Howard Hughes Holdings Inc (HHH) 2025 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good day, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Howard Hughes Holdings second-quarter 2025 earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded.

您好，感謝您的支持。歡迎參加霍華休斯控股 2025 年第二季財報電話會議。（操作員指示）請注意，今天的會議正在錄音。

I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Joe Valane, General Counsel.

現在我想將會議交給今天的發言人、總法律顧問喬·瓦蘭 (Joe Valane)。

Good morning, and welcome to the Howard Hughes Holdings second-quarter 2025 earnings call. With me today are Bill Ackman, Executive Chairman; David O'Reilly, Chief Executive Officer; and Carlos Olea, Chief Financial Officer.

早安，歡迎參加霍華休斯控股 2025 年第二季財報電話會議。今天與我一起出席的有執行董事長比爾·阿克曼 (Bill Ackman)、首席執行官戴維·奧萊利 (David O'Reilly) 和首席財務官卡洛斯·奧萊亞 (Carlos Olea)。

Before we begin, I would like to direct you to our website, www.howardhughes.com, where you can download both our second quarter earnings press release and our supplemental package. The earnings release and supplemental package include reconciliations of non-GAAP financial measures that will be discussed today in relation to their most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.

在我們開始之前，我想引導您訪問我們的網站 www.howardhughes.com，您可以在那裡下載我們的第二季收益新聞稿和補充包。收益報告和補充資料包括非公認會計準則 (GAAP) 財務指標的對賬，將於今天討論這些對帳與最直接可比較的 GAAP 財務指標之間的關係。

Certain statements made today that are not in the present test or that discuss the company's expectations are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the total securities laws. Although the company believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are based upon reasonable assumptions, we can give no assurance that these expectations will be achieved.

今天做出的某些不在本審查範圍內的陳述或討論公司預期的陳述均屬於證券法總體定義下的前瞻性陳述。儘管公司認為此類前瞻性陳述所反映的預期是基於合理的假設，但我們無法保證這些預期將會實現。

Please see the forward-looking statement disclaimer in our second quarter earnings press release and the risk factors in our SEC filings for factors that could cause material differences between forward-looking statements and actual results. We are not under any duty to update forward-looking statements unless required by law.

請參閱我們第二季財報新聞稿中的前瞻性聲明免責聲明以及我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件中的風險因素，以了解可能導致前瞻性聲明與實際結果之間出現重大差異的因素。除非法律要求，我們沒有義務更新前瞻性聲明。

I will now turn the call over to our CEO, David O'Reilly.

現在我將電話轉給我們的執行長大衛·奧萊利 (David O'Reilly)。

Thank you, Joe, and good morning. On our call today, I'm going to begin with a recap of the second quarter and cover segment highlights from the Master Planned Communities, operating assets, and strategic developments. Carlos will review our updated full year guidance and balance sheet. Following our comments on the operating results for HHD, we'll hand the call over to Bill Ackman, our Executive Chairman, who will discuss HHH future strategic direction before we open the lines for Q&A.

謝謝你，喬，早安。在今天的電話會議上，我將首先回顧第二季度的情況，並介紹總體規劃社區、營運資產和策略發展等部分的亮點。卡洛斯將審查我們更新的全年指導和資產負債表。在對 HHD 的經營業績發表評論之後，我們將把電話交給我們的執行主席比爾·阿克曼 (Bill Ackman)，他將在我們開放問答環節之前討論 HHH 未來的戰略方向。

As we discussed on our last earnings call, the second quarter marked a significant milestone for Howard Hughes Holdings, with Pershing Square investing $900 million in exchange for 9 million shares of HHA stock. These funds will be strategically used to transform Howard Hughes use from our pure-play real estate company to a premier diversified holding company.

正如我們在上次收益電話會議上所討論的那樣，第二季度是霍華休斯控股公司的一個重要里程碑，潘興廣場投資 9 億美元換取了 900 萬股 HHA 股票。這些資金將策略性地用於幫助霍華休斯從純粹的房地產公司轉型為一流的多元化控股公司。

Before Bill discusses this in a few minutes, I'm going to shift to talk about the results for HHH's real estate development business, the Howard Hughes Corporation in more detail. The second quarter was another exceptional quarter for Howard Hughes as our team delivered outstanding results across our business segments, highlighting the strong demand in our portfolio of Master Planned Communities and further solidifying our strong 2025 outlook.

在比爾討論這個問題之前，我將先更詳細地談談霍華休斯公司的房地產開發業務——霍華休斯公司的表現。第二季度對霍華休斯來說又是一個非凡的季度，因為我們的團隊在各個業務部門都取得了出色的業績，突顯了我們對總體規劃社區組合的強勁需求，並進一步鞏固了我們強勁的 2025 年前景。

For the second quarter, we delivered adjusted operating cash flow of $91 million or $1.64 per diluted share. Our MPCs continue to see strong homebuilder demand executing land sales at record prices per acre in both Summerlin and Bridgeland. Operating assets also set a new record quarterly NOI across office and multifamily, with solid year-over-year segment growth of 5%.

第二季度，我們的調整後營運現金流為 9,100 萬美元，即每股攤薄收益 1.64 美元。我們的 MPC 繼續看到強勁的房屋建築商需求，在 Summerlin 和 Bridgeland 均以創紀錄的每英畝價格出售土地。營業資產也創下了辦公室和多戶型住宅季度淨營運收入的新紀錄，較去年同期穩定成長 5%。

In strategic developments, condo presales remained strong at The Launiu, and we launched presales at Melia and 'Ilima, which are undoubtedly two of the most anticipated luxury residential towers ever to come to market in Honolulu. With these strong results, we are raising our full year guidance for adjusted operating cash flow, driven by the current and expected strength in our MPC land sale business and operating asset NOI. Carlos will discuss guidance in a few minutes.

在戰略發展方面，The Launiu 的公寓預售依然強勁，我們還啟動了 Melia 和 'Ilima 的預售，這無疑是檀香山有史以來最受期待的兩座豪華住宅大樓。憑藉這些強勁的業績，我們提高了全年調整後營運現金流的預期，這得益於我們 MPC 土地銷售業務和營運資產 NOI 的當前和預期強勁表現。卡洛斯將在幾分鐘內討論指導意見。

Turning to our MPC segment. We delivered solid MPC EBT of $102 million in the second quarter, fueled by the sale of 111 acres of residential land across our communities at a new record high average price per acre of $1.35 million, a 29% increase over last year. Land sales were led by Summerlin with two super pad sales totaling 65 acres, achieving a record average price per acre of $1.6 million. We also sold two custom lots in Astra, Summerlin's newest luxury community for an impressive average price of $7.7 million per acre.

轉向我們的 MPC 部分。我們在第二季度實現了 1.02 億美元的穩健 MPC EBT，這得益於我們社區內 111 英畝住宅用地的銷售，平均每英畝售價創歷史新高，達到 135 萬美元，比去年增長 29%。土地銷售方面，Summerlin 領銜，售出兩塊超級地塊，總面積達 65 英畝，平均每英畝售價創歷史新高，達到 160 萬美元。我們還以每英畝 770 萬美元的驚人平均價格出售了位於 Summerlin 最新豪華社區 Astra 的兩塊定制地塊。

Looking at new home sales, we continue to see solid demand across our MPCs with a total of 487 homes sold in the second quarter. While this was a decline from last year, the reduction was due to a reduced new home inventory in Summerlin and regulatory delays in Bridgeland. As both of these issues are currently being resolved, we expect to see home sales for the second half of the year remains strong.

從新房銷售情況來看，我們繼續看到 MPC 的強勁需求，第二季共售出 487 套房屋。雖然與去年相比有所下降，但下降的原因是薩默林的新房屋庫存減少以及布里奇蘭的監管延遲。由於這兩個問題目前正在解決，我們預計下半年的房屋銷售將保持強勁。

While the national housing market has shown signs of softening during the quarter, our record price per acre highlights the strength and desirability of our MPCs. We're seeing steady demand for new homes across our communities. We believe this demand will drive homebuilders to look for more land to develop in our communities. This will drive what we expect to be a continued record residential land sales, price per acre, and MPC EBT for the full year in 2025.

儘管本季全國房地產市場出現疲軟跡象，但我們創紀錄的每英畝價格凸顯了我們的 MPC 的實力和吸引力。我們看到各個社區對新房的需求穩定。我們相信這種需求將促使房屋建築商在我們的社區尋找更多的土地進行開發。這將推動我們預計 2025 年全年住宅土地銷售、每英畝價格和 MPC EBT 繼續創下新高。

In our operating asset segment, we delivered NOI of $69 million, representing a 5% increase compared to last year, driven primarily by a record-breaking quarterly NOI in our office and multifamily portfolios.

在我們的經營資產部門，我們的淨營業收入達到 6,900 萬美元，比去年增長 5%，這主要得益於我們的辦公室和多戶型投資組合創紀錄的季度淨營業收入。

Looking closer at office, we reported NOI of $35 million or a 6% year-over-year increase. As we previously mentioned, this growth was primarily the result of last year's strong lease-up activity at 9950 Woodloch Forest, 6100 Merriweather, and 1700 Pavilion, which ended the quarter 99%, 98%, and 92% leased, respectively.

仔細觀察辦公室情況，我們報告的淨營業利潤為 3,500 萬美元，年增 6%。正如我們之前提到的，這一增長主要得益於去年 9950 Woodloch Forest、6100 Merriweather 和 1700 Pavilion 的強勁租賃活動，本季末租賃率分別為 99%、98% 和 92%。

During the quarter, we acquired 7 Waterway, a 186,000 square foot Class A office building and adjacent structured parking located in the Woodlands Town Center for approximately $16 million. This acquisition increases our already strong market share of the Woodlands Town Center submarket. With this market share exceptional basis and net rents in the high 20s, this asset is expected to provide outsized risk-adjusted returns upon stabilization.

在本季度，我們以約 1,600 萬美元的價格收購了位於 Woodlands Town Center 的 7 Waterway，這是一棟 186,000 平方英尺的 A 級辦公大樓及其相鄰的結構化停車場。此次收購進一步擴大了我們在 Woodlands Town Center 子市場原本就很大的市佔率。憑藉這一市場份額的卓越基礎和 20 多億美元的淨租金，該資產預計將在穩定後提供超額的風險調整回報。

Our multifamily portfolio also performed well, delivering record NOI of $17 million or a 19% increase year-over-year, driven by strong lease-up efforts at our recently completed assets and improved overall leasing at our stabilized properties, which were 97% leased at quarter end.

我們的多戶型投資組合也表現良好，淨營業利潤達到創紀錄的 1,700 萬美元，同比增長 19%，這得益於我們近期完工的資產的強勁租賃努力以及穩定物業的整體租賃改善（季度末租賃率為 97%）。

In our retail portfolio, NOI was $13 million, which reflected a 7% year-over-year reduction, primarily due to nonrecurring collections on tenant reserves at Ward Village in the prior year. Excluding this impact in 2024, our NOI would have seen a modest increase year-over-year.

在我們的零售投資組合中，淨營業利潤為 1,300 萬美元，年減 7%，主要原因是前一年 Ward Village 租戶儲備金的非經常性收款。若不計入 2024 年的這項影響，我們的營業利潤將較去年同期略有成長。

In Downtown Summerlin, we continue to make progress on our tenant upgrades and recently signed new leases with Biore and Paris Baguette. At quarter end, we had only five retail spaces available, most of which are currently in negotiations, representing only 17,000 square feet.

