People Incorporated (PPLI) 2023 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, and welcome to the IAC and Angi Fourth Quarter 2023 Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) Please note, this event is being recorded.

早安，歡迎參加 IAC 與 Angi 2023 年第四季財報電話會議。（接線員指示）請注意，本活動將被錄音。

I would now like to turn the conference over to Christopher Halpin, CFO and COO of IAC. Please go ahead.

現在我想把會議交給 IAC 的財務長兼營運長 Christopher Halpin。請開始。

Thank you. Good morning, everyone. Christopher Halpin here, and welcome to the IAC and Angi Inc. Fourth Quarter Earnings Call. Joining me today is Joey Levin, CEO of IAC and CEO and Chairman of Angi Inc.

謝謝。各位早安。我是 Christopher Halpin，歡迎參加 IAC 與 Angi Inc. 的第四季財報電話會議。今天與我一同出席的是 Joey Levin，他是 IAC 的執行長，同時也是 Angi Inc. 的執行長兼董事長。

Similar to last quarter, supplemental to our quarterly earnings releases, IAC has also published its quarterly shareholder letter, which is currently available on the Investor Relations section of IAC's website. We will not be reading the shareholder letter on this call. I'll shortly turn the call over to Joey to make a few brief introductory remarks, and we'll then open it up to Q&A.

與上季類似，作為我們季度財報新聞稿的補充，IAC 也已發布季度股東信，目前可於 IAC 官網的投資人關係（Investor Relations）專區取得。我們不會在本次電話會議中朗讀股東信。我稍後會把電話交給 Joey 做幾點簡短的開場說明，接著我們將開放問答。

Before we get to that, I'd like to remind you that during this presentation, we may discuss our outlook and future performance. These forward-looking statements typically may be preceded by words such as we expect, we believe, we anticipate or similar statements. These forward-looking views are subject to risks and uncertainties, and our actual results could differ materially from the views expressed today. Some of these risks have been set forth in IAC's and Angi Inc.'s fourth quarter earnings releases and our respective filings with the SEC.

在開始之前，我想提醒各位，在本次簡報中我們可能會討論我們的展望與未來表現。這些前瞻性陳述通常會以「我們預期」、「我們相信」、「我們預估」或類似措辭作為開頭。這些前瞻性觀點受到風險與不確定性影響，我們的實際結果可能與今日所表達的觀點有重大差異。其中部分風險已載於 IAC 與 Angi Inc. 的第四季財報新聞稿，以及我們各自向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的文件中。

We'll also discuss certain non-GAAP measures, which, as a reminder, include adjusted EBITDA, which we'll refer to today as EBITDA for simplicity during the call. I'll also refer you to our earnings releases, the IAC shareholder letter, our public filings with the SEC and, again, to the Investor Relations section of our respective websites for all comparable GAAP measures and full reconciliations for all material non-GAAP measures.

我們也會討論某些非 GAAP 指標。提醒各位，其中包括調整後 EBITDA；為了簡化，本次電話會議中我們將其簡稱為 EBITDA。我也請各位參閱我們的財報新聞稿、IAC 股東信、我們向 SEC 提交的公開文件，以及再次提醒，請至我們各自網站的投資人關係專區查閱所有可比較的 GAAP 指標，以及所有重大非 GAAP 指標的完整調節表。

Now I'll turn it over to Joey.

現在我把電話交給 Joey。

Good morning. Happy Valentine's Day. I think I've done this call on Valentine's Day many times over the years, so I'm not going to try another bad Valentine's joke. Hopefully, you've all had a chance to read the letter and review the numbers.

早安，情人節快樂。我想這些年來我在情人節做過很多次這通電話會議，所以我就不再講另一個很爛的情人節笑話了。希望各位都已經有機會讀過股東信並檢視數字。

I want to start again by giving you a very big thank you to all the teams across the businesses at IAC and the corporate folks at IAC, at Angi, Dotdash Meredith, MGM, Turo for making our job much easier this quarter. It's a heck of a lot easier to write these letters and get on these calls when the news is good, so thanks to everyone for making that happen.

我想再次先向 IAC 各事業團隊與 IAC 的企業團隊，以及 Angi、Dotdash Meredith、MGM、Turo 的同仁致上非常大的感謝，謝謝你們讓我們這一季的工作輕鬆許多。當消息是好的時候，寫這些信、上這些電話會議都容易得多，所以謝謝大家促成這一切。

And it wasn't just 1 quarter. 2023 was a year of real hard work, changing our mindset, getting things done on behalf of our customers and the long-term health of our businesses. And it really paid off in this last quarter. So thank you all. Hopefully, some of you are listening in this Valentine's morning. And that's why Chris and I have a spring in our step this morning. It's not just Valentine's Day, that's performance.

而且不只是單一季度。2023 年是一年真正努力的一年：改變我們的心態、為客戶與我們業務的長期健康把事情做成。而這些努力在上一季確實獲得回報。所以謝謝大家。希望你們當中有些人正在這個情人節早晨收聽。這也是為什麼 Chris 和我今天早上步伐輕快。這不只是情人節，這是績效表現。

So Drew, let's get to questions. Thank you.

那麼 Drew，我們開始提問吧。謝謝。

(Operator Instructions) The first question comes from Cory Carpenter with JPMorgan.

（接線員指示）第一個問題來自 JPMorgan 的 Cory Carpenter。

I had 2 on Angi. Maybe Joey first, could you just expand on the trends you saw in the fourth quarter and what led to the upside relative to your guide for Angi? And then secondly, it would be helpful to hear your expectations on the revenue side for Angi this year and what's embedded within your '24 profit outlook.

我有兩個關於 Angi 的問題。也許先請 Joey，能否請你更詳細說明第四季你們看到的趨勢，以及是什麼因素讓 Angi 的表現優於你們的指引？第二個問題，希望能聽聽你們對 Angi 今年營收面的預期，以及你們 2024 年獲利展望中所隱含的假設。

Sure. Thanks, Cory. I'll take the first, and Chris will do the second. The biggest thing that we've underestimated, and we've really continually underestimated this is -- notwithstanding talking about it a lot, is service professional retention. And the progress there has been tremendous.

當然。謝謝你，Cory。第一題我來回答，第二題 Chris 來回答。我們低估的最大因素，而且我們一直持續低估——儘管我們談了很多——就是服務專業人士（service professional）的留存。而這方面的進展非常顯著。

It's a result of a lot of things we've done to drive satisfaction, first of all, targeting better service professionals with sales; giving them more compelling, committed offers; giving them a chance of success, and some things we've done on the demand side to improve the mix of demand to help their win rates. And that retention has continued to move up.

這是我們做了很多事情以提升滿意度的結果：首先，在銷售端鎖定更優質的服務專業人士；提供他們更具吸引力、承諾更明確的方案；讓他們有成功的機會；以及我們在需求端做的一些事情，改善需求組合以提升他們的得標率（win rates）。而留存率也持續上升。

And I think we haven't gotten as good at sort of modeling that upside, and we look at it conservatively. But as that comes through, it makes each individual transaction for us, unit economics more profitable because we have more service professionals active and engaging with service request. Related to that is things like bad debt. We've been outperforming on bad debt all year because, again, we have happier service professionals.

我認為我們在建模這種上行（upside）方面還不夠成熟，因此我們會偏保守地看待。但當這些成果反映出來時，因為有更多服務專業人士保持活躍並參與服務需求（service request），我們每一筆交易的單位經濟（unit economics）就更有利可圖。與此相關的還有像是壞帳（bad debt）。我們今年在壞帳表現上一直優於預期，原因同樣是我們擁有更滿意的服務專業人士。

The other thing is the margins in our paid marketing. And we've been expanding the margins in our paid marketing through, I think, a combination of smarter spend and some conversion improvements. And obviously, that's good for margins.

另一個因素是我們付費行銷（paid marketing）的利潤率。我們透過更聰明的投放，以及一些轉換率（conversion）改善，擴大了付費行銷的利潤率。顯然，這對毛利率是有利的。

And all year 2023, relative to 2022, we've been much tighter on fixed costs and costs in general. And so the combination of those things all came through on profit. And I think a lot of those trends are -- I would say, almost all of what I just said, I think, is durable, sustainable for the future. So that's, I think, a good thing for Angi's margins.

而在 2023 年整年，相較於 2022 年，我們在固定成本與整體成本上都控管得更緊。因此，這些因素的組合都反映在獲利上。我認為這些趨勢——我會說我剛才提到的幾乎全部——都是耐久且可持續的。因此我認為這對 Angi 的利潤率是件好事。

Yes. Thanks, Cory. In terms of outlook for '24, we expect the revenue trend to improve over the course of the year from the declines you saw in Q4. But we also think it's important to remain -- retain flexibility in terms of revenue growth in order to do what we need to do to keep improving the foundation for user experiences, both on the pro side and homeowner side.

