Global Ship Lease, Inc. (GSL) 2026 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Thank you for standing by. My name is Jordan, and I'll be your conference operator today. At this time, I'd like to welcome everyone to the Global Ship Lease Q2 2026 earnings conference call.

感謝您的耐心等候。我叫 Jordan，今天將擔任本次電話會議的接線員。此刻，我謹代表公司歡迎各位參加 Global Ship Lease 2026 年第二季財報電話會議。

(Operator Instructions)

（接線員指示）

I would now like to turn the call over to Thomas Lister, Chief Executive Officer. Please go ahead.

接下來我想把電話交給執行長 Thomas Lister。請開始。

Thank you very much. Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Global Ship Lease second-quarter 2026 earnings conference call. You can find the slides that accompany today's presentation on our website at www.globalshiplease.com.

非常感謝。各位好，歡迎參加 Global Ship Lease 2026 年第二季財報電話會議。您可以在我們的網站 www.globalshiplease.com 上找到今日簡報所搭配的投影片。

As usual, slides 2 and 3 remind you that today's call may include forward-looking statements that are based on current expectations and assumptions and are, by their nature, inherently uncertain and outside of the company's control. Actual results may differ materially from these forward-looking statements due to many factors, including those described in the Safe Harbor section of the slide presentation.

如同往常，投影片第 2 與第 3 頁提醒各位，今天的電話會議可能包含前瞻性陳述，該等陳述係基於目前的預期與假設，且其本質上具有不確定性，並且不在公司控制範圍內。由於多項因素（包括投影片簡報中「安全港」章節所述因素），實際結果可能與這些前瞻性陳述存在重大差異。

We would also like to direct your attention to the Risk Factors section of our most recent annual report on our 2025 Form 20-F, which was filed in March 2026. You can find the form on our website or on the SEC's. All of our statements are qualified by these and other disclosures in our reports filed with the SEC.

我們也請各位留意我們最新年度報告（2025 年 Form 20-F）中的「風險因素」章節，該報告已於 2026 年 3 月提交。您可在我們的網站或美國證券交易委員會（SEC）網站上查閱該表格。我們所有陳述均受我們向 SEC 提交之報告中的上述及其他揭露所限制與規範。

We do not undertake any duty to update forward-looking statements. The reconciliations of the non-GAAP financial measures to which we will refer during this call to the most directly comparable measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP usually refer to the earnings release that we issued this morning, which is also available on our website.

我們不承擔更新前瞻性陳述的任何義務。本次電話會議中將提及之非 GAAP 財務衡量指標與依 GAAP 計算並呈列之最直接可比衡量指標之調節表，通常請參考我們今早發布的盈餘新聞稿，該新聞稿亦可於我們網站取得。

I'm joined as usual today by our Executive Chairman, George Youroukos; and our Chief Financial Officer, Tassos Psaropoulos. George will begin the call with high-level commentary on GSL and our industry, and then Tassos and I will take you through our recent activity, quarterly results and financials and the current market environment. After that, we'll be pleased to answer your questions.

今天照例與我一同出席的有：執行董事長 George Youroukos，以及財務長 Tassos Psaropoulos。George 將先就 GSL 與產業概況做高層次評論，接著 Tassos 與我將帶各位回顧近期動態、季度業績與財務狀況，以及目前的市場環境。之後我們很樂意回答各位的問題。

So turning now on to slide 4. I'll pass the call over to George.

現在請翻到投影片第 4 頁。我把電話交給 George。

Thank you, Tom, and good morning, afternoon or evening to all of you joining today. Once again, geopolitical uncertainty and volatility played an outsized role during the second-quarter. Our liner customers are doing extraordinary work from day-to-day and even from hour to hour as circumstances change. Supply chains are reorganized and often, they are then reorganized again. In addition to the repeated closure and partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the security situation in the Lower Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has once again taken a step back.

謝謝你，Tom，也向今天加入的各位道早安、午安或晚安。第二季期間，地緣政治不確定性與波動再次扮演了過度重要的角色。我們的班輪客戶在情勢日新月異、甚至每小時都可能變化的情況下，仍持續進行卓越的日常營運。供應鏈正在重組，而且往往重組後又再次重組。除了荷姆茲海峽反覆關閉與部分重啟之外，下紅海與亞丁灣的安全情勢也再次出現倒退。

On top of that, the reintroduction of broad-based tariffs on US imports is likely to contribute to continued supply chain fragmentation and inefficiency as procurement managers, suppliers and other cargo interests adjust their operations and risk management strategies.

