Neighborhood Intelligence, Inc. (NXH) 2023 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Thank you for standing by, and welcome to Q4 2023 Beyond Inc. Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions). After the speaker's presentation, there will be a question-and-answer session. (Operator Instructions). Please be advised that today's call is being recorded. I would now like to turn the conference over to Adrianne Lee, Beyond's Chief Financial and Administrative Officer. Adrianne?

感謝各位稍候，歡迎參加 Beyond Inc. 2023 年第四季財報電話會議。（接線員指示）。在講者簡報後，將進行問答環節。（接線員指示）。請注意，今日會議將被錄音。現在我想將會議交給 Beyond 的財務與行政長 Adrianne Lee。Adrianne？

Thank you, operator. Good morning, and welcome to Beyond's Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2023 Earnings Conference Call.

謝謝，接線員。各位早安，歡迎參加 Beyond 2023 年第四季暨全年財報電話會議。

Joining me today on the call are Executive Chairman, Marcus Lemonis; CEO of Bed Bath & Beyond, Chandra Holt; and CEO of Overstock, Dave Nielsen.

今天與我一同出席電話會議的有：執行董事長 Marcus Lemonis；Bed Bath & Beyond 執行長 Chandra Holt；以及 Overstock 執行長 Dave Nielsen。

Today's discussion and our responses to your questions reflect management's view as of today, February 21, 2024, and may include forward-looking statements, including, without limitation, regarding our future goals, performance, profitability and financial results. Actual results could differ materially from such statements.

今日的討論以及我們對各位問題的回應，反映管理團隊截至今日（2024 年 2 月 21 日）的觀點，且可能包含前瞻性陳述，包括但不限於關於我們未來目標、表現、獲利能力及財務結果。實際結果可能與此類陳述存在重大差異。

Additional information about risks, uncertainties and other important factors that could potentially impact our financial results is included in our Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2022, and in our subsequent filings with the SEC. During this call, we'll discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Our filings with the SEC, including our fourth quarter earnings release available on our Investor Relations website at investors.beyond.com contain important additional disclosures regarding these non-GAAP measures including reconciliations of these measures to the most comparable GAAP measures.

有關可能影響我們財務結果之風險、不確定性及其他重要因素的更多資訊，載於我們截至 2022 年 12 月 31 日止年度的 Form 10-K，以及我們其後向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的文件中。在本次電話會議中，我們將討論若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。我們向 SEC 提交的文件（包括可於投資人關係網站 investors.beyond.com 取得的第四季財報新聞稿）包含關於這些非 GAAP 指標的重要額外揭露，包括將這些指標與最可比 GAAP 指標進行調節（reconciliation）。

Following management's prepared remarks, we will open the call up for questions. With that, let me turn the call over to our Executive Chairman, Marcus Lemonis.

在管理層預先準備的發言之後，我們將開放提問。接下來，讓我把電話交給我們的執行董事長 Marcus Lemonis。

Well, good morning, and welcome to the first Beyond earnings call into 2024. I am really honored to be here, and I understand the gravity of this opportunity.

各位早安，歡迎參加 Beyond 在 2024 年的第一場財報電話會議。我非常榮幸能在此，也理解這個機會的重要性與分量。

Over the last 75 days, we have made substantial progress laying the foundation for material growth, a differentiated business model and improved customer retention and an affinity focus with our customer. Our goal is to take a simple commodity transaction and turn it into a trust transaction. We realize that's going to take time, but we are going to lay the foundation for it.

在過去 75 天裡，我們在奠定實質成長、差異化商業模式、提升客戶留存，以及強化與客戶之間的黏著與認同（affinity）方面，已取得重大進展。我們的目標是把單純的商品交易，轉變為「信任交易」。我們知道這需要時間，但我們將為此打下基礎。

Positive transactions with frequency with our Bed Bath & Beyond brand will create trust, and trust will create our ability to sell the bigger ticket items from Overstock to more complex products and services from Beyond Plus.

透過 Bed Bath & Beyond 品牌帶來更頻繁的正向交易，將建立信任；而信任將使我們有能力把 Overstock 的高單價商品，以及 Beyond Plus 更複雜的產品與服務，銷售給更多客戶。

As many of you know, we've gone through both a management and company restructure in the last 75 days. Yesterday, we announced management changes, which provide clear direction on the 2 brands and position us with a leadership team that is now aligned with shareholders on incentives and driving value. Adrianne, Chandra and Dave are the 3 leaders whom I trust to lead the day-to-day operations with full P&L authority and responsibility. They bring expertise, vision and the change management skills that this company needs to drive results and evolve this business. You'll be hearing from each of them today in both the prepared remarks and the Q&A.

如各位所知，在過去 75 天裡，我們同時進行了管理層與公司層面的重整。昨天，我們宣布了管理層變動，為兩個品牌提供清晰方向，並使我們的領導團隊在激勵機制上與股東一致、以驅動價值為目標。Adrianne、Chandra 與 Dave 是我信任、能以完整損益（P&L）權限與責任領導日常營運的三位領導者。他們具備專業、願景與變革管理能力，正是公司推動成果並推進業務演進所需要的。今天各位將在預先準備的發言與問答中聽到他們三位的分享。

One thing you can count on going forward is better communication, especially related to our vision, better results and the clear path forward. That vision lands squarely on providing our customers ideas, inspiration and information in addition to the products and services they need to unlock the value of their household. That focus is centered around the 4 walls of their home, extending to the 4 corners of their property.

未來有一點各位可以期待：我們會有更好的溝通，特別是關於我們的願景、更好的成果，以及清晰的前進路徑。我們的願景明確聚焦於：除了提供客戶所需的產品與服務之外，也提供點子、靈感與資訊，協助他們釋放家庭價值。這個焦點以家中的四面牆為核心，並延伸到其房產的四個角落。

To begin this transformation, we feel like we have an unbelievable amount of low-hanging fruit at this company. As an example, we know the most valuable tangible asset we own is our database of consumers. We know that improving the quality of that database drives up conversion and brings variable costs down. Much to my delight, our database is massive with over 150 million records. However, to improve efficiency and profitability, we're going to invest in cleansing, deduping it by household and instituting a more efficient segmentation strategy. We have brought in both external leading firms and subject matter experts create our gold standard of that database now. The implementation of that database across a modern-day CRM will improve conversion and materially reduce inefficient marketing spend.

為了啟動這場轉型，我們認為公司有大量「唾手可得」的機會。舉例來說，我們知道我們擁有的最有價值的有形資產，是消費者資料庫。我們也知道，提升資料庫品質能提高轉換率並降低變動成本。令我非常欣喜的是，我們的資料庫規模龐大，擁有超過 1.5 億筆紀錄。然而，為了提升效率與獲利能力，我們將投資於資料清理、以家庭為單位去重（dedupe），並建立更有效率的分群策略。我們已引進外部領先的公司與領域專家，為資料庫建立「黃金標準」。將該資料庫導入現代化 CRM 後，將提升轉換率並大幅降低低效率的行銷支出。

I believe this simple strategy will reduce the company's marketing expense as a percentage of revenue by anywhere from 0.5% to 1% annually, better than last year, a number that we know we have to reduce materially over the next 24 months. Beyond will have one purpose, to unlock the home's potential for both homeowners and renters, giving us a chance to expand the lifetime value of each customer we establish as a relationship.

我相信這個簡單策略可使公司行銷費用占營收比重每年降低約 0.5% 至 1%，優於去年；而我們也知道，未來 24 個月必須大幅降低這個數字。Beyond 將只有一個目的：釋放「家」的潛力，服務屋主與租屋族，讓我們有機會擴大與每位客戶建立關係後的客戶終身價值。

We believe this will drive growth and profitability. While utopian state would be to create the AAA of the home, a true affinity model, providing both products and services that grow the lifetime value, expanding and growing our core business is where our laser focus is. That starts with generating core revenue and delivering better margins. Our primary focus this year is to achieve $2 billion in sales, a material increase from 2023. And follow that up with achieving a run rate of $3 billion by the end of 2025, all while sequentially improving margins over that period back to the 20% margin plus level. Those 2 factors coupled with material SG&A reductions will result in a profitable run rate by year-end 2024. We believe the bridge and building blocks to achieve that are clear and the team is going to walk you through that bridge shortly.

我們相信這將帶動成長與獲利。雖然理想狀態是打造「家的 AAA」——一個真正的 affinity 模式，同時提供產品與服務以提升終身價值——但我們的雷射聚焦在擴大並成長核心業務。這從創造核心營收與交付更佳毛利率開始。我們今年的首要目標是達成 20 億美元銷售額，較 2023 年有顯著提升；並在 2025 年底前達成 30 億美元的年化營收（run rate）。同時，在此期間逐季改善毛利率，回到 20% 以上的水準。這兩項因素再加上大幅削減 SG&A，將使我們在 2024 年底達到可獲利的 run rate。我們認為達成目標的橋樑與基石已相當清楚，團隊稍後將帶各位走過這座橋。

Before I turn the call over to the team, I wanted to provide a short summary on our 16-company Medici portfolio. a noncore asset that many holders have requested an update on. As a reminder, in April of 2021, our company entered into a limited partnership agreement with Pelion Ventures in Draper, Utah to manage the Medici portfolio. This partnership came with an annual management fee in addition to upside deal economics in exchange for them nurturing these companies and building value.

在我把電話交給團隊之前，我想就我們的 16 家公司 Medici 投資組合做一個簡短摘要。這是一項非核心資產，許多持有人要求我們提供最新進展。提醒各位，於 2021 年 4 月，我們公司與位於猶他州德雷珀（Draper）的 Pelion Ventures 簽訂有限合夥協議，由其管理 Medici 投資組合。該合作包含年度管理費，並在其培育這些公司、建立價值的前提下，另有上行交易經濟利益（upside deal economics）。

While we are wildly excited by the prospects, of a few of them, the overall performance has not been as good as we think it could be. We intend to increase our communication with these respective companies and work closer with Pelion to modify the relationship in a way that singularly unlocks value and hold parties accountable. We do believe there are a few companies that could surprise and delight all of us. We're firmly committed to delivering updates quarterly. I'll now turn the call over to Dave.

雖然我們對其中幾家公司的前景感到非常振奮，但整體表現並未如我們認為可能達到的水準。我們打算加強與各投資公司的溝通，並與 Pelion 更緊密合作，以調整合作關係，讓其能更專注地釋放價值並讓各方承擔責任。我們確實相信其中有幾家公司可能會帶來令人驚喜的成果。我們也堅定承諾將按季提供更新。現在我把電話交給 Dave。

Thank you, Marcus. 2024 is a pivotal year for the company as we lay the groundwork for our new strategic vision and work toward a return to profitability. We have a road map to launch new home-centric websites and value-add services over the course of the year to acquire new customers, improve our retention of them and ultimately drive down the cost of customer acquisition.

