PJT Partners Inc (PJT) 2023 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good day, and welcome to the PJT Partners fourth-quarter 2023 earnings call. Today's conference is being recorded.

美好的一天，歡迎參加 PJT Partners 2023 年第四季財報電話會議。今天的會議正在錄製中。

At this time, I would like to turn the conference over to Sharon Pearson, Head of Investor Relations. Please go ahead, ma'am.

現在，我想把會議交給投資人關係主管莎朗‧皮爾森(Sharon Pearson)。請繼續，女士。

Thank you very much, Todd. Good morning, and welcome to the PJT Partners full year and fourth-quarter 2023 earnings conference call. I'm Sharon Pearson, Head of Investor Relations at PJT Partners. And joining me today is Paul Taubman, our Chairman and Chief Executive Officer; and Helen Meates, our Chief Financial Officer.

非常感謝你，托德。早安，歡迎參加 PJT Partners 2023 年全年和第四季財報電話會議。我是 Sharon Pearson，PJT Partners 投資者關係主管。今天加入我的是我們的董事長兼執行長保羅‧陶布曼 (Paul Taubman)；以及我們的財務長海倫‧梅茲 (Helen Meates)。

Before I turn the call over to Paul, I want to point out that during the course of this conference call, we may make a number of forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to various risks and uncertainties, and there are important factors that could cause actual outcomes to differ materially from those indicated in these statements. We believe that these factors are described in the Risk Factors section contained in PJT Partners' 2022 Form 10-K, which is available on our website at pjtpartners.com. I want to remind you that the company assumes no duty to update any forward-looking statements and that the presentation we make today contains non-GAAP financial measures, which we believe are meaningful in evaluating the company's performance.

在我把電話轉給保羅之前，我想指出，在這次電話會議期間，我們可能會做出一些前瞻性陳述。這些前瞻性陳述受到各種風險和不確定性的影響，並且存在一些重要因素可能導致實際結果與這些陳述中所示的結果有重大差異。我們認為，PJT Partners 2022 年表格 10-K 中的風險因素部分對這些因素進行了描述，該表格可在我們的網站 pjtpartners.com 上取得。我想提醒您的是，本公司不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務，並且我們今天所做的演示包含非公認會計準則財務指標，我們認為這些指標對於評估公司業績有意義。

For detailed disclosures on these non-GAAP metrics and their GAAP reconciliations, you should refer to the financial data contained within the press release we issued this morning, also available on our website.

有關這些非 GAAP 指標及其 GAAP 調整表的詳細揭露，您應該參閱我們今天早上發布的新聞稿中包含的財務數據，該新聞稿也可以在我們的網站上找到。

And with that, I'll turn the call over to Paul.

然後，我會將電話轉給保羅。

Thank you, Sharon, and thank you all for joining us this morning. Today, we reported financial results for quarter end and full-year 2023. Revenues were the highest in our firm's history at $1.15 billion, up 12% year over year. For the full-year, adjusted pretax income was $183 million, and adjusted EPS was $3.27 per share.

謝謝莎倫，也謝謝大家今天早上加入我們。今天，我們報告了 2023 年季度末和全年的財務表現。營收創公司歷史最高紀錄，達 11.5 億美元，年增 12%。全年調整後稅前收入為 1.83 億美元，調整後每股收益為 3.27 美元。

In a very challenging operating environment, we delivered differentiated results, a strong absolute performance in restructuring, coupled with strong relative performance in strategic advisory, were the drivers of our record revenues. This was also a record year for senior recruiting as we added 19 partners and managing directors principally in strategic advisory. Many of these hires bring key industry expertise and relationships which will significantly augment the depth and breadth of our industry footprint.

在充滿挑戰的經營環境中，我們取得了差異化的業績，重組方面強勁的絕對業績，加上戰略諮詢方面強勁的相對業績，是我們創紀錄收入的推動力。今年也是高階人才招募創紀錄的一年，我們主要在策略諮詢領域增加了 19 位合夥人和董事總經理。其中許多員工帶來了關鍵的行業專業知識和關係，這將顯著擴大我們行業足跡的深度和廣度。

Total strategic advisory partner and MD headcount increased 20% this year, while firm-wide headcount grew 12%. This considerable hiring has weighed on our operating margins, but we are confident that, in time, our shareholders will be rewarded for this investment.

今年策略諮詢夥伴和常務董事的總人數增加了 20%，而全公司的總人數增加了 12%。大量的招聘對我們的營業利潤造成了壓力，但我們相信，我們的股東遲早會從這項投資中獲得回報。

During the year, we repurchased almost 2.2 million share equivalents. Even with these significant share repurchases, we ended the year with more than $435 million of cash on hand and the strongest balance sheet in our firm's history. Given the strength of our balance sheet and our continued emphasis on mitigating dilution resulting from our continuing investment in the franchise, our Board has authorized a new $500 million share repurchase program, which supersedes the current repurchase authorization.

年內，我們回購了近220萬股等價股票。即使進行了這些大規模的股票回購，我們在年底仍擁有超過 4.35 億美元的現金和我們公司歷史上最強勁的資產負債表。鑑於我們資產負債表的實力以及我們對減輕因持續投資特許經營權而造成的稀釋的持續重視，我們的董事會已批准一項新的5 億美元的股票回購計劃，該計劃取代了當前的回購授權。

After Helen takes you through our financial results, I will review our business performance, recruiting initiatives, and outlook in greater detail. Helen?

在海倫向您介紹我們的財務表現後，我將更詳細地回顧我們的業務績效、招聘計劃和前景。海倫？

Thank you, Paul, good morning. Beginning with revenues. For the full-year 2023, total revenues were $1.153 billion, up 12% year over year with a significant increase in restructuring more than offsetting a significant decline in PJT Park Hill and a modest decline in strategic advisory revenues compared to year-ago levels. For the fourth quarter, total revenues were $329 million, up 17% year over year, with a significant increase in restructuring and a modest increase in strategic advisory revenues more than offsetting declines in PJT Park Hill.

謝謝你，保羅，早安。從收入開始。2023 年全年，總收入為 11.53 億美元，同比增長 12%，重組的大幅增加足以抵消 PJT Park Hill 的大幅下降以及戰略諮詢收入與去年同期水平相比的小幅下降。第四季總收入為 3.29 億美元，年增 17%，重組大幅增加，戰略諮詢收入小幅增長，足以抵消 PJT Park Hill 的下降。

Turning to expenses, consistent with prior quarters, we've presented the expenses with certain non-GAAP adjustments. These adjustments are more fully described in our 8-K. First, adjusted compensation expense. Full-year adjusted compensation expense was $805 million, up 23% year over year with a compensation ratio of 69.8%. Given we accrued compensation at 69.5% through the first nine months of the year, the resulting fourth-quarter ratio was 70.7%. We will provide guidance on our accrual for compensation expense for 2024 when we report our first-quarter results.

談到費用，與前幾季一致，我們對費用進行了某些非公認會計準則調整。我們的 8-K 中更全面地描述了這些調整。一是調整補償費用。全年調整後薪資支出為8.05億美元，較去年成長23%，薪酬率為69.8%。鑑於今年前 9 個月我們的應計薪酬率為 69.5%，第四季的比率為 70.7%。當我們報告第一季業績時，我們將就 2024 年應計薪酬費用提供指導。

Turning to adjusted non-compensation expense. Total adjusted non-compensation expense was $165 million for the full-year 2023 and $43 million for the fourth quarter. As a percentage of revenues, our adjusted non-comp expense was 14.3% for the full-year 2023 and 13.2% for the fourth quarter. Adjusted non-compensation expense grew 12% in 2023 year over year, driven primarily by higher professional fees and higher occupancy costs.

轉向調整後的非補償費用。2023 年全年調整後非薪資支出總額為 1.65 億美元，第四季調整後非薪資支出總額為 4,300 萬美元。調整後的非公司費用佔收入的百分比在 2023 年全年為 14.3%，第四季度為 13.2%。2023 年調整後的非薪資費用年增 12%，這主要是由於專業費用和入住成本上升。

Looking ahead, we expect our total non-comp expense in 2024 to grow at a similar rate compared to 2023. This will primarily be driven by a step function increase in our occupancy costs as we recently renegotiated a 15-year lease in our office space in New York. We are taking on some additional space in other regions that we will grow into over the next several years.