此外，重新對美國進口商品實施廣泛性關稅，可能促使供應鏈持續碎片化並降低效率，因為採購經理、供應商及其他貨主將調整其營運與風險管理策略。

In short, any one of these factors in isolation would typically be highly significant for our industry. But having all of that same time is driving an extraordinary level of demand for additional vessels and capacity on top of that from underlying containerized freight demand, which is itself remaining quite firm. Flexible midsize and smaller container ships like those in the GSL fleet are the greatest beneficiaries as evidenced by liner company's continued appetite for ships that under more normal circumstances would be considered overage in these size categories.

簡言之，上述任何單一因素在一般情況下都足以對本產業造成高度重大影響；但當這些因素同時發生時，便在原本仍相當穩健的貨櫃化貨運需求之上，推升了對額外船舶與運力的非比尋常需求。像 GSL 船隊所擁有的彈性中型與較小型貨櫃船是最大受益者，班輪公司持續偏好在較正常情況下可能被視為在該等船型尺寸中偏老舊的船舶，即可為證。

Meanwhile, prudent and selective fleet renewal has always been at the front of our minds. Against the backdrop of this evolving market, we have placed newbuild orders for a total of 15 container ships at attractive prices and derisked from the outset with multiyear charters attached and over 75% of the contract cost expected to be captured from the adjusted EBITDA generated by those charters within, on average, the first 25% of the ship's useful lives only. These container ships, which we will speak more on briefly, are best-in-class ultra-high-reefer, latest generation eco vessels and will replace our aging cash cows, providing us with visible cash flows well into the years ahead.

同時，審慎且有選擇性的船隊汰舊換新一直是我們的首要考量。在此不斷演變的市場背景下，我們以具吸引力的價格下單訂造合計 15 艘新造貨櫃船，並自一開始即透過附帶多年期租約來降低風險；預期這些租約所產生的調整後 EBITDA，平均在船舶僅約前 25% 的使用年限內，即可回收超過 75% 的合約成本。這些貨櫃船（我們稍後會再簡要說明）為同級最佳的超高冷藏插座（ultra-high-reefer）、最新世代節能環保船舶，將取代我們逐漸老化的「現金牛」船舶，為我們在未來多年提供可見的現金流。

In this supportive demand environment, at the same time as putting in place charter cover for the newbuilds, we have also locked in additional coverage at attractive rates for various of our existing ships coming up in the market. Our contracted revenues now stand at $3.2 billion over 3.3 years of cover, of which $1.450 billion was added during the first half of this year. Our fleet contract coverage is 100% for 2026 and is already at 90% for 2027.

在此具支撐性的需求環境下，除了為新造船安排租約覆蓋之外，我們也為多艘即將回到市場的既有船舶，以具吸引力的租金水準鎖定了額外的租約覆蓋。我們目前的已簽約收入為 32 億美元，對應 3.3 年的覆蓋期，其中 14.50 億美元是在今年上半年新增。我們船隊的合約覆蓋率在 2026 年為 100%，而 2027 年也已達 90%。

Our strong balance sheet and delevering efforts have been reflected in our affirmed credit ratings and an improved outlook for Moody's as well as a healthy recently upsized dividend of $2.5 per share annualized. We remain focused on maximizing optionality in these turbulent and unpredictable times. Our recent newbuild orders represent a continuation of our long-running focus on flexibility, discipline, downside protection and upside potential. These principles guide our actions and have served us well, and we believe that our emphasis on maintaining optionality is an excellent fit for the containership market of today and of tomorrow.

我們強健的資產負債表與去槓桿努力，反映在我們獲確認的信用評等以及穆迪（Moody's）展望的改善上，同時也體現在我們近期上調且維持健康水準的股利：年化每股 2.5 美元。我們仍專注於在這些動盪且難以預測的時期，最大化策略選擇空間（optionality）。近期的新造船訂單延續了我們長期以來對彈性、紀律、下行保護與上行潛力的重視。這些原則指引我們的行動並已證明成效；我們相信，強調維持策略選擇空間，與當前及未來的貨櫃船市場都高度契合。

With that, I will turn the call over to Tom.

