，而本季發行的優先票據亦進一步延長我們無擔保到期結構。

With that, I'll turn the call back to the operator for questions.

接下來我把電話交回給接線員，進入提問環節。

(Operator Instructions) Rick Shane, JPMorgan.

（接線員指示）JPMorgan 的 Rick Shane。

Look, you guys are making progress in terms of reallocating capital. There's $195 million left. You talk about getting down to 10% by the end of this quarter. Realistically, how much of that $195 million do you expect to be able to realize? Obviously, I think there's some friction as we saw this quarter, and as the business descales, there may be further just operating losses associated with it. How much of that sort of $195 million melting actually will go into the remainder of the business over the next couple of years?

你們在重新配置資本方面確實有進展。目前還剩 1.95 億美元。你們提到希望在本季末降到 10%。務實來看，這 1.95 億美元你們預期能實現多少？顯然，我認為如同本季所見會有一些摩擦，而且隨著業務縮減，可能還會有進一步與營運相關的虧損。這種 1.95 億美元的「融化」中，未來幾年實際會有多少會流入其餘業務？

Hey, Rick, it's Dash. I can start. A couple of pieces in your question. We expect to continue trending towards the capital in the legacy investment segment to below 5% by the end of the year. That's how we've been guiding the market for a few quarters now.

嗨，Rick，我是 Dash。我可以先回答。你的問題有幾個部分。我們預期將持續把傳統投資分部的資本占比趨勢性降至年底低於 5%。這也是我們過去幾季一直對市場的指引。

As we said in our prepared remarks, we actually did price a transaction this week, which we think pro forma will bring allocated capital to below 10% to that segment. So that's definitely progress, as I also mentioned in the prepared remarks.

如同我們在事先準備的發言中提到，我們本週確實已為一筆交易完成定價，我們認為按備考（pro forma）計算，將使分配至該分部的資本降至 10% 以下。因此這確實是進展，我在準備稿中也提過。

We're currently working on a disposition plan for a large portion of the remaining unsecuritized bridge loans which we'll hopefully have more to talk about for Q3 earnings. We believe we're still on track to have that segment below 5% of capital by the end of the year. As we said a lot, we're trying to be balanced between disposition speed and execution, but also recognizing just the significant accretion of redeployment of that capital.

我們目前正在為剩餘未證券化的過渡性（bridge）貸款中相當大的一部分制定處置計畫，希望在第三季財報時能有更多可分享。我們相信仍按計畫在年底前讓該分部資本占比降至 5% 以下。如同我們多次提到的，我們試圖在處置速度與執行品質之間取得平衡，同時也認知到重新部署該資本所帶來的顯著增益。

As we can elaborate on, we're highly confident that as that capital continues to come out of that segment, that we will have a place to go with it immediately. We're still doing $8 billion-plus volumes in mortgage banking, and we're bringing on new joint ventures. All of which speak to the fact that those are all tailwinds for us to continue to grow market share in mortgage banking.

如同我們可以進一步說明的，我們非常有信心，隨著資本持續從該部門流出，我們將能立即為這些資本找到去處並加以運用。我們的房貸銀行業務量仍維持在80億美元以上，且我們正在引入新的合資企業。這些都顯示，對我們而言皆是順風，有助於我們在房貸銀行業務中持續擴大市占率。

As Brooke articulated, the decisions around continuing to unlock that capital, we have to weigh the right execution, but also the fact that there's $0.14 to $0.15 a quarter of negative carry and opportunity cost within that segment that we think is immediately realizable through the retirement of secured debt, like I mentioned, also the immediate redeployment. We feel like the opportunities are there to redeploy very efficiently as we continue to wind that book down.

如同Brooke所闡述的，關於持續釋放該資本的決策，我們必須權衡正確的執行方式；同時也要考量在該部門內，每季約0.14至0.15美元的負向持有成本（negative carry）與機會成本，我們認為可透過償還擔保債務（如我先前提到的）以及立即再部署資本而即刻實現。隨著我們持續縮減該投資組合，我們認為存在可非常有效率地再部署資本的機會。

Got it. Look, you guys executed a transaction at the beginning of the third quarter, as you've talked about. Presumably when you were valuing the portfolio at the end of the second, you were probably pretty close to that execution, so you had a good sense of value.