是的，謝謝你，Cory。就 2024 年展望而言，我們預期營收趨勢會在一年當中逐步改善，相較於你在 2023 年第四季看到的下滑。不過我們也認為，為了持續改善使用者體驗的基礎——無論是專業人士端（pro side）或屋主端（homeowner side）——在營收成長方面保留彈性仍然很重要。

What does that mean in Q1? We'd expect to decline in revenue year-over-year to be roughly the same rate as we experienced in aggregate in Q4 of '23, maybe a little bit better in Q1. The bulk of the actions that we took last year to eliminate low-margin and low-quality revenues really showed up in Q2 of last year. So the comps do get easier. Q1 will be the most challenging.

這在第一季意味著什麼？我們預期第一季營收年減幅度大致會與 2023 年第四季整體的年減幅度相近，第一季可能會稍微好一些。去年我們採取的大部分行動，用以剔除低毛利與低品質營收，主要在去年第二季反映出來。因此比較基期（comps）會變得更容易；第一季將是最具挑戰的一季。

We expect year-over-year revenue declines throughout '24, but expect that percentage to narrow as we lap the easier comps and also the fruits of some of the actions that Joey talked about, and we're taking on the demand side begin to show. But we're not forecasting a return to revenue growth this year.

我們預期 2024 年全年營收仍將呈現年減，但隨著我們跨過較容易的比較基期，以及 Joey 提到的一些行動成果、以及我們在需求端採取的措施開始顯現，年減百分比預期會收斂。不過我們並未預測今年會回到營收成長。

On profitability, we expect to sustain the 10% plus EBITDA margins we demonstrated in this last quarter when you normalize for the insurance settlement. We expect Q1 adjusted EBITDA to be up slightly year-over-year, despite the lower revenue over what we generated -- to be up over what we generated in Q1 of '23. And we'd forecast 10% to 12% adjusted EBITDA margins each quarter in '24. So -- and that's how you get to the $120 million to $150 million of adjusted EBITDA on our guidance.

在獲利方面，當你將保險理賠（insurance settlement）影響正常化後，我們預期能維持上一季所展現的 10% 以上 EBITDA 利潤率。我們預期第一季調整後 EBITDA 將較去年同期小幅成長，儘管營收低於我們在 2023 年第一季所創造的水準。我們預估 2024 年每一季的調整後 EBITDA 利潤率為 10% 至 12%。因此——這就是我們指引中調整後 EBITDA 介於 1.2 億至 1.5 億美元的由來。

The next question comes from John Blackledge with TD Cowen.

下一個問題來自 TD Cowen 的 John Blackledge。

Two questions. First on Dotdash, DDM Digital, the Ad revenue growth acceleration was better than expected. Can you talk about the key drivers of the acceleration? And then for '24, how should we think about the trajectory of DDM Digital Ad revenue growth and EBITDA for the segment, just given the acceleration in EBITDA upside in 4Q?

兩個問題。第一個關於 Dotdash、DDM Digital：廣告營收成長加速優於預期。你能談談加速的主要驅動因素嗎？另外，對於 2024 年，我們應如何看待 DDM Digital 廣告營收成長與該部門 EBITDA 的走勢，考量到第四季 EBITDA 上行加速？

And then second question on free cash flow in '24. It looks like IAC will return to kind of be a big free cash flow generator. Any way to kind of frame free cash flow conversion of EBITDA in '24?

第二個問題關於 2024 年自由現金流。看起來 IAC 將回到成為一個大型自由現金流產生者。能否提供一個方式來框架 2024 年自由現金流相對於 EBITDA 的轉換率？

I'll start, and then I'll turn to Chris again. Digital revenue growth was really all the key factors: traffic, meaning volume; price, meaning ad sales rate; premium sales monetization. And that was, I think, a big win for the business and a big change in direction that we're pretty proud of. You can see that core sessions, which is over 80% of traffic, grew 10% and continued to accelerate. I mean, that's a really nice trend to see. And the rate, if you just look at revenue per session, up nicely, too.

我先開始，然後再把話題交回給 Chris。數位營收成長其實來自所有關鍵因素：流量，也就是量；價格，也就是廣告銷售費率；以及高級銷售（Premium sales）的變現。而我認為，這對業務而言是一個重大勝利，也是我們相當自豪的一個方向性重大轉變。你可以看到核心工作階段（core sessions，占流量的 80% 以上）成長了 10%，而且持續加速。我的意思是，這是一個非常好的趨勢。此外，如果你只看每次工作階段的營收（revenue per session），也有明顯提升。

Premium sales is about 2/3 of our Ad revenue, and that was solid really for the first time since the Ad recession started in Q2 of '22. That's a credit to, again, performance of our product, but also the combined sales force just working well together.

高級銷售約占我們廣告營收的 2/3，而這是自 2022 年第二季廣告衰退開始以來，第一次真正表現穩健。這要歸功於我們產品的表現，另外也要歸功於整合後的銷售團隊協作得很好。

And programmatic was excellent. We mentioned this in the letter, but we think our CPMs are growing more than the market, and that's a combination of, again, technology and performance. And performance marketing, which has been a real source of strength throughout the year is -- continues to do well.

而程式化（programmatic）表現非常出色。我們在信中提到過，我們認為我們的 CPM 成長幅度高於市場，而這同樣是技術與成效的綜合結果。至於成效行銷（performance marketing），它在全年一直是重要的強項——目前仍持續表現良好。

And the one thing I want to add on performance marketing is in this area, performance -- where we're delivering performance marketing, the product that we're creating is something that our users really want from us. Users really want to hear from food and wine on what is the best air fryer. And we delivered that. We deliver that unbiased. We deliver that with real work put into the product.

另外我想補充一點關於成效行銷：在我們提供成效行銷的這個領域，我們打造的產品其實是使用者真正希望我們提供的。使用者真的想從 Food & Wine 得知哪一款氣炸鍋最好，而我們做到了。我們以客觀公正的方式提供，也在產品上投入了真正的工作。

And then that also happens to monetize well because it delivers performance marketing. But you do that across all the Dotdash Meredith brands, and there's a huge opportunity there. And I think we've done a really good job. That was sort of central to the acquisition thesis with Meredith, and I think we've done a really good job executing against that, and it's shown up a lot over the course of 2023.

而這也恰好能很好地變現，因為它能帶來成效行銷。但如果你把這套做法擴展到所有 Dotdash Meredith 品牌，機會非常大。我認為我們做得非常好。這在某種程度上是我們收購 Meredith 的核心投資論點之一，而我認為我們在執行上做得很到位，且在 2023 年的過程中已充分反映出來。

Thanks, Joey. '24, John, how we would think about overall trends in phasing is we expect Digital revenue to continue to grow for all the factors that Joe articulated, while Print revenues will continue to decline. Digital traffic and monetization have continued their momentum into the first quarter of '24.

謝謝你，Joey。John，談到 2024 年整體趨勢的節奏（phasing），我們預期數位營收將因 Joe 所闡述的所有因素而持續成長，而印刷（Print）營收將持續下滑。數位流量與變現動能已延續到 2024 年第一季。

The Ad market is fine, not great, not bad. And we think we're taking share -- we definitely think we're taking share on traffic and also on some on revenue per session. So for the year, we'd expect 10% plus Digital growth across '24.

廣告市場還可以，不算很好，也不算差。我們認為我們正在取得市占——我們確實認為在流量上、以及部分在每次工作階段營收（revenue per session）上都在取得市占。因此就全年而言，我們預期 2024 年數位業務成長可達 10% 以上。

Conversely, Print revenues declined 12% in Q4 of '23, and we'd expect similar declines next year. Especially in the first half, may slow down a bit in terms of decline in the second half.

相對地，2023 年第四季印刷營收下滑 12%，我們預期明年也會有類似幅度的下滑。尤其在上半年；下半年下滑幅度可能會稍微放緩。

When you look at our profitability, our guidance is $280 million to $300 million in adjusted EBITDA across all of Dotdash for the year versus $267 million in adjusted EBITDA in '23. But there's some layers to that. It implies 5% to 10% EBITDA growth. But what's really happening is strong growth and margin expansion continuing in Digital and then offset by some profitability declines, which is what we'd expect.

從獲利能力來看，我們對全年 Dotdash 的調整後 EBITDA 指引為 2.8 億至 3 億美元，相較於 2023 年的調整後 EBITDA 2.67 億美元。但這裡面有一些層次：這代表 EBITDA 成長 5% 至 10%。但實際上發生的是，數位端持續強勁成長並擴張利潤率，而另一方面則被我們預期中的獲利下滑所抵銷。

We've said our aim is to have our Print EBITDA offset our Corporate segment. But in '23, Print actually significantly outperformed Corporate by $24 million. In this current fiscal year, we'd expect the 2 to be pretty much equal. So really, all of that $280 million to $300 million of adjusted EBITDA guidance for this coming year is Digital EBITDA.