謝謝你，Marcus。2024 年對公司而言是關鍵的一年，我們將為新的策略願景奠定基礎，並朝重返獲利邁進。我們有一份路線圖，將在今年陸續推出以「家」為核心的新網站與加值服務，以獲取新客戶、提升留存，並最終降低客戶取得成本。

As a proof point to the above strategy, this dynamic was evident in Q4. Leading up to and during the holidays, we saw a higher number of repeat customers compared to the same period last year. This is important as we work to improve our marketing efficiency and build loyalty among the new acquired customers. Some may say our repeat rate increased because of the categories we leaned into, like bed, bath, kitchen and dining, and that may be true. But we see this as a benefit to the home-centric portfolio of businesses and see Bed Bath & Beyond as a flywheel to power customer acquisition for the entire portfolio.

作為上述策略的佐證，這種動態在第四季已相當明顯。在假期前夕及假期期間，我們看到回購客戶數量較去年同期更高。這點很重要，因為我們正努力提升行銷效率，並在新獲取的客戶之間建立忠誠度。有些人可能會說，我們的回購率提升是因為我們加碼的品類，例如臥室、浴室、廚房以及餐廳用品，而這可能確實如此。但我們將其視為以「家」為核心的業務組合所帶來的好處，並把 Bed Bath & Beyond 視為一個飛輪，為整個投資組合提供客戶獲取動能。

On the third quarter earnings call, we told you that we would relaunch Overstock in September of 2024. Our team found a way to pull that launch date up significantly working with my new best friend, Harley Finkelstein, President of Shopify. We are planning to relaunch Overstock in roughly 5 weeks. This is significant because relaunching it will mean we can immediately begin to build accretive business with the Overstock customer in furniture, area rugs, patio and outdoor among other categories. We're also planning to relaunch the jewelry business, which was once a $100-plus million business annually among other product lines that the Overstock customer was drawn to over the years.

在第三季財報電話會議上，我們告訴各位我們將於 2024 年 9 月重新推出 Overstock。我們的團隊找到方法，在與我新結識的好朋友——Shopify 總裁 Harley Finkelstein——合作下，大幅提前這個上線日期。我們計畫在約 5 週後重新推出 Overstock。這很重要，因為重新推出後，我們可以立即在家具、地毯（area rugs）、庭院與戶外等品類，開始與 Overstock 客戶建立具增益性的業務。我們也計畫重新推出珠寶業務；該業務過去曾是每年超過 1 億美元的業務，此外還有其他多年來吸引 Overstock 客戶的產品線。

Pulling up the relaunch of Overstock has the potential to drive higher average unit retails, improve overall margins and meet customers where they are shopping for the items we know they want, which is a far more efficient way to leverage each of our iconic brands and drive marketing spend efficiencies. Adrianne will outline our targets as she walks you through our margin improvement plan for 2024 later on the call.

提前推動 Overstock 的重新上線，有望帶動更高的平均單件零售價格、改善整體毛利，並在我們知道客戶想買的商品上，於他們正在購物的地方與其相遇；這是一種更有效率的方式來發揮我們每一個經典品牌的槓桿效益，並提升行銷支出的效率。Adrianne 稍後在電話會議中帶您走過我們 2024 年的毛利改善計畫時，將說明我們的目標。

As we look to the future, we believe we can maximize profitability with a larger e-commerce revenue stream underpinned with multiple brands layering value-added services and operating a more variable cost model. While we have a lot to improve, there is also a lot of good work happening. We are thrilled with the fact that we exceeded our expectations and are sitting today at nearly 6 million active customers, a 20% improvement over last year. November through today, revenue growth has remained positive, the first time since 2021. We're encouraged to see our work to improve vendor relations begin to bear fruit.

展望未來，我們相信可以透過更大的電商營收規模來最大化獲利能力；其基礎是多品牌疊加增值服務，並採用更具彈性的成本模式。雖然我們仍有許多需要改善之處，但也有很多良好的工作正在進行。我們很高興我們超出預期，目前活躍客戶接近 600 萬，較去年提升 20%。自 11 月至今，營收成長仍維持正向，這是自 2021 年以來首次。我們也很受鼓舞，看到我們改善供應商關係的努力開始開花結果。

Vendor partners are recognizing our improved sales performance in the Bed Bath & Beyond power categories of bedding, bath, kitchen appliances, cookware and dining, just to name a few and are working with our merchandising teams to increase breadth and depth of assortment to help us drive sales and improve margins. During Q4, our new partner additions grew by 74% with more than 200 new partners added. In fact, as we turn the page on 2023, more than 100 additional partners were under various stages of contracting.

供應商夥伴正認可我們在 Bed Bath & Beyond 核心強勢品類（例如寢具、浴室用品、廚房小家電、鍋具與餐廚用品等）的銷售表現改善，並與我們的採購團隊合作，擴大與加深商品組合的廣度與深度，以協助我們推動銷售並改善毛利。第四季期間，我們新增合作夥伴數成長 74%，新增超過 200 家新夥伴。事實上，當我們翻過 2023 年這一頁時，仍有超過 100 家額外夥伴處於不同階段的簽約流程中。

As you can appreciate, there is an incredible amount of work being done by our team. They are excited and engaged. Our strategic vision is aimed at increasing our engagement with customers by staying connected with them beyond a single sales transaction. It is our mission to help customers unlock the potential of their home. We believe these actions will enable us to achieve our long-term aspirational goals or what we internally refer to as our North Star, 10 million active customers, $250 average order value and a 2x annual order frequency.

如各位所理解，我們團隊正在進行的工作量非常龐大。他們充滿熱情並高度投入。我們的策略願景旨在提升與客戶的互動，讓我們與客戶的連結不僅止於單次交易。我們的使命是協助客戶釋放居家生活的潛力。我們相信這些行動將使我們能達成長期的願景目標，或我們內部所稱的「北極星」：1,000 萬活躍客戶、平均訂單金額 250 美元，以及年訂購頻率 2 倍。

Before I wrap up, I want to give a warm welcome to Chandra. I'm thrilled we've added such a terrific leader and experienced retail professional to our team. With that, Chandra.

在我結束之前，我想熱烈歡迎 Chandra。我非常高興我們為團隊加入了一位如此出色的領導者與資深零售專業人士。接下來交給 Chandra。

Thanks, Dave. I joined the company because I'm passionate about Bed Bath & Beyond and I'm driven to reestablish its category dominance. It's my goal for Bed Bath & Beyond to be a leader in unified commerce. We aim to create a customer experience that is more seamless than today's traditional omnichannel retailers. We also plan to introduce tailored experiences for purchase occasions that are adjacent to our core Bed Bath & Beyond offerings, such as Baby & Beyond, Kids & Beyond, (inaudible) and (inaudible).

謝謝你，Dave。我加入公司是因為我對 Bed Bath & Beyond 充滿熱情，也希望推動其重返品類領導地位。我的目標是讓 Bed Bath & Beyond 成為「統一商務」的領導者。我們希望打造比當今傳統全通路零售商更無縫的客戶體驗。我們也計畫針對與 Bed Bath & Beyond 核心商品相鄰的購買情境，推出量身打造的體驗，例如 Baby & Beyond、Kids & Beyond、(inaudible) 以及 (inaudible)。

Baby & Beyond is expected to be our first specialized experience, and we are excited about the upside because we know many Bed Bath & Beyond customers frequently cross-shop the baby category. (inaudible) is another exciting initiative. At its peak, (inaudible) was a top bedding and textile brand in the U.S. In the coming weeks, I plan to partner with suppliers and designers to set the new vision for (inaudible). I look forward to modernizing the marketing and creative processes through a partnership with a powerful and influential female leader that will serve as the Creative Director and will be announced at a later date.

Baby & Beyond 預期將是我們第一個專門化體驗，我們對其上行空間感到興奮，因為我們知道許多 Bed Bath & Beyond 客戶經常跨品類購買嬰幼兒商品。(inaudible) 是另一項令人振奮的計畫。在其巔峰時期，(inaudible) 曾是美國頂尖的寢具與紡織品牌。未來幾週，我計畫與供應商及設計師合作，為 (inaudible) 設定新的願景。我也期待透過與一位強大且具影響力的女性領袖合作，來現代化行銷與創意流程；她將擔任創意總監，並將於稍後公布。

Across all brands, we seek to build ensuring assortments to improve quality and provide unprecedented value for our customers. We have significant opportunities ahead of us with our robust portfolio of brands and I look forward to leading the charge and positioning the business growth and interacting with our investment community. I will now turn the call over to Adrianne.

在所有品牌上，我們致力於打造「令人安心的商品組合」，以提升品質並為客戶提供前所未有的價值。憑藉我們強健的品牌組合，前方有重大的機會；我期待帶頭衝刺、推動業務成長，並與我們的投資人社群互動。現在我把電話交給 Adrianne。

Thank you, Chandra. I'm going to start by reviewing some key financial results to provide context into how we're thinking about our path forward. Revenue declined 5% year-over-year in the fourth quarter and grew 3% sequentially. Improvement in our revenue trend was led by 9% growth in active customers, driving 35% growth in orders.

謝謝你，Chandra。我將先回顧一些關鍵財務結果，提供我們如何思考未來路徑的背景。第四季營收年減 5%，季增 3%。營收趨勢的改善主要由活躍客戶成長 9% 所帶動，進而推動訂單量成長 35%。

Average order value declined 30% year-over-year due to sales mix stealing to lower AUR categories. November and December revenue combined was up year-over-year, and we have seen that trend continue. There is measured progress being made, and we are focused on carrying the momentum through this year as Chandra leads our team in curating a better assortment for our Bed Bath & Beyond brand, and Dave leads the relaunch of our once $1 billion-plus Overstock site.

由於銷售組合轉向較低平均單件零售價格（AUR）的品類，平均訂單金額年減 30%。11 月與 12 月合計營收較去年同期成長，而我們也看到該趨勢持續延伸。我們正在取得有節奏的進展，並專注於在今年延續動能：由 Chandra 帶領團隊為 Bed Bath & Beyond 品牌策劃更佳的商品組合，並由 Dave 主導重新上線我們曾經年營收超過 10 億美元的 Overstock 網站。

Gross margin landed at 15.6% for the quarter, a 650 basis point decrease versus the same period last year. We believe this result is somewhat transient and was primarily driven by reigniting old customers, attracting new customers and educating and enticing them on a wider assortment. Increased discounting drove about 400 basis points, Welcome Rewards redemptions drove about 160 basis points and increased shipping costs drove about 170 basis points of pressure.