了解。你們如先前所談，在第三季初執行了一筆交易。推測你們在第二季末為投資組合估值時，應該已相當接近那次執行，因此對價值有很好的掌握。

How much of the second quarter mark was informed by the execution of the third quarter deal? Because again, I'm trying to understand. We saw capital allocation decline during the quarter, partially a portion of reallocation, but also partially a function of a decline of capital. That's what I'm trying to understand here, sort of, of that $195 million, how do we think about what flows into the rest of the business going forward?

第二季的評價（mark）有多少是受到第三季那筆交易執行的影響？因為我想再理解一次。我們看到本季資本配置下降，部分是重新配置所致，但也部分是資本下降的結果。我想理解的是，在那1.95億美元之中，我們應如何看待未來流入公司其他業務的部分？

Rick, I would say, every asset in our legacy book at this point, we're down to a couple handfuls of loans here. These are really distinct. The execution, I think, that we had in the third quarter of last year is helpful. We definitely were looking at what our resolution strategy was for each of the assets at 6/30, and that definitely informed our mark.

Rick，我會說，我們目前在舊有投資組合（legacy book）中的每一項資產，現在只剩下少數幾筆貸款。這些資產都非常獨特。我認為我們在去年第三季的執行結果是有幫助的。我們在6/30時確實逐一檢視每項資產的處置策略，而這也確實影響了我們的評價。

Yeah. The transaction you're, I think, referring to, Rick, was for the remainder of our HEI position. Certainly the mark at June 30 was informed by that execution, which we've since completed. That's very much in line.

是的。Rick，我想你指的那筆交易，是我們剩餘的HEI部位。6月30日的評價確實參考了那次執行，而我們之後也已完成該交易。這非常一致。

As it relates to the legacy bridge portfolio, Brooke is right. Obviously, as we say every quarter, that book is fair valued. It's marked where we feel like we could execute it. But we're going to be obviously responsive to what the market tells us in terms of disposing of the rest, again, with an eye towards where we can redeploy that capital quickly and a reduction of the secured debt that's influencing some of the carry costs that Brooke articulated.

至於舊有的過橋貸款投資組合（legacy bridge portfolio），Brooke說得沒錯。顯然，如同我們每季所說，該投資組合是以公允價值衡量。我們的評價反映了我們認為可執行的價格。但我們也會對市場在處置剩餘部位方面所傳達的訊號保持敏感；同時也會著眼於我們能快速再部署該資本，以及降低擔保債務，因為擔保債務正影響Brooke所提到的部分持有成本。

Doug Harter, BTIG.

Doug Harter，BTIG。

This is actually Will Nasta on for Doug this morning. I know you mentioned in the release talking about having a more cautious operating posture early in the quarter. Given the move higher in rates early this quarter, I was hoping you could talk about how you're thinking about banking volume sensitivity to rates and kind of with volatility versus higher rates, how you guys are thinking about that right now.

今天早上其實是Will Nasta代Doug提問。我知道你們在新聞稿中提到，本季初採取較為謹慎的營運姿態。鑑於本季初利率走高，我想請你們談談你們如何看待銀行業務量對利率的敏感度，以及在波動性相較於單純高利率的情況下，你們目前的思考方向。

Yeah. We definitely were more cautious in the second quarter. Certainly, earlier in the quarter, rates were very, very volatile and there was a lot of geopolitical uncertainty, as everybody well knows. June, things felt more stable and we leaned back in. I think we said 40% of our Q2 volume was in the month of June alone.

是的。我們在第二季確實更為謹慎。尤其在季初，利率波動非常、非常大，而且地緣政治不確定性也很高，大家都很清楚。到了6月，情勢感覺更穩定，我們就重新加大投入。我想我們提過，第二季有40%的業務量僅發生在6月。

To me, that's pretty good validation that we've got recurring revenue streams from these businesses, really durable volume opportunities, and obviously we're going to be risk-minded as we pursue them. But we saw things pick back up when we decided to lean back in in June, and I think we saw more of the same in July.