在薩默林市中心，我們繼續在租戶升級方面取得進展，最近與 Biore 和 Paris Baguette 簽署了新的租約。截至本季末，我們僅有 5 個零售空間可用，其中大部分目前處於談判階段，面積僅 17,000 平方英尺。

Turning to our strategic development in the second quarter, condo presales were solid with 17 units contracted, representing incremental future revenue of approximately $35 million. Nearly all of these presales were at The Launiu, bringing this tower to 67% presold. We expect to break ground later this year with an anticipated delivery in 2028.

談到我們第二季的策略發展，公寓預售情況穩健，已簽約 17 套，代表未來增量收入約 3,500 萬美元。幾乎所有預售都發生在 The Launiu，使得該塔的預售率達到 67%。我們預計將於今年稍後破土動工，預計於 2028 年交付。

Presales at our condo projects under construction, which are 96% presold on average, were largely unchanged in the second quarter, and we remain on track to deliver Ulana, a workforce housing development that's 100% sold in the fourth quarter of this year.

我們正在建造的公寓專案的預售率平均為 96%，第二季基本保持不變，我們仍有望交付勞動力住房開發專案 Ulana，該專案已於今年第四季 100% 售出。

At the end of June, we launched presales for Melia and 'Ilima, Ward Village's 12th and 13th condo developments. We've seen exceptional demand for these towers in a very short period of time, and we look forward to discussing these results as soon as the launch is completed and the presold units are beyond the recision period.

6 月底，我們啟動了 Ward Village 第 12 和第 13 個公寓開發項目 Melia 和 'Ilima 的預售。我們在很短的時間內就看到了對這些塔樓的異常需求，我們期待在推出完成後、預售單位超過回收期後立即討論這些結果。

With that, I'll turn the call over to Carlos to discuss our updated full year guidance and our balance sheet.

說完這些，我將把電話轉給卡洛斯，討論我們更新的全年指引和資產負債表。

Thank you, David. And good morning, everyone. Today, we are increasing our adjusted operating cash flow guidance, driven by current and expected continued strength in our MPC and operating assets segments as well as reiterating our condo sales and G&A guidance for the year.

謝謝你，大衛。大家早安。今天，我們提高了調整後的營運現金流指引，這得益於我們 MPC 和經營資產部門當前和預期的持續強勁表現，同時重申了我們今年的公寓銷售和 G&A 指引。

As David mentioned earlier, this was an excellent quarter, led by the outperformance of our MPC and operating asset segments, and we now project our adjusted operating cash flow will range between $385 million and $435 million in 2025 with a midpoint of approximately $410 million or approximately $7.32 per share. This represents an increase of $60 million at the midpoint compared to the original guidance with a corresponding increase of $0.30 per share despite a higher share count resulting from the Version Square transaction.

正如 David 之前提到的，這是一個出色的季度，這得益於我們的 MPC 和營運資產部門的出色表現，我們現在預計，到 2025 年，調整後的營運現金流將在 3.85 億美元至 4.35 億美元之間，中點約為 4.1 億美元或每股約 7.32 美元。儘管 Version Square 交易導致股份數量增加，但與最初的指導相比，中點數仍增加了 6000 萬美元，每股相應增加了 0.30 美元。

In our MPC segment, led by robust demand from homebuilders and continued low inventory of vacant developed lots, we now expect full year MPC EBT to be approximately $430 million at the midpoint reflecting an increase of $55 million compared to our prior guidance, driven by strong anticipated super pad sales in Summerlin and improved residential lot deliveries in Bridgeland in the second half of the year.

在我們的 MPC 部門，受住宅建築商強勁需求和空置開發地塊庫存持續低迷的推動，我們現在預計全年 MPC EBT 中位數約為 4.3 億美元，比我們之前的預期高出 5500 萬美元，這得益於下半年 Summerlin 超級住宅區銷售強勁以及 Bridgeland 住宅地塊交付量增加。

In operating assets, we are increasing full year guidance from our previous $262 million midpoint to $267 million, led by the strong leasing activity of our office and multifamily portfolios. This guidance would represent a new full year record.

在營運資產方面，我們將全年預期從先前 2.62 億美元的中點上調至 2.67 億美元，這主要得益於我們辦公室和多戶型投資組合的強勁租賃活動。這項預期將創下新的全年紀錄。

We are reiterating both our cash G&A and condo sales guidance for the year. Cash G&A is expected to be in the range of $76 million to $86 million with a midpoint of $81 million. As always, our guidance excludes noncash stock compensation and onetime items, representing approximately $15 million and $10 million current expenses, respectively.

我們重申今年的現金一般及行政開支和公寓銷售指引。現金一般及行政開支預計在 7,600 萬美元至 8,600 萬美元之間，中間值為 8,100 萬美元。像往常一樣，我們的指導不包括非現金股票補償和一次性項目，分別代表約 1500 萬美元和 1000 萬美元的當前支出。

Our guidance also excludes the (inaudible) Square variable advisory fee, however, it does include $10 million for (inaudible) Square based advisory fee, which we have substantially offset by future savings resulting from a reduction in our workforce and other cost reduction initiatives we have recently implemented.

我們的指導還不包括（聽不清楚）Square 可變諮詢費，但是，它確實包括 1000 萬美元的（聽不清楚）基於 Square 的諮詢費，我們已通過減少員工和我們最近實施的其他成本削減舉措所帶來的未來節省大幅抵消了這筆費用。

Condo revenues remain projected at approximately $375 million for 2025, reflecting the scheduled closing (inaudible) in the fourth quarter, with no gross profit expected from this workforce housing tower.

預計 2025 年公寓收入仍約為 3.75 億美元，反映出第四季度預定的成交量（聽不清楚），預計這座勞動力住房大樓不會產生毛利。

Turning to our balance sheet. We had $1.4 billion of cash and $515 million of undrawn lines of credit. Combined, we had approximately $2 billion of available liquidity. Together with our strong guidance expectations for the full year, we are well positioned to further strengthen our balance sheet and deploy capital appropriately. At the end of June, the remaining equity contribution needed to fund our current projects, which will not all be spent in 2025, was approximately $239 million.

轉向我們的資產負債表。我們擁有 14 億美元現金和 5.15 億美元未動用信用額度。總計起來，我們擁有大約 20 億美元的可用流動資金。加上我們對全年的強勁指導預期，我們完全有能力進一步加強資產負債表並適當配置資本。截至 6 月底，我們目前專案所需的剩餘股權出資（不會在 2025 年全部用完）約為 2.39 億美元。

From a debt perspective, we had $5.2 billion outstanding at quarter end, of which 92% was fixed or hedged at an average rate of 5.1%. During the quarter, we made meaningful headway on reducing our near-term maturities, successfully completing two major financing to lower our '25 maturities to $282 million. Notably, we extended the construction loan on our Marlow multifamily properties to April 2027, and secured a new $75 million five-year fixed rate mortgage for $1,700 per million, replacing a construction loan previously scheduled to mature later this year. With these extension completed, our remaining maturities for this year primarily consists of Mary Weather Row, 6100 Merriweather and (inaudible). We expect all of this will be successfully refinanced during this year with advanced discussions already underway.

從債務角度來看，截至本季末，我們有 52 億美元未償還債務，其中 92% 是固定的或對沖的，平均利率為 5.1%。本季度，我們在減少短期債務方面取得了重大進展，成功完成兩筆重大融資，將 25 年期債務降低至 2.82 億美元。值得注意的是，我們將馬洛多戶型物業的建設貸款延長至 2027 年 4 月，並以每百萬美元 1,700 美元的利率獲得了一筆新的 7500 萬美元五年期固定利率抵押貸款，以取代原定於今年晚些時候到期的建設貸款。隨著這些延期的完成，我們今年剩餘的到期債券主要包括 Mary Weather Row、6100 Merriweather 和（聽不清楚）。我們預計所有這些都將在今年內成功完成再融資，目前已開始進行深入討論。

And finally, we closed on the sale of (inaudible) receivables during the quarter, generating cash proceeds of $180 million. This fund were used to pay down the Bridgeland notes, reducing their balance to $85 million at quarter end, and leaving $515 million available for drawing the facility.

最後，我們在本季完成了（聽不清楚）應收帳款的出售，產生了 1.8 億美元的現金收益。該基金用於償還 Bridgeland 債券，導致季度末其餘額減少至 8,500 萬美元，剩下 5.15 億美元可用於提取該貸款。

With that, I will now turn the call over to our Executive Chairman, Bill Ackman, to provide an update on Howard Hughes holding strategy.

現在，我將把電話轉給我們的執行主席比爾·阿克曼 (Bill Ackman)，以提供有關霍華·休斯控股策略的最新資訊。

Thank you, Carlos. I'm here with Ryan Israel, who is our -- as you know, our CIO. We wanted to give kind of a report on what we've been up to for the last couple of -- last few months since the transaction closed. Our principal focus has been identifying and doing due diligence on a potential insurance company acquisition.

謝謝你，卡洛斯。我和 Ryan Israel 一起在場，正如你們所知，他是我們的首席資訊長。我們想就交易結束以來的幾個月來我們所做的工作提供一份報告。我們的主要重點是確定潛在的保險公司收購併進行盡職調查。

Just to give you sort of context, if you look at Berkshire Hathaway sort of, if you will, the model here, a major part of the success of Berkshire has come from the acquisition beginning in the 1960s of an insurance operation and the growth of that business over the ensuing 60 years. And what's interesting about insurance, it's a cash-generative business. Generally, you write premium you receive cash upfront that you can invest. And if you run a profitable insurance operation and you invest the capital well, you can earn very attractive returns on equity.

為了給你一些背景信息，如果你看一下伯克希爾哈撒韋公司的模型，你會發現伯克希爾的成功很大一部分來自於 20 世紀 60 年代初對保險業務的收購，以及該業務在隨後 60 年裡的增長。保險有趣的地方在於，它是一種能產生現金的業務。一般來說，您簽訂保費後會預先收到可以投資的現金。如果您經營一家獲利的保險公司，並且您投資資本良好，您就可以獲得非常可觀的股本回報。

We want Howard Hughes to grow its intrinsic value per share at a high rate over a long period of time. The beauty of a successful insurance operation is it's a business where we can grow at a very nice rate over time without having to issue or raise equity capital in order to grow our business model. So that's been a very high priority for us.

我們希望霍華休斯的每股內在價值能夠在很長一段時間內保持較高的成長速度。成功的保險業務的魅力在於，我們可以隨著時間的推移以非常好的速度成長，而無需發行或籌集股本來發展我們的業務模式。所以這對我們來說是一個非常重要的事項。

If you were to examine Berkshire over the last sort of 60 years, what's interesting is Buffett took a very different approach to the way he managed his insurance operation. A typical insurance company writes about as much premium as equity capital every year and then invests the float in fixed income investments principally, but uses a fair amount of leverage to get an attractive return. So about 3 times the assets relative to equity is a typical balance sheet structure for insurance operation with those assets invested principally in low-risk fixed income securities.

如果你回顧波克夏過去 60 年的情況，你會發現有趣的是，巴菲特在管理保險業務方面採取了非常不同的方法。典型的保險公司每年簽發的保費與股本差不多，然後主要將浮動資金投資於固定收益投資，但使用相當大的槓桿來獲得可觀的回報。因此，資產與股權之比約為 3 倍是保險業務的典型資產負債表結構，這些資產主要投資於低風險固定收益證券。

What Buffett did is he ran a very low leverage insurance company. Instead of writing premiums equal to equity every year, he wrote -- he has written premiums equal to about one-third or anywhere between 20% and 40% of equity in any one year. So very, very under-levered in terms of the risks assumed in the insurance operation. He took 100% of that float from writing premium and invested in very short-term US treasuries, basically taking no risk on the insurance company float.