接下來我把電話交回給 Tom。

Thank you, George. Hello again, everyone. Please now turn to slide 5, where you will see in great detail our strategic fleet renewal, which consists of both investment in the next generation of cash cows for our fleet and the opportunistic monetization of older noncore assets.

謝謝你，George。各位好，再次問候。現在請翻到投影片第 5 頁，您將可非常詳細地看到我們的策略性船隊汰舊換新，包含投資於下一世代的船隊「現金牛」，以及把握時機將較老且非核心資產變現。

To echo George's words, on the newbuild front, we see our acquisition of 15 midsized ultra-high-reefer wide beam latest generation container ships with long-term charters attached as the exact combination of prudent downside protection and attractive upside potential that we look for in any transaction. As highly specified ships in a structurally underbuilt but crucially important segment of the containership fleet, we see these vessels as best-in-class, flexible, future-proofed and strong earners going forward.

呼應 George 的說法，在新造船方面，我們認為收購 15 艘中型、超高冷藏插座、寬船體（wide beam）、最新世代貨櫃船，且附帶長期租約，正是我們在任何交易中所尋求的「審慎下行保護」與「具吸引力上行潛力」的完美組合。作為一個結構性供給不足、但又至關重要的貨櫃船隊細分市場中的高規格船舶，我們認為這些船舶同級最佳、具彈性、面向未來（future-proofed），並將在未來持續成為強勁的獲利來源。

It's worth underlining the fact that more than $1 billion of the $1.3 billion of contract price is covered by contracted EBITDA expected to be generated by the firm charters in place ex yard over a TEU weighted average term of 7.1 years, meaning that these newbuilds are materially derisked right out of the gate. And essentially, we're covering over 3/4 of their aggregate contract price within roughly the first-quarter of their collective economic life and all that with charter cover from top-tier charterers.

值得強調的是，在 13 億美元的合約價格中，超過 10 億美元可由已簽訂的 EBITDA 覆蓋；該 EBITDA 預期將由船廠交付後（ex yard）生效的確定租約所產生，按 TEU 加權平均租期為 7.1 年，這意味著這些新造船自一開始就已大幅降低風險。基本上，我們在其整體經濟壽命約前四分之一期間內，即可覆蓋其合計合約價格的逾四分之三，而且租約覆蓋來自一流承租人。

It's also worth highlighting that several of these newbuilds include options for the operator to extend the charters at rates more than 25% above those for the initial firm periods, suggesting that the end users share our conviction that these ships will continue to be in high demand, valuable and with significant upside earnings potential well beyond their initial charters. These newbuild transactions were possible due to our ability to move fast, thanks to our discipline in building a fortress balance sheet, and we expect the forward visibility on contracted revenues to support attractive funding alternatives for these assets, which will likely involve a combination of cash from our balance sheet and debt to enhance returns on equity.

同樣值得注意的是，其中數艘新造船包含由營運方選擇延長租約的選擇權，延長期的租金水準較初始確定期間高出逾 25%，顯示終端用戶與我們同樣堅信這些船舶在初始租期結束後仍將維持高需求、具價值，並擁有顯著的上行獲利潛力。這些新造船交易之所以可行，得益於我們透過紀律性地打造「堡壘式」資產負債表而具備快速行動的能力；我們預期已簽約收入的前瞻可見度將支持這些資產的具吸引力融資替代方案，可能會結合資產負債表現金與舉債，以提升股東權益報酬率。

For modeling purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the contract payments for these newbuilds are milestone-based and backloaded with more than half of the contract price not payable until the respective ship is delivered. We also consider the opportunistic monetization of older assets to be an integral part of fleet renewal. And at the bottom of the slide, you can see that we have sold forward 4 older noncore ships during the first half of the year for a total of $65.5 million, with an aggregate gain on book expected to be in the region of $33 million. Added to which we will continue to benefit from these ships earnings until they deliver to buyers in scheduled slots ranging between the end of this year and the end of next year.