展望未來，我們預計 2024 年的非補償費用總額將以與 2023 年類似的速度成長。這主要是由於我們最近重新談判了紐約辦公空間的 15 年租約，導致我們的佔用成本逐步增加。我們正在其他地區佔用一些額外的空間，我們將在未來幾年內成長。

Turning to adjusted pretax income, we reported adjusted pretax income of $183 million for the full-year 2023 and $53 million for the fourth quarter. Our adjusted pretax margin was 15.8% for the full year and 16.1% in the fourth quarter. The provision for taxes, as with prior years, we presented our results as if all partnership units had been converted to shares and that all of our income was taxed at a corporate tax rate. And our effective tax rate for the full year was 25.3%, below the 26.7% estimated rate that we applied for the first nine months of the year, reflecting a final allocation of state-level income taxes. In 2024, we would expect our effective tax rate to be around 25%, and we will refine our view at the end of the first quarter.

談到調整後的稅前收入，我們公佈的 2023 年全年調整後稅前收入為 1.83 億美元，第四季調整後稅前收入為 5,300 萬美元。我們調整後的全年稅前利潤率為 15.8%，第四季為 16.1%。與前幾年一樣，在稅收準備金方面，我們呈現的結果就好像所有合夥單位都已轉換為股票，並且我們的所有收入均按公司稅率納稅。我們全年的有效稅率為25.3%，低於我們今年前9個月應用的26.7%的估計稅率，反映了州級所得稅的最終分配。到 2024 年，我們預計有效稅率將在 25% 左右，我們將在第一季末完善我們的觀點。

Earnings per share are adjusted as converted earnings of $3.27 per share for the full year compared to $3.92 in 2022, and $0.96 in the fourth quarter compared to $1.08 in 2022. The share count. For the year ended 2023, our weighted average share count was 41.7 million shares, essentially unchanged from the prior year. During the year, we repurchased the equivalent of approximately 2.2 million shares, primarily through open market repurchases. For the fourth quarter, our weighted average share count was 42.9 million shares, up 2.7% year over year.

每股收益調整後，全年每股收益為 3.27 美元，而 2022 年為 3.92 美元；第四季每股收益為 0.96 美元，而 2022 年為 1.08 美元。份額計數。截至 2023 年，我們的加權平均股數為 4,170 萬股，與前一年基本持平。年內，我們主要透過公開市場回購，回購了約220萬股股票。第四季度，我們的加權平均股數為 4,290 萬股，較去年同期成長 2.7%。

A portion of this increase is attributable to the fact that during the fourth quarter, we reached the price hurdle on 1.3 million performance shares, which are partially reflected in our Q4 weighted average share count and will be fully reflected in our Q1 2024 weighted average share count. Of these 1.3 million performance units, 20% have been for service requirements. As Paul mentioned, our Board has authorized a new $500 million share repurchase program and, consistent with our capital priorities, we will continue to invest in the franchise while using excess cash to reduce the dilutive impact of share issuance.

這一增長的部分原因是，在第四季度，我們達到了130 萬股績效股的價格門檻，這部分反映在我們第四季度的加權平均股票數量中，並將全面反映在我們2024 年第一季度的加權平均股票中數。在這 130 萬個主動單元中，20% 用於服務需求。正如保羅所提到的，我們的董事會已批准一項新的5 億美元股票回購計劃，並且根據我們的資本優先事項，我們將繼續投資於特許經營權，同時使用多餘的現金來減少股票發行的稀釋影響。

On the balance sheet, we ended the year with $437 million in cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments, and $456 million in net working capital. And we have no funded debt outstanding. Finally, the Board has approved a dividend of $0.25 per share. The dividend will be paid on March 20, 2024, to Class A common shareholders of record as of March 6.

在資產負債表上，我們年底的現金、現金等價物和短期投資為 4.37 億美元，淨營運資本為 4.56 億美元。我們沒有未償債務。最後，董事會批准每股 0.25 美元的股息。該股將於 2024 年 3 月 20 日支付給截至 3 月 6 日登記在冊的 A 類普通股股東。

And with that, I'll turn back to Paul.

說到這裡，我將回到保羅。

Thank you, Helen.

謝謝你，海倫。

Beginning with restructuring, we saw significant growth in restructuring activity in 2023, driven by sharply higher interest rates, dislocated capital markets, and slowing economic growth around the globe. Our restructuring business capitalized on this favorable backdrop, delivering stellar results for the fourth quarter and record results for the full year. We were increasingly active across both liability management and in-court restructuring assignments as we continued to be the go-to advisor for complex liability management engagements. For full-year 2023, we ranked number one in announced restructurings in both the US and globally, and we were named Global Restructuring Adviser of the Year by IFR for the fourth year in a row.

從重組開始，在利率大幅上升、資本市場混亂和全球經濟成長放緩的推動下，2023 年重組活動顯著成長。我們的重組業務抓住了這一有利背景，第四季度取得了出色的業績，全年業績也創下了歷史新高。隨著我們繼續成為複雜責任管理業務的首選顧問，我們在責任管理和法庭重組任務中變得越來越活躍。2023 年全年，我們在美國和全球宣布的重組中排名第一，並連續第四年被 IFR 評為年度全球重組顧問。

Turning to PJT Park Hill. After record fundraising in 2021 and 2022, the 2023 environment for alternative investments proved to be extraordinarily difficult. The dearth of M&A and IPO activity led to a significant reduction in capital return, leaving many alternatives investors overallocated to the asset class and highly restrained in making new commitments. Last year's environment was best characterized as one of elongated fundraising timelines and downward revisions to fund size targets, with an uptick in the number of postponed fundraises. Against this difficult backdrop, our fourth-quarter and full-year revenues in PJT Park Hill declined significantly year on year. On the positive side, the gap between public and private valuations has narrowed, and we now see some early signs of a more constructive fundraising environment.

轉向 PJT 公園山。在 2021 年和 2022 年創紀錄的融資之後，事實證明 2023 年另類投資的環境異常困難。併購和IPO活動的缺乏導致資本回報率大幅下降，導致許多另類投資者過度配置該資產類別，並在做出新承諾時受到高度限制。去年的環境最明顯的特徵是融資期限延長和基金規模目標下調，延遲的融資數量增加。在這種困難的背景下，我們在 PJT Park Hill 的第四季度和全年收入同比大幅下降。從積極的一面來看，公共和私人估值之間的差距已經縮小，我們現在看到了一些更具建設性融資環境的早期跡象。

Turning to strategic advisory. 2023 marked the second year in a row of meaningfully below trend global M&A activity, with announced global M&A volumes declining to levels not seen in a decade. The uncertainty caused by volatile markets, sharply higher interest rates, and greater economic and geopolitical uncertainty all weighed on the pace of strategic activity. Our fourth-quarter strategic advisory revenues were up slightly, and our full-year strategic advisory revenues were down slightly year over year. These results compare favorably when measured against the declines in industry-wide volumes.

轉向策略諮詢。 2023 年是全球併購活動連續第二年顯著低於趨勢水平，公佈的全球併購數量下降至十年來未見的水平。市場波動、利率大幅上升以及經濟和地緣政治不確定性加大帶來的不確定性都影響了策略活動的步伐。我們第四季的策略諮詢收入略有成長，全年策略諮詢收入較去年同期略有下降。與全行業銷售下降相比，這些結果是有利的。

Turning to talent. Our most important strategic priority continues to be the buildout of our strategic advisory franchise. 2023 was a favorable recruiting environment when dislocated M&A markets enabled us to significantly accelerate the pace of senior hiring. While we expect our hiring to remain elevated in 2024, it may not equal 2023's record levels.

轉向人才。我們最重要的策略重點仍然是擴大我們的策略諮詢業務。 2023年是一個有利的招募環境，併購市場的錯位使我們能夠大幅加快高階人才招募的步伐。雖然我們預計 2024 年的招募人數將保持在較高水平，但可能達不到 2023 年的創紀錄水平。

As we look ahead, in PJT Park Hill, we expect the environment to slowly but steadily improve after a difficult couple of years for fundraising. Narrowing spreads between public and private valuations, more receptive capital markets, and greater capital returns to LPs as M&A and IPO activity picks up should result in an improved backdrop for fundraising. Our private capital solutions business should also benefit from increased demand from GPs to employ continuation funds to create additional monetization opportunities for their LPs.

展望未來，在經歷了幾年的籌款困難之後，我們預計 PJT Park Hill 的環境將緩慢而穩定地改善。隨著併購和首次公開募股活動的增加，公共和私人估值之間的差距不斷縮小，資本市場的接受度更高，有限合夥人的資本回報率更高，這應該會改善融資環境。我們的私人資本解決方案業務也應該受益於普通合夥人使用持續基金為其有限合夥人創造額外貨幣化機會的需求增加。

In M&A, while we expect the markets to take time to get back to historical relationships between M&A activity and broader market benchmarks, the direction of travel should be positive, although the pace of such recovery remains unclear. Higher equity valuations, lower volatility, and anticipated rate cuts should cause the macro environment to be more conducive to deal-making. Executives remain focused on M&A as a strategic tool as they seek to remake their companies in response to the significant disruptions caused by technological innovation.