對我而言，這相當能驗證我們這些業務具有可重複的收入來源、非常耐久的業務量機會；當然，我們在追求這些機會時也會以風險為導向。但當我們在6月決定重新加大投入時，確實看到業務回升，我想7月也看到類似情況。

In the past week or two, rates have backed up. Obviously, we're looking at a 463-ish [10-year], and mortgage rates are close to their one-year high, I suppose. So all of that we need to factor in.

在過去一兩週，利率又回升。顯然，我們看到10年期殖利率大約在4.63%左右，而房貸利率我想也接近一年來的高點。因此這些因素我們都需要納入考量。

But I think by and large, we feel pretty good with our risk position today, and our ability to continue to grow volumes. But we can't control what's going on in the macro environment, we need to continue to be responsive to what we're seeing on the ground. I would say July's been a fairly strong month from a mortgage banking perspective, and we're hoping that we can maintain that momentum in August and September.

但整體而言，我們對目前的風險部位以及持續擴大業務量的能力感到相當有信心。不過我們無法控制總體環境的變化，因此必須持續對第一線所見情況做出反應。我會說，從房貸銀行業務的角度來看，7月表現相當強勁，我們希望能在8月與9月維持這股動能。

Got it. Thanks. Then just one more. I know you talked about [tenure] technology investment and how that's helped to improve expense efficiency down to, I think, 64 bps you guys had mentioned. I was just hoping that you could talk about kind of where you see that number trending, if you see more potential upside there or progress you can make on that side, or if there's a particular level that you guys are comfortable with on that.

了解。謝謝。再一個問題。我知道你們談到[tenure]科技投資，以及這如何幫助提升費用效率，降到你們提到的大約64個基點（bps）。我想請你們談談你們認為這個數字的趨勢會如何發展，是否還有更多上行空間或可持續改善之處，或是你們對此有一個覺得舒適的特定水準。

This might be a good opportunity for Abhinav to chime in on a few of the efficiencies we've been focused on, then perhaps Brooke could follow up with some of the numbers.

這可能是個讓Abhinav補充我們聚焦的一些效率提升的好機會，之後也許Brooke可以再補充一些數字。

Thank you, Chris. Thank you, Doug, for the question. I think the important part to recognize is that Redwood has been very thoughtfully investing in technology and especially AI over the last 18 months, I would say. We've started to see some of that result in compounding value proposition for the company.

謝謝你，Chris。也謝謝你，Doug，提出這個問題。我認為重要的是要認知到，Redwood在過去18個月，尤其是在AI方面，一直非常審慎且有策略地投入科技。我們已開始看到其中一部分為公司帶來可疊加的價值主張。

We've been investing in foundational AI platforms, as Chris mentioned in his prepared remarks. We're not bolting on AI, where we look at incremental or small, minor changes in how we do our business. We are rather looking at how we rethink the operating model in itself. So as we built our platforms, we've kind of re-engineered how our operating platforms and business platforms conduct business.

我們一直在投資基礎性的AI平台，如同Chris在事先準備的發言中提到的。我們不是把AI當作外掛，僅在我們做生意的方式上做一些增量或小幅度的微調。相反地，我們是在思考如何重新構想整個營運模式本身。因此在建置平台的同時，我們也某種程度上重新設計了我們的營運平台與業務平台如何運作與執行。

To that effect, we've not only added efficiencies in terms of where we see waste in the process, but we also have now eliminated parts of the function that no longer make sense to our business. In doing so, we've been able to provide value as we grow our businesses. The more important part to think about is as we scale our business, these platforms are designed to handle volume as we grow and operate at efficiencies that are going to be significantly much larger than where we are today. Brooke?

因此，我們不僅在流程中找出浪費並提升效率，也已經移除了一些對我們業務而言不再合理的職能環節。透過這樣的作法，我們得以在擴張業務的同時創造價值。更重要的是，當我們擴大規模時，這些平台的設計能在我們成長時承接更高的業務量，並以遠高於目前的效率水準運作。Brooke？

Yeah. The only thing I would add is that the improvement thus far from 2025, they have been driven first by just the scalability of our platforms and the amount of market share we've gained. And so volume has certainly helped that.