就建模而言，重要的是要記住，這些新造船的合約付款是以里程碑為基礎，且付款時點偏後，超過一半的合約價格要到各船舶交付時才需支付。我們也認為，把握時機將較老舊資產變現是船隊汰舊換新的重要一環。在投影片底部，您可以看到我們在今年上半年已遠期出售 4 艘較老的非核心船舶，總價為 6,550 萬美元，預期合計帳面處分利益約為 3,300 萬美元。此外，在這些船舶於預定交付時段（介於今年年底至明年年底）交付給買方之前，我們仍將持續受益於其營運收益。

Moving to slide 6, we show the structural rationale behind the new building orders and why this is the right time for us to pounce on these opportunities. As we have highlighted for some time, the midsized and smaller containership classes have been underbuilt for many years with the lion's share of investment capital piling into ultra-large ships. That has left the crucially important sub-10,000 TEU portion of the global fleet with an advanced age profile. And to illustrate this point, the median age of the oldest quartile by TEU capacity within each fleet segment below 10,000 TEU ranges from 21 to 28 years, and that's today, which translates to around 24 to 31 years by the time our newbuilds actually deliver into the space. So you have an aging global fleet combined with a more limited order book at a time when the value proposition of such flexible assets is proving to be increasingly important and in growing demand from liner operators.

接著看第 6 張投影片，我們說明新造船訂單背後的結構性邏輯，以及為何現在正是我們把握這些機會的最佳時點。正如我們一段時間以來所強調的，中型與較小型的貨櫃船船型多年來一直建造不足，而絕大部分投資資本則集中投入超大型船舶。這使得全球船隊中 10,000 TEU 以下這一關鍵區段呈現明顯老化。為了說明這一點，在 10,000 TEU 以下各船隊分段中，以 TEU 運力計算之最老四分位數的中位船齡目前介於 21 至 28 年；而以今天為基準，等到我們的新造船實際交付投入市場時，將相當於約 24 至 31 年。換言之，在全球船隊老化、訂單簿相對有限的同時，這類具高度彈性的資產其價值主張正變得愈發重要，且班輪營運商的需求也在持續增加。

Furthermore, with the industry and its regulators now looking less likely to coalesce around a long-term decarbonization trajectory and rule set anytime soon, we see the option value of a wait-and-see approach on fuels and propulsion as having materially diminished. The convergence of these factors, together with the commercial terms available to us, our ability to transact on the newbuilds while derisking them with charter coverage ex yard and the aging out of our existing cash cows made these orders a clear and compelling opportunity for us and for our shareholders.

此外，隨著產業與監管機構在短期內愈來愈不可能就長期減碳路徑與規則體系達成一致，我們認為在燃料與推進技術上採取「觀望等待」策略的選擇權價值已顯著降低。這些因素的匯聚，再加上我們可取得的商業條款、我們能在新造船交易上迅速落地並透過出廠即有租約（ex yard）的租約覆蓋來降低風險，以及我們現有現金牛資產逐步老化退役，使得這些訂單對我們及股東而言成為一個明確且極具吸引力的機會。

We expand further on our rationale for investing in newbuilds on slide 7. We have a history of being prudent in managing risk through the shipping cycle while capitalizing on upside cyclicality and volatility, particularly in time charter earnings to build value for shareholders. In the chart, you can see how secondhand asset prices, which are the dark blue line and particularly the time charter rate index, the green line, have both trended and spiked upwards, while the newbuild price index, the pale blue line, has remained comparatively flat in recent years. In fact, with yard order books essentially full for the next few years, the main factor currently expected to drive new building prices is inflation.

我們在第 7 張投影片進一步闡述投資新造船的理由。我們一向在航運景氣循環中審慎管理風險，同時把握景氣上行與波動所帶來的機會，特別是透過期租收益來為股東創造價值。從圖表可見，二手資產價格（深藍線）以及尤其是期租運價指數（綠線）近年來皆呈現上升趨勢並出現大幅飆升；相較之下，新造船價格指數（淺藍線）在近年則相對平穩。事實上，由於船廠訂單簿在未來幾年基本已滿，目前市場預期推動新造船價格的主要因素是通膨。

So combining all these considerations, this is a good entry point for newbuilds as long as they are in the right size categories, appropriately specified and derisked with charters. And with the combination of our fortress balance sheet and strong industry relationships, we have the ability to move quickly and decisively in developing these compelling opportunities. The result is 15 newbuilds contracted on attractive terms with multiyear charters attached, which lower our average fleet age and crucially increase our cash generation runway as our cash cows begin to age out. In other words, exactly the recipe for low risk and high upside potential that we like.