巴菲特所做的就是經營一家槓桿率很低的保險公司。他寫道，他每年簽訂的保費並非等於股權金額，而是每年簽訂的保費大約相當於股權金額的三分之一或 20% 至 40% 之間。因此，就保險業務承擔的風險而言，槓桿率非常非常低。他從保費收入中拿出 100% 的浮動資金，投資短期美國國債，基本上不承擔保險公司浮動資金的任何風險。

But then he invested about 100% of the equity of the insurance operation in common stocks. And Buffett's been a good stock picker. And the result has been an insurance company that's earned well into a 20% return on equity over a very long period of time, and the power of compounding is built really led to the success of Berkshire Hathaway. It's really been driven off of the insurance operations and the investment operations associated with that business.

但隨後他將保險業務約100%的股權投資於普通股。巴菲特是一位出色的選股者。結果是，保險公司在很長一段時間內獲得了高達 20% 的股本回報率，而複利的力量真正促成了波克夏海瑟威的成功。它實際上已經脫離了保險業務和與該業務相關的投資業務。

We've taken a page from Berkshire. We are looking to acquire a diversified insurance operation, and we intend to run it in a similar fashion, low leverage in terms of the premiums written relative to equity, low leverage in terms of the amount of assets relative to equity, call it, 1.5 times versus 3 times for a typical insurer, investing 100% of the float in short-term US treasuries and taking no risk on kind of float balances and then invest in common stocks and very high-quality durable growth companies. of the kind that Pershing Square has identified and invested in over time.

我們借鏡了波克夏的經驗。我們正在尋求收購一家多元化保險業務公司，並打算以類似的方式運營它，即保費與股權的低槓桿率，資產與股權的低槓桿率，例如，一家典型的保險公司是 1.5 倍，而另一家是 3 倍，將 100% 的浮動資金投資於短期國債，並且不承擔浮動資金 (Pershing)長期以來所識別和投資的那種。

One sort of interesting question would be why don't more insurance companies operate this way? And the answer is what was unique to Buffett is he brought investment skills that really are generally absent certainly on the common stock side of an insurance operation. Insurance companies today really focus on maximizing the profitability their ensure. And I would say the asset side of the balance sheet is a bit of an afterthought. And part of that is insurance companies have difficulty recruiting kind of best-in-class talent to run a successful investment operation, particularly when that invests in equities.

一個有趣的問題是，為什麼沒有更多的保險公司以這種方式運作？答案是，巴菲特的獨特之處在於他擁有保險公司普通股業務通常所不具備的投資技巧。如今，保險公司真正注重的是最大化其承保的獲利能力。我想說資產負債表的資產方有點事後才被考慮。其中一部分原因是保險公司難以招募一流的人才來進行成功的投資業務，尤其是投資股票時。

One of the things that we bring to this transaction with Howard Hughes is an investment operation. And that investment operation comes for free, if you will, to the insurance subsidiary. So the plan would be we acquire insurer, we run it as a low leverage insurer. We're conservative, extremely conservative in the way we invest the insurance company float. And then (inaudible) Square, (inaudible) Square team invest the assets of that in the assets equal to about the equity of the insurer in a common stock portfolio that we manage for the company for free.

我們與霍華德·休斯在此次交易中帶來的一項就是投資營運。如果你願意的話，這項投資業務對於保險子公司來說是免費的。因此，我們的計劃是收購保險公司，然後將其作為低槓桿保險公司來運作。我們在投資保險公司浮動資金的方式上是保守的，極度保守的。然後（聽不清楚）Square，（聽不清楚）Square 團隊將其資產投資於相當於保險公司股權的資產，這些資產是我們免費為公司管理的普通股投資組合。

We are looking at a number of potential transactions. We hope to be in a position if we find the right company at the right price to have a transaction we can announce we would hope by the full and, at which point, obviously, we'll be able to share sort of more information. We have -- our annual meeting will be on September 30. We're hosting it this year in New York City. It will be at the (inaudible) Square Signature Center on 42nd Street. It's a theater complex for Signature Theater, will be in the morning. And we really encourage you to attend. We're going to give a very detailed presentation on our plans for the insurance operation. We're going to talk more about the overall strategy of the company. David O'Reilly is going to update shareholders who are kind of less familiar with the real estate story of Howard Hughes.

我們正在考慮一些潛在的交易。我們希望，如果我們以合適的價格找到合適的公司，我們就可以宣布交易，我們希望在交易全面完成之前，顯然，我們將能夠分享更多資訊。我們的年會將於 9 月 30 日舉行。我們今年將在紐約市舉辦這項活動。它將在第 42 街的（聽不清楚）Square Signature Center 舉行。這是 Signature Theater 的劇院綜合體，將在早上開放。我們非常鼓勵您參加。我們將對我們的保險業務計劃進行非常詳細的介紹。我們將進一步討論公司的整體策略。大衛·奧萊利 (David O'Reilly) 將向那些不太熟悉霍華德·休斯 (Howard Hughes) 房地產故事的股東通報最新情況。

We've had some -- as we spend more time thinking about the business, we think we will be able to kind of present some metrics that people should be focusing on as we kind of build this company over time to kind of measure our progress and measure our success over time.

我們已經有一些——隨著我們花更多的時間思考業務，我們認為我們將能夠提出一些人們應該關注的指標，隨著我們隨著時間的推移建立這家公司，以衡量我們的進展並衡量我們的成功。

So really encourage you to come to that meeting. We're also going to have an open Q&A session where Ryan, myself, David will be available to answer really any questions you have. And I think it will be really a fun interesting session. So we really think it would be a great way for you to learn more about our plans going forward.

所以真心鼓勵你來參加這次會議。我們還將舉行一個開放的問答環節，Ryan、我本人和 David 將隨時解答大家的任何問題。我認為這將會是一次非常有趣的會議。因此，我們確實認為這將是您了解我們未來計劃的絕佳方式。

One last comment with respect to what I sort of failed to mention, as I described, our plans for the insurance going to be one of the other benefits that this insurance operation Berkshire had it was part of a diversified holding company. And the result of that is that incremental credit support that came from the holding company gave the insurance operation more flexibility in terms of its ability to invest its assets.

最後要說的是，正如我所描述的，我似乎沒有提到，我們的保險計劃將成為伯克希爾保險業務的另一項優勢，它是多元化控股公司的一部分。結果是，來自控股公司的增量信貸支持使保險公司在投資資產方面擁有更大的靈活性。

We believe we offer something quite similar here in the sense that, one, we have Howard Hughes Holdings as the owner of this insurance subsidiary and a completely unrelated business that will start to spin off substantial amounts of cash over time, really unrelated to the insurance operation. And then Howard Hughes itself is owned 47% by the (inaudible) Square Funds, namely (inaudible) Square Holdings, which is an A- rated company with about $15 billion of equity and the (inaudible) Square Management Company, which is a basically unlevered business, very profitable unlevered business that is not currently rated that we do intend to rate the business, but was valued in a transaction last year at about $10.5 billion.

我們相信，我們在這裡提供的服務非常類似，首先，我們擁有霍華休斯控股公司作為該保險子公司的所有者，以及一個完全不相關的業務，該業務將隨著時間的推移開始剝離大量現金，實際上與保險業務無關。然後，霍華德休斯本身 47% 的股份由（聽不清楚）Square Funds 持有，即（聽不清楚）Square Holdings，這是一家 A 級公司，擁有約 150 億美元的股權，以及（聽不清）Square Management Company，這基本上是一個無槓桿企業，利潤豐厚的無槓桿企業，目前尚未估值，我們確實打算對該企業進行 10 億美元，但在去年的估值。

You have about $25 billion of equity in terms of the 47% owner of Howard Hughes, very high creditworthy enterprise and unrelated business to insurance, and then Howard Hughes itself owning, hopefully, insurance operation and relative short-term that we will run in a similar fashion -- some approach that Berkshire has taken over time in terms of low leverage on both the asset and liability side of the balance sheet and a higher return strategy with respect to the assets of the company.

就霍華休斯 47% 的所有者而言，您擁有約 250 億美元的股權，這是一家信譽極高的企業，業務與保險無關，然後霍華德休斯本身也擁有保險業務，我們將以類似的方式運營相對短期的業務——伯克希爾長期以來採取的方法是降低資產負債表資產和負債方的槓桿率，並對相對短期的業務——伯克希爾長期以來採取的方法是降低資產負債表資產和負債方的槓桿率，並對相對短期的業務採取更高的回報策略。

With that, we would be happy to open it up for questions. And if operator, you could take the questions, please.

有了這些，我們很樂意回答大家的問題。如果是接線員，請回答問題。

(Operator Instructions) Alexander Goldfarb, Piper Sandler.

（操作員指示）亞歷山大·戈德法布、派珀·桑德勒。

Two questions. The first one is going to be on the MPC business, and then I'll get to the bigger picture. David, your land sales, the volumes have increased, that's despite what we're all reading about challenges in the single-family market. Obviously, you have the premium product that you guys sell, but there's also a wider array.

兩個問題。第一個主題是 MPC 業務，然後我會講到更大的圖像。大衛，儘管我們都讀到有關獨戶住宅市場面臨挑戰的消息，但您的土地銷售量還是增加了。顯然，你們銷售的是優質產品，但也有更廣泛的產品系列。

So can you just give some more granularity on it's impressive what you guys deliver but still against the higher interest rates, housing affordability, et cetera, what -- how do we think about your properties, the price points, the diversity of buyers versus what's going on in the broader market, and your confidence that this can endure -- can continue to endure even in the face of elevated interest rates and sort of all the macro concerns?

那麼，您能否更詳細地說明一下，你們的成果令人印象深刻，但在利率上升、住房負擔能力等因素的影響下，我們如何看待你們的房產、價格點、買家多樣性以及更廣泛的市場情況，以及您對這種狀況能夠持續下去的信心——即使在利率上升和所有宏觀擔憂的情況下，這種狀況也能繼續持續下去嗎？

Alex, it is a question -- it's a great question and one that we've spent a lot of time discussing. We go through an excruciating detail our communities with the teams and track, as you know, home sales within our communities maniacally. And we see those home sales as a leading indicator for what the homebuilders will need in land purchases on a go-forward basis. To date, our home sales have been incredibly resilient. And I think that is due to the quality of assets that we have. Our MPCs have the best schools, amenity, quality of life. They're attractive for residents and homebuilders.

亞歷克斯，這是一個好問題，我們花了很多時間討論這個問題。我們與團隊一起仔細檢查我們社區的細節，並瘋狂地追蹤我們社區內的房屋銷售情況。我們認為這些房屋銷售是未來房屋建築商購買土地需求的領先指標。到目前為止，我們的房屋銷售表現非常強勁。我認為這歸功於我們擁有的資產品質。我們的 MPC 擁有最好的學校、便利設施和生活品質。它們對於居民和房屋建築商來說很有吸引力。

The homebuilders are building homes and they sell at a premium relative to those areas around them. And as a result, our land remains incredibly attractive. And our communities, I've been saying for years, we're not immune, but we're insulated. And there's always a flight to quality in markets when there is perhaps a little bit of a reduction in price in homes and now it's my chance to get into Bridgeland. Now, it's my chance to get into Summerlin, and we see residents continue to come in and buy homes.