是的。我唯一想補充的是，截至目前自2025年以來的改善，首先是由我們平台的可擴展性以及我們取得的市占率提升所驅動。因此，業務量確實對此有所幫助。

Secondly, our variable expense structure has provided a large benefit here, and we're really starting to see technology start to carry some of its weight here on the improvement. I think the next 10 to 15 basis points improvement will probably be driven more by tech and continued scalability of our platform. But we imagine this ratio will continue to decline as we efficiently fund our loans via some of these technological enhancements that Chris and Abhinav and Dash all mentioned today in their prepared remarks.

第二，我們的變動費用結構在這裡帶來了很大的效益，而我們也真的開始看到科技在改善上開始發揮其應有的作用。我認為接下來10到15個基點的改善，可能會更多由科技以及平台持續擴展性所驅動。但我們預期，隨著我們透過Chris、Abhinav與Dash今天在事先準備的發言中提到的一些技術強化，更有效率地為貸款提供資金，這個比率將會持續下降。

Marissa Lobo, UBS.

Marissa Lobo，瑞銀（UBS）。

Just thinking about gain on sale margins. You flagged that banks were competing aggressively in Q2, but Sequoia margins were better than we expected. So how much of that resilience was mix versus pricing discipline? And as banks lean in further, how should we think about how the gain on sale margins evolve?

我想談一下出售收益（gain on sale）利差。你提到第二季銀行競爭相當激烈，但 Sequoia 的利差表現比我們預期更好。所以這種韌性有多少是來自產品/業務組合（mix），又有多少是來自定價紀律？另外，隨著銀行進一步加大投入，我們應該如何看待出售收益利差的演變？

Yeah, we observed -- and certainly, we're still kind of midway through earnings season here. But we definitely observed the large money center banks leaning back in whether that was front running, the anticipated capital rule changes. We're not certain, but certainly, 20%, 30% sequential gains in volume at meaningfully lower margins, at least from what was disclosed, sort of indicate to us that you saw some leaning back in.

是的，我們觀察到——而且當然，目前我們仍算是在財報季進行到一半。但我們確實看到大型貨幣中心銀行重新加大投入，可能是為了搶先布局（front running）預期中的資本規則變更。我們不敢完全確定，但從已披露的資訊來看，單季環比量能成長 20%、30%，但利差明顯更低，這些跡象在我們看來顯示確實有人在重新加碼。

It'll be interesting to see what overall industry volumes do for the quarter. We did a pretty good job of maintaining our volumes or demonstrating consistency even while staying risk-minded. Part of staying risk-minded is preserving margins and not chasing volume. I thought we did a good job of that during the quarter. Our business has really been built to be a holistic partner to banks.

接下來要看本季整體產業量能會如何，會很有意思。我們在維持量能方面做得相當不錯，或至少在保持風險意識的同時展現一致性。保持風險意識的一部分，就是守住利差，而不是為了追量而犧牲利差。我認為我們本季在這方面做得很好。我們的業務模式，確實是以成為銀行的全方位合作夥伴為核心建立起來的。

In July, we actually locked a very large bulk sale to a regional bank. We've been mostly buying loans from banks over the past few years, but there could be two-way flows. The real essence of the franchise is the relationship itself and the technology implementations, the LO training, all of those things that go into a partnership.

在 7 月，我們實際上與一家區域性銀行鎖定了一筆非常大型的整批出售（bulk sale）。過去幾年我們多半是向銀行買入貸款，但也可能出現雙向流動。這個特許經營（franchise）的真正核心在於關係本身，以及技術導入、貸款專員（LO）訓練，以及所有構成合作夥伴關係的要素。

So if the banks want to lean in, particularly the regional banks, and they want a capital partner to help them do that, we're very much focused on serving our clients. That said, we don't necessarily see housing activity meaningfully higher and certainly refi activity had trended down over the past quarter. These do look to be kind of market share battles between perhaps the banks and the non-banks from an originator standpoint. We'll look when the smoke clears on Q2 earnings season to kind of see where overall volumes landed.

因此，如果銀行——特別是區域性銀行——想要加大投入，並希望有資本合作夥伴協助他們做到這點，我們會非常專注於服務客戶。話雖如此，我們並不一定看到房市活動顯著升溫，而且再融資（refi）活動在過去一季確實呈下降趨勢。從發起端（originator）的角度看，這看起來更像是銀行與非銀行機構之間的市占爭奪戰。等到第二季財報季塵埃落定後，我們會再看看整體量能最終落在哪裡。

Got it. Thanks for that. Can you provide any color on book value performance quarter to date?