在併購方面，雖然我們預期市場需要時間才能恢復併購活動與更廣泛市場基準之間的歷史關係，但趨勢應該是正面的，儘管這種復甦的速度仍不清楚。較高的股票估值、較低的波動性和預期的降息應該會導致宏觀環境更有利於交易。高階主管仍然將併購作為策略工具，尋求重塑公司以應對技術創新造成的重大破壞。

Today, we have a decidedly more formidable team on the field to capitalize on these opportunities. We are better positioned in certain key growth areas including technology, healthcare, and consumer. Our brand and our capabilities are stronger than ever. We are engaged in an increasing number of strategic conversations, and our mandate count is at near-record levels, up 25% from a year ago. However, given the slowdown in 2023 deal activity, we began 2024 with a lower-than-typical backlog of announced pending closed transactions.

今天，我們在該領域擁有一支顯然更強大的團隊來利用這些機會。我們在某些​​關鍵成長領域處於更有利的地位，包括科技、醫療保健和消費者。我們的品牌和能力比以往任何時候都更強大。我們正在進行越來越多的戰略對話，我們的任務數量接近歷史最高水平，比一年前增加了 25%。然而，鑑於 2023 年交易活動放緩，我們在 2024 年伊始宣布的待完成交易積壓量低於正常。

In restructuring, we are in the early days of what we believe will be a multi-year cycle of elevated activity in liability management and important restructurings. While the rebound in capital markets activity and lower interest rates may provide relief for some companies, the sheer quantum of debt that must be refinanced, together with an increasing number of companies facing structural pressures, will likely extend this restructuring cycle for some time to come. We are confident about our businesses, we are confident about our strategy, and we are confident about our long-term growth prospects.

在重組方面，我們正處於負債管理和重要重組活動增加的多年周期的早期階段。雖然資本市場活動的反彈和較低的利率可能會減輕一些公司的負擔，但必須再融資的巨額債務，加上越來越多的公司面臨結構性壓力，可能會在未來一段時間內延長重組週期。我們對我們的業務充滿信心，我們對我們的策略充滿信心，我們對我們的長期成長前景充滿信心。

And with that, we will now take your questions.

現在我們將回答你們的問題。

(Operator Instructions) Devin Ryan, JMP Securities

（操作員指示）Devin Ryan，JMP 證券

So just want to, Paul, start maybe on some of the outlook commentary and just talk a little bit about the interplay between restructuring and the strategic advisor M&A advisory business. And I'm curious, does this feel like a 2020 to 2021 environment where you had a record 2020, with your restructuring strength and then into 2021, you saw normalizing restructuring, and that was then offset by the M&A growth and recovery? So do you see that scenario, or based on what you're seeing today, do you see a scenario where maybe both businesses are working and then the M&A part of the business is recovering to the extent that kind of macro environment that you laid out plays out?

保羅，我想從一些前景評論開始，並談談重組與策略顧問併購諮詢業務之間的相互作用。我很好奇，這是否感覺像是 2020 年至 2021 年的環境，在 2020 年，您的重組實力創下了紀錄，然後到 2021 年，您看到重組正常化，然後被併購增長和復蘇所抵消？那麼您是否看到了這種情況，或者根據您今天所看到的情況，您是否看到了這樣一種情況：也許兩家公司都在運轉，然後業務的併購部分正在恢復到您所佈置的那種宏觀環境的程度發揮出來嗎？

Yeah. I think it's a far different bridge from 2021 versus '23, '24. So let's look at restructuring first. Restructuring was an incredibly accelerated but abbreviated cycle in 2020, and the timeframe for these executions all compressed just given the urgency of the situation. And then, it stopped raining. The sun came out, and all of the wet grounds dried up seemingly overnight. And we went from incredibly active to inactive on a dime.

是的。我認為這是一座與 2021 年和 23、24 年截然不同的橋樑。那我們先來看看重組。2020 年，重組是一個令人難以置信的加速但縮短的周期，考慮到形勢的緊迫性，這些執行的時間框架都被壓縮了。然後，雨停了。太陽出來了，所有潮濕的地面似乎一夜之間就乾了。我們很快就從極度活躍變成了不活躍。

Here, what we have seen, and we've been talking about this for some period of time, is a multi-year restructuring wave, and we have caught that wave early. We have caught it earlier than most. And we have done a very good job in leveraging the increased footprint in strategic advisory to go hand in hand with our restructuring capabilities to continue to build out and expand our footprint. I expect that this cycle is a multi-year cycle. Clearly, if the economy strengthens to such an extent and rates come all the way back down, it will have some effect on this restructuring cycle. But as we look out at '24, and as we look out even further than '24, we think that we're in the early to middle innings of what should be an extended restructuring cycle.

在這裡，我們所看到的，也是我們已經討論了一段時間的，是一場持續多年的重組浪潮，我們很早就抓住了這一浪潮。我們比大多數人更早發現了它。我們在利用策略諮詢業務的增加以及我們的重組能力來繼續建立和擴大我們的業務方面做得非常好。我預期這個週期是一個多年周期。顯然，如果經濟強勁到這種程度且利率一路回落，將對本次重組週期產生一定影響。但當我們展望 24 年，甚至比 24 年更遠的時候，我們認為我們正處於應該是一個延長的重組週期的早期到中期。

And then I'd also make the point that the default rates that we've experienced for the better part of a decade were so far below trend that simply getting default rates to trend can have a major impact on the quantum of restructuring. That's point number one. Point number two, is that if you look at what's going on in terms of innovation, creative destruction, industries being created overnight and having profound effects on others, there can't be winners without there also being losers. Technology helps, but it also pressures other business models, and we're seeing that. So you can have severe disruption and dislocation coexist with a relatively benign macro environment.

然後我還要指出，我們在過去十年的大部分時間裡所經歷的違約率遠低於趨勢，因此簡單地使違約率趨於趨勢就可以對重組的規模產生重大影響。這是第一點。第二點是，如果你看看創新、創造性破壞、一夜之間創建的並對他人產生深遠影響的產業等方面正在發生的事情，你會發現，沒有贏家，就不可能有輸家。科技有所幫助，但它也給其他商業模式帶來壓力，我們已經看到了這一點。因此，嚴重的破壞和混亂可能與相對良性的宏觀環境共存。

And then the third point is if you just look at the sheer quantum of debt outstanding, and I've been talking about this for a long time, the maturity walls and the debt that needs to be refinanced in the coming years and it needs to be refinanced at meaningfully higher rates than that debt was put on the books at. And when you think about all the ways with these relatively loose covenants to be creative in restructuring balance sheets and assisting companies in creating runway, this should be a long cycle.

第三點是，如果你只看未償債務的絕對數量，我已經談論這個問題很長時間了，期限牆和未來幾年需要再融資的債務，它需要以明顯高於賬面債務的利率進行再融資。當你考慮到透過這些相對寬鬆的契約來創造性地重組資產負債表和協助公司創造跑道的所有方式時，這應該是一個很長的周期。

And on the M&A side, this is different in a very different way, which is '21, the world melted up seemingly on a dime. I don't think we're going to see that here. We've touched bottom. We're building a stronger foundation. I expect this to be an up year in M&A from a global perspective. But if you look historically, the good news is that after two down years, we've never had three.

在併購方面，情況以一種非常不同的方式有所不同，那就是21世紀，世界似乎在一角錢上融化了。我認為我們不會在這裡看到這一點。我們已經觸底了。我們正在建立更牢固的基礎。我預計從全球角度來看，今年將是併購成長的一年。但如果你回顧歷史，好消息是，在經歷了兩年的低迷之後，我們從未經歷過三年的低谷。

But when you look at that first year of recovery, it typically is a modest recovery. And if you look at how things are playing out sitting here in February, I think this is going to be a slow, steady build, and it's going to continue to gain strength. But I think the pivot from '20 to '21 we saw in M&A globally, you're not going to see from '23 to '24. So very, very different marketplaces.

但當你觀察第一年的復甦時，你會發現它通常是溫和的復甦。如果你看看二月的情況如何，我認為這將是一個緩慢、穩定的成長，並且它將繼續增強。但我認為我們在全球併購中看到的從 20 世紀到 21 世紀的轉變，你不會在 23 世紀到 24 世紀看到。市場非常非常不同。

Yeah, got it. Thanks for all the color, Paul. And then just a follow-up question here just on the comp ratio. In 2023, you obviously meaningfully grew the headcount. We're also operating in an environment where two out of the three businesses that you're in were incredibly subdued, and then there was competitive dynamics as well. So just trying to think about relative to that 69.8% 2023 comp ratio, how you guys would frame the comp ratio in a more normalized environment for all three businesses? And maybe there's another way to explain it from just like incremental margins from here. Thanks.