我們曾表示，我們的目標是讓印刷業務的 EBITDA 抵銷公司（Corporate）部門。但在 2023 年，印刷業務實際上比 Corporate 顯著高出 2,400 萬美元。在本會計年度，我們預期兩者大致相當。因此，明年這 2.8 億至 3 億美元的調整後 EBITDA 指引，基本上全部都是數位 EBITDA。

That pattern will be pronounced in the first quarter. We expect Digital EBITDA to grow 40% plus year-over-year in the quarter. Print will be roughly breakeven on an adjusted EBITDA basis in the quarter. It's seasonally the smallest revenue. And also, we've got some expense increases like postage flowing through.

這種型態在第一季會更明顯。我們預期本季數位 EBITDA 年增 40% 以上。印刷業務在本季以調整後 EBITDA 計將大致損益兩平。這一季的營收季節性最小，而且我們也有一些費用增加，例如郵資（postage）會反映進來。

And then finally, Corporate expense should be roughly equal in the $9 million range to what we saw in Q4. For those looking year-over-year, just remember, we had the $44 million lease impairment that flowed through in Q1 of '23 in Corporate.

最後，Corporate 費用應大致與第四季相同，約在 900 萬美元左右。對於看年對年的人，請記得 2023 年第一季 Corporate 中有 4,400 萬美元的租賃減損（lease impairment）入帳。

When you roll that up, adjusted EBITDA in aggregate will grow in Q1, but strong Digital growth will be masked by declines in Print. And then for the year, Digital revenue should continue, as we said, at 10-plus growth. You'll see that margin scale, the incremental margins and the seasonal uplift. And we feel good about the momentum trend across the business.

把這些加總起來，第一季整體調整後 EBITDA 會成長，但數位端的強勁成長會被印刷端的下滑所掩蓋。至於全年，數位營收如我們所說應可維持 10% 以上的成長。你會看到利潤率規模效益、增量利潤率（incremental margins）以及季節性回升。我們對整體業務的動能趨勢感到樂觀。

Your last question on free cash flow conversion across all of IAC, if I'm getting that right, we felt good about getting back to free cash flow generation. Last year, it's been a major point of focus by Joey to all of us. And we expect our conversion to only improve in '24 due to a couple of factors.

你最後一個問題是關於 IAC 整體的自由現金流轉換率（free cash flow conversion），如果我理解正確的話，我們對重回自由現金流產生能力感到滿意。去年這一直是 Joey 對我們所有人的重要關注重點。我們預期 2024 年轉換率只會因幾個因素而改善。

One is aggregate EBITDA, as evidenced in our guidance, should be up even with the sale of Mosaic, led by DDM and Angi. CapEx should stay in the $70 million range. Last year, in that 15% conversion that you referenced, we purchased the land under our headquarters for $80 million. That's obviously not recurring.

第一，整體 EBITDA 如我們指引所示，即使出售 Mosaic，仍應上升，主要由 DDM 與 Angi 帶動。資本支出（CapEx）應維持在約 7,000 萬美元。去年你提到的 15% 轉換率中，我們以 8,000 萬美元買下總部所在地的土地，這顯然不是經常性項目。

Interest -- net interest expense should only improve with higher yield for the full year than we had in our cash last year. And then we've got $1.4 billion of NOLs, which is a substantial tax shield. So roll that all up and we would expect 50% plus of adjusted EBITDA to convert into free cash flow in '24, and look forward to continue to improve going forward.

利息——淨利息費用（net interest expense）應會改善，因為我們全年現金的收益率會高於去年。再者，我們有 14 億美元的 NOL（淨營業虧損結轉），這是相當可觀的稅務屏障。把這些因素加總，我們預期 2024 年調整後 EBITDA 的 50% 以上可轉換為自由現金流，並期待未來持續改善。

The next question comes from Brian Fitzgerald with Wells Fargo.

下一個問題來自 Wells Fargo 的 Brian Fitzgerald。

On Angi, thanks again for the comments on the shape of the year there. We wanted to ask more specifically on consumer demand. I think the service request decline was one of the steepest we've seen since you've been prioritizing quality and profitability. Are you closing in on getting the customer acquisition engine where you want it and getting to scale that back up? Do you have line of sight for when that hits sometime in '24?

關於 Angi，謝謝你們再次就今年的走勢所做的評論。我們想更具體地問一下消費者需求。我認為服務請求（service request）的下滑是自你們開始優先考量品質與獲利能力以來，我們見過最陡峭的一次。你們是否正接近把客戶獲取引擎調整到你們想要的狀態，並把規模再拉回來？你們是否能看得到在 2024 年某個時間點達成的明確路徑（line of sight）？

Sure, Brian. I would say not yet in terms of line of sight. We are making real progress. We are -- and I'll also just point out, and I think you said some layer of monetized transactions are doing better than the trend line in service requests because we are doing a better job with stuff that monetizes well and matching that better with service professionals. So that service request decline, while steep, is not as steep to the business as it appears.

當然，Brian。我會說目前就明確路徑而言還沒有。我們正在取得實質進展。我們也——我再補充一點，我想你也提到，部分已變現交易（monetized transactions）的表現其實優於服務請求的趨勢線，因為我們在更能有效變現的項目上做得更好，並且更好地與服務專業人士（service professionals）進行匹配。因此，服務請求的下滑雖然陡峭，但對業務的影響並沒有看起來那麼大。

But maybe it's helpful to talk about some of the things that we're working on and how those impact the business. I mentioned before, and I'll keep mentioning this because it's so important to the business, the service professional retention trends and, relatedly, the improvement in monetized transactions per SR. Those things improve our margins on the unit economics of any transaction. And they also are going to start to improve our marketing allowables, which means that we can go out in our paid marketing and buy more, buy better, because the -- we have better matching behind it.

不過，或許談談我們正在做的一些事情以及它們如何影響業務會更有幫助。我之前提過，而且我會持續提，因為這對業務非常重要：服務專業人士留存（retention）的趨勢，以及相關的每個 SR 的已變現交易數（monetized transactions per SR）的改善。這些都能提升我們在任何交易單位經濟（unit economics）上的利潤率。同時，它們也將開始改善我們的行銷可允許成本（marketing allowables），這表示我們可以在付費行銷中買到更多、買到更好，因為——我們背後的匹配能力更好了。

The [courses] of demand beyond paid marketing is really a combination of direct and SEO, and that's going to come from improvements in the product experience. We know what drives homeowner satisfaction and homeowner repeat rate, and that's better matching with service professionals and a better chance of getting a job done well.

除了付費行銷之外的需求[courses]，主要是直訪（direct）與 SEO 的組合，而這將來自產品體驗的改善。我們知道什麼能驅動屋主滿意度與屋主回訪率（repeat rate），那就是與服務專業人士更好的匹配，以及更高的機率把工作做好。

And so we are starting to drive those underlying metrics. We shared some of those stats in the letter. And we need that now to show up over time in direct and SEO. It's not going to be sort of an automatic, where it just sort of flip on a switch. But it is something that, over time, with a better experience, you start to see those users coming in, coming in more often, coming in our free channels and referring their friends and family. That's what happens with a better product experience. That does take time for people to realize it.

因此，我們正開始推動那些底層指標。我們在信中分享了其中一些數據。而我們現在需要讓這些成果隨時間在直訪與 SEO 上反映出來。這不會是那種自動發生、好像按下開關就立刻切換的事情。但這確實是會隨時間發生的：當體驗更好時，你會開始看到使用者進來、來得更頻繁、透過我們的免費渠道進來，並且推薦他們的親友。更好的產品體驗就是會帶來這些結果。只是人們需要時間去意識到這一點。

And the other thing I'll say is that is what we saw happen in Europe. Europe has grown 20% the last couple of quarters. Europe is -- I don't know that we'll hold down to 20% exactly, but double-digit growth is very real at Europe. It has been real for a while. And that's a product of, I think, a better customer experience. And the other thing, just tactically, is that the comps do get easier starting in Q2.

另外我想說的是，這正是我們在歐洲看到的情況。歐洲在過去幾個季度成長了 20%。歐洲——我不確定我們是否能精準維持在 20%，但在歐洲，雙位數成長是非常真實的。這已經持續一段時間了。我認為這是更佳客戶體驗的成果。再補充一個戰術層面的點：從第二季開始，比較基期也會變得更容易。

The next question comes from Jason Helfstein with Oppenheimer.

下一個問題來自 Oppenheimer 的 Jason Helfstein。

Two questions on Dotdash Meredith and then a quick housekeeping question. So what percent of ads or coverage does D/Cipher cover? And is there still risk that CPMs fall post cookie deprecation? And then how do you think potentially about offsetting that with a higher mix of performance inventory, so D/Cipher?

有兩個關於 Dotdash Meredith 的問題，然後再一個簡短的行政問題。D/Cipher 覆蓋了多少比例的廣告或投放？在 Cookie 淘汰後，CPM 下滑是否仍有風險？另外，你們如何看待可能透過提高成效型（performance）庫存的占比來抵消這個影響，也就是 D/Cipher？

And then how are you thinking about the impact of the Amazon retail media partnership and then thoughts about expanding that to other DSPs and retail partners in '24? And then I've got a housekeeping question after that.