房屋建築商正在建造房屋，並且相對於週邊地區而言，它們的售價較高。因此，我們的土地仍然極具吸引力。多年來我一直在說，我們的社區並非免疫，但我們受到了保護。當房價稍微下降時，市場總是會湧現出對優質房產的需求，現在我有機會進入布里奇蘭了。現在，我有機會進入薩默林，我們看到居民們不斷進來購買房屋。

The home prices that we're seeing the transactions at vary across the spectrum. In Bridgeland, there homes are in the 300 to the 500s. In Summerlin, there in the $400,000 to the $10 million range. So we're seeing it with your first-time homebuyer, your move-up home buyer and your luxury buyer. It has been pretty consistent across the board. It has been even somewhat surprising to those of us in the room given the national headlines. I wake up, I read the headlines. I think, my God, days today, the music stops. And gosh darn it, if the report doesn't come in on Monday morning that says we sold another 20 homes in each of our communities, which is an incredible pace.

我們看到的房屋交易價格各不相同。在布里奇蘭，那裡的房屋數量在 300 到 500 之間。在薩默林，價格在 40 萬美元到 1000 萬美元之間。因此，我們在首次購屋者、升級購屋者和豪宅買家身上都看到了這一點。總體而言，情況相當一致。考慮到全國的頭條新聞，這甚至讓我們在場的人有點驚訝。我醒來後讀了頭條新聞。我想，天哪，今天音樂就停止了。天哪，如果週一早上沒有收到報告說我們在每個社區又賣出了 20 套房屋，這是一個令人難以置信的速度。

So we're thrilled with the results. We see continued strength for the balance of the year. The record price per acre, I think, speaks to the quality of our communities, the desirability of our land. And at the end of the day, that land we have is the precious raw material that the homebuilders need to sustaining business and remain profitable.

所以我們對結果感到非常興奮。我們預計今年餘下時間裡該行業將繼續保持強勁勢頭。我認為，每英畝創紀錄的價格體現了我們社區的品質和土地的吸引力。歸根結底，我們擁有的土地是房屋建築商維持業務和保持盈利所需的寶貴原材料。

And if you have the opportunity to buy land as a homebuilder in a cuspy market where you do not sure if you can generate a great margin or buy land in Summerlin that for 25 years, has demonstrated success in our performance, I still believe that those homebuilders will buy land in our communities.

如果你有機會作為房屋建築商在一個動蕩的市場中購買土地，而你不確定是否可以獲得巨大的利潤，或者在薩默林購買土地，25 年來，我們的業績一直很成功，我仍然相信那些房屋建築商會在我們的社區購買土地。

Okay. And then the second question is for Bill. Bill, when we met with you a few months ago, you spoke about the potential for creating your own insurance entity, hiring an individual and creating homegrown. It sounds like now you're thinking more on acquiring an outside entity. So one is, your thoughts on homegrown versus acquiring.

好的。第二個問題是問比爾的。比爾，幾個月前我們與您會面時，您談到了創建自己的保險實體、僱用個人並創建本土保險實體的可能性。聽起來您現在正在更多地考慮收購外部實體。所以，首先，你對自主研發和收購的看法是怎麼樣的。

And then two, as you ramp up the Howard Hughes and that investment, cash flows, it almost sounds like from the outside, like we should think about this to be two to three years before those cash flows really start to ferment. But just curious if we should be thinking longer or you think that the accretion could be sooner?

其次，隨著霍華休斯和投資現金流的增加，從外部來看，我們應該考慮需要兩到三年的時間，這些現金流才會真正開始發酵。但我只是好奇我們是否應該考慮更長時間，或者您認為增長可能會更快？

Sure. So our thinking on building versus buying is if we can find the right asset and we're, I would say, increasingly confident we can, there are a number of potential transactions of a size and a, I think, quality that would be a great start for us. And again, it's going to come down to terms and price and work, but I think we've got a number of potential things that we're looking at. So that gives us some confidence there's a deal to be done. And there's a big advantage to -- starting from truly scratch the issues in terms of licensing, building an organization, technology, it's not -- let's put it this way, it's not a running start, whereas we actually buy an existing well-run insurance operation, then you're off the ground and running sort of immediately.

當然。因此，我們對自建還是購買的想法是，如果我們能夠找到合適的資產，而且我想說，我們越來越有信心，有很多潛在的交易，其規模和質量，我認為，這對我們來說是一個很好的開始。再次，這將歸結為條款、價格和工作，但我認為我們正在考慮許多潛在的事情。這讓我們有信心能夠達成協議。而且這樣做有一個很大的優勢——從零開始解決許可、建立組織、技術等方面的問題，這並不是——讓我們這樣說吧，這不是一個良好的開端，而我們實際上購買了一個現有的運作良好的保險公司，然後你就可以立即開始運營。

Our expectation, based on the things that we're looking at, is this would be a material transaction to Howard Hughes, assuming we do one of the transactions we're looking at, meaning it would very quickly represent an important part of the business and has successfully run insurance operation the way that we've identified is a business that can consistently over time, earn, I would say, returns on equity that are meaningfully higher than even the best run as kind of real estate operations.

根據我們正在考慮的事情，我們的預期是，這對霍華休斯來說將是一筆重大交易，假設我們進行我們正在考慮的其中一項交易，這意味著它將很快成為業務的重要組成部分，並成功地以我們所確定的方式運營保險業務，這是一種可以持續賺取的業務，我想說，股本回報率甚至比最好的房地產業務回報率要高得多。

So we do expect insurance in the relative intermediate term to become very material to the company to the point that people will probably stop thinking about Howard Hughes as a real estate company with a little insurance operation. I think they'll think of it in the way that we sort of our business plan as of perhaps an insurance holding company or a diversified holding company with a major insurance operation. But that's the business plan.

因此，我們確實預計，在相對中期內，保險對公司來說將變得非常重要，以至於人們可能不再認為霍華休斯是一家擁有少量保險業務的房地產公司。我認為他們會認為我們的商業計劃可能是一家保險控股公司或一家擁有主要保險業務的多元化控股公司。但這就是商業計劃。

But again, it's all subject to our ability to find the right company, the right price and that we won't know until we get a transaction done. But I would say we are cautiously optimistic that there are a number of potential candidates, and we're working hard to do a transaction.

但同樣，這一切都取決於我們找到合適的公司和合適的價格的能力，而且我們在完成交易之前不會知道。但我想說，我們謹慎樂觀地認為有很多潛在的候選人，我們正在努力交易。

Okay. And then if I could just add, when we think about the earnings potential, we should think about a significant part coming from the insurance business or that the stock portfolio is going to be more of the generation of the earnings contribution?

好的。然後我可以補充一下，當我們考慮盈利潛力時，我們應該考慮很大一部分來自保險業務，或者股票投資組合將更多地產生盈利貢獻？

Sure. So again, going out to the Berkshire model, I would say the investment part of the insurance operation has been more -- materially more important to the profitability of the insurer than the insurance company itself. And I think when you run a -- if you will, a pedal to the metal, if you will, in Berkshire's insurance operation comes from the fact that he's investing in assets that can earn equity type returns and the insurance company itself is a focus on profitability. The typical insurance operation is pretty aggressive in making as much money as possible from insurance and using leverage to get an adequate return on assets.

當然。因此，再次以波克夏模式為例，我想說，保險業務的投資部分對保險公司的獲利能力而言比保險公司本身更為重要。我認為，當你經營波克夏的保險業務時，如果你願意，可以全力以赴，因為他投資的是能夠賺取股權回報的資產，而保險公司本身則專注於獲利能力。典型的保險業務非常積極地從保險中賺取盡可能多的錢，並利用槓桿來獲得足夠的資產回報。

We think this approach is both lower risk and kind of higher returns. So I think the way you should look at the insurance operation over time is how are we going to -- if we had $1 billion of equity invested in insurance, let's say, and we can compound that equity at 20% or more over time, it will become very, very material to the overall intrinsic value of Howard Hughes.

我們認為這種方法風險較低且回報較高。因此，我認為您應該這樣看待保險業務的長期發展：如果我們在保險方面投資了 10 億美元的股權，並且隨著時間的推移，我們可以將該股權的複合增長率提高 20% 或更多，那麼它將對霍華德休斯的整體內在價值產生非常非常重要的影響。

I think that's the way to look at it as opposed to earnings. I think you're going to want to focus you on the growth in the equity value of this insurance company over time.

我認為這是看待這個問題的方式，而不是收益的方式。我認為你會希望關注這家保險公司的股權價值隨時間的成長。

And Howard Hughes has tried over time to come up with sort of a per share kind of cash flow or earnings metric to try to fit in with other conventional real estate companies that have an FFO or other metric, I think that's frankly a mistake. And I don't know that the market is actually really given us credit for that. So we're going to come back. We're working with the team on giving you some kind of KPIs that you can think about in looking at our business.

霍華休斯一直試圖提出一種每股現金流或收益指標，以適應其他擁有 FFO 或其他指標的傳統房地產公司，我認為這坦率地說是一個錯誤。我不知道市場是否真的認可我們的做法。所以我們會回來的。我們正在與團隊合作，為您提供一些 KPI，您可以在了解我們的業務時參考這些 KPI。

Like if you think about Howard Hughes today, right, you've got, obviously, the most straightforward part of the business is net operating income we generate from a portfolio of real estate assets. We have a condo business that you can think of in a fairly straightforward way, right?

就像如果你今天想想霍華休斯，對吧，你顯然會發現，業務中最直接的部分是我們從房地產資產組合中產生的淨營業收入。我們有公寓業務，您可以相當直接地想到這一點，對嗎？

We've got a certain amount of profits we're going to generate from each of these various towers kind of over time. And then we have land holdings, both commercial and residential. And what the intrinsic value of Howard Hughes depends on kind of growing the cash flows from the real estate operation. And they relate to what price we're monetizing land and what the value of our remaining holdings are? Those are kind of the key sort of metrics that we're going to look at.

隨著時間的推移，我們將從每座不同的塔中獲得一定數量的利潤。我們擁有商業和住宅用地。霍華休斯的內在價值取決於房地產營運的現金流的成長。它們與我們將土地貨幣化的價格以及我們剩餘持有的價值有關嗎？這些都是我們要研究的關鍵指標。

But we think people, over time, particularly as the insurance operation becomes a bigger part of the business, will be focused on kind of overall the growth of the intrinsic value of the company over years as opposed to a quarterly metric of cash that I think is very challenging to do for business, as you know, that has everything from land sales to development, stabilize assets.

但我們認為，隨著時間的推移，特別是當保險業務成為業務中更重要的一部分時，人們將關注公司多年來整體內在價值的增長，而不是季度現金指標，我認為這對企業來說非常具有挑戰性，因為你知道，企業涉及從土地銷售到開發、穩定資產等各個方面。

Ray Zong, JPMorgan.

摩根大通 (JPMorgan) 的 Ray Zong。

My first question is on the leverage side. Bill, as you look at the leverage as of today for Howard Hughes and the target that you're trying to go after, how should we think about a pro forma on leverage? And given that, what are the deal sizes that you think we should be expecting? Would it be 100% stake or something in something or a smaller stake but a larger company? How should we think about that?

我的第一個問題是關於槓桿方面的。比爾，當你看到霍華休斯今天的槓桿作用以及你想要追求的目標時，我們應該如何考慮槓桿作用的形式？有鑑於此，您認為我們應該預期多少規模的交易？這會是某家公司 100% 的股份，還是某家公司的部分股份，或是較大公司中較少的股份？我們該如何看待這個問題？

Sure. So we think that Howard Hughes' real estate operation is kind of appropriately financed and we don't intend to kind of lever it up in any kind of material way. We like the business the way it's being managed today. We have today excess cash of certainly the $900 million and maybe another $100 million or a couple of hundred million dollars of excess cash in the overall company, call it $1 billion. that's sort of in the realm of the amount of capital that we would intend to use if we were to invest in insurance operation.