是的，明白了。謝謝你的所有顏色，保羅。然後是關於薪酬比率的後續問題。2023 年，您顯然有意義地增加了員工人數。在我們所處的營運環境中，您所在的三分之二的企業都非常低迷，而且競爭也很激烈。因此，我們想一下，相對於 2023 年 69.8% 的補償比率，你們將如何在更規範化的環境中為所有三個業務制定補償比率？也許還有另一種方法可以解釋它，就像這裡的增量利潤一樣。謝謝。

Sure. Look, to me it's a pretty simple issue which is, we have made very significant investments in our strategic advisory business. And while it was record levels in 2023, it didn't start in 2023. And if you just look at the quantum of headcount that we have added over the last three years, we are a demonstrably stronger, more formidable, more complete firm as we build out these verticals where the opportunities are extraordinary. And if you're doing that in an environment where M&A is down for two years in a row, you have this conflict between significant investments where you know you're going to get a meaningful return. But in the short term, you don't have a return for it, and it pressures margins.

當然。聽著，對我來說這是一個非常簡單的問題，那就是我們在策略諮詢業務上進行了非常重大的投資。雖然 2023 年達到了創紀錄水平，但它並不是從 2023 年開始的。如果你看看我們在過去三年中增加的員工數量，我們顯然是一家更強大、更強大、更完整的公司，因為我們在這些機會巨大的垂直領域中建立了基礎。如果你在併購連續兩年下降的環境中這樣做，那麼你知道自己將獲得有意義的回報的重大投資之間就會存在這種衝突。但在短期內，你不會獲得回報，而且還會對利潤率造成壓力。

And as that investment begins to earn a return and the principal gating item is you need more constructive M&A markets, and it's not just announcements, you need to get to closings before you see it in the comp ratio, it's going to take a little bit of time. But that's pretty much what we've been doing. We're looking at all of these investments, and we're quite confident with the return, but you don't oftentimes make investment and get a day-one payback. We are going to get a long-term payback, and we're going to amply reward our shareholders.

隨著這項投資開始獲得回報，主要的控制項目是你需要更具建設性的併購市場，而這不僅僅是公告，你需要在看到補償比率之前完成交割，這將需要一點時間的時間。但這幾乎就是我們一直在做的事情。我們正在考慮所有這些投資，並且對回報非常有信心，但您通常不會進行投資並獲得第一天的回報。我們將獲得長期回報，我們將充分回報我們的股東。

And in the short term, we're going to see our comp ratios go up. And I would just -- it would be remiss of me not to add, it's not as if we're the only ones who are seeing our comp ratios move higher, but we're doing it with complete confidence that it's the right thing. This is not where we expect the business to be when it hits its normal stride, but it's part of the journey. And on the other side of this is a lot of attractive return.

在短期內，我們將看到我們的薪酬比率上升。我只是想——如果我不補充的話，那就太失職了，我們並不是唯一看到我們的薪酬比率上升的人，但我們完全有信心這樣做是正確的。這不是我們期望業務正常發展時的樣子，但它是旅程的一部分。另一方面是大量有吸引力的回報。

Got it. I mean, is there any way to just drill that a little bit more into like where the comp ratio could revert to or like any way to quantify the numbers around like where you see it going as the businesses are either more mature or just the backdrop is, call it, more normal?

知道了。我的意思是，有沒有什麼方法可以進一步深入研究，例如補償比率可以恢復到什麼程度，或者有什麼方法可以量化周圍的數字，就像你看到的那樣，因為企業要么更加成熟，要么只是背景是，這樣說，比較正常嗎？

Well, look, again, part of the challenge is what's normal. And I think one of the things we've always said is anyone who talks about one comp ratio for all conditions, it's just not -- it's not realistic, which is you need to overlay, are you in a bull market, are you in a bear market, are you at a normalized market, as you're hiring levels out. There's no reason why our comp ratios should not be in line with peer ratios in time. But you need to assume a set of circumstances. The reality is that most of firms who came well before us were operating in the circa 60% comp ratio, some a little higher, some a little bit lower. So unless and until we have other evidence to suggest that that's not the right ratio, that's pretty much where this should trend over time.

好吧，再看一次，挑戰的一部分是正常的。我認為我們一直說的一件事是，任何人在所有情況下都談論一種補償比率，這不是——這是不現實的，這是你需要疊加的，你是否處於牛市中，你是否處於牛市中？熊市，你是否處於正常化市場，因為你正在招募水準。我們的薪酬比率沒有理由不及時與同業比率保持一致。但您需要假設一系列情況。現實情況是，大多數先於我們的公司的薪酬比率約為 60%，有些略高，有些略低。因此，除非並且直到我們有其他證據表明這不是正確的比率，否則隨著時間的推移，這幾乎應該是趨勢。

Got it. Okay. That's all I needed.

知道了。好的。這就是我所需要的。

James Yaro, Goldman Sachs.

詹姆斯·亞羅，高盛。

Good morning, and thanks for taking my questions. Paul, maybe just to start with a bigger picture macro one, I think we're seeing generally mixed, but generally somewhat better industry announced M&A trends. I'd love to get your mark-to-market on how you are thinking about the macro, and how that's factoring into the conversations in corporate boardrooms. And then separately, how are M&A dialogues evolving with sponsors?

早上好，感謝您回答我的問題。保羅，也許只是從更宏觀的宏觀角度開始，我認為我們看到的總體情況是喜憂參半，但總體來說行業公佈的併購趨勢有所改善。我很想了解您對宏觀經濟的看法，以及如何將其納入公司董事會的對話中。另外，與贊助商的併購對話進度如何？

Right. Well, look, I'm not sure that there's a one-size fits-all answer to that. It depends on geography. It depends on industry, its size of transaction. It's whether you're talking about strategics or sponsors. Let's just talk about sponsors first. Let's double-click on sponsors.

正確的。好吧，聽著，我不確定是否有萬能的答案。這取決於地理位置。這取決於行業及其交易規模。這取決於你是在談論策略還是贊助商。我們先來談談贊助商。讓我們雙擊贊助商。

Sponsors, people tend to focus on sponsors as creating demand for M&A as buyers of assets. But the reality is, given their immense portfolios, they're also potential sources of supply and sellers of assets. And when you look at sponsor activity, it gets created when sponsors monetize portfolio investments as well as when they reload, and they make new investments. And the reality is, with many of their portfolio companies on the books because they were acquired in a near-zero interest rate environment, the math may not work in the very near term to sell those assets in order for them to get maximum value.

發起人，人們傾向於關注發起人作為資產買家創造的併購需求。但現實是，鑑於它們龐大的投資組合，它們也是潛在的資產供應來源和賣方。當你觀察贊助商活動時，它是在贊助商將投資組合投資貨幣化以及他們重新加載並進行新投資時創建的。現實情況是，由於他們的許多投資組合公司是在接近零利率的環境下收購的，因此在短期內出售這些資產以獲得最大價值可能行不通。

And one of the things about the alts world and private equity sponsors is they are incredibly adroit at timing exits. And without an incredible impetus, I think you're seeing more restrained exits which is dampening M&A. And because you are having more restrained exits and because there is less DPI for investors and because this flywheel is slightly out of balance, I think that the margin they're willingness to commit capital has also been subdued. And I have said that when rates actually start to be cut as opposed to when they have crusted is when you're likely to see that market heat up in a meaningful way And that most likely will be sometime in the middle of 2024.

另類世界和私募股權贊助商的特點之一是，他們在退出時機方面非常熟練。如果沒有令人難以置信的推動力，我認為你會看到更多受限的退出，這正在抑制併購。而且因為退出更加受限，而且投資者的 DPI 較少，而且這個飛輪稍微失去平衡，我認為他們願意投入資本的利潤也受到了抑制。我說過，當利率真正開始下調時，而不是利率已經結痂時，你可能會看到市場以有意義的方式升溫，而且最有可能是在 2024 年中期的某個時候。

And on the strategic side, what I've always pointed to is, even with these very challenging conditions, companies' desires to pursue M&A, to use M&A as a tool has never wavered, and that's not something you typically see in a bear market. In many bear markets for M&A, oftentimes, executives have no interest in seriously considering M&A. And what we have here is two going on three years of subdued activity, lots of companies have strategic plans and initiatives that they need to execute, and at the first sign that they can finance a transaction, that they can agree on value, that they're going to be in the game.