本季毛利率為 15.6%，較去年同期下降 650 個基點。我們認為這個結果在某種程度上屬於短期現象，主要是由於我們重新喚回舊客、吸引新客，並教育與吸引他們接觸更廣的商品組合。折扣加深帶來約 400 個基點的壓力，Welcome Rewards 點數兌換帶來約 160 個基點的壓力，而運輸成本上升帶來約 170 個基點的壓力。

We are taking the following actions that are within our control to improve our gross margin profile: renegotiating freight rates, improving vendor relations for more favorable product costs, relaunching Overstock.com, which we believe will drive higher AOV, providing integration add-ons like product warranties and shipping insurance, reintroducing (inaudible) and other owned brands to complement the superior name brands we have assembled and eliminating inefficient discounting.

我們正在採取以下可控的行動，以改善毛利結構：重新談判運費費率、改善供應商關係以取得更有利的產品成本、重新上線 Overstock.com（我們相信這將帶動更高的平均訂單金額 AOV）、提供如產品保固與運送保險等整合加購項、重新引入 (inaudible) 與其他自有品牌以補強我們已集結的優質知名品牌，以及消除低效率的折扣策略。

The G&A and tech expense increase of $7 million was primarily driven by us booking approximately $6 million of discrete onetime item costs primarily associated with expense reduction actions announced in December. All in, adjusted EBITDA was a loss of $49 million. On a margin basis, this was a negative 12.7%, an almost 1,500 basis points decline year-over-year, with approximately 50% of the decline driven by gross margin pressure.

G&A 與技術費用增加 700 萬美元，主要是因為我們認列了約 600 萬美元的一次性離散項目成本，主要與 12 月宣布的費用削減行動相關。整體而言，調整後 EBITDA 為虧損 4,900 萬美元。以利潤率計，為負 12.7%，年減接近 1,500 個基點，其中約 50% 的下滑由毛利壓力所致。

In addition to our focus on improving gross margins, we continue to look for opportunities to reduce expenses throughout the P&L. We have identified a total of $45 million of annualized cost savings, which is expected to be fully annualized in the first half of 2025. This includes the $25 million cost reductions committed to in December and $20 million of incremental savings. We expect to reinvest these dollars to continue to drive growth.

除了專注改善毛利之外，我們也持續在整個損益表中尋找降低費用的機會。我們已辨識出合計 4,500 萬美元的年化成本節省，預期將於 2025 年上半年完全年化。這包括 12 月承諾的 2,500 萬美元成本削減，以及額外 2,000 萬美元的增量節省。我們預期將再投資這些資金，以持續推動成長。

I want to highlight that we have revised our executive team's equity compensation to align it with stock price appreciation and revenue growth. This is meaningful as it incentivizes the team to push to our $2 billion revenue goal, make progress towards getting back to a 20% plus gross margin and continue to identify cost savings.

我想強調，我們已修訂高階主管團隊的股權薪酬，使其與股價上漲與營收成長更一致。這很重要，因為它能激勵團隊推進我們 20 億美元營收目標、朝重回 20% 以上毛利率邁進，並持續辨識成本節省。

Our reported GAAP EPS loss of $3.55 for the fourth quarter was primarily impacted by establishing a valuation allowance against our net deferred tax assets due to our recent operating losses and expected near-term pressure on profitability related to growing our customer file. Excluding the impact of equity securities, our building write-down and the valuation allowance we reported adjusted diluted loss per share of $1.22.

第四季我們報告的 GAAP 每股盈餘（EPS）虧損 3.55 美元，主要受到以下因素影響：由於近期營運虧損，以及為擴大客戶檔案而導致短期獲利能力承壓，我們對淨遞延所得稅資產建立了估值備抵。排除股權證券影響、我們的建物減記，以及估值備抵後，我們報告的調整後稀釋每股虧損為 1.22 美元。

Our balance sheet remains strong. On a net basis, we ended the year with a cash balance of $268 million. On our third quarter earnings call, we shared that we expected to spend $175 million on the purchase of Bed Bath & Beyond brand and subsequent customer acquisition strategies. We have spent about $100 million through the fourth quarter, and I expect that we will invest less in large part due to the key learnings Dave mentioned from the fourth quarter.

我們的資產負債表仍然強健。以淨額計算，我們在年底的現金餘額為 2.68 億美元。在第三季財報電話會議上，我們分享預期將投入 1.75 億美元，用於收購 Bed Bath & Beyond 品牌及後續的客戶獲取策略。截至第四季我們已花費約 1 億美元，而我預期後續投資將會較少，主要是因為 Dave 提到的第四季關鍵學習。

Chandra and Dave are focused on growing our anchor brands and launching new products and services. These products are under various stages of launch. Our margin and cost-saving actions are well underway. So as far as expectations, we expect revenue to be positive year-over-year in Q1 with the goal of $2 billion for 2024. We expect gross margins to be in the 16% to 17% range in Q1 with a goal for the full year closer to 20%. We expect the second half of the year to be profitable. There is work to be done, but I'm confident in our path forward. And now we'll turn the call back to Marcus.

Chandra 與 Dave 專注於成長我們的核心主力品牌，並推出新產品與服務。這些產品正處於不同的上市階段。我們的毛利與成本節省行動也已全面展開。因此就展望而言，我們預期第一季營收將較去年同期為正成長，並以 2024 年達成 20 億美元為目標。我們預期第一季毛利率將落在 16% 至 17% 區間，全年目標接近 20%。我們預期下半年將實現獲利。仍有工作要做，但我對我們前進的路徑充滿信心。現在把電話交回 Marcus。

Thanks, Adrianne. And before we get into the Q&A, I want to reiterate that we hope you hear loud and clear from us what we know the expectations are from you and what our standards are of ourselves. I'd like to now turn the call over to the Q&A.

謝謝你，Adrianne。在我們進入問答之前，我想再次強調，我們希望你能非常清楚地從我們這裡聽到：我們知道你們對我們的期待是什麼，以及我們對自己的標準是什麼。現在我想把電話交給問答環節。

(Operator Instructions). Our first question comes from the line of Rick Patel of Raymond James.

（接線員指示）。我們的第一個問題來自 Raymond James 的 Rick Patel。

Congrats to Chandra, Dave and Adrianne on the new and expanded roles. I just had a question on just the low-hanging fruit that you touched on. So you talked about database and -- opportunities around the database and segmentation. Can you dig a little further on how to gain efficiency here? And when should we really start to see this initiative gain traction? Is it something that happens in 2024? Or is it more of an out-year event?

恭喜 Chandra、Dave 和 Adrianne 擔任新的與擴大的職務。我有一個問題，關於你們提到的那些比較容易先做、立竿見影的部分。你們談到資料庫，以及圍繞資料庫與分眾（segmentation）的機會。你能再深入說明一下如何在這裡提升效率嗎？以及我們應該在什麼時候真正開始看到這項計畫取得進展、開始發酵？這會在 2024 年發生嗎？還是更偏向於較後期的事件？

So this is Marcus. Thank you for the question. For me, when I look at a valuable asset like the database, understanding the construct of it and the cleanliness of it is probably first and foremost. And when we made the Bed Bath & Beyond acquisition, we picked up a very large database. But understanding what a large database looks like, it's important to understand the quality of that database and the segmentation of it.

我是 Marcus。謝謝你的問題。對我來說，當我看到像資料庫這樣有價值的資產時，首先也是最重要的，是理解它的架構以及它的乾淨程度（資料品質）。我們進行 Bed Bath & Beyond 的收購時，取得了一個非常龐大的資料庫。但要理解「龐大的資料庫」意味著什麼，關鍵在於了解該資料庫的品質以及它的分眾情況。

So putting people in the right categories at the right time, offering them the right products improves efficiency. Today, in my opinion, we are basically just spraying the database with every single offer that we have. And we need to do a better job of understanding who that customer is, what their historical purchases are, creating some predictive logic around what their next purchases could be, understanding their address and their home better to understand size of property, square footage of home, number of rooms in the house and what the things are that are going to speak directly to them.

因此，在正確的時間把人放到正確的類別，並向他們提供正確的產品，能提升效率。以我看來，我們目前基本上是把我們所有的優惠一股腦地對整個資料庫「廣撒」出去。我們需要更好地理解那位客戶是誰、他們的歷史購買是什麼，建立一些預測邏輯來推測他們下一次可能購買什麼；也要更了解他們的地址與住家狀況，以掌握房產大小、房屋坪數（square footage）、房間數，以及哪些內容能直接打動他們。

Too often, customers forget to curate a message or an offer specifically to its individual consumer. And when they do that, they end up exhausting the database, creating fatigue and having people either not come back and do business or opt out of the relationship because they don't feel like it's customized to them. When you do these things, you should expect to yield more from that customer over a 12-month period. As Dave mentioned, our goal is to increase the frequency of visits to 2 and to expand the offering to them by looking to generate a higher AOV.

太常見的情況是，企業忘了為個別消費者精心策劃訊息或優惠。當他們這麼做時，最後會把資料庫「用到疲乏」，造成疲勞，讓人不是不再回來消費，就是選擇退出關係，因為他們覺得內容沒有為他們量身打造。當你把這些事情做好，你應該預期在 12 個月期間能從該客戶身上取得更多價值。正如 Dave 提到的，我們的目標是把到訪頻次提升到 2 次，並透過提高 AOV 來擴大對他們的提供內容。

The process has already started. We've engaged with a leading database provider (inaudible). It is our expectation within 30 days, we'll have done the deduping of those households, and then it will be implemented into our CRM. This is a now task, not a tomorrow task. And the primary reason for doing it, in addition to growing revenue is we need to take costs out of this company.

這個流程已經開始了。我們已與一家領先的資料庫供應商合作（聽不清）。我們預期在 30 天內完成這些住戶資料的去重（deduping），然後把它導入我們的 CRM。這是現在就要做的事，不是明天才做的事。除了帶動營收成長之外，做這件事的主要原因是：我們需要為這家公司降本。

This company cannot spend north of 13% as a percentage of revenue, driving revenue. Every 1% is meaningful to the bottom line, and we take that seriously. In fact, at $2 billion, 1% represents $20 million. We know that when we look at a $200-plus million marketing budget, there has to be inefficiency in it. And it's not about just trimming that expense. It's about taking that savings and reinvesting it in growth. That is why we believe that by the end of '25, we could be at a $3 billion run rate as we launch these other brands. So it's a now thing.