另外，你們如何看待 Amazon 零售媒體合作夥伴關係的影響？以及在 2024 年將其擴展到其他 DSP 與零售合作夥伴的想法？之後我還有一個行政問題。

Sure. I'll start. The -- a lot of those questions are related. So first, we have D/Cipher in about 30% of our direct ad campaigns since we launched it less than a year ago. And I think that's like 150 clients. And the folks who are buying it are, as far as we can tell, very happy so far.

好的。我先開始。——這些問題很多彼此相關。首先，自從不到一年前推出以來，我們在約 30% 的直客廣告活動中使用了 D/Cipher。我想這大約是 150 個客戶。就我們目前所能判斷，購買這項產品的客戶到目前為止都非常滿意。

No sign that people won't be repeating on that. And then when we've done case studies, and we've done a couple, one with a large well-known beauty brand, we did a case study with Amazon. And in both cases, we saw a meaningful lift relative to cookie-based targeting. And so we're -- we have a lot of confidence in D/Cipher's ability to deliver for our customers.

目前沒有跡象顯示他們不會重複購買。然後我們做過一些個案研究，也做了幾個：一個是與某個大型知名美妝品牌；我們也與 Amazon 做了一個個案研究。在兩個案例中，相較於以 Cookie 為基礎的定向，我們都看到顯著的提升。因此，我們對 D/Cipher 為客戶帶來成效的能力非常有信心。

The -- one of the things that will drive that D/Cipher adoption is plugging into the pipes and the purchase path of DSPs, demand-side platforms, so that advertisers can access D/Cipher's targeting easier or access it in areas where they're already organizing their money and spending their money.

——推動 D/Cipher 採用的一個因素，是把它接入 DSP（需求方平台）的管道與購買路徑，讓廣告主能更容易取得 D/Cipher 的定向能力，或是在他們已經用來配置與投放預算的地方直接使用它。

So Amazon is the first example of that, but we hope and expect that there will be many more of [non-net]. We're obviously targeting the biggest ones first. Working with Amazon is happening already. We're working on something with Google and then we'll look to really integrate with every ad agency.

因此，Amazon 是第一個例子，但我們希望也預期會有更多的 [non-net]。我們當然會先鎖定最大的幾家。與 Amazon 的合作已經在進行中。我們也正在與 Google 推進一些事情，接著我們會尋求與每一家廣告代理商做深度整合。

And this is a thing that's a win-win. It's a win for the advertiser on performance. It's a win for the partner, where their data combined with our data delivers better, more spend. And certainly, it's a win for us. If we can build into those pipes, which I think is totally doable, then we've got big opportunities for growth from here.

而這是一件多方共贏的事：對廣告主而言，在成效上是贏；對合作夥伴而言，他們的數據與我們的數據結合能帶來更好的效果、也帶來更多投放；當然，對我們而言也是贏。如果我們能把產品建進那些管道裡——我認為這完全可行——那麼從現在起我們就有很大的成長機會。

And then just the housekeeping question. The Search and Emerging & Other were both weaker as far as the -- I think, the '24 outlook versus the Street. I guess, with Search, is this the new baseline for Search? Just any color? And then are there any onetime factors you want to call out why Emerging & Other was weaker than the Street as well?

然後是那個行政問題。Search 以及 Emerging & Other 這兩個項目，相較於市場預期（Street），在——我想是 2024 年展望上都比較弱。就 Search 而言，這是否就是 Search 的新基準？能否提供一些說明？另外，Emerging & Other 比市場預期弱，是否有任何一次性因素想特別指出？

Yes. Thank you, Jason. On Search, the business definitely experienced a tougher market environment at the end of last year. You can see that in it producing $7.5 million of adjusted EBITDA in the fourth quarter. This is -- it's continued in the first quarter of this year, but we believe we've reached the baseline where we are, and it should grow from here.

是的。謝謝你，Jason。關於 Search，該業務在去年年底確實遇到較艱難的市場環境。你可以從第四季產生 750 萬美元的調整後 EBITDA 看出來。——這種情況在今年第一季仍在延續，但我們相信我們已經觸及目前所處的基準水準，接下來應該會從這裡開始成長。

The -- that business has always done a great job of finding new areas in digital advertising to create value and create profit streams. That's our goal for '24. But hitting a baseline in profitability recently is what drives the $20 million to $40 million of adjusted EBITDA guidance, and that's really just a reflection of the softer environment for that business.

——這項業務一向很擅長在數位廣告中找到新的領域來創造價值並建立獲利來源。這是我們 2024 年的目標。但近期在獲利能力上觸及基準，正是我們給出 2,000 萬到 4,000 萬美元調整後 EBITDA 指引的原因，而這基本上只是反映該業務所面臨的較疲弱環境。

On Emerging & Other, it's a different story. Last year, that business in '23 generated $41.8 million of adjusted EBITDA. We disclosed a month ago that we signed a definitive agreement to sell our Mosaic subsidiary for $160 million in cash. That is expected to close very shortly, that transaction. Last year, and this is going to be in our disclosure, Mosaic generated about $37 million of revenue per quarter and averaged about $5 million of EBITDA. So think of it as $20 million of the $41.8 million of EBITDA is being sold closing this month.

至於 Emerging & Other，則是不同的故事。去年，也就是 2023 年，該業務產生了 4,180 萬美元的調整後 EBITDA。我們在一個月前披露，我們已簽署具約束力的最終協議，以 1.6 億美元現金出售我們的 Mosaic 子公司。該交易預期將在非常短期內完成交割。去年——而這也會在我們的披露中——Mosaic 每季約產生 3,700 萬美元營收，平均約 500 萬美元 EBITDA。所以可以這樣理解：4,180 萬美元 EBITDA 中約有 2,000 萬美元，將在本月隨交割而被出售。

Additionally, and this is in the guidance section in Joey's letter, we disclosed that in Q1 of this year, we expect to incur about $20 million of transaction expenses associated with that sale. That's obviously nonrecurring, but we'll hit our definition of adjusted EBITDA in the first quarter and for the year.

此外——這也在 Joey 信件的指引部分——我們披露今年第一季預計會產生約 2,000 萬美元、與該出售相關的交易費用。這顯然是非經常性，但在第一季以及全年，它都會影響我們對調整後 EBITDA 的定義口徑。

So the Emerging & Other guidance of 0 to 20, half of that is nonrecurring -- is brought down -- or is impacted by $40 million related to Mosaic. Half of that is nonrecurring transaction expenses, and then half of that is run rate profitability that we sold for $160 million. So on an ongoing basis, I think of it as a $20 million to $40 million adjusted EBITDA segment, and the bulk of that would be [care]. Does that help, Jason?

因此，Emerging & Other 的 0 到 2,000 萬美元指引，其中一半是非經常性——是被拉低——或是受到與 Mosaic 相關的 4,000 萬美元影響。一半是非經常性的交易費用，另一半則是我們以 1.6 億美元出售的常態（run rate）獲利能力。所以從持續經營角度，我會把它視為一個 2,000 萬到 4,000 萬美元調整後 EBITDA 的分部，而其中大部分會是 [care]。這樣有幫助嗎，Jason？

Yes.

有。

The next question comes from Justin Patterson with KeyBanc.

下一個問題來自 KeyBanc 的 Justin Patterson。

Just 2 on Angi. You've kind of alluded to it a little bit so far, but would love to hear just what the top 2 or 3 priorities are for the business in 2024, which is to keep executing on the foundation that you've built. And then just around international, you've mentioned taking some of the learnings from abroad and bringing it domestically into the Angi product. Could you elaborate a little more just what that means and how long that could potentially play out?

關於 Angi 有兩個問題。你們到目前為止已稍微提到一些，但我想更清楚了解 2024 年這項業務最重要的 2 到 3 個優先事項是什麼，也就是持續執行你們已建立的基礎。然後關於國際業務，你們提到把海外的學習帶回國內並導入 Angi 產品。你能否再多說一點這代表什麼，以及這可能會在多長時間內逐步展開？

Yes. So I'd say driving free and repeat traffic through better user experiences. Obviously, that has big impacts on our business, on our P&L, and it's something that everybody in the Angi organization is thinking about.

是的。我會說，第一是透過更好的使用者體驗來推動免費流量與回訪流量。顯然，這會對我們的業務、對我們的損益表（P&L）產生重大影響，而且 Angi 組織中的每個人都在思考這件事。

Second, and again I'm a broken record on this, but we'll keep going to help with the active SP network. That's -- the retention gains we've seen, holding those, growing those, that making sure pros are active and spending more and getting wins for that spend. That's better targeting within the sales to reach our SP network. And you can see that we've been delivering that through better -- through a smaller sales force, better targeted. But again, that all speaks to the health of the active SP network.