在策略方面，我一直指出的是，即使在這些非常具有挑戰性的條件下，公司進行併購、利用併購作為工具的願望也從未動搖過，這不是熊市中常見的情況。在許多併購熊市中，高階主管通常沒有興趣認真考慮併購。我們在這裡看到的是連續三年的低迷活動，許多公司都有需要執行的戰略計劃和舉措，並且一有跡象表明他們可以為交易提供資金，他們可以就價值達成一致，他們可以將會出現在遊戲中。

And that's why we've seen the leader, if you will, in resuming and reopening the market has been more corporate driven and less sponsor-driven. But that, too, takes a little bit of time because there are still impediments to this. In some of the targets, in order to take over a company, the entire cap stack has to be refinanced, and that may be difficult in the current environment. There may be concerns about antitrust risks, not so much about whether the deal will ultimately be balanced but more about how long it will take, how long the review process, and what could happen to the underlying business mainly signing and closing and extended regulatory review. So you've got lots of different elements, but I think what's clear to say is the direction of travel is positive, but these markets tend to take a little bit of time to reopen and to pick up steam.

這就是為什麼我們看到，如果你願意的話，在恢復和重新開放市場方面，領導者更多的是企業驅動，而不是贊助商驅動。但這也需要一點時間，因為仍然存在障礙。在某些目標中，為了接管一家公司，整個資本結構必須進行再融資，這在當前環境下可能很困難。人們可能會擔心反壟斷風險，與其說是交易最終是否會平衡，不如說是擔心交易需要多長時間、審核過程需要多長時間，以及基礎業務（主要是簽署和交割以及延長監管審查）可能會發生什麼。因此，有許多不同的因素，但我認為可以明確的是，發展方向是正面的，但這些市場往往需要一點時間才能重新開放並恢復活力。

And then the last point I would make is that a lot of M&A is pro-cyclical, which I cheekily refer to as FOMO, that transactions beget transactions, and transactions beget competitive responses. And if your competitors are taking advantage in using M&A as a tool, that's probably going to accelerate your timeline. If your competitor isn't doing anything, it probably gives you a sense of security that you can bide your time.

我要說的最後一點是，很多併購都是順週期性的，我厚顏無恥地將其稱為“FOMO”，交易引發交易，交易引發競爭性反應。如果您的競爭對手利用併購作為工具，這可能會加快您的時間表。如果你的競爭對手沒有採取任何行動，這可能會給你一種可以等待時機的安全感。

So we've clearly touched bottom. We're clearly building a base backup. But just exactly what that recovery curve looks like, it's hard to tell. Although if history is a guide, the first year tends to be subdued, and then it picks up steam and recover.

所以我們顯然已經觸底了。我們顯然正在建立一個基礎備份。但恢復曲線到底是什麼樣子，很難說。儘管以史為鑑，第一年往往會受到抑制，但隨後就會復甦並復甦。

Okay. That's very clear. As my follow-up, somewhat related question to what you just spoke to on the sponsor side, fundraising remains muted. And I do appreciate your constructive commentary on 4Q improving, but maybe you could just update us on what you're hearing from sponsors on their ability to accelerate fundraising at this point relative to 2023 and over the course of 2024, and then what this means for the timeline for Park Hill revenue to fully normalize? Is that a 2024 event or something that's more of a medium-term expectation?

好的。這非常清楚。作為我的後續問題，與您剛才在贊助商方面談到的問題有些相關，籌款活動仍然保持沉默。我確實感謝您對第四季度改善的建設性評論，但也許您可以向我們介紹一下您從贊助商那裡聽到的關於他們在此時相對於2023 年和2024 年加速籌款的能力的最新信息，以及這意味著什麼Park Hill 收入完全正常化的時間表是什麼？這是 2024 年的事件還是更多的中期預期？

I think the direction of travel begins in a positive direction in '24, but I don't think it gets fully back to normal levels in '24. I would defer that for the moment to say '25, we'll revisit that. But I think it's probably a two-year process to get to where we got to. We saw some weakening in the marketplace in the latter half of '22. That carried over to '23.

我認為行進方向在 24 年開始朝著正面方向發展，但我認為它不會在 24 年完全恢復到正常水平。我會暫時推遲到 25 日，我們會重新討論這個問題。但我認為這可能需要兩年的時間才能達到我們所達到的目標。我們看到 22 年下半年市場出現一些疲軟。這一直延續到'23。

I think, in a similar vein to the M&A commentary, I think we've touched bottom, and it's now more constructive, but that will take some time. And one of the challenges is a little bit of an affordability issue, which is, you're culling all those capital, and you're not returning a lot of capital. And with the IPO markets still not really fully open and vibrant as a monetization tool, and with subdued M&A, that has put a damper on it.

我認為，與併購評論類似，我認為我們已經觸底，現在更具建設性，但這需要一些時間。其中一個挑戰是承受能力問題，也就是說，你正在剔除所有這些資本，並且你沒有返還大量資本。由於 IPO 市場作為一種貨幣化工具尚未真正完全開放和充滿活力，加上併購活動低迷，這給它帶來了阻礙。

But the lack of capital has been called. It's one of the ways in which the system gets back into equilibrium. Also, the credit markets ripping tighter. You're starting to see the early signs of some dividend recap deals and the like, so I think liquidity is beginning to flow back in the marketplace. And I think that's all very positive for the Park Hill business in the intermediate term. But clearly, '24 will be an up year.

但資金匱乏已被稱為。這是系統恢復平衡的方式之一。此外，信貸市場也趨緊。你開始看到一些股息重述交易等的早期跡象，所以我認為流動性開始回流市場。我認為，從中期來看，這對 Park Hill 業務來說是非常積極的。但顯然，24 年將是一個上升的一年。

Steven Chubak, Wolfe Research.

史蒂文‧丘巴克，沃爾夫研究中心。

Hi. Good morning, Paul. Paul, you find election risk in a recent interview as a potential overhang on deal activity. Admittedly, I've asked that of other managements, and they've been fairly dismissive of the impact, and so I was hoping you could maybe walk through some of the election game theory, how this overhang is going to impact deal activity across different sectors? And just what you're hearing from corporates generally ahead of the upcoming election?

你好。早安，保羅。保羅，您在最近的一次採訪中發現選舉風險是交易活動的潛在懸念。誠然，我已經問過其他管理層，他們對這種影響相當不屑一顧，所以我希望你能了解一些選舉博弈論，這種懸而未決的問題將如何影響不同領域的交易活動部門？在即將到來的選舉之前，您從企業那裡聽到的消息是什麼？

Yeah, I think just let me be really clear. What I said was that no one was focusing on the election right now. But that come summer, that's all people are going to be talking about. And therefore, what is not a risk today may well be a risk tomorrow. And therefore, I'm not at all surprised to hear you say that in some of your conversations, people are not assigning that as a principal risk today because it's not.

是的，我想讓我說清楚。我想說的是，現在沒有人關注選舉。但到了夏天，這就是人們談論的話題。因此，今天不是風險的事情明天很可能就會成為風險。因此，聽到您說在您的一些談話中，人們沒有將其視為當今的主要風險，我一點也不感到驚訝，因為事實並非如此。

But I do believe that as we get into the election, and as the rhetoric heats up, and as we have competing policy initiatives, and as we -- I expect to have a very close election where it is unclear where we're going to be in terms of policies, tax, immigration, China relations, and the like that that may have a freezing effect, I've also said, I think there is some possibility for some foreign intervention to create mischief near the election. So when people talk about geopolitical risks, that's geopolitical risk, but it comes in the form of an election.

但我確實相信，隨著我們進入選舉，隨著言論升溫，隨著我們有相互競爭的政策舉措，隨著我們——我預計將會有一場非常接近的選舉，但目前還不清楚我們將走向何方。在政策、稅收、移民、中國關係等方面可能會產生凍結效應，我也說過，我認為一些外國幹預有可能在選舉臨近時製造禍害。因此，當人們談論地緣政治風險時，那是地緣政治風險，但它是以選舉的形式出現的。

And then I've made the point that since we've had two razor-thin elections that have been decided by literally tens of thousands of votes, it goes down to a county or two or three, I don't expect this third time around to be any different. And therefore, the possibility of a disputed election and what that brings, which is another form of geopolitical risk. So I don't want to be naysayer, I'm just simply pointing out that I think something that is not on people's radar screens today, will get on people's radar screens at some point. And we've seen that with things like the debt ceiling where no one talks about it and then all of a sudden they can't stop talking about it. So that would be my perspective.

然後我指出，由於我們已經進行了兩次微弱的選舉，實際上是由數萬張選票決定的，所以它會下降到一個或兩個或三個縣，我不認為這是第三次周圍有什麼不同。因此，有爭議的選舉的可能性及其帶來的後果，是另一種形式的地緣政治風險。所以我不想成為反對者，我只是簡單地指出，我認為今天不在人們雷達屏幕上的東西，會在某個時候出現在人們的雷達屏幕上。我們已經看到，像債務上限這樣的事情，沒有人談論它，然後突然他們無法停止談論它。這就是我的觀點。

Very helpful color, Paul. And just for my follow-up on capital management. Certainly, a meaningful uptick in the repurchase authorization, certainly nice to see that. Just wanted to better understand how we should think about the cadence of buyback and the share count trajectory in the year ahead given some of the impact of prior-year awards which Helen had alluded to in her prepared remarks.