當然。因此，我們認為霍華休斯的房地產業務得到了適當的融資，我們並不打算以任何物質方式加大融資力度。我們喜歡目前業務的管理方式。我們今天擁有的過剩現金肯定是 9 億美元，整個公司可能還有另外 1 億美元或幾億美元的過剩現金，就說 10 億美元吧。如果我們要投資保險業務，這差不多就是我們打算使用的資本金額。

If that business, the check size was larger, we would raise capital or partner with other Pershing Square affiliates in doing a transaction. But the goal would be for the company we acquired to be controlled by Howard Hughes, and yes, that's an important element. Ryan, I want to add something. Go ahead.

如果該業務的金額較大，我們將籌集資金或與其他 Pershing Square 附屬公司合作進行交易。但我們的目標是讓我們收購的公司由霍華休斯控制，是的，這是一個重要因素。瑞安，我想補充一點。前進。

And to clarify just to your question, we don't need to own 100%. As Bill mentioned, we would like to own more than 50% of it for control. But when we talk about raising capital, one of the values that we believe Pershing Square is providing the Howard to use in our arrangement is we have the ability and a demonstrated over time at Pershing Square to be able to raise capital externally.

為了澄清你的問題，我們不需要擁有 100%。正如比爾所提到的，我們希望擁有 50% 以上的控制權。但是，當我們談論籌集資金時，我們認為潘興廣場為霍華德提供的價值之一是，我們有能力並且經過一段時間的證明，潘興廣場有能力從外部籌集資金。

We have a large and deep network of partners who have partnered with us very successfully in the past. And so we bring we have the opportunity if we were to decide to do a larger transaction beyond the cash on the balance sheet, we could partner in a way that would be very accretive to our Howard Hughes' shareholders, while at the same time, still allowing us to be able to control the entity in terms of the daily operations.

我們擁有龐大而深入的合作夥伴網絡，他們過去與我們合作非常成功。因此，如果我們決定進行一項超出資產負債表現金的更大規模交易，我們就有機會，我們可以以一種對霍華德休斯股東非常有利的方式進行合作，同時仍然允許我們能夠在日常運營方面控制該實體。

Yes. Just to further -- to Ryan's point, if we were to buy a business, insurance operation for $1.5 billion, $1 billion check written by Howard Hughes and, let's say, $500 million by co-investment sort of vehicle, it's an attractive co-investment for someone where Howard Hughes is sort of the likely ultimate buyer when the company sort of gets to a scale where it can buy out sort of the minority partner.

是的。進一步說——就瑞安的觀點而言，如果我們要以 15 億美元收購一家企業、一家保險公司，其中 10 億美元由霍華德·休斯開出，5 億美元通過共同投資方式投資，那麼對於某些人來說，這是一項很有吸引力的共同投資，當公司發展到可以收購少數股東權益的規模時，霍華德·休斯很可能是最終買家。

So there's a interesting potential partnership opportunity. But we're not talking about buying a $5 billion asset and owning 20% of it. We're really focused on something order of magnitude in the billion, $2 billion-ish kind of -- whatever, it could be $1 billion to theoretically $3 billion, something along those lines, where Howard Hughes is sort of the control owner.

因此這是一個有趣的潛在合作機會。但我們並不是在談論購買價值 50 億美元的資產並擁有其中 20% 的股份。我們真正關注的是十億美元、二十億美元左右的數量級——無論如何，可能是 10 億美元到理論上 30 億美元，類似的金額，其中霍華德·休斯是控制所有者。

Got you. Understood. And the second question is on, as Bill and your team has gotten into day-to-day in the organization, what are the things that you guys have changed so far? Obviously, on the G&A side, we see that. Maybe just give us some thoughts on things that you have changed? And what else are you looking at to change at this point? Should we expect this is more like -- more or less the stable status?

明白了。明白了。第二個問題是，隨著比爾和您的團隊在組織中日漸成熟，到目前為止，你們做出了哪些改變？顯然，在 G&A 方面，我們看到了這一點。也許只是告訴我們一些關於您所改變的事情的想法？目前您還希望做出哪些改變？我們是否應該期待這更像是──或多或少穩定的狀態？

And also you mentioned the mix of it moving forward strategically. You want a bigger part of the business mix to be towards insurance. So does that change the remainder real estate portfolio? Do you look for changing the mix between operating assets, MPC and condo. Like how should we think about those as well looking out?

您還提到了其在戰略上向前發展的混合。您希望業務組合中更大的部分是保險。那麼這會改變剩餘的房地產投資組合嗎？您是否希望改變營運資產、MPC 和公寓之間的組合。例如，我們該如何看待這些事情？

Sure. So I would say we've changed nothing with respect to Howard Hughes' real estate operation. I do think it would be helpful at the G&A initiative was something that David had sort of underway in planning prior to our transaction. And there is a very thoughtful, I would say, strategic logic for the changes that were made organizationally.

當然。所以我想說，我們對霍華休斯的房地產業務沒有任何改變。我確實認為這會很有幫助，因為 G&A 計劃是 David 在我們交易之前就已經開始計劃的事情。我想說，組織上所做的改變有著非常深思熟慮的策略邏輯。

I think it would be useful for, David, maybe you described where those G&A savings came from, why we made those changes. We don't -- and then we don't have any plans to change the way Howard Hughes -- we really like -- obviously, we've been involved with this business for 14 years. We've had a Board presence. I was Chair, whatever, for 13 or those years. So we're very happy with where the real estate business is and the way it's currently being managed.

我認為這很有用，大衛，也許你描述了這些 G&A 節省的來源，以及我們為什麼做出這些改變。我們沒有——而且我們也沒有任何計劃改變霍華休斯的方式——我們真的很喜歡——顯然，我們已經參與這項業務 14 年了。我們已經有一個董事會了。我擔任主席已經 13 年了。因此，我們對房地產業務的現狀和目前的管理方式非常滿意。

I think the only difference today versus before would be maybe if some of the world's greatest MPC assets showed up across the street -- I mean, across the street, like, I don't know, some other market, like another Phoenix type transaction were to show up, I would say we're less likely to do that today. We feel like we have enough exposure to sort of the MPC business, but there's a ton of work to do in the existing assets. And the idea is just to continue to develop the Howard Hughes communities in sort of small cities and make them the most desirable places to live in America.

我認為今天與以前的唯一區別可能是，如果世界上一些最偉大的 MPC 資產出現在街對面——我的意思是，街對面，比如，我不知道，其他一些市場，比如另一個鳳凰類型的交易出現，我想說我們今天不太可能這樣做。我們覺得我們已經對 MPC 業務有足夠的了解，但在現有資產方面還有大量工作要做。我們的想法就是繼續在小城市發展霍華休斯社區，使它們成為美國最理想的居住地。

And I think they're -- the fact that the home sales performance, lot sales performance kind of speaks in a more -- as maybe increasingly challenged residential market kind of speaks to the power of those communities. But no real change to that business and the team is doing a great job of running it. But David, maybe you should comment on some of the changes you've made organizationally, and why -- how they generated G&A benefits?

我認為，房屋銷售業績、地塊銷售業績在某種程度上說明了——也許日益嚴峻的住宅市場在某種程度上說明了這些社區的力量。但該業務並沒有發生真正的變化，而且團隊在營運方面做得很好。但大衛，也許你應該評論一下你在組織上所做的某些改變，以及為什麼——它們如何產生 G&A 效益？

Absolutely, Bill. It's a good question, Ray. I appreciate it. What we really did is we took a step back long before the Pershing Square announcement was made in terms of how we operate this business. And given the changing market environment where development returns are tighter, costs are up, rents have not kept up with it, we thought about rationalization of the overall organization and a focus of that development platform into more rifle shot opportunities where we can generate the highest and best risk-adjusted returns rather than taking a more scattered approach. As a result, we centralized a lot of our development expertise here in the corporate office, taking a lot of the developers out of the regions knowing that there would be fewer projects to do on a go-forward basis.

當然，比爾。這是個好問題，雷。我很感激。我們真正做的是，早在潘興廣場宣佈如何經營這項業務之前，我們就退後了一步。鑑於市場環境的變化，開發回報越來越少，成本越來越高，而租金卻沒有跟上，我們考慮對整個組織進行合理化，並將開發平台的重點放在更多的快速開發機會上，以便我們能夠獲得最高和最佳的風險調整回報，而不是採取更分散的方法。因此，我們將大量的開發專業知識集中在公司辦公室，將大量開發人員從各個地區調走，因為我們知道，從長遠來看，要做的專案會更少。

And at the end of the day, when you think about it this way, there was a point in time where we had multifamily developers, office developers, retail developers in multiple regions. And it became largely redundant because the velocity of development, as you noted in our results, has slowed. So we've been able to centralize and bring that talent into one place where we can use that talent across regions, partner with our regional presidents to execute, and I think operate in a much more efficient way, delivering greater free cash flow to the bottom line.

最後，當你這樣想的時候，你會發現曾經有一段時間我們在多個地區擁有多戶住宅開發商、辦公大樓開發商和零售開發商。而且它在很大程度上變得多餘，因為正如您在我們的結果中所注意到的，開發速度已經減慢。因此，我們能夠將這些人才集中到一個地方，以便我們可以跨地區使用這些人才，與我們的地區總裁合作執行，我認為我們可以以更有效的方式運營，為最終客戶帶來更大的自由現金流。

I don't want it to be lost on our investors and our analysts that in Carlos' prepared remarks, we left our G&A guidance unchanged despite the transaction with Pershing and the inclusion of their fixed fee in that G&A guidance. I think our ability to do that and maintain G&A neutrality and get the ability to leverage the incredible amount of expertise that's at Pershing Square, it shouldn't be lost on our investors. I think it's an incredible benefit.

我不想讓我們的投資者和分析師忽視這一點，在卡洛斯準備好的發言中，儘管與潘興進行了交易，並在 G&A 指南中包含了他們的固定費用，但我們仍保持 G&A 指南不變。我認為，我們有能力做到這一點，保持一般及行政費用中立，並有能力利用潘興廣場豐富的專業知識，我們的投資者不應該忽視這一點。我認為這是一個令人難以置信的好處。

Yes. The other thing I would say, investing real estate development and running a profitable insurance company have sort of the same thing in common. You want to do business when the returns are attractive, and you want to step away when they're not. And the problem of having kind of soup-to-nut development teams at each of these various locations is if you're a developer, you just want to do stuff. And that's when people get into trouble and kind of real estate development. And it's also not great to have headquarters always turning down transactions you propose because they don't offer attractive enough returns. And so you can actually have an absolutely best-in-class team.

是的。我想說的另一件事是，投資房地產開發和經營一家盈利的保險公司有某種共同點。當回報誘人時，你想做生意，當回報不誘人時，你想放棄。而在每個不同地點都擁有從頭到尾的開發團隊的問題是，如果你是一名開發人員，你只想做些事情。這時人們就會陷入困境並進行房地產開發。而且總部總是拒絕你提出的交易，因為它們沒有提供足夠有吸引力的回報，這也不太好。這樣你實際上就可以擁有一支絕對一流的團隊。

You can take the best and brightest of all the various regions and centralize them in one location. You can take the skills like we have an incredible team, marketing team that has run the condo program, for example, in Hawaii, led by Bonnie. And when Howard Hughes decided to build a condo in the Woodlands, we had all of that expertise and development expertise that we could apply to what is going to be an enormously successful -- what is already enormously successful development in the Woodlands.