綜合以上考量，只要船型類別選得正確、規格配置得當，並以租約進行風險對沖，現在就是切入新造船的良好時點。憑藉我們堅實如堡壘的資產負債表以及強大的產業關係，我們能夠快速且果斷地推進這些具吸引力的機會。結果是我們以具吸引力的條件簽訂了 15 艘新造船合約，並附帶多年期租約，這不僅降低我們的平均船齡，更關鍵的是在我們的現金牛資產開始逐步老化退役之際，延長並提升我們的現金創造跑道。換句話說，這正是我們所偏好的「低風險、高上行潛力」配方。

On slide 8, you will see our diversified charter portfolio with the chart showing the breakdown of our charter revenues by charterer from our operating fleet for the first half of this year. As of June 30, and to be clear, these figures also include the firm charters from our 15 newbuilds, we have over $3.2 billion in forward contracted revenues over a 3.3 year of average TE weighted contract cover. In 2026, our revenue days are 100% covered with 90% coverage in 2027.

在第 8 張投影片，您將看到我們多元化的租約組合；圖表顯示我們今年上半年營運船隊的租船收入按承租人分布的拆分。截至 6 月 30 日，且需說明的是，這些數字也包含我們 15 艘新造船的確定租約（firm charters），我們已鎖定超過 32 億美元的未來合約收入，平均以 TEU 加權的合約覆蓋期為 3.3 年。2026 年我們的收入天數（revenue days）已 100% 覆蓋，2027 年覆蓋率為 90%。

Slide 9, we recap our dynamic capital allocation policy with which we have navigated both the cyclical nature of our industry and the flock of black swan events that have occurred in recent years. We have delevered to build resilience and create a fortress balance sheet, which in turn has allowed us to mitigate risk, build equity value and position ourselves to seize opportunities as they arise. This is reflected in our improved credit outlook, our order book of 15 new buildings and the continued return of capital to our shareholders via our annualized dividend of $2.50 per common share.

第 9 張投影片回顧我們動態的資本配置政策；藉此我們得以在產業的週期性波動以及近年接連出現的一系列黑天鵝事件中穩健前行。我們透過去槓桿化提升韌性並打造堅實如堡壘的資產負債表，進而降低風險、提升股東權益價值，並讓我們在機會出現時能夠把握。這也反映在我們改善的信用展望、15 艘新造船的訂單簿，以及透過每股普通股年化 2.50 美元股息持續向股東回饋資本。

With that, I'll pass the call to Tassos to discuss our financials.

接下來我把電話交給 Tassos，請他說明我們的財務狀況。

Thank you, Tom. Slide 10 shows our financial highlights for the first half of 2026. I would like to emphasize a few key takeaways. Our financial performance and cash flow have remained very strong. Our cash position at quarter end was $649 million, of which $140 million is restricted.

謝謝你，Tom。第 10 張投影片顯示我們 2026 年上半年的財務重點。我想強調幾個關鍵重點：我們的財務表現與現金流依然非常強勁。季度末我們的現金部位為 6.49 億美元，其中 1.40 億美元為受限制現金（restricted）。

The remainder ensures that we can fully cover our covenants, our working capital needs and manage the potential financial implication of geopolitical disruptions and other macro events in an increasingly unpredictable world. It also provides dry powder both for CapEx to optimize the commercial value and marketability of our existing fleet and for disciplined investment in fleet renewal when the right opportunities present themselves, including the payment installments, of course, for our 15 new buildings.

其餘現金可確保我們能完全符合各項財務契約（covenants）、滿足營運資金需求，並因應在愈發難以預測的世界中，地緣政治擾動及其他總體事件可能帶來的財務影響。同時，這也提供充足的「乾粉」：一方面用於資本支出（CapEx），以提升我們現有船隊的商業價值與市場適銷性；另一方面在出現合適機會時，以紀律方式投資船隊汰舊換新，當然也包括我們 15 艘新造船的分期付款。

During the second-quarter, we were also pleased to put in place a new $55.5 million debt facility with Bank of America, 5-year paper secured against ships we bought with cash at the end of 2025, priced at SOFR plus 140 basis points, a good addition to our capital stack. And of course, we continue to pay our compelling dividend.

在第二季期間，我們也很高興完成一筆由美國銀行（Bank of America）提供的新 5,550 萬美元債務融資，期限 5 年，以我們在 2025 年底以現金購入的船舶作為擔保，利率為 SOFR 加 140 個基點，為我們的資本結構帶來良好補強。當然，我們也持續支付具吸引力的股息。

On slide 11, we highlight our ongoing efforts to delever and derisk to build resilience and maximize optionality. The graph on the left shows our outstanding debt, which was $950 million at the end of 2022, and we have managed to reduce it to just under $600 million by June 30, 2026, while at the same time, growing our fleet considerably and increasing the number of unencumbered ships. The graph on the right shows the same story of the financial leverage front, but with even great progress, improving from 8.4x in 2018 to 0.4x today.