這家公司不能以營收的 13% 以上來投入以推動營收成長。每降低 1% 對損益底線都很有意義，我們非常重視。事實上，以 20 億美元規模來看，1% 就代表 2,000 萬美元。我們知道，當我們看一個超過 2 億美元的行銷預算時，裡面一定存在效率不彰之處。而這不只是削減費用而已，而是把省下來的錢再投資到成長上。這也是為什麼我們相信，隨著我們推出其他品牌，到 2025 年底我們有機會達到 30 億美元的 run rate。所以這是現在就要做的事。

And Marcus, can you talk about your assumptions for macro and the home product market as we think about the $2 billion goal for this year? Are you assuming things get better from here? Or does it remain very challenging? Just curious how we should think about the market relative to the self-help levers that you can pull?

Marcus，你能談談你對總體環境與家居產品市場的假設嗎？我們在思考今年 20 億美元目標時，你是假設從現在開始情況會變好嗎？還是仍會非常具挑戰？我只是好奇，我們應該如何看待市場狀況，相對於你們可以拉動的自助式（self-help）槓桿？

We expect the market to stay challenging and quite frankly, have some headwinds. But what I think people are underestimating is the power that the Bed Bath & Beyond historical customer operated with. And what we learned in this entire process to be really candid, is that shutting Overstock down was a fatal mistake. Because while we were able to win the buy box on selling large big items with high AOVs at Bed Bath & Beyond, we had to do that by buying the business.

我們預期市場仍會具挑戰性，而且坦白說會有一些逆風。但我認為大家低估的是 Bed Bath & Beyond 歷史客群所具備的力量。而我們在整個過程中非常坦率地學到的是：關掉 Overstock 是一個致命的錯誤。因為雖然我們能在 Bed Bath & Beyond 以高 AOV 的大型商品贏得 buy box，但我們必須透過「買下這門生意」才能做到。

Overstock.com has built a legacy on selling those types of products. And when you try to convince people that a new brand is going to do the same thing, you lose them. Turning Overstock.com back on will not only allow Bed Bath & Beyond to expand its existing assortment and hone in on its historical legacy success, but it allows Overstock to do the same. In bringing in and establishing separate CEOs for the Overstock brand and its family of products, and we'll talk about that in a minute, and Bed Bath & Beyond and its family of products, we have an acute focus by each of them to manage their P&L, to establish their own vendors and to chart their own course to growth. The only mandate that exists in their collaboration is that I don't ever want to see the same product on both sides. They're tasked with establishing new vendors, new ideas and new pathways to find customers, all while ensuring that they're adding to the overall company database, which allows us to monetize that customer through these other products and services in the recently launched Beyond.com.

Overstock.com 建立其傳承（legacy）正是靠銷售這類產品。當你試圖說服人們一個新品牌也會做同樣的事時，你會失去他們。重新啟動 Overstock.com，不僅能讓 Bed Bath & Beyond 擴大既有品類組合並聚焦其歷史上成功的傳統優勢，也能讓 Overstock 做同樣的事。透過為 Overstock 品牌及其產品家族（我們稍後會談）以及 Bed Bath & Beyond 及其產品家族分別引入並設立獨立的 CEO，我們讓雙方各自以高度聚焦來管理其損益表（P&L）、建立各自的供應商體系，並規劃各自的成長路徑。他們合作中唯一的要求是：我不希望在兩邊看到同一個產品。他們的任務是建立新的供應商、新的想法與新的找客路徑，同時確保他們在為整體公司資料庫增加新客戶，讓我們能透過近期上線的 Beyond.com 上的其他產品與服務來變現這些客戶。

One moment, please. Our next question comes from the line of Curtis Nagle of Bank of America.

請稍等。我們的下一個問題來自美國銀行（Bank of America）的 Curtis Nagle。

I guess the first one, just Marcus, I would love to dig into the $250 AOV target. Just kind of curious what, I guess, is assumed in terms of contribution from normalizing pricing and promotions? How much of that is contribution from new products like baby, on new categories, I guess, cross-selling across brands, and then I guess, services contribution? Which I'll have a follow-up question on that in just a second.

我想第一個問題是，Marcus，我很想深入了解 250 美元 AOV 的目標。想請教一下，這裡面假設了多少來自價格與促銷正常化（normalizing pricing and promotions）的貢獻？又有多少來自像 baby 這類新產品、或新類別的貢獻，我想也包括跨品牌交叉銷售，以及我猜服務的貢獻？我等一下會就服務再追問一個問題。

Yes. So I'm going to unpack that a little bit because I heard a question around the AOV. And then -- is that right? And then I want to separate out what we think the contribution of those other businesses are to the total top line? Did I hear that right?

好的。我先稍微拆解一下，因為我聽到你問的是 AOV 的問題。然後——是這樣沒錯吧？接著我也想把我們認為其他業務對整體營收（top line）的貢獻分開來談。我的理解正確嗎？

Just a contribution to the total AOV, how do all those things factor in? I just want to (inaudible) probably, that would be great. Yes.

是的。就是對整體 AOV 的貢獻，這些因素各自如何反映在裡面？我只是想（聽不清）大概拆一下，會很棒。是的。

Yes. So AOV is really a function of mix. And when you look at the Overstock customer, the frequency that, that customer visits the website is lower, primarily because they are larger ticket items, large furniture assortments, outdoor aboveground spas, big outdoor patio furniture and larger items that Overstock.com had historically really, really excelled in. When you look at driving overall revenue, you need the frequency of visits that Bed Bath & Beyond brings to the table with common items from bed, bath, kitchen and dining along with other things that Chandra is expected to grow over time.

好的。AOV 本質上是由組合（mix）所驅動的。當你看 Overstock 的客戶，他們造訪網站的頻率較低，主要因為他們購買的是較高單價的商品：大型家具品類、戶外地上式 SPA（aboveground spas）、大型戶外庭院家具，以及 Overstock.com 歷史上非常、非常擅長的更大型商品。當你要推動整體營收時，你需要 Bed Bath & Beyond 帶來的到訪頻率，這來自床品、衛浴、廚房與餐廳等常用商品，以及 Chandra 預期會隨時間成長的其他品類。

What we really have learned is that if we can stay myopically focused on the premise that our job is to deliver products and services to everything inside of the 4 walls of the home and the 4 corners of the property, we then really understand which brand is going to actually execute that different part of each strategy. Clearly, on the outside of the house, Overstock is going to lead that process with things like trampolines, aboveground spas, outdoor patio furnitures, outdoor kitchens, and things like that.

我們真正學到的是：如果我們能以近乎狹義聚焦（myopically focused）的方式堅持一個前提——我們的工作是為「家中四面牆內」以及「房產四個角落」的一切提供產品與服務——那麼我們就能真正理解，哪個品牌會去執行策略中的不同部分。很明顯，在房子外部，Overstock 會主導這個流程，像是彈跳床、地上式 SPA、戶外庭院家具、戶外廚房等等。

When you come inside, it's clear that Overstock is going to be better at delivering large ticket items around furniture. Now that doesn't mean that Bed Bath & Beyond can't sell furniture? But if you look at the historical brand attributes, the consumer didn't intrinsically think of them that way. And I believe what happened in the fall of 2023 is that when the company made the decision to shut down Overstock, it believes that it could transition that large ticket, high-AOV consumer to Bed Bath & Beyond. And quite frankly, it didn't happen. And anybody that had a brain, would have known it wasn't going to happen.

當你走進室內，很明顯 Overstock 會更擅長提供家具等高單價商品。現在這不代表 Bed Bath & Beyond 不能賣家具？但如果你看其歷史品牌屬性，消費者並不會本能地這樣看待它。我認為 2023 年秋天發生的事是，公司決定關掉 Overstock 時，相信可以把那群購買高單價、高 AOV 的消費者轉移到 Bed Bath & Beyond。坦白說，這並沒有發生。而任何有腦子的人都會知道這不可能發生。

When you look at Bed Bath & Beyond and you look at those historical categories that had high margin and high frequency, it was obvious to us that we needed to lean into those things. So when you look at growing customer count, well, clearly, Bed Bath & Beyond does that. When you look at increasing frequency, clearly, Bed Bath & Beyond does that.

當你看 Bed Bath & Beyond，並回顧那些歷史上具備高毛利與高購買頻率的品類時，對我們來說很明顯，我們需要加大投入在這些領域。因此，當你看客戶數成長時，很清楚，Bed Bath & Beyond 做得到。當你看提升購買頻率時，很清楚，Bed Bath & Beyond 也做得到。

But when you're looking to drive AOV, you need the trust and relatability that Bed Bath & Beyond created to then have Overstock be able to convert that consumer in our database. We know that driving overall revenue and getting to this $2 billion number are essentially Lego building blocks. The core Bed Bath & Beyond business has to deliver. And you heard about adding new vendors and adding new relationships and eliminating distributors and picking up margin by having first cost dollars. But we also know that, that particular consumer has life events, having a baby, getting married, going to college, buying their first home, whatever that may be.

但當你要推動 AOV（平均訂單金額）時，你需要 Bed Bath & Beyond 所建立的信任與親和力，才能讓 Overstock 有能力把我們資料庫中的消費者轉化。我們知道，推動整體營收並達到 20 億美元這個數字，本質上就像樂高積木一樣一塊一塊堆起來。Bed Bath & Beyond 的核心業務必須交出成果。你也聽到我們談到新增供應商、建立新合作關係、取消經銷商，並透過取得第一成本（first cost）美元來提升毛利。但我們也知道，那位特定消費者會有各種人生事件：生小孩、結婚、上大學、買第一間房子，不管是哪一種。

And Chandra is a world-class expert and has proven over several decades that she knows how to execute that, quite frankly, better than all of us that are currently here. That's why we added her to the team. But when we look at driving to $2 billion, we believe that Overstock is going to fill that gap up. You heard Adrianne mention, Overstock was a $1.5 billion brand before Bed Bath & Beyond even showed up. Now it is true that there are some categories that both businesses played in. Overstock sold some bedding, off-price bedding, but it sold some bedding and it sold some household items. But for the most part, for the most part, that revenue was driven by other categories.