您可以將各個區域中最優秀、最出色的人才集中到一個位置。您可以利用這些技能，例如我們擁有一支出色的團隊，行銷團隊負責運行公寓計劃，例如在夏威夷，由 Bonnie 領導。當霍華休斯決定在伍德蘭茲建造公寓時，我們擁有所有的專業知識和開發經驗，可以將其應用於即將取得巨大成功的伍德蘭茲開發案——該計畫已經取得了巨大的成功。

So there's G&A savings, and it actually -- it makes it -- it's a much more attractive place to work in the sense that in our various developments, there's probably always going to be something interesting to do in a certain property type. So we got a G&A savings. We've got a best-in-class team. We leverage all the learnings from the various communities and there's less pressure to do business.

因此，可以節省一般及行政費用，而且實際上，這使得它成為一個更具吸引力的工作場所，因為在我們的各種開發項目中，在某種類型的房產中可能總會有一些有趣的事情可做。因此我們節省了一般及行政費用。我們擁有一流的團隊。我們利用來自各個社區的所有經驗，從而減輕經營壓力。

Ryan, do you want to add something?

瑞安，你想補充一點嗎？

Yes. And I would just add, I think one of the most important things that we're focused on now and where you will ultimately see over time, the value creation from the addition the Pershing Square team to Howard Hughes is in capital allocation broadly. And as both David mentioned in his comments on real estate and taking a rifle approach to get to the highest return projects, and as Bill mentioned, we are opening the aperture in the ways in which we can deploy capital. So we've put a lot of capital on the balance sheet three months ago that can be deployed.

是的。我想補充一點，我認為我們現在關注的最重要的事情之一，也是你最終會隨著時間的推移看到的，潘興廣場團隊加入霍華德休斯所帶來的價值創造，在於廣泛的資本配置。正如大衛在關於房地產的評論中提到的那樣，他採取了全力以赴的方式來獲得最高回報的項目，正如比爾提到的那樣，我們正在開闢部署資本的方式。因此，我們三個月前就在資產負債表上投入了大量可供部署的資本。

And if you think about it now, going forward, we have an opportunity to take the highest return real estate projects and be able to focus on those, take the excess cash that may have otherwise been deployed towards somewhat attractive, but still lower returning real estate projects and put those towards other things.

如果你現在想想，展望未來，我們有機會選擇回報率最高的房地產項目，並能夠專注於這些項目，將原本可能部署到有吸引力但回報率較低的房地產項目的多餘現金用於其他事情。

Every time you write an insurance policy, that is a capital allocation decision. The way you invest the cash from the float, that's a capital allocation decision. We have historically had, in our Pershing Square investment strategy, arguably among the highest returns that you could find amongst most capital allocation strategies and insurance gives us a pathway to continue that.

每次您簽訂保險單時，這都是資本配置決策。您投資浮動資金的方式是一種資本配置決策。從歷史上看，我們的潘興廣場投資策略可以說是大多數資本配置策略中回報率最高的，而保險為我們提供了繼續保持這種回報率的途徑。

In addition, though, we have the ability to ultimately over time, look to acquire other businesses, which will both provide a diversification of the cash flows beyond insurance and real estate, but at the same time, give us another arrow in our quiver to be able to take advantage of high-return opportunities.

此外，隨著時間的推移，我們最終有能力尋求收購其他企業，這不僅能讓我們的現金流多樣化，超越保險和房地產，同時也能為我們提供另一支箭，讓我們能夠利用高回報機會。

And if you look at -- as Bill had mentioned, Berkshire as an example, we think one of the reasons why Berkshire has been so attractive is that there were a number of ways in which they can deploy a lot of capital into the highest return opportunity at that moment. And that's really the value that we're trying to add to Howard Hughes as we transition it to a diversified holding company.

如果你看一下——正如比爾所提到的，以伯克希爾為例，我們認為伯克希爾如此有吸引力的原因之一是，他們可以透過多種方式將大量資本投入到當時回報最高的機會中。這正是我們在將霍華休斯轉型為多元化控股公司時試圖為其增加的價值。

Yes. When we're sort of -- the other benefit we have is we own 47% of the company. We are under no pressure to deliver an outcome next quarter this year. And we can, as a result, be super thoughtful about how we think about deploying capital, and that carries over to the entire Howard Hughes sort of organization. If you -- as a pure-play real estate community developer, all the cash that we generated over time, we really had no place to put it other than in our various communities or in buying a new sort of NPC.

是的。當我們——我們擁有的另一個好處是我們擁有該公司 47% 的股份。我們並沒有面臨在今年下個季度交付成果的壓力。因此，我們可以非常認真地考慮如何部署資本，而這種思考方式可以延伸到整個霍華·休斯類型的組織。如果您——作為純粹的房地產社區開發商，我們隨著時間的推移所獲得的所有現金，除了投入到我們的各個社區或購買新型 NPC 之外，我們真的沒有其他地方可以投入。

Now, we have the whole world, if you will, is our oyster. The reason why we're focusing on insurance First is a well-run insurance operation is a great platform for a successful investment strategy. And our favorite version of Howard Hughes is we build this very, very valuable company and the shares outstanding don't change or if anything, they shrink over time. And the ability to do that is much greater in insurance than if we were running around doing acquisitions one deal at a time.

現在，如果你願意的話，整個世界都是我們的。我們之所以專注於保險，首先是因為運作良好的保險業務是成功投資策略的絕佳平台。我們最喜歡的霍華德休斯版本是，我們建立了一家非常非常有價值的公司，而流通股數不會改變，或者如果有的話，它們會隨著時間的推移而縮水。在保險領域，我們實現這一目標的能力比我們一次進行一項收購要強得多。

But over time, the goal is as the real estate operation generates more and more cash, we'll have more cash for investment. The holding company, the insurance operation itself, we expect to generate a lot of cash that will be reinvested in equities at least beyond the piece that we need to put aside for the insurance business, the claims -- potential claims in the future. And that's how we built a company that's very valuable on a per share basis.

但隨著時間的推移，我們的目標是隨著房地產業務產生越來越多的現金，我們將擁有更多的現金用於投資。我們預計控股公司、保險業務本身將產生大量現金，這些現金將至少超出我們需要為保險業務、索賠（未來的潛在索賠）留出的部分，用於再投資於股票。這就是我們如何打造一家每股價值極高的公司。

John Kim, BMO Capital Markets.

蒙特利爾銀行資本市場 (BMO Capital Markets) 的 John Kim。

Bill, in your commentary earlier, I think you mentioned that you were looking at a number of potential transactions. And I just wanted to clarify that ultimately, you'll just be acquiring one insurance company and not a series of acquisitions.

比爾，在你之前的評論中，我想你提到你正在考慮一些潛在的交易。我只是想澄清一下，最終你只會收購一家保險公司，而不是一系列收購。

And then secondly, for the companies that you're considering to acquire, do they already operate the way that you prefer in terms of being conservative and the levered? Or do you anticipate changing how they run? And if that's the case, how difficult is that to implement?

其次，對於您考慮收購的公司，它們是否已經按照您喜歡的保守和槓桿方式運作？或者您預計會改變它們的運作方式？如果確實如此，那麼實施起來有多困難？

Sure. So what we're focused on now is buying one business run by an excellent management team that's done a very good job in the writing business over time. All of the companies we're looking at are operated as conventional insurance companies, I would say, in terms of the amount of premium they write relative to capital and the way they invest their assets.

當然。因此，我們現在專注於收購一家由優秀管理團隊經營的企業，該團隊長期以來在寫作業務方面做得非常出色。我想說，就其相對於資本的保費金額以及其投資資產的方式而言，我們所關注的所有公司都是以傳統保險公司的方式運營的。

Our plan would be to change that over time. But the Berkshire is pretty much -- it's almost unique. There are a couple of other examples of insurers that have taken kind of a somewhat similar approach. I think it's the exemplar sort of example, but the -- it helps enormously. There are very few insurance companies that are part of the (inaudible) holding companies basically. And so that's why the targets we're looking at are operated conventionally, I would say.

我們的計劃是隨著時間的推移改變這種狀況。但伯克希爾幾乎是獨一無二的。還有一些保險公司也採取了類似的做法。我認為這是一個典型的例子，但它有很大幫助。基本上，很少有保險公司屬於（聽不清楚）控股公司的一部分。所以我想說，這就是為什麼我們所關注的目標都是以常規方式運作的。

Okay. That's helpful. Maybe turning to David. You talked about the record price per acre that you achieved this quarter. In page 23 of your supplement, you have an estimated price per acre, and that didn't change sequentially for Summerlin or Bridgeland. Is that policy not to change that figure since an estimate? Or do you anticipate that number going up?

好的。這很有幫助。也許轉向大衛。您談到了本季創下的每英畝價格紀錄。在您的補充資料第 23 頁中，您給出了每英畝的估價，而對於 Summerlin 或 Bridgeland 來說，該估價並沒有隨之變化。該政策是不是自估算以來就不改變該數字？或者您預計這個數字還會上升？

John, I think conservatism is always the best policy. And as incredible as our results have been this quarter and the past several quarters, for me to try to extrapolate that to the moon over the next 30 years, I think, would be a little bit cavalier. So we take a conservative approach. We don't use one quarter's results to impact the future per sale acres on a daily basis. We look on a trailing 12, trailing 24 months. And if we feel that it's appropriate to apply that price break across the remaining, we will.

約翰，我認為保守主義永遠是最好的政策。儘管本季和過去幾季我們的業績令人難以置信，但我認為，試圖以此推斷未來 30 年內我們的業績將達到巔峰，未免有些輕率。因此我們採取保守的方法。我們不會根據一個季度的結果來每天影響未來每英畝的銷售量。我們回顧過去 12 個月、過去 24 個月的情況。如果我們認為將這項價格優惠適用於剩餘產品是合適的，我們就會這麼做。

Okay. If I could just squeeze one more in on Ritz-Carlton. The condo sales have sort of stalled over the last couple of quarters?

好的。如果我可以在麗茲卡爾頓酒店再擠一次的話。過去幾季公寓銷售有些停滯？

Intentionally.

故意。

Actually, let me jump in there. So it's largely because of me. And the team sold out the first half of the project despite raising prices on a weekly basis because of demand. And I said, look, we're -- this is a unique, incredible asset. It's like a really an amazing -- I would say it's a -- it's the highest end equivalent of the best of New York City type projects, and I see us selling at prices that seem to me, really, really cheap.

實際上，讓我插話一下。所以很大程度上是因為我。儘管由於需求旺盛，團隊每週都會提高價格，但該項目的前半部分仍然銷售一空。我說，看，這是一筆獨特、不可思議的資產。這真是一個令人驚嘆的項目——我想說這是——它是紐約市最佳項目的最高端等同物，而且我看到我們的售價在我看來真的非常便宜。

And I said, look, let's just sell half and let's deliver the product, and then we'll get the price that we deserved. And then I made the mistake of stepping off the board and not being Chairman anymore, and David snuck out another like 20% of the project because that's his instinct. But the bottom line is, we can sell the entire project out if we wanted to. But our goal is to maximize the profitability for the project.

我說，看，我們只賣一半，然後交付產品，我們就能得到應得的價格。然後我犯了一個錯誤，退出了董事會，不再擔任董事長，而大衛則偷偷地拿走了該項目另外 20% 的股份，因為這是他的本能。但底線是，如果我們願意的話，我們可以出售整個項目。但我們的目標是最大限度地提高專案的獲利能力。

So I guess the current approach is, if someone desperately wants to buy something, maybe we find a way to make a deal with them. But we think that -- since again, it's a first of its kind in the Woodlands and really truly breaking new ground here, we're definitely leaving a lot of money on the table in the initial units that we've sold. It's still prudent to do so. So I'm obviously supportive of everything that management has done so far, but it behooves us to leave a nice piece of the project as it gets -- as people can actually see the finished product.