在第 11 張投影片，我們強調持續去槓桿與降低風險的努力，以提升韌性並最大化策略選擇權。左側圖表顯示我們的未償債務：2022 年底為 9.50 億美元，而截至 2026 年 6 月 30 日我們已將其降至略低於 6.00 億美元；同時我們大幅擴充船隊並增加無擔保船舶（unencumbered ships）的數量。右側圖表則從財務槓桿角度呈現同樣的趨勢，且進展更為顯著：自 2018 年的 8.4 倍改善至目前的 0.4 倍。

Slide 12 further emphasize our commitment to a strong financial platform. The left-hand graph shows how we have successfully lowered our borrowing cost from 7.56% in 2018 to 4.43% today, even as base rates have moved higher. And despite an inflationary environment, we have managed to reduce our average daily breakeven cost from over $12,000 per ship at the end of 2018 to just over $10,000 per ship today.

第 12 張投影片進一步強調我們對強健財務平台的承諾。左側圖表顯示，即使基準利率走高，我們仍成功將借款成本自 2018 年的 7.56% 降至目前的 4.43%。此外，儘管處於通膨環境，我們仍將平均每日損益兩平成本（breakeven cost）從 2018 年底每艘船超過 12,000 美元，降至目前每艘船略高於 10,000 美元。

With that, I will turn the call back over to Tom to discuss the market and our fleet.

接下來我把電話交回給 Tom，請他談談市場與我們的船隊。

Thank you, Tassos. On slide 13, we reiterate our focus on midsized and smaller containerships with our fleet ranging from 2,200 TEU at the bottom end to a little over 11,000 TEU at the top. Vessels in this range are workhorses of the global fleet, predominantly serving the non-mainlane trades that collectively comprise around 75% of total global containerized trade volumes. Very large ships are more or less restricted to the big East-West mainlane trades as they require specialized port infrastructure, deepwater berths and very long terminals to be operationally viable and equally importantly, huge volumes of cargo to be economically viable. Midsize and smaller container ships, on the other hand, like those in GSL's fleet, trade on a truly global basis.

謝謝你，Tassos。在第 13 張投影片，我們重申對中型與較小型貨櫃船的聚焦；我們的船隊運力範圍從最低端的 2,200 TEU 到最高端略高於 11,000 TEU。此區間的船舶是全球船隊的主力，主要服務非主幹航線（non-mainlane）貿易，而這些航線合計約占全球貨櫃化貿易總量的 75%。超大型船舶或多或少受限於東西向主幹航線，因其需要專門的港口基礎設施、深水泊位以及非常長的碼頭才能在營運上可行；同樣重要的是，還需要龐大的貨量才能在經濟上可行。相較之下，中型與較小型貨櫃船（例如 GSL 船隊中的船舶）則能真正以全球範圍進行營運。

And as geopolitical uncertainty has decentralized and fragmented the containerized supply chain beyond China and throughout Southeast Asia, our liner customers have placed a growing priority and value on the commercial and operational flexibility that such ships provide.

此外，隨著地緣政治不確定性使貨櫃化供應鏈從中國以外向東南亞各地去中心化並碎片化，我們的班輪客戶愈來愈重視並提高對此類船舶所提供之商業與營運彈性的優先度與價值評估。

On slide 14, we provide a snapshot of the choke points currently impacting containerized trade in the Middle East. While we cannot predict how these situations will develop, we can provide some context on how things are playing out for the industry in real time. Starting with the Red Sea and Suez through which around 20% of global containerized trade volume was transited before the security situation was disrupted in 2023. Since then, vessels have been forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. This longer, costlier journey has absorbed around 10% of effective containership capacity.

在第14頁投影片中，我們提供一個快照，說明目前影響中東地區貨櫃化貿易的瓶頸環節。雖然我們無法預測這些情勢將如何發展，但我們可以就產業當下的即時演變提供一些背景。先從紅海與蘇伊士運河談起：在2023年安全情勢遭到破壞之前，約有全球20%的貨櫃化貿易量經由此處通行。自那之後，船舶被迫改道繞行好望角。這段更長、成本更高的航程，吸收了約10%的有效貨櫃船運力。

And after a brief period of cautious optimism with some minor operators trialing a return to this transit with selected vessels, the security status has since deteriorated again. So as with so many things at the moment, it's a watch and brief.