而 Chandra 是世界級專家，並在數十年來證明她知道如何執行，坦白說，比我們目前在座各位都更擅長。這就是我們把她加入團隊的原因。但當我們看要推進到 20 億美元時，我們相信 Overstock 會把那個缺口補起來。你聽到 Adrianne 提到，在 Bed Bath & Beyond 出現之前，Overstock 曾是一個 15 億美元的品牌。現在確實有一些品類兩個業務都有涉足。Overstock 賣過一些寢具、折扣寢具，但也賣過一些寢具與一些家居用品。但大體上，大體上，那些營收是由其他品類所驅動。

I believe that splitting these roles, giving them full P&L responsibility, giving them the resources and the tools they need to grow their companies and improving vendor relationships will drive the gap that everybody seems to be so convinced that we can't achieve. We're telling you today as you can look at our pay plans and look at our stock incentive plans, we signed up for a program we believe we can achieve. As opposed to what the historical model was where management was just taking bonuses and taking RSUs regardless of what the outcome was, we've all signed up for a program that we firmly believe we can deliver.

我相信，把這些角色拆分、賦予他們完整的損益（P&L）責任、提供他們成長公司所需的資源與工具，並改善供應商關係，將能補上那個大家似乎都深信我們無法達成的缺口。我們今天告訴你們，你們可以看我們的薪酬方案與股票激勵方案，我們報名參加的是一個我們相信能達成的計畫。相較於過去的歷史模式，管理層不論結果如何都只是領獎金、拿 RSU（限制型股票單位），我們所有人都加入了一個我們堅信能交付成果的計畫。

In spite of the headwinds, it is our intention to aggressively grab market share. And if you look at the P&L for the full 2024 year, we plan on returning to profitability by the end of the year on a run rate basis. We know the first 2 quarters are still going to be -- we're still going to be operating at a moderate loss. The first quarter, we expect that as we continue to build the database as we get ready to launch Overstock, as we reengage with customers on a continued basis, we're confident that that's going to happen.

儘管面臨逆風，我們的意圖是積極搶佔市占。若你看 2024 全年的損益表（P&L），我們計畫在年底以前以 run rate（運行率）基礎回到獲利。我們知道前兩個季度仍會——我們仍會處於中度虧損。第一季，我們預期會如此，因為我們會持續建立資料庫、為推出 Overstock 做準備，並持續重新與客戶互動；我們有信心這會發生。

Keep in mind, last fall, this company told you that it was going to take up to $175 million to reignite the brand. Dave and Adrianne and myself prior to Chandra coming committed that there was no way, no way we were going to spend $175 million. We believe that we will materially improve that statistic but we know that launching Overstock was the simple silver bullet that, quite frankly, was obvious to us, but not obvious to others.

請記住，去年秋天，這家公司告訴你們，重振品牌最多需要 1.75 億美元。在 Chandra 加入之前，Dave、Adrianne 和我就承諾，絕對不可能，絕對不可能花 1.75 億美元。我們相信我們會大幅改善那個數字，但我們也知道，推出 Overstock 是那顆簡單的銀彈，坦白說，對我們來說很明顯，但對其他人並不明顯。

That was really comprehensive. And then just a bit of a follow-up on the services angle. So you talked a lot about trust, right? And driving purchases that either require, I guess, more intent or just things you're not playing in, where do you see -- so I look at your side, you've got a couple of new businesses. Mortgages, you've got home services business that is coming soon. In terms of plan to eventually get into $3 billion run rate, I would assume these things are kind of longer dated? Or just how do you see those things integrating? And I guess, when do you think they'll start contributing to the revenue?

這真的很全面。接著我想就服務面向再追問一下。你談了很多關於信任，對吧？以及推動那些我想是需要更高意圖的購買，或是你們目前尚未涉足的領域。你怎麼看——我看你們這邊有幾個新業務：房貸，還有即將推出的居家服務業務。就最終要達到 30 億美元 run rate 的計畫而言，我猜這些可能是比較長期的？或者你怎麼看它們的整合？以及你認為它們何時會開始對營收做出貢獻？

Look, I have -- yes, I have been a public company CEO now for 8 years, and I have learned a lot of hard lessons and one of those lessons is setting expectations properly around what could be achieved. And while we have an immense amount of enthusiasm, about what we know we have transformed this company into. We don't want investors and the people that we work for, to be confused with any lack of focus on us delivering core revenue with improved margins with reduced SG&A.

你看，我——是的，我擔任上市公司 CEO 已經 8 年了，我學到很多慘痛教訓，其中之一就是要正確設定對可達成事項的預期。雖然我們對於我們已將這家公司轉型成什麼樣子，充滿熱情，但我們不希望投資人以及我們為之工作的人，因為我們在交付核心營收、提升毛利、降低 SG&A（銷售、一般及行政費用）上的任何缺乏聚焦而感到困惑。

But let me be really clear about one thing. I did not join this company to be a peddler of products on the Internet. I joined this company because I am 100% confident that I will turn this business into the AAA of the home business. I've done it in other businesses and I truly understand that once you understand the fact set of who the customer is that lives inside of the 4 corners of that property, homeowner or home renter. We need to build trust with them. And as you build trust with them over time by delivering world-class service, innovative solutions and all the nice, nice words that everybody wants to use, you will be able to penetrate their wallet by selling them products and services that they need, not flashing products that we want them to have that they need. We know they need product warranties. Things break. We know we need to provide services to improve the installation and delivery of those products to reduce returns, which ultimately improves margin, and improves the customer experience.

但我必須把一件事說得非常清楚。我加入這家公司，不是為了在網路上兜售商品。我加入這家公司，是因為我 100% 有信心，我會把這個業務打造成居家領域的 AAA。我在其他業務做過，而且我真正理解，一旦你了解住在那個房產四面牆內的客戶事實樣貌——不論是屋主或租屋者——我們就需要與他們建立信任。當你隨著時間透過提供世界級服務、創新解決方案，以及大家都愛用的那些美好詞彙來建立信任後，你就能透過向他們銷售他們需要的產品與服務來提高他們的錢包占比，而不是用我們想讓他們擁有的商品去刺激他們。我们知道他們需要產品保固。東西會壞。我們也知道需要提供服務來改善這些產品的安裝與配送，以降低退貨，最終提升毛利並改善客戶體驗。

We know that our homeowners have assets. Their most important asset is their home. We know they need to from time to time, unlock value in that home. And whether that's buying a new one, refinancing one that they have, cashing out or do a cash-out refine or just accessing some value that's been established in the appreciation of their home, so they can pull that money out and reinvest it in their home. Our idea of offering a $20,000 HELOC program is purely made to give that consumer the ability to grab cash from the appreciated asset and reinvest it.

我們知道我們的屋主擁有資產。他們最重要的資產是他們的房子。我們知道他們會不時需要把房屋的價值解鎖。不論是買新房、替現有房屋再融資、提領現金，或做現金提領再融資（cash-out refi），或只是取得因房價上漲而累積的部分價值，好把那筆錢拿出來再投資到房子上。我們提出 2 萬美元 HELOC（房屋淨值信用額度）方案的想法，純粹是為了讓消費者能從增值的資產中取得現金並再投資。

But let's be clear, we expect that consumer to actually reinvest a portion of that in buying the products that they need to decorate, to fulfill the balance of that renovation or expansion. I know confidently that as we merge the rewards program, as we improve the credit card program, and we launched these other finer products, including home improvement loans that we will build that brand over time. I have not -- we have not established any of those revenue metrics or profit contribution expectations in any standard that we have outlined for you today as it relates to achieving profitability by the end of next year or the year after.

但要說清楚，我們預期那位消費者確實會把其中一部分再投資，用於購買他們需要的產品來裝飾、完成整體翻修或擴建的其餘部分。我很有信心，隨著我們整合獎勵計畫、改善信用卡計畫，並推出其他更精緻的產品（包括房屋修繕貸款），我們會隨時間建立那個品牌。我沒有——我們也沒有——就你們今天所看到的任何標準中，建立這些營收指標或獲利貢獻的預期，這些也不在我們今天所概述、與明年年底或後年年底達成獲利相關的內容之內。

Our job is to surprise and delight with our penetration on those, and we will give you an update on the complexity and the size of that when we believe it's established a level of materiality.

我們的工作是在這些方面的滲透上帶來驚喜與愉悅；當我們認為其已建立到具備一定重大性（materiality）的程度時，我們會向你們更新其複雜度與規模。

One moment, please. Our next question comes from the line of Seth Sigman of Barclays.

請稍等。我們的下一個問題來自 Barclays 的 Seth Sigman。

Congrats to all on the new roles. My main question is around the pricing strategy, the pricing philosophy more from a competitive perspective. I guess the term the team used to use in the past was Smart Value. How do you all feel about that today? How that was executed? What does that actually mean? And as you think about Overstock and Bed Bath, how should they be positioned in the marketplace from a price perspective? And ultimately, what's the type of work you're doing right now to ensure that right value proposition?

恭喜各位新任職務。我主要的問題是關於定價策略、定價理念，更多是從競爭角度來看。我想團隊過去常用的詞是 Smart Value。你們現在對此有何看法？當時是如何執行的？那實際上代表什麼？以及當你們思考 Overstock 與 Bed Bath 時，從價格角度它們在市場上應該如何定位？最後，你們目前正在做哪些工作，以確保正確的價值主張？

Thanks, Seth. I'm going to speak to the Overstock side of the equation, and then I'll hand it over to Chandra. But I can tell you from Overstock that -- when you think about Overstock, I don't want you to think about Overstock circa 2022. I want you to think of Overstock circa 2016, 2017, 2009, get it back into that era where Smart Value was our opportunity. Think about us as surplus goods.

謝謝你，Seth。我會先談這個等式中 Overstock 的部分，然後再交給 Chandra。不過我可以告訴你，就 Overstock 而言——當你想到 Overstock 時，我不希望你想到 2022 年的 Overstock。我希望你想到 2016、2017、2009 年左右的 Overstock，把它帶回到 Smart Value 是我們機會的那個年代。把我們想成是剩餘商品（surplus goods）。

Don't think about us necessarily as liquidation. Think about us as factory directs, overruns, surplus; as Marcus mentioned, products that you will not find on Bed Bath & Beyond. We will have different assortments on both product categories. We will have more than just home furnishings on the Overstock website. There is a need for this in the market. There is a need for this among our suppliers, especially after what we've just gone through. But there's always been that need. Nobody ever orders the perfect amount of sofas or nobody ever orders the perfect amount of health and beauty products. There's always an overrun here or there and an opportunity to price that competitively.