了解。謝謝你的說明。你能否提供一些關於本季迄今（quarter to date）帳面價值（book value）表現的資訊？

Yeah. We're up about approximately 1%. We've recovered part of Q2's decline.

可以。我們大約上升了 1%。我們已收復了第二季下滑的一部分。

Yeah, that 1% is certainly a function of strong mortgage banking results [in] supply.

是的，那 1% 當然主要是因為按揭銀行業務（mortgage banking）在供給端帶來的強勁成果。

Crispin Love, Piper Sandler.

Crispin Love，Piper Sandler。

This is Ben Graham in for Crispin Love. Thanks so much for taking the question. I'm wondering what your views are on the administration really focusing on housing, specifically housing affordability through GSE purchases, the single-family executive order, et cetera. Just broadly, what do you think would be some of the best ways to address the affordability issues in the US?

我是 Ben Graham，代 Crispin Love 提問。非常感謝讓我提問。我想請教你們如何看待本屆政府把重點放在住房上，特別是透過 GSE 購買、單戶住宅行政命令等方式來改善住房可負擔性。更廣泛地說，你認為解決美國可負擔性問題的最佳方式有哪些？

Well, I think, the Road to Housing Act, the legislation is very focused on housing supply, which is the right long-term answer. We need more homes built. We need permits to be easier to obtain. We need builders to be profitable. There's a lot in the bill. We were very happy that build-to-rent wasn't adversely impacted at the end of the day. We're excited about the future of our CoreVest business.

我認為《Road to Housing Act》這項立法非常聚焦於住房供給，這是正確的長期解方。我們需要建造更多住房。我們需要更容易取得許可。我們需要讓建商能夠獲利。法案內容涵蓋很多。我們很高興最終「以租代建」（build-to-rent）沒有受到不利影響。我們對 CoreVest 業務的未來感到振奮。

All of those supply initiatives, I think are going to take those are long-run initiatives. In the short run, it's really the demand side is probably all that the administration can hope to affect certainly between now and the midterms. The MBS buying of the GSEs has been pretty evident in the market. There's not as many kind of natural buyers of those bonds.

我認為所有這些供給面的措施都需要時間，屬於長期倡議。短期來看，政府在現在到期中選舉（midterms）之間，可能只能寄望影響需求端。GSE 購買 MBS 在市場上已相當明顯。這些債券的「自然買家」並沒有那麼多。

Certainly, since the Fed stopped buying a few years ago, and to have the GSE step up, I think has certainly helped the TBA market through this very volatile rate period since the conflict with Iran began, certainly. So we've seen some offsetting pressures there, which we suspect are coming from GSE purchases.

尤其是自從聯準會幾年前停止購買後，GSE 站出來加大購買，我認為確實在伊朗衝突開始以來這段利率高度波動期間，對 TBA 市場提供了支撐。因此我們看到一些相互抵銷的壓力，我們推測其中一部分來自 GSE 的購買。

Overall, that makes its way into the non-agency space. We're seeing pretty stable jumbo executions for instance which is very good. In the near term, I'm not sure what else can be done to really rein in mortgage rates. We got a long way to go before we're back into a five handle, if you will, rate, and we see meaningful pickups in refi volume. I think home equity is a big initiative for many in the industry, ways to continue to serve the client without new mortgages.

整體而言，這也會傳導到非機構（non-agency）市場。例如我們看到超大額房貸（jumbo）的執行（execution）相當穩定，這非常好。短期內，我不確定還能做什麼來真正壓低房貸利率。如果你說要回到「5 字頭」（five handle）的利率水準，我們還有很長一段路要走，才能看到再融資量能明顯回升。我認為房屋淨值（home equity）是產業內許多人的一項重要倡議，也就是在不新增房貸的情況下，持續服務客戶的方法。

All of those things we're focused on as well. Overall, I think between now and certainly the end of the year, we're sort of range bound absent any big catalyst.