第二點——我知道我一直重複——但我們會持續推進，以協助活躍的 SP 網路。——我們看到的留存提升，要把它維持住、擴大它，確保專業人士（pros）保持活躍、投入更多支出，並且讓這些支出帶來成果。這需要在銷售端做更好的定向，以觸達我們的 SP 網路。你也可以看到，我們透過更好的——透過更精簡但更精準的銷售團隊——正在交付這些成果。但同樣地，這一切都指向活躍 SP 網路的健康度。

And the other one, but then, again, that same framework is starting to drive online self-enroll for SPs. The -- and probably the third would be unit economics, which is certainly partially #1 and #2 in terms of demand and supply, but it's also driving things like conversion. We've had some big wins recently on conversion, but we still, I think, have a long way to go in terms of upside on driving conversion.

另外一點是，在同樣的框架下，這也開始推動 SP 的線上自助註冊。——而第三點可能是單位經濟（unit economics）。這當然部分來自於第 1 與第 2 點在需求與供給兩端的改善，但也包括推動像是轉換率（conversion）這類指標。我們最近在轉換率上有一些重大進展，但我仍然認為，在提升轉換率的上行空間方面，我們還有很長的路要走。

We went through a period where conversion across most of our channels leaked a little bit, and I think we can get a lot of that back. And so we're very focused on driving conversion in ways that are a win-win for users in our platform. And when that comes through, that moves the unit economics. So those are the big 3.

我們經歷了一段時期，在我們大多數渠道的轉換率都有些微流失，我認為我們可以把其中很大一部分拿回來。因此，我們非常專注於以對平台用戶雙贏的方式來推動轉換率。當這些成效顯現時，就會改善單位經濟效益。所以這就是三大重點。

In terms of international, one is -- well, first, you saw Jeff Kip, who was running the international business. He did a great job getting that all of Europe onto a common platform and winning user experience. Now he's in the U.S. And some others from his team are now also helping out in the U.S. We brought the head of Performance marketing in Europe and now running Performance Marketing in the U.S. And the product and marketing leadership from Europe and the U.S. are now much more closely intertwined and interacting.

就國際業務而言，第一點是——嗯，首先，你們看到負責國際業務的 Jeff Kip。他在把整個歐洲整合到同一個平台、並提升用戶體驗方面做得非常出色。現在他在美國。而他團隊中的一些人也開始在美國協助。我們把歐洲的成效行銷（Performance Marketing）負責人調來，現在負責美國的成效行銷。此外，歐洲與美國的產品與行銷領導團隊現在也更緊密地交織合作、頻繁互動。

The other thing, and this has been a theme for us for a while, is the -- and maybe it was easier to do this in Europe quietly than it is sort of in the U.S. with the public disclosure. But we did a lot to optimize user experience in Europe over short-term monetization for long-term benefit. And that took a while to come through, but it has delivered in a meaningful way. And those trade-offs are trade-offs that we've been making in the U.S., and we expect to continue making in the U.S.

另一件事，而且這一段時間以來一直是我們的主題，就是——也許在歐洲比較容易低調地做這件事，而在美國因為需要公開揭露就沒那麼容易。但我們在歐洲做了很多優化用戶體驗、以長期利益優先於短期變現的工作。這需要一段時間才會反映出來，但已經以相當有意義的方式帶來成果。而這些取捨也是我們在美國一直在做、並且預期會持續做下去的取捨。

And then the last one, is -- and this is very, very early for us. But the European business is almost entirely online self-enroll as opposed to a phone sales force. And the -- sorry, Europe is almost entirely online self-enroll, and U.S. is basically the inverse. So we're working on a lot of the learnings there to see how we can drive more online self-enroll in the U.S. and rely less on phone sales, and really focus the phone sales on the opportunities that warrant it.

最後一點是——而且對我們來說還非常、非常早期。歐洲業務幾乎完全是線上自助註冊（self-enroll），而不是依賴電話銷售團隊。然後——抱歉，歐洲幾乎完全是線上自助註冊，而美國基本上正好相反。所以我們正在把那邊的許多經驗拿來學習，看看如何在美國推動更多線上自助註冊、降低對電話銷售的依賴，並把電話銷售真正聚焦在值得投入的機會上。

The next question comes from Dan Kurnos with The Benchmark Company.

下一個問題來自 The Benchmark Company 的 Dan Kurnos。

Great. Joey, just 2 quick follow-ups on Angi. You've been talking about it a lot this morning. I guess, just how do you balance the consumer and the user and SP experience, if you start going back towards showing multiple SPs per service request? And to follow up from Brian's question, just are there any verticals where you've started to make a change or you're starting to see a return to SR growth? Just help us think about how you're attacking that a little bit more.

很好。Joey，關於 Angi 我有兩個簡短追問。你今天早上談了很多。我想問的是，如果你們開始回到每個服務需求（SR）展示多位服務專業人士（SP）的做法，你們要如何在消費者、用戶以及 SP 的體驗之間取得平衡？另外延續 Brian 的問題，有沒有任何垂直領域你們已經開始做出改變，或開始看到 SR 成長回升？請幫我們更進一步理解你們是如何著手處理的。

And then, Chris, just on Dotdash on the margins, appreciate the color for the year. You've taken a lot of cost out of that business already. So I get sort of the cadence for '24, but what are we waiting for? Is it a revenue level like you talked about in the past? Or do we need to just see premium continue to stay strong this year to kind of get that real sort of vertical inflection that I think we're still waiting for on Dotdash margins?

然後 Chris，關於 Dotdash 的利潤率，謝謝你對今年的說明。你們已經在那個業務上削減了很多成本。所以我理解 2024 年的節奏，但我們在等什麼？是像你過去提到的某個營收水位嗎？還是我們需要看到高端（premium）業務今年持續強勁，才能帶來我認為我們仍在等待的、Dotdash 利潤率真正的垂直向上拐點？

Okay. So first question, Dan, it is -- this is so far a win-win, meaning when we are matching homeowners with more service professionals, we are driving homeowner satisfaction, meaning Net Promoter Score and we think, ultimately, repeat rate. And we have been seeing ROI for pros increase. And while we can't measure this exactly, our thesis on this is more jobs are getting done on the platform as opposed to off platform.

好的。Dan，先回答第一個問題——到目前為止，這是一個雙贏。也就是說，當我們把屋主與更多服務專業人士配對時，我們提升了屋主滿意度，也就是淨推薦值（Net Promoter Score），並且我們認為最終會提升回訪率（repeat rate）。同時，我們也看到專業人士的投資報酬率（ROI）在提高。雖然我們無法精準衡量，但我們的論點是：更多工作是在平台上完成，而不是在平台外完成。

So while there may be more competition within our platform, meaning if we were previously matching with less than one, and now we're matching with more than one, I think monetized transactions per SR was 1.27 in the last quarter. While we're matching with more and there is, therefore, more competition, we think more of that is staying in our platform as opposed to the kind of unknown competition for that same job that was previously happening off platform.

因此，雖然在我們的平台內部可能會有更多競爭——也就是如果我們之前每次配對不到一位，而現在配對到多位——我想上一季每個 SR 的變現交易數（monetized transactions per SR）是 1.27。當我們配對更多人、競爭因此增加時，我們認為更多交易會留在平台內，而不是像以前那樣，同一個工作在平台外發生那種我們無法掌握的競爭。

So we want to keep driving that number up, and we want to keep giving both homeowners and pros a better chance of success on the platform. And we can see that play out in the numbers so far. So that is -- that balance that you're asking about is we want to continue pushing it up. We can't push it up forever, but we want to continue pushing it up because we think it's a win for all on the platform.

所以我們想持續把那個數字往上推，也希望讓屋主與專業人士在平台上都有更高的成功機會。到目前為止，我們可以從數據中看到這點正在發生。因此，你問的那個平衡點——我們希望繼續往上推。我們不可能永遠推升，但我們想持續推升，因為我們認為這對平台上的所有人都是好事。

In terms of verticals, the short answer to your question, I think, is no. But again, the things that we're trying to do are focused on certain user paths and user experiences. So where a user comes in from and then what we do with that user as they move through our ecosystem. And that's kind of how we're organized is thinking about each of those paths into our ecosystem and making sure they deliver a winning consumer experience and a winning pro experience.

就垂直領域而言，你的問題簡短答案我認為是：沒有。但我們正在做的事情，主要是聚焦在特定的用戶路徑與用戶體驗上。也就是用戶從哪裡進來，以及當他們在我們的生態系中移動時，我們如何引導與服務他們。我們的組織方式也是以此為核心：思考每一條進入生態系的路徑，並確保它們能提供成功的消費者體驗與成功的專業人士體驗。

And a lot of that, as you've seen in our revenue, is modifying those experiences to reduce some revenue. But we are -- as I say, if we want to talk about a region confident, Europe did that, and Europe has had real success. So that's the path in the U.S.

而其中很大一部分——如你從我們的營收所看到的——是調整那些體驗，並因此降低了一些營收。但我們——如我所說，如果要談一個我們有信心的區域，歐洲就是這麼做的，而且歐洲取得了真正的成功。所以這就是美國要走的路徑。

Dan, thanks for the question on margins. You can see the scale in our margin structure by the incremental margins across '23 and particularly in Q4 of '23, where we were at basically 90% incremental adjusted EBITDA margins on Digital.