非常有用的顏色，保羅。只是為了我對資本管理的追蹤。當然，回購授權的大幅增加，當然很高興看到這一點。只是想更了解我們應該如何考慮未來一年的回購節奏和股票計數軌跡，因為海倫在準備好的演講中提到了上一年獎項的一些影響。

Look, we are big believers in our company and in our prospects, and we also feel an obligation to our shareholders to be good stewards of capital. And those two things go hand in hand, so you should expect us to continue, certainly relative to others, to be very aggressive in using our capital to buy back our stock because we can capture value, and we can avoid dilution for our shareholders. And if you look back over the last eight years how well we've accomplished that goal, that's the playbook we intend to use for the next eight years and the eight years after that and beyond.

看，我們對我們的公司和我們的前景充滿信心，我們也覺得我們的股東有義務成為資本的好管家。這兩件事是相輔相成的，所以你應該期望我們繼續，當然相對於其他人，非常積極地利用我們的資本回購我們的股票，因為我們可以獲得價值，並且我們可以避免股東被稀釋。如果你回顧過去八年我們如何很好地實現了這一目標，這就是我們打算在未來八年以及之後的八年及以後使用的劇本。

What we've also said is, we happen to come into this year with our best balance sheet in the firm's history when you measure it on any basis whether it's cash, cash less accounts payable, net working capital, any dimension. And therefore, we have more firepower now than we've ever had. So you should expect that our open market purchases to be as robust, if not more robust than they've ever been.

我們也說過，今年我們剛好擁有公司史上最好的資產負債表，無論是現金、現金減去應付帳款、淨營運資本或任何維度。因此，我們現在擁有比以往更多的火力。因此，您應該預期我們的公開市場購買將與以往一樣強勁，甚至更加強勁。

The other thing that we're also mindful of is if we're going to repurchase, we've typically tried to do it in the front half of the year, more so just because we can match repurchases better with awards that get issued. But there's no black box algorithm. It's just a basic philosophy, which is always be prudent with the balance sheet, always put shareholders first, and all else equal, probably bigger buyers in the first half of the year than in the second half of the year just because it's easier for us to do matchings.

我們還注意到的另一件事是，如果我們要回購，我們通常會嘗試在今年上半年進行，更重要的是因為我們可以更好地將回購與頒發的獎勵相匹配。但不存在黑盒算法。這只是一個基本理念，始終對資產負債表保持謹慎，始終將股東放在第一位，在其他條件相同的情況下，上半年可能比下半年有更多的買家，因為這對我們來說更容易進行配對。

I would just add, if you look over the last two years, our repurchases had pretty closely matched, what we issued as part of year-end comp. And as you mentioned, these additional shares that are coming into the share count, it will be about 1.3 million shares, and it will be our intention to go get those back, but we may not perfectly match when they come into the count.

我想補充一點，如果你回顧過去兩年，我們的回購與我們作為年終補償的一部分發行的股票非常接近。正如你所提到的，這些額外的股票將進入股票計數，大約為 130 萬股，我們打算收回這些股票，但當它們進入計數時，我們可能不會完全匹配。

Great color. Thanks so much for taking my questions.

顏色很棒。非常感謝您回答我的問題。

Brennan Hawken, UBS.

布倫南霍肯，瑞銀集團。

Hi. Good morning. Thanks for taking my questions. So, Helen, you touched on this in your prepared remarks but hoping to drill down a little bit. You touched on hitting the performance metrics, I believe it was a VWAP target. I think you guys hit that in December, so if you could confirm that. And then I think what you said was, that impacted the fully diluted average shares, but there's more to come. Could you give us a sense of how much more we should expect in the first quarter from that averaging in? And did it also impact the compensation expense in 2023 as well?

你好。早安.感謝您回答我的問題。所以，海倫，你在準備好的發言中談到了這一點，但希望能深入探討。您談到了績效指標，我相信這是一個 VWAP 目標。我想你們在 12 月就做到了這一點，所以如果你們能證實這一點的話。然後我認為你所說的是，這影響了完全稀釋的平均股票，但還會有更多。您能否告訴我們，我們對第一季的平均預期應該增加多少？這是否也影響了 2023 年的補償費用？

It does not -- I'll answer that question. It does not impact the compensation expense in 2023 and the crystallization of those units. And in terms of sizing, of the 1.3 million, 600,000 payment in Q4, and so another 700,000 will come in in Q1.

事實並非如此——我來回答這個問題。它不會影響 2023 年的補償費用和這些單位的結晶。就規模而言，在 130 萬美元中，第 4 季將支付 60 萬美元，因此第一季將支付 70 萬美元。

Excellent.

出色的。

And just to clarify, the triggering of the award in no way affected the comp ratio. But clearly, the granting of the award back in '22 was expensed beginning in '22 and continues for a number of years, but it's not the triggering of the vesting of it.

需要澄清的是，該獎項的觸發絕不會影響補償比率。但顯然，早在 22 年授予該獎項就從 22 年開始支出，並持續了很多年，但這並不是授予該獎項的觸發因素。

Understood. Thank you for clarifying that. Staying on expenses. So under -- totally appreciate that trying to predict the comp ratio is really challenging, right? Because you've got revenue and you've got expenses, and it's very hard to predict revenue in February, beginning of February. So if we were to just maybe lay out a scenario, right, if you were to see total revenue in 2024, grow by 10%, and you were to hire no more bankers, right. So all you had was the existing base of employees, what sort of a magnitude could we expect comp expense to grow in a scenario like that for 2024?

明白了。感謝您澄清這一點。維持開支。因此，完全理解嘗試預測補償比率確實具有挑戰性，對吧？因為你有收入，也有支出，很難預測二月、二月初的收入。因此，如果我們只是設想一個場景，對吧，如果你看到 2024 年總收入成長 10%，並且你不再僱用銀行家，對吧。那麼，你所擁有的只是現有的員工基礎，在 2024 年這樣的情況下，我們預期薪資支出會成長多少？

So we're just trying to clarify your assumptions. Revenues are up 10%, is that what you said, and no hiring?

所以我們只是想澄清你的假設。收入成長了 10%，是你所說的，而且還沒有招募嗎？

Revenue is up 10%, headcount unch, what kind of operating leverage? I'm just trying to get a sense of the operating leverage that is embedded given how much recruiting you guys have done, and how much the comp ratio was impacted?

營收成長了 10%，員工數量不變，營運槓桿是多少？我只是想了解一下，考慮到你們做了多少招聘，以及薪酬比率受到了多大影響，所嵌入的營運槓桿？

Yeah, I mean, I guess my first reaction to that is, it's really hard to answer hypotheticals because you've got to start to then say, okay, if revenues are up 10%, how is that distributed amongst our three businesses? Are they all up 10%, you start to get there. Then, you get into what's the broader macroenvironment for talent and compensation, what are the fixed costs at the more junior levels, what's the Associate and VP and on? What's the pyramid cost going to be? Are we having inflation or deflation?

是的，我的意思是，我想我對此的第一個反應是，很難回答假設，因為你必須開始說，好吧，如果收入增長10%，那麼這在我們的三個業務之間如何分配？當它們都上漲 10% 時，你就開始到達那裡了。然後，您會了解人才和薪酬的更廣泛宏觀環境是什麼，初級級別的固定成本是什麼，助理和副總裁是什麼？金字塔的成本是多少？我們正在經歷通貨膨脹還是通貨緊縮？

Then you've got the next issue which is, is it up 10% because the next year looks like it's going to be where the business takes off or is it up 10% but then you think you have a lot to come right back down. You start to get into so many hypotheticals. If you want to talk about the comp leverage, the way I think about it is, over the last three years, we have added 35% headcount, and we've not grown our revenues near 35%. And that's what the drag is.

然後你會遇到下一個問題，即它是否會上漲 10%，因為明年看起來將是業務起飛的時候，還是上漲 10%，但隨後你認為你還有很多東西需要回落。你開始做出很多假設。如果你想談論薪資槓桿，我的想法是，在過去三年裡，我們增加了 35% 的員工人數，但我們的收入成長卻沒有接近 35%。這就是阻力所在。

And we're making an investment where we're confident that over time, that headcount is going to be reflected in the bottom line, and it's less about at 10% in one year, it's really trying to get step function change in our revenue as those individuals who we know are going to be quite productive on the platform are not only productive on the platform in a relative sense, but they actually have a constructive M&A backdrop in which to translate client progress into revenues. And then this all gets back to normal, but exactly how it drifts back in to reduce the ratio, it's very hard to answer a hypothetical like that.