我們也同樣聚焦在這些方向上。整體來看，從現在到年底，若沒有重大催化因素，我們大致會處於區間震盪（range bound）。

One thing too on the ROAD to Housing legislation. We've seen our CoreVest production a bit softer over the last two quarters. A lot of that was largely tied to the legislation. Now that there's clarity, we have seen a pickup in transaction volume from middle market investors, allowing them to really start to reallocate capital.

另外補充一點關於《ROAD to Housing》立法。過去兩季我們的 CoreVest 產量（production）偏弱一些。其中很大一部分主要與這項立法相關。現在法規已更明朗，我們看到中型市場投資人（middle market investors）的交易量開始回升，讓他們能真正開始重新配置資本。

There was a lot of frozen capital on the sidelines, particularly in parts of the bridge market where we've been really under-penetrated, particularly in build-to-rent, which was about 2% of our volume on the quarter. We might see a mix shift here from some of that pent-up demand. I think our term sheets issued are up about 40% since the trough in the spring when this was really an overhang on the sector.

先前有大量資本凍結在場邊，特別是在我們滲透率仍偏低的部分過橋（bridge）市場，尤其是以租代建（build-to-rent）；該項在本季約占我們量能的 2%。隨著部分被壓抑的需求釋放，我們可能會看到組合出現轉移（mix shift）。我認為自春季低點以來——當時這確實是該產業的一個壓力來源——我們發出的條款清單（term sheets）已上升約 40%。

So CoreVest had a quarter where income picked up, and we should see more of that as some of these deals get done.

因此 CoreVest 本季收入有所回升，隨著部分交易完成，我們應該會看到更多這樣的表現。

(Operator Instructions) Mikhail Goberman, Citizens JMP.

（接線員指示）Mikhail Goberman，Citizens JMP。

If I could maybe dig in and get some more color on your general thoughts on the non-QM space, what you guys are seeing in that Aspire segment of yours. Your thoughts on the progression of lock volume going forward, which has been obviously very excellent, and also your expectations for margins going forward.

我想更深入請教一下你們對非 QM（non-QM）市場的整體看法，以及你們在 Aspire 這個分部看到的情況。也想聽聽你們對未來鎖定量（lock volume）走勢的看法——這方面表現顯然非常出色——以及你們對未來利差的預期。

Thanks, Mikhail. It's Dash. I can start there. We are still very much of the view that the non-QM market is going to continue to grow. As I think we said in the prepared remarks, there's 20% or so expected growth this year.

謝謝你，Mikhail。我是 Dash。我先開始回答。我們仍然非常認為非 QM 市場會持續成長。正如我們在事先準備的發言中提到的，今年預期成長約 20%。

We think with Aspire, we're leaning in at the right time to what's definitely a growing market. I think some of that, as always with these consumer products, is just consumer awareness, and I think the market's come a long way over the past couple of years in making consumers that qualify for these loans aware that they can qualify, the folks that aren't traditional W-2 employees. I think that's been a big development for the sector.

我們認為 Aspire 在正確的時間加大投入，因為這確實是一個成長中的市場。我想其中一部分——就像這類消費型產品一向如此——在於消費者認知；而我認為過去幾年市場已經有很大進展，讓符合這類貸款資格的消費者知道自己其實可以申請，特別是那些不是傳統 W-2 受薪員工的人。我認為這是該領域的一項重大發展。

In terms of how we're approaching it, one of the value propositions for Aspire from the beginning has always been just the incredibly strong foundation from our Sequoia business and the years-long relationships we've had with sellers, more of whom we've seen insource these sorts of expanded credit products.

就我們的做法而言，Aspire 從一開始的價值主張之一，一直是建立在我們 Sequoia 業務極其強健的基礎之上，以及我們與賣方多年來建立的長期關係；而我們也看到其中更多賣方把這類擴展型信貸產品轉為內部承作。

As rates have stayed high, as you know, a lot of our longtime relationships that we've bought jumbo loans from for a very long time have begun to insource these loans over the past couple of years to diversify their product offerings, retain and attract LOs, et cetera. I think that competitive advantage has been empirical in Aspire's growth. At this point, two-thirds or so of our Aspire production is with existing Sequoia relationships, which is pretty close to how we expected it to happen.