Dan，謝謝你關於利潤率的問題。你可以從我們的利潤結構中看到規模效應，尤其是 2023 年的增量利潤率，特別是在 2023 年第四季，我們的數位業務增量調整後 EBITDA 利潤率基本上達到 90%。

For '24, if you think about it as 10% plus, but just for simplicity, say 10% Digital revenue growth, that would be $89 million of incremental revenue. If you pick the midpoint of the $280 million to $300 million adjusted EBITDA guidance and you said that is equivalent to Digital EBITDA, you're talking about $47 million of adjusted EBITDA uplift. So there, you have north of 50% incremental margins.

以 2024 年來看，如果你把它想成 10% 以上，但為了簡化就假設數位營收成長 10%，那會帶來 8,900 萬美元的增量營收。如果你取 2.8 億到 3.0 億美元調整後 EBITDA 指引的中位數，並假設那相當於數位 EBITDA，你談的是 4,700 萬美元的調整後 EBITDA 提升。如此一來，你的增量利潤率就超過 50%。

Our investments in cost in Digital are really content, especially video, which is performing well for us. And frankly, our partners want more video out of our brands, also Performance Marketing and then investments in D/Cipher. And we can fund those in part through reallocation of costs from historical activities that are less strategic.

我們在數位業務的成本投資主要是內容，尤其是影片，而影片對我們的表現很好。坦白說，我們的合作夥伴也希望我們的品牌產出更多影片；另外還有成效行銷（Performance Marketing），以及對 D/Cipher 的投資。我們可以部分透過把成本從過去較不具策略性的活動重新配置，來支應這些投入。

So we feel pretty good about our ability to continue to manage our cost structure and feel good about incremental margins. We've said we expect 50% to 60% incremental Digital EBITDA -- adjusted EBITDA margins in this business. And we may be able to do better, but we also want to keep the growth momentum going.

因此，我們對於持續管理成本結構的能力相當有信心，也對增量利潤率感到樂觀。我們曾表示，預期這個業務的數位 EBITDA——調整後 EBITDA 增量利潤率會在 50% 到 60%。我們可能做得更好，但我們也希望維持成長動能。

The next question comes from Eric Sheridan with Goldman Sachs.

下一個問題來自高盛（Goldman Sachs）的 Eric Sheridan。

Maybe 2, if I could. First, just following up on John's question earlier around Dotdash Meredith. In the letter, you talked about the aspects of the business through the lens of premium programmatic and Performance Marketing. Can you talk us through some of the key learnings from 2023 and how you're thinking about the opportunity set through those 3 prisms for the business looking out to 2024 and beyond?

如果可以的話我問兩個問題。第一個是延續 John 先前關於 Dotdash Meredith 的問題。在股東信中，你們從高端程式化（premium programmatic）與成效行銷（Performance Marketing）的角度談到業務的各個面向。你能否帶我們回顧 2023 年的一些關鍵學習，並說明你們如何透過這三個面向來看待 2024 年及之後的機會集合？

And then second, turning to Angi, you talked in the letter about transacting SPs declining, but improving from a second derivative standpoint, and you're still shrinking the sales force. Can you talk about the balance between driving efficiency and return in the sales force and aiming that towards the optimized level of service provider growth?

第二個轉到 Angi。你們在信中提到，進行交易的服務專業人士（transacting SPs）在下降，但從二階導數的角度看正在改善，而你們仍在縮減銷售團隊。你能否談談在銷售團隊中推動效率與回報、以及把資源對準服務提供者成長的最佳化水位之間，你們如何取得平衡？

Yes. I'll do the last one first before I forget it. This is -- so we -- you're right, we have been reducing the size of the sales force over the last 18 months. And the main thing is driving our productivity by eliminating unproductive calls. I think we were making a lot of phone calls to a lot of pros that in the end didn't really make economic sense. So we've cut back on that meaningfully. That is a driver of the retention gains that we've seen, and that's a driver of the efficiency gains that we've seen, too.

可以。我先回答最後一個，免得我忘了。這是——你說得對，我們在過去 18 個月一直在縮減銷售團隊規模。主要重點是透過消除低產出的電話來提升生產力。我認為我們以前打了很多電話給很多專業人士，但最後在經濟效益上其實不太合理。所以我們已經大幅縮減這部分。這是我們看到留存改善的驅動因素之一，也是我們看到效率提升的驅動因素之一。

We're also prioritizing prospects more smartly now. So we have data. We built a system last year to deploy against this. We have data now to rate prospects that we call and make sure that we're focusing the effort of the sales on the best prospects that are most likely to impact our business for the better, meaning most likely to stick with our platform and most likely to get jobs done well for our homeowners.

我們現在也更聰明地把潛在客戶做優先排序。因此我們有數據。我們去年建立了一套系統來推動這件事。現在我們有數據可以為我們致電聯繫的潛在客戶評分，並確保我們把銷售團隊的精力聚焦在最優質、最可能為我們業務帶來正向影響的潛在客戶上，也就是最可能持續使用我們平台、也最可能為我們的屋主把工作做好的人。

That's also the type of offer we're pushing to our sales force. We're focused on higher commitment offers that -- we've known this for a long time, but I think there was a period where we deviated from it. But we really have to give pros a chance to succeed, and so that means getting them to a higher commitment, so that they can see enough volume through our platform to see the positive ROI.

這也是我們正在推動給銷售團隊的那種方案。我們聚焦在更高承諾度的方案上——我們很早就知道這點，但我認為曾有一段時間我們偏離了這個方向。但我們確實必須給專業人士（pros）一個成功的機會，因此這意味著要讓他們採用更高承諾度的方案，讓他們能在我們平台上看到足夠的量，進而看到正向的投資報酬率（ROI）。

That's a little bit harder in the beginning because you're not going to make as many sales, but it's long term better because those sales are going to be more valuable, and those pros have a better chance of succeeding with the platform. I think those are the big ones on the sales force. And now I've forgotten what the other questions were.

一開始這會比較難，因為你不會做出那麼多筆銷售，但長期來看更好，因為那些銷售會更有價值，而那些專業人士也更有機會在平台上成功。我認為這些是銷售團隊方面的重點。然後我現在忘了其他問題是什麼了。

I'll start. You can jump in.

我先開始。你可以再補充。

Okay. Got it.

好的。了解。

So Eric, on DDM, you hit on the 3 key digital revenue categories, drivers of premium, programmatic and Performance Marketing. The one top of the funnel, so to speak, element though is traffic. So to talk about all the supports or drivers of revenue growth, traffic is growing. You saw we're getting to stability on overall sessions, and core is growing 10% in the quarter. Those trends have continued and/or strengthened so far this year. So overall, traffic, sessions, impressions increasing.

Eric，關於 DDM，你提到了三個關鍵的數位營收類別：高端（premium）、程式化（programmatic）以及成效行銷（Performance Marketing）的驅動因素。不過，從某種意義上說，漏斗最上層的要素是流量。因此在談所有支撐或驅動營收成長的因素時，流量正在成長。你看到我們整體 sessions 正在趨於穩定，而核心（core）在本季成長了 10%。截至今年目前為止，這些趨勢仍在延續並且／或有所增強。因此整體而言，流量、sessions、impressions 都在增加。

That then, from an ad perspective, either falls into -- the first is premium that we sell directly to our advertising brands and agencies. And then what's left over essentially is the programmatic. Premium, it's been a tough market for us since we acquired DDM -- since we acquired Meredith, really starting in May of '22 when the ad market fell out of bed. But we are seeing momentum there. And as Joey said earlier, we're seeing performance by the combined sales force, and we'll keep that momentum going.

接著，從廣告的角度來看，這些流量要嘛落在——第一類是我們直接賣給廣告品牌與代理商的高端（premium）。而剩下的基本上就是程式化（programmatic）。自從我們收購 DDM——更精確地說，自從我們收購 Meredith 之後，從 2022 年 5 月廣告市場崩跌開始，premium 對我們而言一直是個艱難的市場。但我們確實看到動能。而且如 Joey 先前所說，我們看到合併後的銷售團隊帶來的表現，我們也會持續推進這股動能。

Programmatic, the team has done a great job with our ad stack and continuing to optimize and improve the performance of our ads and our monetization. D/Cipher will definitely be a tailwind for premium. And then increasingly, as we do the connections into things like Amazon, other DSPs, platforms, we think we'll increase our programmatic yield, which will be a tailwind there.

在程式化方面，團隊在我們的廣告技術堆疊（ad stack）上做得非常出色，並持續優化與提升廣告表現與變現能力。D/Cipher 對 premium 絕對會是順風。並且隨著我們逐步與 Amazon 等其他 DSP、平台做串接，我們認為將能提升程式化的收益率（yield），這也會成為該部分的順風。

And then finally, Performance Marketing, the -- Neil and the team are exceptional performance marketers. And you can see the acceleration quarter-to-quarter across the portfolio, and Performance Marketing going 0 plus 12, plus 22, plus 31. We expect it to continue. Comps will get tougher, but we think we're as good as anybody in that space.