我們正在進行一項投資，我們有信心隨著時間的推移，員工人數將反映在利潤中，一年內的增長率不會達到 10%，這確實是在努力使我們的收入發生階躍函數變化因為我們知道那些將在平台上非常高效的個人不僅在相對意義上在平台上高效，而且他們實際上擁有建設性的併購背景，可以將客戶的進步轉化為收入。然後一切都會恢復正常，但到底是如何恢復正常以降低比率的，很難回答這樣的假設。

You've got to really sit down with all the facts at the end of the year, which is why I'm confident that where we are is certainly elevated relative to trend, and I'm confident that it will return to a more normal level. But fundamentally, that's just getting the investment to begin to show a financial return. We see a return by what these individuals are doing and how they're expanding our practice, well before you all see it in the P&L. And that's the lag effect.

你必須在年底真正坐下來面對所有事實，這就是為什麼我相信我們的處境相對於趨勢來說肯定會有所提高，而且我相信它將恢復到更正常的狀態等級。但從根本上來說，這只是讓投資開始展現財務回報。我們早在你們在損益表中看到這些人正在做的事情以及他們如何擴展我們的實踐中就看到了回報。這就是滯後效應。

Yeah, no, I totally appreciate all that, Paul. It would be great maybe -- I know it's really challenging to come up with on the fly, but it would be great if you could find out -- because this is the one question investors struggle with is, how do you think about the leverage that's embedded into the platform, and how much is from this expansion? And so maybe you guys could consider adding some more granular color around compensation leverage in the future. Would really appreciate that.

是的，不，我非常感謝這一切，保羅。也許這會很棒 - 我知道即時想出這確實很有挑戰性，但如果你能找到答案那就太好了 - 因為這是投資者面臨的一個問題，你如何看待槓桿這是嵌入到平台中的，這個擴充有多少？因此，也許你們可以考慮在未來在薪酬槓桿周圍添加一些更細粒度的顏色。真的很感激。

More than happy to revisit it. But as I said, that -- here's the paradox of the business. When M&A is going gangbusters, and it's easiest financially to absorb new investment, it's hardest to attract the new investment. When M&A markets are dislocated, and it's the worst possible time to absorb that investment into your P&L is when you get the best opportunities to build the franchise. And we're just simply trying to -- I learned in driver's ed many, many decades ago was aim high in the steering wheel, look far down the road.

非常樂意重溫它。但正如我所說，這就是這個行業的悖論。當併購活動如火如荼時，在財務上最容易吸收新投資，但吸引新投資卻是最困難的。當併購市場混亂時，將投資吸收到損益表中最糟糕的時機就是當你獲得建立特許經營權的最佳機會時。我們只是簡單地嘗試——我在幾十年前的駕駛員教育中了解到，要瞄準方向盤高處，看著遠處的道路。

That's what we're doing, and we're constantly measuring it to make sure we're doing the right things. But that's really where we're at, and that's the paradox, which is we invested at the depth of the market because that's when you could get the best talent. That's when people are most willing to move. I think that continues into '24, but consistent with my commentary, as the M&A markets slowly heal, I expect that that environment will still be quite attractive by historic levels, but not as attractive as '23 was. And then, as this market begins to rebound, as we know it will for deal-making, then these ratios start to quickly return to more normal levels.

這就是我們正在做的事情，並且我們不斷地對其進行衡量，以確保我們所做的是正確的事情。但這確實是我們所處的位置，這就是悖論，我們在市場深度進行投資，因為只有這樣你才能獲得最優秀的人才。那是人們最願意搬家的時候。我認為這種情況會持續到24 年，但與我的評論一致，隨著併購市場慢慢癒合，我預計這種環境在歷史層面上仍將相當有吸引力，但不會像23 年那樣有吸引力。然後，隨著市場開始反彈（正如我們所知，交易將會反彈），這些比率開始迅速恢復到更正常的水平。

Am I last in the queue because I have one more question, but I can re-queue if somebody is still there.

我是不是在隊列中排在最後，因為我還有一個問題，但如果有人還在，我可以重新排隊。

No, that's fine. Go ahead.

不，沒關係。前進。

Okay, great. I would love to ask about Park Hill. So Park Hill has been struggling. You spoke a good deal about the headwinds to that business broadly and the environment, so totally appreciate that. But we just had a competitor of yours speak to strength in their private asset advisory business, and that they actually were seeing revenue growth. So are you losing share in that business?

好的，太好了。我很想問一下帕克希爾的情況。所以帕克希爾一直在苦苦掙扎。您談到了該業務和環境所面臨的不利因素，所以完全理解這一點。但我們剛剛讓您的競爭對手談到了他們私人資產諮詢業務的實力，並且他們實際上看到了收入成長。那麼您是否正在失去該業務的份額？

Is there maybe some indexing to certain asset classes like real estate that happens that's causing Park Hill to show a bit of weakness when others are showing some more resilience? Could you speak to maybe consolidation in the industry creating some problems? What do you think might be causing those divergent data points? Thank you.

是否可能會對房地產等某些資產類別進行一些指數化，導致帕克希爾在其他資產表現出更強的韌性時表現出一些弱點？您能談談產業整合可能會帶來一些問題嗎？您認為是什麼導致了這些不同的數據點？謝謝。

Yeah. It's always hard to mix and match everything, but I'll make a few observations. Number one, Park Hill had another record year in 2022. So just to put this in perspective, after setting record after record after record, you've got to look at that. So sometimes it's easy for someone to have quote-unquote growth. It's all a question of what your pace is. So we're dealing with record results in 2022, number one.

是的。混合和匹配所有內容總是很困難，但我會提出一些觀察。第一，Park Hill 在 2022 年再創紀錄。因此，正確地看待這一點，在創造了一個又一個的記錄之後，你必須審視這一點。所以有時候，一個人很容易獲得無報價的成長。這完全取決於你的節奏。因此，我們將在 2022 年迎來創紀錄的結果，第一。

Number two, you've got to look at the composition within that business as to how much of it is primary versus secondary, and how the firms are weighted one versus the other. And the third is, it's not unlike the M&A business particularly with fundraisers that are long tailed at all. Timing plays a very important role. And there's an idiosyncratic nature to this as to what actually gets closed in the year, what gets pushed into the next year.

第二，你必須查看該業務的組成，了解其中有多少是主要的，哪些是次要的，以及公司之間的權重如何。第三，這與併購業務沒有什麼不同，尤其是長尾募款活動。時機扮演著非常重要的角色。對於今年實際關閉的內容和推遲到明年的內容來說，存在著一種特殊的性質。

And I think if you've listened to my earlier commentary, you've no doubt heard that we are quite constructive on a rebound in our results in 2024, which I think this, again, emphasizes the fact that with slightly longer loans, a lot of things that appear to be important moves one way or the other tend to be more noise than anything else.

我認為，如果您聽過我之前的評論，您無疑會聽說我們對 2024 年業績反彈相當有建設性，我認為這再次強調了這樣一個事實：貸款期限稍長，許多看起來很重要的事情往往會以一種或另一種方式發展，而這往往比其他任何事情都更加噪音。

Does Park Hill have a pretty large real estate business, though? Could you give some texture around some of the different asset classes?

帕克希爾有相當大的房地產業務嗎？您能否對一些不同的資產類別提供一些說明？

Well, it has a real estate business, but it's principal largest primary fundraising business is on the PE side, and probably second largest would be hedge funds, credit funds, and the like.

嗯，它有房地產業務，但它最大的主要融資業務是私募股權方面，第二大可能是對沖基金、信貸基金等。

Got it. Thank you.

知道了。謝謝。

Michael Brown, KBW.

邁克爾布朗，KBW。

Great. Good morning, everyone. So Paul, I wanted to ask about the ramping potential here from the talent base. So if you could dive into where you see the productivity expansion as greatest. And I assume the expansion potential for the strategic advisory would be higher than restructuring. And so if you focus on the strategic advisory side, where is the opportunity the highest as a recent hire season on the PJT platform? And what would be -- would it be possible to get back to the 2020 peak, which I think was the peak for you guys in terms of advisory revenue per partner?

偉大的。大家，早安。保羅，我想問這裡的人才基礎的潛力。因此，如果您能深入研究一下您認為生產力成長幅度最大的地方。我認為策略諮詢的擴張潛力將高於重組。因此，如果您專注於策略諮詢方面，PJT 平台上最近的招募季節機會最大的地方在哪裡？會怎麼樣——是否有可能回到 2020 年的峰值，我認為對於你們來說，就每個合作夥伴的諮詢收入而言，這是峰值？

I'm doing this to set new benchmarks for the firm, not to go back to old benchmark. So my goal would be to be more productive than we were in 2020. So there's absolutely no reason why we can't be and that we won't be at some point.