不要把我們必然地視為清算。把我們視為工廠直供、超量生產、剩餘庫存；如 Marcus 所提到的，是你在 Bed Bath & Beyond 找不到的商品。我們在兩個產品類別上都會有不同的商品組合。Overstock 網站上的品類不會只有家居用品。我們看到市場有這樣的需求；我們的供應商也有這樣的需求，尤其是在我們剛剛經歷的一切之後。但其實一直都有這個需求。沒有人能剛好訂到完美數量的沙發，也沒有人能剛好訂到完美數量的健康與美容產品。總會有這裡或那裡的超量，並且有機會以具競爭力的價格來定價。

So for us, something that I think is really important with Overstock for you to -- for everybody to remember. The Overstock customer is a higher average household income customer. This is a customer who has made a lot of money. They have a high income and they make money by saving money and they love that shopping experience. They love the treasure hunt. They love that thrill of the hunt. They will spend when they see quality at a value.

所以對我們而言，我認為有一點對你——對所有人——在談 Overstock 時真的很重要：Overstock 的客戶平均家庭收入更高。這是一群賺了很多錢的客戶。他們收入高，而他們賺錢的方式之一就是省錢，他們很喜歡那種購物體驗。他們喜歡「尋寶」。他們喜歡那種狩獵的刺激感。當他們看到以划算價格買到高品質時，就會願意花錢。

And that's primarily what that brand has been built on over the years. When you think of, well, how can Overstock drive these high average order sizes, that Bed Bath & Beyond can't. It wasn't just in furniture that, that was capable. We've sold $100,000 diamond rings on Overstock in the past. Several of them. There are customers looking for that deal, and that's the way we want you to think about Overstock. Chandra?

而這基本上就是這個品牌多年來建立起來的核心。當你在想，Overstock 怎麼能帶動 Bed Bath & Beyond 做不到的高平均客單價（AOV）？不只是家具能做到。我們過去在 Overstock 上賣過 10 萬美元的鑽戒。好幾枚。確實有客戶在找那樣的好交易，而這就是我們希望你對 Overstock 的理解方式。Chandra？

Yes. Bed Bath & Beyond pricing is pretty straightforward. So we try to be competitive with the main competitors in our space in the market. And then our customers love coupons and discounts. And so we use those levers to drive the business where appropriate.

是的。Bed Bath & Beyond 的定價相當直接。我們會努力在市場上與同業主要競爭對手保持競爭力。然後我們的客戶很喜歡優惠券和折扣，所以我們會在適當的時候運用這些槓桿來推動業務。

Okay. And then I'm just curious, with the recent inflection that you've seen in the business, can you talk about some of the themes, types of customers, maybe the categories that you're seeing the improvement? What is working right now?

好的。那我也好奇，隨著你們最近看到業務出現轉折點（inflection），你能談談一些主題、客群類型，或是你看到改善的品類嗎？目前什麼在奏效？

Yes. For us, the -- again, the lion share of what's going -- what's happening right now is Bed Bath & Beyond. And with Bed Bath & Beyond, it's happening in the core power categories of bedding, bath, kitchen dining, tabletop, cookware, you name it. These are all really, really important categories for us. We'll see spikes in furniture and area rugs and home improvement, just like this recent Labor Day or President's Day.

是的。對我們來說——再次強調，目前發生的事情絕大部分都在 Bed Bath & Beyond。而在 Bed Bath & Beyond，改善主要出現在核心強勢品類：寢具、浴室用品、廚房與餐飲、餐桌用品、鍋具等等。這些都是對我們非常、非常重要的品類。我們也會在家具、地毯以及居家修繕等品類看到尖峰，就像最近的勞動節或總統日那樣。

However, I will tell you. It isn't at the same average order size as what you would get with Overstock. We have Overstock running as a sub-domain right now. If you click on Overstock, you can see the assortment that's there. Right now, it's just as a placeholder because we had some 60,000 customers a day clicking on Overstock. They were keying in on their keyboards and on their cell phones Overstock. We wanted to give them a place so we didn't let them go cold until we got this launch started. The average order size is $50 plus higher there than what you'll see on Bed Bath & Beyond. And it's just that same pricing strategy.

不過我可以告訴你，這些的平均客單價並不像 Overstock 那麼高。我們目前把 Overstock 以子網域的形式運行。如果你點進 Overstock，就能看到那裡的商品組合。現在它只是個佔位（placeholder），因為每天大約有 6 萬名客戶點擊 Overstock；他們在鍵盤和手機上直接輸入 Overstock。我們想先給他們一個去處，讓他們在我們啟動正式上線之前不至於流失。那邊的平均客單價比你在 Bed Bath & Beyond 看到的高出 50 美元以上。而定價策略其實是同一套。

There is an opportunity for us with the product categories on Overstock to drive a higher margin and a higher AOV. But Bed Bath & Beyond, Marcus spoke to it, the frequency. We love it. We love how often they're coming back, and we love frequency in which they're buying.

在 Overstock 的品類上，我們有機會推動更高的毛利率與更高的平均客單價（AOV）。但 Bed Bath & Beyond——Marcus 也提到了——是購買頻率。我們很喜歡。我們喜歡他們回來的頻率，也喜歡他們購買的頻率。

I'll tell you one thing that we definitely learned as Dave and I, over the last couple of months hit the road, that Bed Bath & Beyond had a historical relationship with certain vendors in excess of $300 million, $400 million, $500 million a year. And when we studied intently, what mistakes we believe Bed Bath & Beyond made in their final days, it was really abandoning the solid brand recognition that large brands like Newell and Cuisinart, and a number of other brands have established in the marketplace.

我可以告訴你一件事：Dave 和我在過去幾個月到處拜訪時，我們確實了解到 Bed Bath & Beyond 過去與某些供應商的歷史合作規模一年超過 3 億、4 億、5 億美元。而當我們深入研究、仔細檢視我們認為 Bed Bath & Beyond 在最後階段犯了哪些錯誤時，核心之一就是他們真的放棄了像 Newell、Cuisinart 以及其他多個品牌在市場上建立起來的強大品牌認知。

And when you went to Bed Bath & Beyond, you expected to see those name brands from Dyson vacuums to (inaudible) sheets. And for some reason, the company thought it was a good idea to part ways with those world-class globally dominated brands that consumers came to expect and understand. The balance in any business like that is to have a perfect balance between well recognizable brands that gives the customer the understanding that you are a credible retailer and weaving in own brands that give you the margin expansion you need to hit the levels of profitability.

當你走進 Bed Bath & Beyond，你會期待看到那些知名品牌——從 Dyson 吸塵器到（聽不清）床單。出於某些原因，公司認為與這些全球一流、在全球市場占主導地位、且消費者已經習慣並理解的品牌分道揚鑣是個好主意。這類業務的平衡點在於：在能讓顧客理解你是可信賴零售商的高辨識度品牌，與能帶來毛利擴張、讓你達到獲利水準的自有品牌之間，取得完美平衡。

But that's a very fine balance. And when I started looking to hire a CEO for this business, I said to the Board, we need to find somebody that doesn't think like this. We need to find somebody that has actually done it. And so when we went out and were blessed to find someone at Chandra's caliber to be the CEO of Bed Bath. If you look back at her previous relationships in her previous post, she had not only executed, but every channel check that I did prior to bringing her on was not just with the people that she worked with, it was the vendors that she had relationships with.

但那是一個非常微妙的平衡。當我開始為這個業務尋找 CEO 時，我對董事會說：我們需要找到一個不只是「這樣想」的人；我們需要找到一個真正做過的人。所以當我們外部尋覓，並很幸運找到 Chandra 這樣水準的人來擔任 Bed Bath 的 CEO。回頭看她過去的經歷與關係，她不僅有執行成果，而且在我把她延攬進來之前做的每一次通路訪查（channel check），不只是問她共事過的人，也包括與她有合作關係的供應商。

That for me was the gating principle of understanding. Does Chandra or does this candidate understand the importance of putting those world-class brands up on a pedestal and then understanding through her experience of creating private labels at all those companies how to underpin that. how to support it as a foundational piece just to prop up the overall margin. That really is a simple thing. And many people have said to me, is Bed Bath & Beyond going to have stores again. I will tell you as clear as I can. I have no idea as I sit here today. I have a feeling because Chandra has mentioned it 2 or 3 times that being in the retail business is an omnichannel experience. I'd like you to expand on that a little bit.

對我而言，那是理解的關鍵門檻：Chandra 或這位候選人是否理解把那些世界級品牌放在「神壇」上的重要性；並且能透過她在那些公司打造自有品牌（private label）的經驗，知道如何在其下支撐——如何把它作為基礎來支撐，作為撐起整體毛利的根本。這其實是很簡單的事。很多人也問我：Bed Bath & Beyond 會不會再有門市？我會盡可能清楚地告訴你：以我今天坐在這裡的狀態，我不知道。我有種感覺，因為 Chandra 已經提過兩三次，做零售是一種全通路（omnichannel）的體驗。我希望你能多展開談談。

Yes. Right now, within both e-commerce and brick-and-mortar, there's white space for a category killer to come in, in bed, bath, kitchen dining. The categories that Bed Bath & Beyond has always been dominant. And we -- when we look at how our customers want to shop, we think there's an opportunity to serve them in multiple ways. So right now, we're serving them from an e-commerce standpoint. But should we look at some brick-and-mortar presence? Right now, I think everything is on the table.

是的。現在不論在電商或實體零售之間，在寢具、浴室、廚房與餐飲這些領域，都還有「空白地帶」（white space）讓一個品類殺手（category killer）進來——而這些正是 Bed Bath & Beyond 一直以來占優勢的品類。我們在看顧客想怎麼購物時，認為有機會用多種方式服務他們。所以目前我們以電商的角度在服務他們。但我們是否要考慮一些實體據點？目前我認為一切都在評估範圍內。

Yes. Let me be clear about sort of time frames around that. This company is sitting with a relatively meaningful amount of cash and no debt other than the building that we're currently in the process of selling. Every dollar that we have in the bank, we think about as our last dollar and there will be no material CapEx investments made of any kind until we have reestablished a level of profitability that is sustained.

是的。讓我把相關時間框架說清楚。公司目前握有相對可觀的現金，且除了我們正在出售的那棟大樓之外沒有負債。銀行裡的每一美元，我們都當作最後一美元來思考；在我們重新建立並維持可持續的獲利水準之前，我們不會進行任何形式的重大資本支出（CapEx）投資。

I want to really be clear. And if there is an opportunity to license the brand to somebody internationally, like we already have today in Mexico, we will explore those. In fact, Dave is heading over to Dubai here next week from an inbound call of somebody that wants to open up Bed Bath & Beyond stores in the UAE. We're open to all those things.