所以我猜現在的做法是，如果有人迫切想要購買某樣東西，也許我們會找到方法與他們達成交易。但我們認為——由於這在伍德蘭茲地區尚屬首例，而且確實開闢了新局面，我們在最初售出的單位中肯定會損失很多錢。這樣做仍然是謹慎的。因此，我顯然支持管理層迄今為止所做的一切，但我們有責任保留專案的精華部分——因為人們可以真正看到最終的產品。

And are the remaining units (inaudible) higher floor or hinder price points generally?

其餘單位（聽不清楚）樓層較高還是通常會阻礙價格點？

I'd say the remaining units represent a good sample set of the overall units of the building. It's not as if the small units are left or the penthouses are left. I think we've sold a great range of units from the smaller all the way up to some of the penthouses. And what remains is a representative sample set of the overall building.

我想說剩下的單元代表了該建築整體單元的良好樣本集。這並不是說只剩下小戶型或頂樓公寓了。我認為我們已經售出了各種各樣的單位，從較小的單位到一些頂層公寓。剩下的就是整棟建築的代表性樣本集。

I mean basically, every time David sells a unit, I tell him he sold it a too cheaper price. And every time he hasn't sold the unit, I'm told me he's not selling quickly enough. So that's the nature of our relationship.

我的意思是，基本上每次大衛賣出一間房子時，我都會告訴他，他賣的價格太便宜了。每次他沒有賣出房子時，我都會被告知他賣得不夠快。這就是我們的關係的本質。

Great color.

顏色很棒。

It's like in trading, when you tell the trader, we should have bought it. I would have bought it here and I want have sold this here. That's -- it's a good way to keep management the feed up the fire, so to speak.

這就像在交易中，當你告訴交易員，我們應該買它。我會在這裡買它，也想在這裡賣它。可以這麼說，這是讓管理階層繼續火力的一個好方法。

Peter Abramowitz, Jefferies.

彼得‧阿布拉莫維茲 (Peter Abramowitz)，傑富瑞 (Jefferies)。

Thank you -- maybe just kind of a philosophical question, if I could, for Bill. I guess, what would you say to kind of some of the common pushback from the market and from investors on sort of the complexity of the Howard Hughes story, it's maybe been a concern over time and been a challenge that some of the feedback from the investment community is that it can be hard to underwrite or people struggle with some of the parts stories and kind of the the long duration of capital required for unlocking value, the lack of comps. And certainly, Berkshire is a good model to follow, but is a bit of a unicorn success story in the public market.

謝謝——如果可以的話，我可能只是問比爾一個哲學問題。我想，對於市場和投資者對霍華休斯故事的複雜性所持的一些常見反對意見，您有何看法？這可能是長期以來的一個擔憂，也是一個挑戰。投資界的一些回饋是，它可能很難承保，或者人們難以接受一些部分故事，以及解鎖價值所需的長期資本，缺乏可比性。當然，波克夏是個值得效仿的好榜樣，但在公開市場上，它更像是一個獨角獸式的成功故事。

So I guess, keep kind of philosophically, how do you get the market comfortable with some of those challenges that still exist in the stock? And kind of what would you say to some of that pushback?

所以我想，從哲學角度來說，你如何讓市場適應股票中仍然存在的一些挑戰？那麼您對於這些反對意見有何看法？

Sure. So look, I completely understand it, and it's something we struggled with as an independent public company focused on this business. And ultimately, I think we collectively and certainly at Pershing Square came to the conclusion that we're never going to be able to get the kind of respect we deserve, if you will, for management's accomplishments and the quality of our assets as a pure-play real estate company.

當然。所以，我完全理解這一點，作為一家專注於這項業務的獨立上市公司，我們一直在努力解決這個問題。最終，我認為我們大家，當然還有潘興廣場，都得出了這樣的結論：作為一家純粹的房地產公司，我們永遠無法獲得應有的尊重，無論對於管理層的成就還是我們資產的質量。

And I think that's driven as much by complexity as actually the market assigning a very high cost of capital to a business that's in real estate development, land sales, condominium development and multi-geography and it's unique and doesn't pay a dividend, et cetera. So we sort of said: You know what, we're never going to overcome this. So not what you should do instead is embrace the complexity, so to speak. And what I mean by that is Howard Hughes, the core real estate business is a phenomenal business, and you'll understand that business over the next -- you all understand it even more over the next three, four, five years as it starts generating a ton of cash. And then even more so over kind of a longer period of time.

我認為這不僅是因為複雜性，也是因為市場實際上為從事房地產開發、土地銷售、公寓開發和跨地域業務的企業分配了非常高的資本成本，而且這些企業很獨特，不支付股息等等。所以我們說：你知道嗎，我們永遠無法克服這個問題。因此，你應該做的不是擁抱複雜性，可以這麼說。我的意思是，霍華休斯，核心房地產業務是一項非凡的業務，在接下來的三、四、五年裡，你們會更加了解這項業務，因為它開始產生大量的現金。並且，在更長的一段時間內，這種現象會更加嚴重。

But we don't want to double down in that business and just keep redeploying capital and buying more MPCs because it's a story that we'll never properly be told. What we want to do instead while you're right, there are -- the examples of successful diversified holding companies are limited. We do believe that we have the kind of necessary collection of skills, assets and kind of a starting base to do so.

但我們不想在該業務上加倍投入，只是不斷重新部署資本併購買更多 MPC，因為這是一個我們永遠無法正確講述的故事。雖然您說得對，但我們想做的是——成功的多元化控股公司的例子是有限的。我們確實相信，我們擁有實現這一目標所需的技能、資產和起步基礎。

If you look at Berkshire's success, a big part of it came from the fact that Buffett himself owned half the shares outstanding. So we can take a very long-term view. Well, we own 47% the shares outstanding. The second thing that Buffett brought to the table is he was a very talented investor, a proven talented investor in the stock market investing in common stocks. We bring that -- we've got a 21-year record at Pershing Square of generating in excess of a 20% compounded return over that period of time and 27%, 28% compounded since we've had permanent capital over the last almost kind of eight years. That's a unicorn record, at least investing in common stocks, and we bring that to the table to this company.

如果你看看波克夏的成功，你會發現很大一部分原因是巴菲特本人擁有一半的流通股。因此我們可以採取非常長遠的眼光。嗯，我們有 47% 的流通股。巴菲特帶來的第二件事是，他是一位非常有才華的投資者，一位在股票市場投資普通股方面被證明有才華的投資者。我們實現了這一點——我們在潘興廣場擁有 21 年的記錄，在此期間產生了超過 20% 的複合回報率，自從我們在過去近八年擁有永久資本以來，複合回報率達到了 27% 至 28%。這是一個獨角獸記錄，至少在投資普通股方面是如此，我們把這一點帶到了這家公司面前。

We spent a lot of time studying Berkshire over time. And without Berkshire's insurance operation, it wouldn't have been a particularly interesting business. That is a key part of our strategy here. We're cautiously optimistic, as I mentioned, that we can start in a good place with a good asset with a great team and build a profitable insurance operation, and we're going to manage that insurance company's investment portfolio for free. Now, I want to very carefully distinguish, you've seen there are many examples of regular way insurance companies that invest their assets, principally in fixed income securities.

我們花了很多時間研究伯克希爾。如果沒有波克夏的保險業務，它就不會成為一項特別有趣的業務。這是我們策略的關鍵部分。正如我所提到的，我們持謹慎樂觀的態度，我們可以在一個良好的基礎上，憑藉良好的資產和優秀的團隊，建立一個盈利的保險業務，並且我們將免費管理該保險公司的投資組合。現在，我想非常仔細地區分一下，你已經看到有很多保險公司以常規方式投資其資產的例子，主要是固定收益證券。

And then there are a bunch of hedge funds, I would say, that kind of either built or acquired insurance companies for the purpose of creating permanent capital to invest in their funds. And the way -- and the track record of those entities is poor, I would say, generally. And the reason for that is, one, they didn't focus as much as they should have on actually having best-in-class teams running the insurance operation; and two, they invested their assets in their funds and charged high fees. It was really a fee-generating AUM kind of exercise.

我想說的是，還有很多對沖基金，它們要么建立要么收購保險公司，目的是創造永久資本來投資他們的基金。而且我想說，這些實體的業績整體來說很差。原因在於：第一，他們沒有足夠重視擁有一流的團隊來經營保險業務；第二，他們將資產投資於基金並收取高額費用。這實際上是一種產生費用的 AUM 活動。

What we're doing here is the assets of Howard Hughes' insurance operation are going to be invested directly in common stocks, not in Pershing Square funds, not charge fees. In fact, it will be -- it will be lowest cost investment operation of any insurance company because we literally will be doing that as part of our overall arrangement with Howard Hughes. So one of the interesting benefits to the management teams that we -- the management team that runs our insurance operation is because the benefit of Pershing Square is investment document without any cost associated with it. That actually obviously is beneficial to the ability to run that company Kind of profitability.

我們在這裡所做的是，將霍華休斯保險業務的資產直接投資於普通股，而不是潘興廣場基金，也不收取費用。事實上，這將是——這將是任何保險公司中成本最低的投資運營，因為我們實際上將把它作為與霍華休斯整體安排的一部分來做。因此，對於我們管理團隊（負責管理保險業務的管理團隊）來說，一個有趣的好處是，潘興廣場 (Pershing Square) 的好處是投資文件不需要任何相關成本。這實際上顯然有利於提高公司的獲利能力。

So while there's no guarantee we're going to be successful taking this approach, I think we have a sufficient degree of ownership and understanding of the existing base business. We've got a balance sheet that will enable us to do initial transaction. The company has vastly more resources that it could afford because it has the entire (inaudible) organization working alongside Howard Hughes at a cost that is a fraction of what it costs. So these are significant competitive advantages.

因此，雖然我們不能保證採用這種方法會成功，但我認為我們對現有基礎業務擁有足夠的所有權和了解。我們有一份資產負債表，可以讓我們進行初始交易。該公司擁有的資源遠遠超出了其所能承受的範圍，因為它擁有整個（聽不清楚）組織與霍華德·休斯一起工作，而成本只是其成本的一小部分。所以這些都是顯著的競爭優勢。

And I would say, unlike Berkshire, our base business is a vastly more attractive one. Buffett had an effect, a liquidating insurance company that was his base asset and -- which was basically a textile operation. And he redeployed that capital fairly quickly over time into much better businesses. We have the benefit of a real estate operation that we really like. And as long as we don't buy another MPC, it starts, which we don't intend to, it will generate a lot of cash that we can redeploy in other businesses. And I think as this becomes a more diversified company, then the very high cost of capital that shareholders have signed to the company is going to come down.

我想說，與伯克希爾不同，我們的基礎業務更具吸引力。巴菲特產生了影響，一家清算保險公司是他的基礎資產，基本上是一家紡織企業。隨著時間的推移，他很快就將這些資本重新部署到更好的業務中。我們受益於我們真正喜歡的房地產業務。只要我們不購買另一個 MPC，它就會啟動（我們並不打算這樣做），它將產生大量現金，我們可以將其重新部署到其他業務中。我認為，隨著公司變得更加多元化，股東向公司簽署的高額資本成本將會下降。

And just from a technical perspective, I would say, the universe of investors who want to invest in a pure-play MPC company, we kind of know. Those are the investors that have kind of come and gone over time that have owned Howard Hughes over the last 14 years. Universe of investors that can invest in a diversified holding company is 1,000 times the scale or infinite relative to what are willing to invest in a diversified holding company. The -- it takes only a small number of Berkshire shareholders, if you will, a tiny percentage of $1 trillion market cap to decide to be interested in Howard Hughes to buy the 53% of the float that's not held by us for the stock to do very well over time.