最後是成效行銷（Performance Marketing）。Neil 和團隊是非常出色的成效行銷人員。你可以看到整個投資組合季度對季度的加速，成效行銷從 0 到 +12、+22、+31。我們預期會持續。可比基期（comps）會變得更具挑戰，但我們認為在那個領域我們不輸任何人。

And then finally, we don't talk about it much, but licensing, which has been a drag on Digital revenue due to some syndication partners and other dynamics is starting to get stronger. And we think some of our syndication partners can be a source of growth in '24. So they're all separate factors, but we feel good about the pace and executing on those this year forward to drive growth.

最後，我們不太常談到的是授權（licensing）。由於一些內容聯播（syndication）合作夥伴以及其他動態因素，它一直在拖累數位營收，但現在開始轉強。我們也認為部分聯播合作夥伴在 2024 年可能成為成長來源。這些都是不同的因素，但我們對今年以來的節奏與執行力感到樂觀，並將在未來持續推動成長。

The next question comes from Kunal Madhukar with UBS.

下一個問題來自 UBS 的 Kunal Madhukar。

One on organic traffic. Can you talk about what percentage of your total traffic on both DDM as well as Angi is organic? And then the second question relates to Angi. You talked about it earlier in terms of the number of transactions per service request, the monetized transaction per service request being at 127%.

第一個關於自然流量（organic traffic）。你們能否談談在 DDM 以及 Angi 上，你們總流量中有多少比例是自然流量？第二個問題與 Angi 有關。你們先前提到每個服務需求（service request）對應的交易數，也就是每個服務需求的變現交易數（monetized transaction per service request）為 127%。

So can you talk about, in an ideal state, what is this percentage level that you are targeting? And what does it mean for a revenue per monetized transaction?

所以你們能否談談，在理想狀態下，你們目標要達到的比例水準是多少？以及這對每筆變現交易的營收（revenue per monetized transaction）意味著什麼？

Sure, sure. On the breakdown of traffic, we don't provide that publicly. I think we've given some data on DDM in the past, but that we don't share. Obviously, organic is a very important and a large portion of the mix, but we don't do the breakdown.

當然，當然。關於流量的拆分，我們不會對外公開。我想我們過去曾提供過一些 DDM 的數據，但我們不會分享那個拆分。很明顯，自然流量非常重要，而且在組合中占比很大，但我們不做拆分披露。

The -- in terms of monetized transactions per SR, it's a very good and fair question. And the answer is we don't know yet. And it gets a little bit back to Dan's question from earlier, we want to keep pushing that up. We want to keep giving homeowners and pros a better chance of a job done well on our platform. There is a point that you would go too high, and so we don't want to go beyond that point, and we haven't found that point yet. So there's certainly room from here, but it doesn't go up to infinity.

至於每個 SR 的變現交易數，這是個非常好、也很公平的問題。答案是我們還不知道。這也有點回到先前 Dan 的問題：我們希望持續把這個數字往上推。我們希望讓屋主與專業人士在我們平台上更有機會把工作做好。確實存在一個點，超過那個點就會太高，因此我們不想超過那個點，而我們也還沒找到那個點。所以從目前水準往上仍有空間，但它不可能無限上升。

And in terms of revenue per SR, that's a little bit different. Obviously, monetized transactions per SR is going to be a very big driver of that. But also the, I'll call it, quality of the SR, but quality may be an unfair word. It's what mix it is. So a home remodel job is worth meaningfully more than a home cleaning job. The channel that comes through matters. How sort of far down the purchase funnel the homeowner might be matters. How much information there is within the SR matters.

至於每個 SR 的營收（revenue per SR），那又有些不同。顯然，每個 SR 的變現交易數會是非常重要的驅動因素。但另外還有我稱之為 SR 的「品質」——不過「品質」可能不是很公平的用詞——更準確是它的組合（mix）。例如，房屋翻修案的價值就明顯高於居家清潔案。來源渠道也很重要。屋主在購買漏斗中走到多後段也很重要。SR 中包含多少資訊也很重要。

And so those things, as we refine the service request, can drive revenue per SR up. And one of the things that's been happening certainly over the course of the last year is we've been both improving the mix shift and improving the quality of those SRs to help drive the win rate, and that's something that we hope to continue.

因此，當我們精煉服務需求（service request）時，這些因素都能推升每個 SR 的營收。而在過去一年中確實發生的一件事是：我們同時改善了組合轉移（mix shift），也提升了這些 SR 的品質，以幫助提高成交率（win rate），而這也是我們希望能持續下去的方向。

The only thing I'd add is just we've become increasingly focused on monetized transactions per SR as an indication of the two-sided health of the platform and quality of the experience. So -- and there's no silver bullet to optimize that.

我唯一想補充的是，我們越來越把每個 SR 的變現交易數視為衡量平台雙邊健康度與體驗品質的指標。所以——而且要最佳化它並沒有什麼萬靈丹。

Clearly, having it greater than 1 is good, because that's a better consumer experience. If it got to 4, that's suboptimal for SPs because -- in terms of the experience. So there's something in there. But the more that number increases, the higher the quality of SRs we're getting and also the higher the quality of our matching technology and of our SP base. So we believe there's room to run, as Joey said, and it's a key metric to us in terms of the improvement in our overall 2-sided marketplace.

很明顯，大於 1 是好的，因為那代表更好的消費者體驗。如果到了 4，對服務專業人士（SPs）而言在體驗上就不理想了。所以其中有個平衡點。但這個數字越高，代表我們取得的 SR 品質越高，也代表我們的媒合技術與 SP 基礎的品質越高。因此如 Joey 所說，我們相信仍有成長空間，而這也是我們衡量整體雙邊市場改善的一個關鍵指標。

The next question comes from Ygal Arounian with Citigroup.

下一個問題來自 Citigroup 的 Ygal Arounian。

First -- 2 questions. First, on Angi. We've been talking a lot about the optimizations. But maybe just to dial-in specifically on the user side because about a year ago, we started talking about -- Joey started talking about bringing back a greater focus on the integration, I guess, between ads and needs and services and the optimization around the user.

首先——兩個問題。第一個關於 Angi。我們談了很多最佳化。但也許更具體聚焦在使用者端，因為大約一年前，我們開始談到——我想是 Joey 開始談到——要把更高的重心放回整合上，也就是廣告、需求與服務之間的整合，以及圍繞使用者的最佳化。

How much is left there? Can you give us a little update on -- specifically on the user side and what users are seeing today that might be better than they were seeing a year ago and how much is left?

那部分還剩下多少？你能否給我們一點更新——特別是在使用者端，今天使用者看到的內容有哪些可能比一年前更好？以及還剩下多少要做？

And then on the broader IAC business, in the letter, you talked about being more offensive on capital allocation with the -- your individual businesses being in a healthier position now. Then you also talked about in the letter the shift from goods to experiences and seeing that as kind of sustaining for longer, right around the MGM story. How does that fit into your M&A strategy and where you're focused on finding the right capital allocation?

然後關於更廣泛的 IAC 業務，你們在信中提到，隨著各個業務現在處於更健康的位置，你們會在資本配置上更具進攻性。你們也在信中談到從商品轉向體驗，並認為這種趨勢會持續更久，並在 MGM 的故事附近提到。這如何融入你們的併購（M&A）策略？以及你們在尋找正確資本配置時的重點聚焦在哪裡？

Sure. So in terms of the Ads and Leads integration, it's a really astute question and top of mind for us right now. You focused on the user side, which is where, as it relates to integration, we've actually made the most progress. And we have some big things rolling out shortly, actually, along those lines in terms of -- again, I'm talking the homeowner side.

當然。就 Ads 與 Leads 的整合而言，這確實是個非常精準的問題，也是我們目前最關注的議題之一。你聚焦在使用者端，而就整合來說，我們其實在使用者端已經取得最多進展。而且我們很快就會推出一些重大更新，確實也是沿著這個方向——再次強調，我指的是屋主端。

So previously, the algorithm for how a homeowner would match to historically Ads pros and Leads pros was complicated and, I'd say, somewhat illogical. And we now have improved the algorithm to the point which we're getting ready to roll out now, which we've been testing for, I don't know, 6 or 9 months now, to better distribute and better match.

過去，屋主如何與歷史上的 Ads 專業人士與 Leads 專業人士配對的演算法相當複雜，而且我會說有點不太合邏輯。我們現在已把演算法改善到一個程度，正準備推出；我們已經測試了大概 6 到 9 個月，以便更好地分配、也更好地配對。

And so a little bit of what we've been doing and seeing on the monetized transactions for SR is a result of what we've been testing there, so that a homeowner comes in and has the best chance of matching with the right pros, independent of whether they were historically Ads pros or Leads pros. And that is a very big deal for driving the business.