我想非常清楚地說：如果有機會把品牌授權給海外的合作方——就像我們今天在墨西哥已經有的那樣——我們會去探索。事實上，Dave 因為接到一通主動來電，對方希望在阿聯酋開設 Bed Bath & Beyond 門市，他下週就要去杜拜。我們對這些事情都持開放態度。

But I would expect that we will explore partnerships, shop-in-shop opportunities and things that are CapEx light and brand-centric around how we want to build it. But I don't want anybody to leave this call thinking that we're going to start opening stores tomorrow, next week or even next year. That is not on the runway. We just don't want people to think that we are limiting the growth potential of this business. We are open to lots of ideas including acquisitions of other companies or maybe a Bed Bath can integrate or more a variety of other things.

但我預期我們會探索合作夥伴關係、店中店（shop-in-shop）機會，以及那些資本支出較輕（CapEx light）且以品牌為核心的做法，來思考我們要如何打造它。不過我不希望任何人離開這通電話時以為我們明天、下週、甚至明年就要開始開店。那不在目前的規劃跑道上。我們只是不希望大家以為我們在限制這個業務的成長潛力。我們對很多想法都很開放，包括收購其他公司，或許讓 Bed Bath 能夠整合，或是更多各式各樣的可能性。

Our next question comes from the line of Steven Forbes of Guggenheim.

我們的下一個問題來自 Guggenheim 的 Steven Forbes。

Marcus, I realize you have mentioned working on improving the customer segmentation data. But given the ramp in 4Q orders and obviously, the revenue goals for the year. Any update on the mix of orders between the customer groups that we can help contextualize? And any sort of earlier learnings around repeat behavior differences among those groups that are -- is worth highlighting?

Marcus，我知道你提到正在努力改善客戶分群資料。但考量到第四季訂單的加速成長，以及顯然今年的營收目標，能否更新一下不同客戶群之間的訂單組合，讓我們更好地理解？另外，關於這些客群在重複購買行為上的差異，有沒有任何早期觀察——值得特別指出的？

On the third quarter earnings call, Steven, we talked about the legacy Overstock customers, which were customers who had purchased on Overstock and also purchased on Bed Bath & Beyond, the legacy Bed Bath & Beyond customers and then TAM new. For the fourth quarter, relatively similar performance among all 3 groups. In fact, maybe a little bit more improvement and a willingness on the TAM new customer segment to lean into some of the higher price point categories in furniture and area rugs. But for the most part, the Overstock customer stayed about right where they were from a repeat function.

Steven，在第三季財報電話會議上，我們談到過傳統的 Overstock 客戶——也就是曾在 Overstock 購買、同時也在 Bed Bath & Beyond 購買過的客戶；傳統的 Bed Bath & Beyond 客戶；以及 TAM 新客。第四季，這三個族群的表現相對類似。事實上，TAM 新客族群在家具與地毯等較高客單價品類上，可能有更多一些改善與更願意嘗試。但整體而言，Overstock 客戶在回購表現上大致維持在原本的水準。

The Bed Bath & Beyond customer, as I mentioned, we had a higher repeat frequency among those customers in the fourth quarter. And that had a lot to do with, I believe, what Marcus was just touching on and what Chandra is here to do, and that is reestablish these powerhouse world-class brands on Bed Bath & Beyond with even taking it to the next level, having unique collaborations with some of these major brands, where we have something unique on our website that brings people to Bed Bath & Beyond.

至於 Bed Bath & Beyond 客戶，如我提到的，我們在第四季看到這些客戶有更高的回購頻率。我認為這與 Marcus 剛剛提到的、以及 Chandra 來這裡要做的事情有很大關係，也就是：在 Bed Bath & Beyond 重新建立這些強勢、世界級的品牌，甚至更進一步，與其中一些大型品牌進行獨家合作，讓我們在網站上提供獨特的商品或內容，吸引人們回到 Bed Bath & Beyond。

And getting back in those businesses, it took us a little bit of time in the third quarter to get those up and running with those world-class brands. But by the fourth quarter, that's where we've seen some of the momentum, and it's carried on into the first quarter, as I mentioned, in those key categories.

而回到那些業務上，第三季我們花了一點時間，才把與這些世界級品牌的合作重新啟動並運轉起來。但到了第四季，我們就在那些關鍵品類看到一些動能，而且如我所提到的，這股動能也延續到了第一季。

Look, the Overstock customer was coming to the website and asking who moved. I mean, they literally tighten the word Overstock and they came to the site and it was gone. Entirely gone. It's like you being invited to a party and then finding out that you had the wrong address. And I think the challenge with that is that we lost short-term credibility when that website, when that sub-domain got popped up really as a reaction to what I think Dave and I believe was just a mistake.

你看，Overstock 客戶來到網站上，會問「誰搬走了？」我的意思是，他們真的輸入「Overstock」這個字就來到網站，結果它不見了——完全不見了。就像你被邀請去參加派對，結果發現地址搞錯了一樣。我認為挑戰在於，當那個網站、那個子網域被架起來時——其實更像是對我和 Dave 認為的一個錯誤所做的反應——我們在短期內失去了可信度。

We were seeing a business on a daily basis, $200,000, $225,000 with no marketing, no anything. Trying to get people to buy something from a business that is intuitively not correct is cost prohibitive. And we don't have an infinite amount of our shareholders' cash to spend on that, which is why we've pivoted so hard and so quickly because we need to hit that $2 billion revenue, and we know Overstock is the path forward.

我們每天看到的業務量是 20 萬到 22.5 萬美元，而且沒有行銷、沒有任何推廣。要讓人們去買一個在直覺上就不太對的業務，成本高得不划算。而我們也沒有無限的股東資金可以投入，這就是為什麼我們會如此用力、如此快速地轉向，因為我們需要達成 20 億美元營收，而我們知道 Overstock 才是前進的道路。

And just a quick follow-up, more of a clarification, Marcus. I believe you stated that the goal is to sort of improve the marketing expense ratio by 50 to 100 basis points per year. I guess, first, can you just confirm that, that's what you mean? And then what's sort of the base line? Is it the fourth quarter run rate or the full year 2023 that we should think about that improvement over the next 12 to 24 months?

再追問一下，算是釐清，Marcus。我記得你說目標是每年把行銷費用率改善 50 到 100 個基點。我想先確認一下，你的意思是這個嗎？另外，基準是什麼？是第四季的 run rate，還是 2023 全年的水準，作為我們在未來 12 到 24 個月衡量改善的起點？

Yes. When I started looking at the financial statements for 2023, 14% was the marketing spend as a percentage of revenue. And I have a goal of getting us down to 11% over time. That 3% is material when you're talking about a $2 billion, $3 billion business. This company cannot afford a 14% marketing expense as a percentage of revenue, nor should it be leaning exclusively on its vendors to mitigate that expense.

是的。我開始看 2023 年的財務報表時，行銷支出占營收的比例是 14%。我的目標是隨時間把它降到 11%。當你談的是一家 20 億、30 億美元規模的企業時，這 3% 是很可觀的。這家公司負擔不起行銷費用占營收 14% 的比例，也不應該完全依賴供應商來抵消那筆費用。

The vendors have a finite amount of money and we need that money to show up with better first cost dollars. So we have true margins that are better and supporting the customer experience when things don't go right. That's a form of marketing. And I think too often people are focused on, let's just drive more and more and more. You also need to retain what you've built.

供應商的資金是有限的，而我們需要那筆錢以更好的第一成本（first cost）體現在商品上。如此一來，我們才能有更好的真實毛利，並在事情不順利時支撐客戶體驗。那也是一種行銷。我認為人們太常只專注在「再多推、再多拉、再多衝」。你也需要留住你已經建立起來的東西。

So when we look at the overall marketing spend and our goal to drop it by 0.5% to 1% this year, that would mean that we would be looking at a 13% to 13.5% number as part of that. Improving the efficiency of that database to drive that below 13%, getting retention of our customers to drive that to 12% or below, and then getting more efficient with our database and being smarter about our relationships with our customers is the pathway to 11%. For those people that believe it's not possible, there's no reason that you couldn't cut $30 million, $40 million of marketing expense out of this budget. The question is, which $30 million or $40 million do you cut? And that usually is where the devil is in the details. We believe we have the secret sauce to figure that out.

所以，當我們看整體行銷支出，並以今年降低 0.5% 到 1% 為目標時，這意味著我們會把它降到 13% 到 13.5% 的區間。透過提升資料庫效率把它推到 13% 以下；透過提升客戶留存把它推到 12% 或更低；然後再透過更有效率地運用資料庫、並更聰明地經營與客戶的關係，這就是通往 11% 的路徑。對於那些認為不可能的人，沒有理由不能從這個預算中砍掉 3,000 萬到 4,000 萬美元的行銷費用。問題是，你要砍的是哪 3,000 萬或 4,000 萬？而魔鬼通常就在細節裡。我們相信我們有祕密武器能把這件事做出來。

Our next question comes from the line of Jonathan Matuszewski of Jefferies.

我們的下一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 Jonathan Matuszewski。

Great. And welcome to the team, Chandra. My first question is on the 2024 sales goal. Maybe if you could just break that down a little bit, the $2 billion. Marcus, I think you described Overstock.com as the silver bullet. So just curious how much you see Overstock.com contributing to 2024 after the 1Q launch?

很好。也歡迎 Chandra 加入團隊。我第一個問題是關於 2024 年的銷售目標。或許你可以把 20 億美元這個目標再拆解一下。Marcus，我想你把 Overstock.com 形容為「銀色子彈」。所以我想了解，在第一季上線之後，你預期 Overstock.com 在 2024 年會貢獻多少？

Yes. Thanks, Jonathan. I read your note last evening that came out shortly after we released our earnings. And I suppose I could understand why you asked or why you questioned our ability to get to $2 billion. At this moment in time, Overstock and Bed Bath & Beyond are not separate reporting segments. We expect that in the 2025 calendar year because of the materiality of what we believe Overstock will become, that we will report them separately.

是的，謝謝你，Jonathan。我昨晚讀了你在我們發布財報後不久發出的報告。我想我能理解你為什麼會問、或為什麼會質疑我們達到 20 億美元的能力。就目前而言，Overstock 與 Bed Bath & Beyond 並不是分開揭露的報導部門。我們預期在 2025 年曆年，基於我們認為 Overstock 將成為的規模之重大性，我們會把它們分開揭露。

But if you look at the financials for 2023 from a revenue standpoint, we were approximately at $1.6 billion. And Bed Bath & Beyond's business did not layer into that number until the early -- the late summer, early fall, August of 2023. What happened in that moment is when Bed Bath & Beyond -- when the website literally went from red to blue, you literally just changed the name of it.