我這樣做是為了為公司設定新的基準，而不是回到舊的基準。因此，我的目標是比 2020 年提高生產力。因此，我們完全沒有理由不能做到這一點，而且在某個時候我們也不會做到這一點。

But in order to do that, it's a function of what's the macro environment, and it's a function of how much harvesting you're doing with established partners versus how much investing you're doing with new partners. So you need all of those things. But absolutely, I don't view that as the ceiling at all on what we're all about.

但要做到這一點，它取決於宏觀環境，取決於您與現有合作夥伴的收穫量與與新合作夥伴的投資量。所以你需要所有這些東西。但絕對地，我根本不認為這是我們一切的上限。

I would observe, though, that in that period of time, and over the last three years, we haven't exactly see growth in the M&A marketplace. So it's great that you picked 2020. I think the overall M&A market is pretty much flattish, plus or minus. It went up in '21, and it came down in '22, and it came back down to '23, and it was more or less a round trip. But over that period of time, we've added significant headcount. That will be the first line.

不過，我觀察到，在那段時間以及過去三年中，我們並沒有看到併購市場的成長。所以你選擇2020年真是太好了。我認為整體併購市場無論是正值或負值都相當平淡。它在21年上升，在22年下降，然後又回落到23年，這或多或少是一個往返。但在那段時間裡，我們增加了大量員工。這將是第一行。

I think the second is, ultimately where you want to be is, you want to be where the biggest wallets are. And those wallets have historically been technology, healthcare, consumer, industrials, among others, but you can't start a firm and then just focus on where the biggest wallets are because if you do that, you may end up fishing in the best waters in terms of wallet opportunity, but you don't get the best bankers. And to get the best bankers, you've got to be opportunistic about when those opportunities present themselves.

我認為第二個是，最終你想成為的地方是，你想要成為錢包最大的地方。這些錢包歷來都是科技、醫療保健、消費者、工業等領域的，但你不能創辦一家公司，然後只專注於最大的錢包在哪裡，因為如果你這樣做，你最終可能會在最好的水域釣魚就錢包機會而言，但你得不到最好的銀行家。為了獲得最好的銀行家，你必須在機會出現時抓住機會。

And that's why it takes time. And that's why we continue to build out in areas where we heretofore hadn't been. It's not because we necessarily didn't have an interest in the space, it was we perhaps couldn't find the right people to occupy that space.

這就是為什麼這需要時間。這就是為什麼我們繼續在以前沒有涉足的領域進行建設。這並不是因為我們一定對這個空間不感興趣，而是因為我們可能找不到合適的人來佔據這個空間。

And then when you get to the productivity, in a way, it's the last partner in that's the most productive as opposed to the first partner because the first partner in a new space, that's a very large order for one individual to come into a new space and have the critical mass and the expertise and the totality of the relationships. So you tend to make investment, investment, investment, and all the while you're being stronger and more competitive, and you're starting to light up the network, but it's really about that last individual.

然後，當你達到生產力時，在某種程度上，最後一個合作夥伴是最有生產力的，而不是第一個合作夥伴，因為新空間中的第一個夥伴對於一個人進入新空間來說是一個非常大的訂單空間並擁有臨界質量、專業知識和完整的關係。所以你傾向於進行投資、投資、投資，同時你變得更強大、更有競爭力，你開始點亮網絡，但這實際上是關於最後一個人的。

Now as we've made this journey of investment, and we have what I would call mostly built, but not fully built networks industry group by industry group, we're starting to now close off and complete some of those networks. And when you do that, that's when you get big spikes in productivity. And then, as we play a longer game as we start to now compete in some areas where there's very rich wallets like the technology space, Mike, we end up with another bump. So those are all the ways in which we continue to strengthen the firm.

現在，隨著我們已經完成了這一投資之旅，並且我們擁有了我所說的大部分已建成但尚未完全建成的網路產業組，我們現在開始關閉並完成其中一些網路。當你這樣做時，你的生產力就會大幅提升。然後，當我們玩更長的遊戲時，我們現在開始在一些錢包非常豐富的領域（例如技術領域）競爭，麥克，我們最終會遇到另一個障礙。這些都是我們持續增強公司實力的方法。

And then finally, a lot of this investment also has utility beyond just strategic advisory. And we see that in opening up new corporate and sponsor relationships for our restructuring colleagues. So everywhere we go, that investment finds other ways to be amortized and to be monetized. But it does take constructive markets where we've had constructive markets and restructuring, we've had more than enough proof of concept as far as our penetration and sponsors and corporate. And as the M&A market heats up, I expect we'll see the same productivity gains there as well.

最後，許多投資除了策略諮詢之外還有其他用途。我們在為重組同事建立新的企業和贊助商關係中看到了這一點。因此，無論我們走到哪裡，投資都會找到其他方式進行攤銷和貨幣化。但這確實需要建設性市場，我們已經擁有建設性市場和重組，就我們的滲透率、贊助商和企業而言，我們已經有了足夠的概念證明。隨著併購市場的升溫，我預期我們也會看到同樣的生產力提升。

Okay, maybe just a quick one for Helen on the non-comp guide. I understand that the occupancy sounds like that's going up as your as your business grows. That makes sense. Is this increase that you talked about for 2024, is that a one-year or a transitory impact or that essentially permanent increase? Essentially, is there a double rent impact that's impacting the guidance?

好吧，也許只是海倫在非補償指南上的一個快速介紹。據我所知，隨著業務的發展，入住率似乎會不斷上升。這就說得通了。您談到的 2024 年成長是一年期的還是暫時的影響，還是本質上是永久性的成長？從本質上講，是否存在雙重租金影響影響了指導？

So in 2024, there will be a step-function increase in occupancy cost, then it will stay elevated. So it's not a one-time increase. It's not a double occupancy issue. So we're just pointing out that that increase is more significant in 2024, and then it will level out beyond that.

因此，到 2024 年，入住成本將呈階梯式增長，然後將保持在較高水平。所以這不是一次性的增加。這不是雙人入住的問題。所以我們只是指出，2024 年這一增長更為顯著，然後就會趨於平穩。

And then the majority of that increase is coming from the fact that we've renegotiated these leases as I mentioned. It's a 15-year lease, so rents are higher. And we also had some sublease income that was below market. So that's being mark to market, and we are taking on some additional space.

正如我所提到的，大部分成長來自於我們重新談判了這些租賃。因為是15年的租約，所以租金比較高。我們還有一些低於市場水平的轉租收入。因此，這是針對市場的，我們正在佔用一些額外的空間。

And then there is an accounting straight lining of a 15-year lease, which means in the early years, we're expensing more than our cash outlay, but that's just an accounting issue. So we're just trying to highlight that. As I mentioned, as we sit here today and look at the non-comps overall, we expect that growth will be around the growth that we had in 2023, and we'll refine that as we get further into the year.

然後是 15 年租約的會計直線，這意味著在最初幾年，我們的支出超過了現金支出，但這只是一個會計問題。所以我們只是想強調這一點。正如我所提到的，當我們今天坐在這裡審視整體非比較情況時，我們預計增長將圍繞 2023 年的增長，隨著今年的進一步深入，我們將對其進行完善。

I mean, the way I think of that simply is the bad news is we do have a step function jump in real estate expense. The good news is we have a lot of space to grow without having to make additional commitments, and that rent from accounting perspective just stays fixed at that number, it doesn't grow. So over time, we have the same nominal rent expense. And as we add more and more people to that space, we use it more efficiently and effectively. So we take our lumps on the front end, and then we get the benefit over time.

我的意思是，我認為這只是壞消息，我們的房地產支出確實出現了階梯函數跳躍。好消息是，我們有很大的成長空間，而無需做出額外的承諾，而且從會計角度來看，租金只是保持在這個數字，不會成長。所以隨著時間的推移，我們的名義租金費用是相同的。隨著我們為該空間添加越來越多的人，我們可以更有效率、更有效地使用它。所以我們先把困難放在前端，然後隨著時間的推移我們會得到好處。

Okay, great. Good luck continuing to fill up the space. Look forward to hearing more.

好的，太好了。祝你好運，繼續填補空間。期待聽到更多。

We appreciate that. Thank you.

我們對此表示讚賞。謝謝。

Thank you. That concludes our question-and-answer period. I would now like to turn the call back over to Mr. Taubman for any closing remarks.

謝謝。我們的問答環節到此結束。我現在想將電話轉回給陶布曼先生，請他發表結束語。

I just again want to thank everyone for their interest and their support, and I look forward to visiting with all of you when we report first-quarter earnings in the spring. Thank you very much and have a great day.

我想再次感謝大家的興趣和支持，我期待在我們春季報告第一季收益時與大家見面。非常感謝您，祝您有美好的一天。