如你所知，在利率維持高檔的情況下，我們許多長期合作夥伴——我們長期以來向其購買巨額貸款（jumbo loans）——在過去幾年開始把這些貸款轉為內部承作，以多元化其產品供給、留任並吸引貸款專員（LOs）等等。我認為這項競爭優勢已在 Aspire 的成長中得到實證。目前，我們約三分之二的 Aspire 產量來自既有的 Sequoia 關係，這與我們原先預期的發展方式相當接近。

But we're also growing with new sellers, and we have a lot of existing sellers that aren't online yet. When you think about the growth to $2 billion a quarter, some of that runway is what underpins our goal that Aspire speaks for closer to a 10% market share by the end of this year or early next year, up from what we estimate to be 5% to 6% currently.

但我們也在與新賣方一起成長，而且我們有不少既有賣方尚未上線。當你思考每季成長到 20 億美元時，其中一部分的成長跑道支撐了我們的目標：讓 Aspire 在今年底或明年初的市占率更接近 10%，高於我們目前估計的 5% 到 6%。

As it relates to margins, we're still expecting to be very much in our long-term range of [75 to 100]. We're excited to get this new joint venture up and running as sort of a fast follow from the Castlelake joint venture and the Sequoia business.

就利差而言，我們仍預期會非常接近我們的長期區間[75 到 100]。我們很期待讓這個新的合資企業（JV）上線運作，作為 Castlelake 合資以及 Sequoia 業務之後的快速跟進。

Those JVs in general, just to speak to that for a second, just the pricing power that they give us in the market and the ability that we have to leverage our internal capital 10 to 20 times with these partnerships. Our dollar goes a lot further and at higher ROEs when you combine the certainty of those economics, the fees we earn, and obviously, the fact that we're partnered with [ParaPursuit] Capital next to us, that's 80% to 90% plus of the equity of those vehicles. It's become a really virtuous cycle with how we've brought some of this outside capital in to drive growth. We certainly expect Aspire to continue to grow.

這些合資案整體而言，稍微談一下，它們帶給我們在市場上的定價能力，以及透過這些合作夥伴關係把我們的內部資本放大 10 到 20 倍的能力。當你把這些經濟條件的確定性、我們賺取的費用，以及很明顯地——我們與 [ParaPursuit] Capital 並肩合作（其持有這些載體 80% 到 90% 以上的股權）——結合起來時，我們的每一美元能走得更遠，且能帶來更高的 ROE。我們引入部分外部資本來推動成長，已形成一個非常良性的循環。我們當然預期 Aspire 會持續成長。

I would say that the market in general, Mikhail, continues to be very responsive to these sorts of cash flows. If you think about the ability to access mortgage credit, the GSEs haven't issued deals in a while. It's uncertain when they'll do that again. The non-QM market continues to be a pretty efficient vehicle for investors to put capital to work in US housing credit. I think you've seen that in how well the markets absorb volumes and obviously with the overall growth.

我會說，Mikhail，整體市場對這類現金流仍然非常買單。如果你想想取得房貸信用的能力，GSEs 已經有一段時間沒有發行交易了。他們何時會再做也不確定。非 QM 市場仍是投資人將資本投入美國住宅信貸的一個相當有效率的工具。我想你也從市場吸收量能的表現，以及整體成長中看到了這一點。

Thanks, Dash. That's much appreciated. If I could squeeze in one more, just your guys' general thoughts on borrower credit quality at the mid-year point. Thanks.

謝謝，Dash。非常感謝。如果我可以再塞一個問題，你們對於年中時點借款人信用品質的整體看法是什麼？謝謝。

In our experience, Mikhail, it's been quite stable. We track obviously our delinquencies and certainly our underwriting guides, and we've been pretty fortunate with the performance of the book up to this point. More broadly, obviously there's some warning signs out there, but I think for us, we're focused on working down our legacy book and in Aspire and Sequoia is a pretty consistent credit performance.

以我們的經驗來看，Mikhail，整體相當穩定。我們當然會追蹤逾期情況以及我們的承作（underwriting）指引，到目前為止，這個資產組合的表現我們算是相當幸運。更廣泛來看，外部確實有一些警訊，但對我們而言，我們專注於逐步降低我們的存量舊帳（legacy book），而 Aspire 與 Sequoia 的信用表現相當一致。

Bose George, KBW.