但如果你從營收角度看 2023 年的財務數字，我們大約是 16 億美元。而 Bed Bath & Beyond 的業務直到 2023 年的夏末——初秋，也就是 2023 年 8 月——才納入那個數字。那一刻發生的事情是，當 Bed Bath & Beyond——當網站真的從紅色變成藍色時，你其實只是把名字改掉了。

You not only confuse people, but I think you sent away Overstock customers. So the way that I've asked the team to think about it is if you take the Bed Bath & Beyond core segment business from August 1 through December 31 or quite frankly, even through today, and you annualize that, and then you took the historical Overstock business that was January through July 31 and you annualize that and then took out some of the crossover categories, that's what gives us confidence that $2 billion is a clear path.

你不只會讓人困惑，我認為你也把 Overstock 客戶趕走了。所以我要求團隊這樣思考：如果你把 Bed Bath & Beyond 的核心分部業務從 8 月 1 日到 12 月 31 日——坦白說，甚至到今天——把它年化；再把歷史上的 Overstock 業務（1 月到 7 月 31 日）年化；然後扣掉一些重疊品類，這就是讓我們有信心認為 20 億美元是一條清晰路徑的原因。

Let me also add to that, that we know that adding Baby & Beyond and a few other ancillary things also contribute to that. But we are not able to tell you because of SEC reporting, how that $2 billion is going to be broken out. The reason I said that Overstock is the silver bullet is there's a gap to fill. And that's about as good as I can be. There's the gap to fill. But we did use science and historical information to lay this track down. It wasn't just some wild finger in the air swag.

我也補充一下，我們知道加入 Baby & Beyond 以及其他一些附屬項目也會對此有所貢獻。但因為 SEC 申報揭露的限制，我們無法告訴你這 20 億美元會如何拆分。我之所以說 Overstock 是銀色子彈，是因為有一個缺口需要補上。而我能說的大概就到這裡：有個缺口要補。但我們確實是用科學方法與歷史資訊來鋪設這條軌道，並不是隨便憑空估一個數字。

Yes. That's very helpful color. And just a quick follow-up question. Marcus, I think you made some comments about kind of working closely -- more closely with Pelion going forward and -- just some color on the cash flow statement. I think you guys had a $10 million of proceeds from block chain asset sales or cryptocurrency proceeds. Just more detail there and what's the path ahead for '24?

是的，這些補充非常有幫助。再快速追問一個問題。Marcus，我想你提到未來會更緊密地與 Pelion 合作——另外關於現金流量表的一些細節。我看到你們有 1,000 萬美元來自區塊鏈資產出售或加密貨幣的收入。能否多說明一下那部分，以及 2024 年接下來的規劃路徑？

Yes, I'm going to have Adrianne handle the cash portion of how she wants to manage unlocking the value of her assets. And she'll go through whether it's the building or bitcoin, things of that nature, but let me address the Pelion relationship.

是的，我會讓 Adrianne 負責現金部分，說明她希望如何管理並釋放其資產價值。她會談到不論是大樓或比特幣等這類事項，但我先回應一下與 Pelion 的合作關係。

I take very seriously every dollar that leaves this company. And when I look at a P&L on a monthly basis, and I see a line item of a management fee, I take that very seriously. And in 2021, this company, for some reason, decided that it couldn't manage a portfolio that wasn't even a noncore asset. So we've elected to sign up a partnership with a local corporate ventures fund to help manage those 16 portfolio companies.

我非常嚴肅看待每一塊離開這家公司的錢。當我每月查看損益表（P&L），看到「管理費」這個科目時，我會非常重視。2021 年，這家公司不知何故決定它無法管理一個投資組合，而那甚至稱不上是非核心資產。因此，我們選擇與一家本地企業創投基金建立合作夥伴關係，協助管理那 16 家投資組合公司。

I've had the pleasure of speaking to a number of the leaders of those portfolio companies and, quite frankly, have been pleased when I have one-on-one dialogue with them about what they're doing, what ideas they have and more importantly, what sorts of results they're driving. But I had to make that phone call. And what I will not stand for is anybody getting in the way of our shareholders understanding what's happening with money that has left their bank account and been invested in some other assets.

我很榮幸與其中多家投資組合公司的領導者交流，坦白說，當我與他們一對一對話，了解他們在做什麼、有哪些想法，更重要的是他們正在推動什麼樣的成果時，我感到很滿意。但那通電話必須由我來打。我絕不容許任何人阻礙我們的股東了解：從他們的銀行帳戶支出、並投資到其他資產的資金，究竟發生了什麼。

And when I pay somebody a fee, to manage that business, I expect results and communication. And so we're going to work with Pelion on improving those 2 things over time. And if those 2 things aren't going to improve at a level that meets all of our standards, then we're going to just assess what options we have in redoing it.

當我付費請人管理那項業務時，我期待看到成果與溝通。因此，我們將與 Pelion 合作，隨時間推進改善這兩件事。如果這兩件事的改善程度無法達到我們所有的標準，那麼我們就會評估有哪些選項可以重新安排或重做。

But it is in no way an indictment on the businesses that are inside of that portfolio. In fact, we don't control them. They are proprietors. We don't have a controlling stake where we could tell anybody what to do and whether you agree or disagree with the investment that had been made over the previous 5 years, it's water under the bridge.

但這絕不是對該投資組合內部企業的指控。事實上，我們不控制它們；它們是自主經營者。我們沒有控股權，無法指示任何人該做什麼。不論你同意或不同意過去 5 年所做的投資，那都已成過去、無需再糾結。

Our job is to understand the value of that investment and figure out how to monetize that investment. I have one goal: maximize the value of that investment, turn it into cash and then weaponize that cash to grow this company by either investing in its core business or acquiring another bolt-on business that fits naturally inside of what our core business is. Adrianne?

我們的工作是理解那項投資的價值，並找出如何將其變現。我只有一個目標：最大化那項投資的價值，把它轉成現金，然後把這筆現金武器化，用來透過投資核心業務來成長公司，或收購一個能自然融入我們核心業務的附加型（bolt-on）業務。Adrianne？

Yes, happy to. Jonathan, thanks for the question on cash. Let me just frame that up a bit. Obviously, we're always looking at our balance sheet and looking at particularly nonperforming assets and if there's an opportunity to monetize in a meaningful way.

好的，很樂意。Jonathan，謝謝你關於現金的提問。我先稍微框架一下。很明顯地，我們一直在檢視資產負債表，特別是表現不佳的資產，並觀察是否有機會以有意義的方式進行變現。

So the item you're seeing here in the fourth quarter was our decision to sell some of our bitcoin, actually all of our Bitcoin. So we did have a holdings. If you recall, there was a point in our company history where we accepted cryptocurrency as payment and we have decided to sell those currencies. I'll say, in addition, Marcus mentioned that we do have our corporate headquarters here in Salt Lake City, pending -- up for sale, and we're looking to monetize that asset as well.

所以你在第四季看到的項目，是我們決定出售部分比特幣——其實是全部比特幣。我們確實曾持有一些部位。若你還記得，在公司歷史上的某個時期，我們曾接受加密貨幣作為付款方式，而我們已決定出售那些幣種。另外，Marcus 提到我們位於鹽湖城的公司總部目前——正在出售中，我們也希望將該資產變現。

And we received 1 offer so far. That offer as much as Dave and I would like to move on, it doesn't meet Adrianne standards just yet and we're waiting on a few other offers that we expect to come in, but it is our goal to have transacted on this building one way or the other by the middle of the year. The carry cost on this building is about $8 million and that's $7.6 million more than we're willing to invest in just parking desks and computers. That money needs to be reinvested in technology, the database, expanding brands, et cetera, et cetera.

到目前為止我們收到 1 份出價。那份出價雖然 Dave 和我都很想往前推進，但它還沒有達到 Adrianne 的標準；我們正在等待另外幾份我們預期會進來的出價。不過，我們的目標是在年中以前，以某種方式完成這棟大樓的交易。這棟大樓的持有成本約為 800 萬美元，而這比我們願意投入在只是擺放辦公桌和電腦上多了 760 萬美元。這筆錢需要再投資於技術、資料庫、擴展品牌等等。

And that is our time for questions today. I'd like to turn the call back over to Marcus Lemonis for any closing remarks.

以上就是我們今天的提問時間。我想把電話交回給 Marcus Lemonis，請他做結語。

Thank you so much. I couldn't be more excited about the team that has been assembled here to manage the day-to-day operations. For those of you that know me, I drive a very, very hard charging mentality around serving at the pleasure of our employees and our shareholders.

非常感謝。我對於這裡組建起來、負責日常營運管理的團隊感到無比振奮。認識我的人都知道，我在「以員工與股東為依歸、為其服務」這件事上，有非常、非常強勢的衝刺心態。

One thing that was not mentioned on today's call is that we will use a different tactic over time to influence the outcome of our results. We will use influencers and content and information and ideas to bring the customers closer to us. The days of buying singularly linear TV or just buying ads are over. Consumers don't react to things like that and you could expect a whole host of influencers to not just be involved in our business but be motivated financially by the results. A really new idea around influencers being tied to the variability of performance.

今天的電話會議有一件事沒有提到：隨著時間推進，我們會採用不同的策略來影響我們的業績結果。我們會運用影響者（influencers）、內容、資訊與想法，讓客戶更貼近我們。只買單一線性的電視廣告或只是買廣告的時代已經結束了。消費者不會對那樣的方式有反應；你可以預期會有一大批影響者不僅參與我們的業務，還會在財務上因結果而受到激勵。這是一個全新的概念：讓影響者的報酬與績效的變動性掛鉤。

We are on the cusp of announcing a few of them and believe that not only are we going to be adding them to our pool, but I'm confident that Dave and Chandra are going to be adding additional resources to their army as well. Thanks for joining us on the call, and we look forward to seeing you on the next one. Take care.

我們正準備宣布其中幾位；我們相信不僅會把他們加入我們的名單，我也有信心 Dave 和 Chandra 也會為他們的團隊增添更多資源。感謝各位參與本次電話會議，我們期待在下一次再見。保重。

Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, this does conclude today's conference. Thank you all for participating. You may now disconnect. Have a great day.

謝謝。各位女士、先生，今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝各位的參與。您現在可以掛線。祝您有美好的一天。