因此，我們在 SR 的變現交易上所做、以及所看到的一部分成果，正是來自於我們在那裡的測試：讓屋主進來後，有最高機會配對到合適的專業人士，而不受他們過去是 Ads 專業人士或 Leads 專業人士的影響。這對推動業務成長非常關鍵。

On the pro side, which you didn't ask about, but is also important is, I think there's still work to do on the integration. So we still have multiple apps. We still have multiple back-end systems. We're slowly but steadily migrating folks onto common systems, which will reduce our OpEx, reduce our -- or improve our speed of execution.

在專業人士端（你沒有問到，但同樣重要），我認為整合方面仍有工作要做。我們仍然有多個 App，也仍有多套後端系統。我們正緩慢但穩健地把大家遷移到共用系統上，這將降低我們的營運費用（OpEx），降低我們的——或提升我們的執行速度。

But we still have a lot of work to do on that side of the integration. And it was work that was never done historically, that was sort of hiding in the background, and that we are now tackling and is really important to get done and, I think, will yield real value in terms of our operating efficiency.

但在整合的那一端，我們仍有大量工作要完成。而且那是過去從未真正做過的工作，有點一直藏在背景裡；我們現在正在著手處理，這件事非常重要，我也認為完成後將在營運效率方面帶來實質價值。

In terms of capital allocation and the shift towards experiences, those do go hand in hand. That is an area of focus for us for sure. We do -- we believe this trend is a long-term trend, has been a long-term trend and will be a trend for a while still to come. And we like the idea of businesses that benefit from that trend. So we've spent a lot of time recently looking in that area and looking deeply in that area, and we'll continue to do so. Nothing imminent on that, but that is certainly a focus of our capital allocation.

就資本配置以及轉向體驗（experiences）的趨勢而言，兩者確實相輔相成。這無疑是我們的重點方向之一。我們——我們相信這個趨勢是長期趨勢，過去一直是長期趨勢，未來也還會持續一段時間。我們也喜歡能從這個趨勢中受益的企業。因此我們最近花了很多時間在這個領域觀察並深入研究，未來也會持續。短期內沒有什麼迫在眉睫的動作，但這確實是我們資本配置的重點。

And I think if we look at last year, we bought back $165 million of IAC. We bought another $100 million of Turo. We bought $80 million worth of land. And those were, I think, easy transactions in each case given the data at that time. Now with steady cash flow and the businesses, I think, in a more stable place, we're starting to look more opportunistically externally. Again, nothing to -- nothing immediately on the horizon, but I think we have the position to do that now.

我想如果回顧去年，我們回購了 1.65 億美元的 IAC 股票。我們另外回購了 1 億美元的 Turo。我們買了 8,000 萬美元的土地。我認為以當時的數據來看，這些在每個案例中都是相對容易做出的交易。現在隨著現金流穩定、各項業務也更趨穩定，我們開始更機會主義地向外部尋找機會。同樣地，眼前沒有——沒有任何立即可見的事項，但我認為我們現在具備這樣做的條件。

That question will come from Brent Thill with Jefferies.

下一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 Brent Thill。

Joey, just a follow-up question on capital allocation. I guess, when you think about what you're seeing in the private market and asset prices, I'm just curious, many have asked why not have been more aggressive last year when we've had this downturn? Are you starting to see asset prices go back up? Are you seeing things maybe not as buoyant as most would expect given the public market recovery? Just curious in terms of kind of what you're seeing from your perspective.

Joey，我想就資本配置追問一下。我想，當你看私募市場與資產價格的情況時，我有點好奇：很多人都問，為什麼去年在市場下行時沒有更積極一些？你現在開始看到資產價格回升了嗎？或者你看到的情況其實沒有像多數人基於公開市場復甦所預期的那麼熱絡？想請教你從你的角度看到的狀況。

Yes. Brent, we tried on a couple of things last year to be opportunistic. That was more public market than private market. And while the valuations were down a lot, to your point, the expected premiums were up a lot, and we couldn't quite get there on those things.

是的。Brent，我們去年確實嘗試在幾個項目上採取機會主義策略。那更多是在公開市場，而不是私募市場。雖然估值如你所說大幅下跌，但預期溢價卻大幅上升，我們在那些案子上始終無法達到可接受的條件。

The private market, I think, is still totally irrational, if you -- front or rear view. I think that these businesses did a phenomenal job, very smartly raising enough capital to be able to weight out markets. And I think there's still a lot of capital that has been raised to go after private opportunities, and that capital has a fuse on it to be deployed.

我認為私募市場仍然完全不理性，不管你是用前瞻或回顧的角度看。我認為這些公司做得非常出色，也非常聰明地募到了足夠的資金，得以撐過市場週期。我也認為仍有大量已募得的資金要去追逐私募機會，而那筆資金有部署期限，必須投入。

And so the private markets need not be rational on those things. And so unless something is on the verge of running out of money, I don't think anybody has to face reality on valuations. And therefore, it is not, I think, a productive place for opportunity. That is a very broad generalization. And certainly, there will be exceptions to that, if not many exceptions to that. But that's been our experience so far in looking at opportunities there.

因此，在這些事情上，私募市場不一定需要理性。除非某家公司已經快要沒錢了，否則我不認為有人必須在估值上面對現實。所以我認為那不是一個能有效產生機會的地方。這當然是非常概括的說法；而且肯定會有例外，甚至可能有很多例外。但就我們目前在那裡尋找機會的經驗而言，大致如此。

Yes. Maybe if you have just the time, one quick one on the Emerging assets. Anything surprising you in the portfolio that we haven't talked about as it relates to the smaller emerging stories in the portfolio?

是的。也許如果你還有時間，想快速問一個關於 Emerging 資產的問題：在投資組合裡，關於那些較小、正在成長的故事，有沒有什麼讓你意外、但我們還沒談到的？

Well, I'm glad you raised it. We didn't talk about Vivian at all. But Vivian is a good growing product and business. I mean, it's kind of amazing what the business has done. Continues to grow. Continues to grow very healthily in a market that is shrinking dramatically.

嗯，我很高興你提到這個。我們完全沒有談到 Vivian。但 Vivian 是一個成長良好的產品與業務。我的意思是，這家公司做到的事情有點令人驚訝。持續成長，而且在一個正在大幅萎縮的市場中，仍然維持非常健康的成長。

So the -- not many people are familiar with Vivian, so let me just explain what they do. They're in matching nurses with jobs. They have focused primarily on the travel nurse category, which turned out to be a very big category, especially during the pandemic. Still is a very big category, but the growth in that category -- or that category shrank a lot post pandemic. Still bigger than what it was pre-pandemic, but it shrank off.

所以——很多人對 Vivian 不熟，我簡單說明他們在做什麼。他們做的是把護理人員與工作機會進行配對。他們主要聚焦在旅遊護理師（travel nurse）這個類別，而這後來證明是一個非常大的類別，尤其在疫情期間。現在仍然是很大的類別，但該類別的成長——或者說該類別在疫情後大幅縮小。雖然仍比疫情前大，但確實回落了。

Throughout that whole period, Vivian has been growing. And the reason Vivian has been growing is because they have an incredible concentration of the available nurses in the market using the platform, actively using the platform, building profiles on the platform, looking for jobs.

在那整段期間，Vivian 一直在成長。Vivian 之所以能成長，是因為他們在平台上聚集了市場上極高比例的可用護理人員，這些人會使用平台、積極使用平台、在平台上建立個人檔案、尋找工作。

And while the -- there's been some near-term volatility in that market with the pandemic and the need for nurses in hospitals and facilities, the supply-demand imbalance is still enormous, meaning, there are many more facilities that need nurses than there are nurses available to do those jobs. And so Vivian, I think, is very well positioned there.

而且雖然——疫情以及醫院與機構對護理人力的需求，讓那個市場在短期內出現一些波動，但供需失衡仍然非常巨大；也就是說，需要護理人員的機構遠多於可用來做這些工作的護理人員。因此我認為 Vivian 在那裡的定位非常好。

Parth Bhakta, who runs that business -- who founded and runs that business is a phenomenal entrepreneur and has done a wonderful job growing and building through that. And we think that business has a lot of potential. Where it goes from here, we'll see. But it is a -- the execution so far has been really tremendous in a fun, small business. Not moving the needle for IAC, but since you asked about it, we do like that one in the Emerging category.

經營那項業務的 Parth Bhakta——也是創辦人兼負責人——是一位非常出色的創業家，在成長與建設方面做得非常好。我們認為那項業務有很大的潛力。接下來會走向哪裡，我們再觀察。但這——到目前為止的執行真的非常出色，是一個有趣的小型業務。對 IAC 的整體影響還不大，但既然你問到 Emerging 類別，我們確實很喜歡這一個。

Thank you all for your participation this morning. Operator, that's it.

感謝各位今天早上的參與。接線員，就到這裡。

Thank you. Bye-bye.

謝謝。再見。

The conference has now concluded. Thank you for attending today's presentation. You may now disconnect.

本次電話會議至此結束。感謝您參加今天的簡報。您現在可以中斷連線。