在一段短暫的審慎樂觀期之後（期間有一些小型業者以特定船舶試行恢復該航線通行），安全狀況其後又再度惡化。因此，如同目前許多事情一樣，只能持續觀察並隨時更新。

As for the Strait of Hormuz, the on again, off again situation there is both dangerous and unpredictable. Prior to this conflict, about 3% to 4% of containerized trade volumes passed through the strait in global terms. Now major hubs and ports within the Persian Gulf are severely constrained.

至於荷姆茲海峽，那裡時緊時鬆的情勢既危險又難以預測。在這場衝突之前，就全球而言，約有3%到4%的貨櫃化貿易量會通過該海峽。如今，波斯灣內的主要樞紐與港口受到嚴重限制。

Liner companies are rejigging service networks and although considerable effort is being put into trying to explore alternative means to reliably flow cargo into and out of the region, it is not proving straightforward. Both of these situations are highly dynamic and their long-term implications for container shipping are unclear. But in the near term, they add layers of complexity and inefficiency for the shipping industry to navigate with seafarer safety of paramount concern.

班輪公司正在重新調整航線服務網路；儘管投入相當多的努力，試圖探索可讓貨物可靠進出該區域的替代方式，但進展並不容易。這兩種情勢都高度動態，其對貨櫃航運的長期影響仍不明朗。但在短期內，它們為航運業帶來更多複雜性與低效率需要因應，而海員安全仍是最重要的考量。

On slide 15, we highlight supply side and scrapping trends where little has changed. Idle capacity and scrapping activity both continue to hover near 0. The inefficiencies in the supply chain and subsequent longer voyages have both nearly eliminated slack in the system and kept vessels on the water longer than would otherwise have been expected in a "normal environment." Why? Because earnings have remained so attractive.

在第15頁投影片中，我們強調供給端與拆船趨勢，整體變化不大。閒置運力與拆船活動都仍接近於零。供應鏈的低效率以及隨之而來的更長航程，幾乎消除了系統中的餘裕，並使船舶在水上營運的時間比在「正常環境」下原本預期的更久。為什麼？因為收益仍然非常具吸引力。

Slide 16 shows the order book. While the order book has certainly grown meaningfully, it remains smaller in the segments upon which GSL is focused. For the big ship segments over 10,000 TEU, the order book-to-fleet ratio stands at 55%, which drags the average ratio for the overall fleet order book to 39%. Meantime, the ratio for the midsized and smaller containership segments relevant to GSL is significantly lower at around 25% with deliveries spread over the next four years or so.

第16頁投影片顯示訂單簿。雖然訂單簿確實明顯成長，但在GSL所聚焦的船型區隔中仍相對較小。對於10,000 TEU以上的大型船舶區隔，訂單簿對船隊比率為55%，使整體船隊的平均訂單簿比率被拉高至39%。同時，與GSL相關的中型與較小型貨櫃船區隔，其比率顯著較低，約為25%，且交付分散在未來約四年。

As I mentioned earlier in the context of our own newbuild orders, the midsize and smaller size segments of the global fleet are also aging such that the corresponding order book is quite closely matched by ships that are or will shortly become 25 years or older. Essentially, these ships will be scrapping candidates whenever the market eventually pulls back. If we assume that all vessels over 25 years old were to be scrapped through 2030, the net effect will be growth of under 1% for the global fleet sub-10,000 TEU.

如我先前在我們自身新造船訂單的脈絡中提到，全球船隊中的中型與較小型船舶區隔也正逐步老化，因此相對應的訂單簿，與目前已達或將在短期內達到25年以上船齡的船舶數量相當接近。基本上，一旦市場最終回落，這些船舶就會成為拆解候選。若我們假設到2030年所有船齡超過25年的船舶都將被拆解，則全球10,000 TEU以下船隊的淨增長效果將低於1%。

In any case, while charter rates remain strong, we're very happy to lock in charter coverage. If the market were to normalize on the other hand to the downside, then we would expect global scrapping activity to pick up meaningfully, offsetting fleet growth and potentially also creating countercyclical purchase opportunities for owners like us with strong finances and a long-term through-cycle strategy. So it's a win-win as we see it.