僅從技術角度來看，我想說，我們了解那些想要投資純 MPC 公司的投資者群體。這些投資者在過去 14 年中一直擁有霍華德休斯公司，但隨著時間的流逝，他們來來去去。能夠投資多元化控股公司的投資者數量，相對於願意投資多元化控股公司的投資者數量，是其1000倍甚至無限大。只需要一小部分波克夏股東，或者說 1 兆美元市值的一小部分，決定對霍華休斯感興趣，購買我們未持有的 53% 流通股，該股票就能隨著時間的推移表現良好。

So we think while there has been some pretty material exit from the shareholder base of kind of dedicated pure-play real estate investors, those investors have been replaced by investors who are betting on kind of the diversified holding company story, the -- what we intend to do here. And I think what causes the stock price to go up over time, I think if we execute on what we hope to and starting with a great insurance operation, we start to deploy that capital intelligently, people start to see results. They realize this is no longer the old Howard Hughes. We're going to attract a much broader base of investors, and I think that becomes a pretty attractive stock story.

因此，我們認為，儘管一些專注於純粹房地產的投資者已經從股東基礎中退出，但這些投資者已經被押注多元化控股公司故事的投資者所取代，這就是我們打算在這裡做的事情。我認為導致股價隨時間上漲的原因是，如果我們按照我們的期望去做，並從一個偉大的保險業務開始，我們開始明智地部署這些資本，人們就會開始看到結果。他們意識到這已經不再是以前的霍華休斯了。我們將吸引更廣泛的投資者群體，我認為這將成為一個非常有吸引力的股票故事。

Got it. Appreciate that. And certainly, you can post a 20%-plus ROE on an annual basis. I think that's awful lot of problems. So -- and then maybe a micro question -- and just more kind of a micro question on the real estate side. David, could you just talk about just kind of leasing demand for the office asset you just acquired in the Woodlands, and how that's sort of shaping up?

知道了。非常感謝。當然，您可以實現每年 20% 以上的 ROE。我認為存在很多問題。所以 — — 也許是一個微問題 — — 以及更多關於房地產方面的微問題。大衛，您能否談談您剛在伍德蘭茲收購的辦公資產的租賃需求以及其發展？

Yes. No, it's a great question. We're couldn't be more excited because this is an asset that I'm looking out the window, and I can see here right on the heart of the waterway. It's the first office building you come to as you exit 45 and it's a pristine Class A building that is entirely empty. It is the only vacancy in the waterway submarket of the Woodlands as we've leased up all of the other assets that we've had almost entirely full. And it's a market where we're able to achieve on a building like that high [20] net rents with a basis today of around $80 a foot. And after we put in TIs, we'll still be sub-$200.

是的。不，這是一個很好的問題。我們非常興奮，因為這是我從窗外望出去的財富，我可以看到水道的中心。這是您從 45 號出口出來後看到的第一棟辦公大樓，這是一座嶄新的 A 級建築，裡面空無一人。這是伍德蘭茲水道子市場中唯一的空置物業，因為我們已經出租了所有其他資產，幾乎全部都租滿了。在這個市場上，我們能夠實現像這樣高 [20] 淨租金，目前約為每英尺 80 美元。在我們加入 TI 之後，價格仍將低於 200 美元。

And we think it's an outstanding opportunity to generate risk-adjusted returns and allow us to meet the existing demand that we see in this submarket that we just currently can't accommodate because our assets in the submarket are full. So we're meeting the demand to offer tenants that want to be in the submarket. We're doing it in an outstanding basis, and I think that we have a really good opportunity here to lease this thing up quickly, similar to how we did this building here, 9950 that we acquired, if you recall, right before the pandemic.

我們認為這是一個產生風險調整回報的絕佳機會，讓我們能夠滿足這個子市場中現有的需求，但由於我們在該子市場的資產已經飽和，我們目前無法滿足這一需求。因此，我們滿足了那些想要進入子市場的租戶的需求。我們正在以出色的基礎開展這項工作，我認為我們有一個非常好的機會來快速租賃這棟建築，就像我們在疫情爆發前收購的 9950 號建築一樣。

[Josh Kaffin].

[喬許·卡芬]。

I just had a question about the macro hedging. Regarding hedging strategies, how will the positions be constructed, for example, in the scenario of the CDS trades that Pershing held? If HHH was to be in a situation now, would the trade be executed through both of them? Or how would the sizing of those positions be constructed? And for future acquisitions would similar approaches being used?

我只是想問一下宏觀對沖的問題。關於對沖策略，例如在Pershing持有的CDS交易場景中，部位將如何建構？如果 HHH 現在遇到這種情況，交易會透過他們兩人來執行嗎？或是這些職位的規模如何建構？未來的收購是否會採取類似的方法？

Sure. I think that's a very good question. So one of the things that Pershing Square has done over time with respect to our investment portfolio is the bulk of our assets have been invested in common stocks of high-quality, durable growth companies, periodically, I would say, episodically, we've identified what I would describe as black swan type risk in the market or cases where we've got a very, I would say, very in few on interest rates or commodity prices or currencies and the market offers us the opportunity in the form of an option like instrument to make a large profit relative to our investment if the expected or the potential risks were to occur. And we've used that to kind of hedge risk and, in some cases, a little more opportunistically just to make money.

當然。我認為這是一個非常好的問題。因此，潘興廣場長期以來針對我們的投資組合所做的事情之一就是，將我們的大部分資產投資於高質量、持久增長型公司的普通股，我們會定期（我想說，偶爾）發現市場上所謂的“黑天鵝”風險，或者在利率、商品價格或貨幣方面我們遇到非常、非常少的情況，而市場以期權等工具的形式為我們發生了巨額機會，如果我們預期的利潤相對我們利用它來對沖風險，在某些情況下，甚至更傾向於投機取巧來賺錢。

The -- if we were to identify such a risk, and we thought it appropriate for Howard Hughes to hedge that risk, we would size a similar-sized hedge in Howard Hughes by buying either an interest rate option or a credit default swap at Howard Hughes like we do in the Pershing Square portfolio. And we'd size it relative to what we think is appropriate in light of how much equity or how much exposure we have to that particular kind of risk. And that would also be a strategy within the insurance company investment portfolio that we would operate similarly.

如果我們發現這樣的風險，而我們認為霍華休斯適合對沖這種風險，我們將透過購買霍華休斯的利率選擇權或信用違約掉期，對霍華休斯進行類似規模的對沖，就像我們在潘興廣場投資組合中所做的那樣。我們會根據股權規模或我們對特定風險的曝險大小來決定我們認為合適的規模。這也將成為我們在保險公司投資組合中採取的類似策略。

Yes. And I think the key to think about that, as Bill mentioned, is when we buy these typically options or option like instruments, if the risk that we're worried about doesn't come to fruition and the option doesn't pay off, we size into an amount where we like to think about it is effectively, you don't notice it in the aggregate result because the amount of money you can lose will be small enough.

是的。我認為，正如比爾所提到的，思考這個問題的關鍵在於，當我們購買這些典型的期權或類似期權的工具時，如果我們擔心的風險沒有實現，並且期權沒有帶來回報，那麼我們就會將其規模縮小到一個我們希望看到的金額，這樣你就不會在總體結果中註意到它，因為你可能損失的金額足夠小。

At the same time, if the risk that we're worried about actually comes to fruition, the payoff from a relatively small investment will be large enough where it will have a very material impact. And those are really the only types of investments we make where they're very asymmetric so that when we're hedging something if it doesn't work out, it will not be a material negative impact to the Howard Hughes' business, but it would be a very material positive if that risk were to come to fruition. That would be the key in how we size what we call asymmetric hedges, which is the way that we have historically done inside of Pershing Square.

同時，如果我們擔心的風險真的成為現實，那麼相對較小的投資將帶來足夠大的回報，從而產生非常重大的影響。這些確實是我們進行的唯一非常不對稱的投資類型，因此，當我們對沖某件事時，如果事情沒有成功，它不會對霍華休斯的業務造成重大的負面影響，但如果這種風險得以實現，那將是一個非常重大的正面影響。這將是我們如何確定所謂的非對稱對沖規模的關鍵，這也是我們過去在潘興廣場所做的方式。

And just to give a very real life sort of example of this. At the February 2020 Board meeting for Howard Hughes, I told the Board, one, I didn't actually travel to Dallas because I was concerned about the COVID pandemic becoming much more serious over the next several weeks. And I said it's time to hunker down because things are going to get complicated.

我只是舉一個很現實的例子。在 2020 年 2 月的霍華休斯董事會會議上，我告訴董事會，第一，我實際上沒有前往達拉斯，因為我擔心 COVID 疫情在接下來的幾週內會變得更加嚴重。我說現在是時候冷靜下來了，因為事情會變得複雜。

What we were doing at Pershing Square at the time is we were buying sort of hand-over-fist credit default swaps or investment grade CDS as a very low-risk way to hedge a potential deterioration in the credit markets and/or deterioration in the equity markets. Howard Hughes was not in a position to do so, didn't have the expertise (inaudible) set up in order to be able to write that insurance didn't have arrangements in place with various financial institutions. Howard Hughes didn't participate. We made a very large amount of money on a very small amount of premium investment, invested $27 million premium, we made $2.6 billion ultimately in profit from that trade.

我們當時在潘興廣場所做的就是購買大量信用違約掉期或投資等級 CDS，以極低風險的方式對沖信貸市場和/或股票市場的潛在惡化。霍華·休斯沒有能力這樣做，也沒有專業知識（聽不清楚）來寫出保險沒有與各金融機構達成協議。霍華·休斯沒有參加。我們用很少的保費投資賺了一大筆錢，投資了 2,700 萬美元的保費，最終從這筆交易中獲利 26 億美元。

If we could have done $10 million for Howard Hughes, or if we had done $5 million for Howard Hughes at the same time, Howard Hughes would not have had to do a $600 million equity offering a month later. It's maybe a very real life example of what we hope to achieve in the future.

如果我們能為霍華德休斯提供 1000 萬美元，或者如果我們同時為霍華德休斯提供 500 萬美元，霍華德休斯就不必在一個月後進行 6 億美元的股票發行。這也許是我們希望在未來實現的一個非常現實的例子。

At this time, I would like to turn the conference back over to David O'Reilly for closing remarks.

現在，我想將會議交還給大衛·奧萊利 (David O'Reilly) 作結束語。

Once again, thank you all for joining us. If there are additional questions or thoughts, we are always available to answer those.

再次感謝大家的參與。如果您還有其他問題或想法，我們隨時可以為您解答。

And I'll close by reiterating what Bill mentioned earlier that we'd like to invite everyone to join us on September 30 in New York City for the Annual Shareholder Meeting. It will be on 42nd Street in Manhattan. Information, details and your ability to register will be available as soon as our proxy is filed beginning on August 18 on the Investor Relations page of our website, howardhughes.com. Thank you again.

最後，我想重申比爾之前提到的，我們想邀請大家於 9 月 30 日參加在紐約舉行的年度股東大會。它將位於曼哈頓第 42 街。相關資訊、詳情以及您的註冊方式將於8月18日提交代理後立即在我們的網站howardhughes.com的投資者關係頁面公佈。再次感謝您的惠顧。

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝您的參與。您現在可以斷開連線。