Bose George，KBW。

Just wanted to go back to the expenses discussion. The comp expense was down quite a bit quarter over quarter. Was there some structural stuff, or was it just like Q1, I guess, had some of the year end? Anything to just call out there?

我想回到費用的討論。薪酬費用（comp expense）季對季下降不少。這是有一些結構性的因素，還是只是像第一季可能包含一些年終項目？有什麼需要特別點出的嗎？

Yeah. Thanks for asking. Part of our prepared remarks were just really calling out that we did have about $5 million to $7 million of kind of restructuring related expenses in that Q1 number. We expected that to come out of our run rate.

是的。謝謝提問。我們在事先準備的講稿中其實有特別提到，第一季的數字中大約包含 500 萬到 700 萬美元的重整相關費用。我們預期這部分會從我們的常態費用率中消失。

We had originally guided, I think, last quarter that we should be inside our fixed comp from Q4, which we saw in G&A by a couple million bucks. And so we had about $7 million or $8 million that was attributable to just the one-timers that were in last quarter. But we did have lower acquisition costs just based on slightly a smaller volume. We did have slightly lower portfolio management costs relative to the first quarter, and then just generally fixed comp expense and some variable costs were the remainder of the delta.

我記得我們在上季原先指引，我們的固定薪酬應該會落在第四季的水準之內；而我們在 G&A 上確實看到下降了幾百萬美元。因此，大約有 700 萬到 800 萬美元可歸因於上季的一次性項目。不過，由於量能稍微小一些，我們的取得成本（acquisition costs）也較低。相較第一季，我們的投組管理成本也略低；另外固定薪酬費用以及一些變動成本，則構成其餘的差異。

We've really tried to ensure that we're putting out enough metrics on the expenses of the business, particularly given how much we've increased volume since the fourth quarter for that comparison point where we're down on an annualized basis, probably $10 million to $12 million of G&A, which we had guided, and volume's up a couple billion relative to that quarter. Again, back to the point around technology and our scale. We're proud of those efficiency metrics.

我們一直努力確保在業務費用方面提供足夠的指標，特別是考量到自第四季以來我們的量能增加了很多；以第四季作為比較基準，我們的 G&A 年化大概下降了 1,000 萬到 1,200 萬美元，這也符合我們先前的指引，而相較該季量能則增加了約 20 億美元。再次回到技術與規模的重點。我們對這些效率指標感到自豪。

Okay, great. Makes sense. Thanks. Actually, I didn't know if you mentioned this, but on the allocation of capital, those capital looks like reallocated from mortgage banking to the investment segment. Was that just sort of reflecting the economics of that, or just curious what happened there.

好的，很好。合理。謝謝。另外我不確定你是否提過，但在資本配置上，看起來資本從房貸銀行業務重新配置到投資部門。這只是反映其經濟性，還是想了解一下發生了什麼。

Yeah. We have several servicing or other IO-related assets that hedge our pipeline. At a certain point, if those lose some of their pure hedging value for mortgage banking based on our pipeline, we will move them into the portfolio as we like those profiles as long-term hold assets as well. That was really the mix shift between the capital allocation between the portfolio and mortgage banking.

是的。我們有幾項服務權（servicing）或其他與 IO 相關的資產，用來對沖我們的管線。在某個時間點，如果這些資產基於我們的管線，對房貸銀行業務的純對沖價值下降，我們就會把它們移入投組，因為我們也喜歡這些特性，並將其視為可長期持有的資產。這就是投組與房貸銀行業務之間資本配置變動的主要原因。

Okay. Was the decline in servicing income because of the reallocation or --?

好的。那服務收入的下降是因為重新配置，還是--？

No, we just saw a slight pickup in speeds relative to our Q1 results. That was just a small mark-to-market impact from legacy MSR.

不是，我們只是看到相較第一季的結果，提前償還速度（speeds）略有上升。那只是來自存量 MSR 的一個小幅按市價評價（mark-to-market）影響。

We have reached the end of our question-and-answer session, which now concludes today's teleconference. You may disconnect your lines at this time. Thank you for your participation.

我們的問答環節到此結束，今天的電話會議也就此結束。您現在可以掛斷電話線。感謝您的參與。