無論如何，在租船費率仍然強勁之際，我們非常樂於鎖定租約覆蓋。另一方面，若市場向下回歸常態，我們預期全球拆船活動將顯著增加，抵銷船隊成長，並可能也為像我們這樣財務穩健、採取長期跨週期策略的船東創造逆週期的收購機會。因此，在我們看來這是雙贏。

On slide 17, we provide a snapshot of the charter market. The right side of the slide shows market rates for term charters, which remain strong and should be considered alongside our average breakeven rates, which stand at just over $10,000 per vessel per day.

在第17頁投影片中，我們提供租船市場的快照。投影片右側顯示期租的市場費率，仍然強勁；同時也應與我們的平均損益兩平費率一併考量，目前每艘船每日略高於10,000美元。

With that, I will turn the call back to George on slide 18.

接下來，我把電話交回給第18頁投影片上的George。

Thank you, Tom. To summarize, we continue to focus on maximizing optionality and resilience in a world beset by geopolitical complexity, macroeconomic volatility and regulatory uncertainty. Supply chains have decentralized and fragmented, making the operational flexibility offered by GSLs, midsized and smaller ships a priority for our liner customers. We have continued adding charter coverage, which now stands at $3.2 billion, up by over $1 billion on where it stood at the end of the first-quarter, thanks largely to the addition of our 15 newbuilds with charters attached.

謝謝你，Tom。總結來說，在一個充滿地緣政治複雜性、宏觀經濟波動與監管不確定性的世界裡，我們持續專注於最大化選擇權與韌性。供應鏈已去中心化並趨於碎片化，使得GSL所提供的中型與較小型船舶之營運彈性，成為我們班輪客戶的優先需求。我們持續增加租約覆蓋，目前達32億美元，較第一季末增加超過10億美元，主要得益於我們新增的15艘附帶租約的新造船。

Our delevering efforts have resulted in a fortress balance sheet and our high operational efficiency and capital allocation discipline have resulted in highly competitive breakeven rates. Our prudent selective fleet renewal has seen us monetize older noncore ships and acquire both secondhand vessels and more recently newbuilds. But our recipe remains the same, be disciplined, be patient and be nimble and use the cycle to minimize downside risk and maximize upside potential.

我們的去槓桿努力打造了堅若磐石的資產負債表；而我們高營運效率與資本配置紀律，帶來了極具競爭力的損益兩平費率。我們審慎且有選擇性的船隊汰舊換新，使我們得以將較老且非核心的船舶變現，並收購二手船舶以及近期的新造船。但我們的方法不變：保持紀律、保持耐心、保持靈活，並運用景氣循環來降低下行風險、放大上行潛力。

And of course, returning capital to shareholders remains a top priority. Our recently upsized dividend now stands at $2.5 per share annualized, which is a dividend yield of about 5.7% on the basis of yesterday's close.

當然，回饋股東資本仍是首要重點。我們近期上調後的股利，目前年化為每股2.5美元；以昨日收盤價計算，股息殖利率約為5.7%。

With that, we will be very pleased to take your questions.

接下來，我們很樂意回答各位的提問。

(Operator Instructions)

（接線員指示）

Omar Nokta, Clarksons Securities.

Omar Nokta，Clarksons Securities。

A couple of questions. Maybe just first on the investment in the new buildings back in June that you first announced. You've got 15 of them that come with a large backlog that, as you say, derisks the investments in a very big way. And as you highlight, it's interesting, 75% of the cost is earned back in the first 25% of their operable life. Obviously, it's a sizable investment and don't expect you to do more of this, but you do have the flexibility given just how strong your balance sheet is.

我有幾個問題。也許先從你們在6月首次宣布的新造船投資談起。你們有15艘，並附帶龐大的在手訂單，如你所說，這在很大程度上降低了投資風險。而且如你們強調的，這點很有意思：在其可營運壽命的前25%期間，就能賺回75%的成本。顯然這是一筆相當可觀的投資，我也不預期你們會做更多類似交易，但考量到你們資產負債表的強勁程度，你們確實具備彈性。

I wanted to get a sense from you, how repeatable is this type of business? It's clearly unique, and we haven't seen this in the past, but just want to get a sense from you, is this sort of a one-off that you're really able to capture? Or is this sort of like kind of like the norm in what owners can expect to capture in today's market?

我想了解的是，這類型的生意可重複性有多高？這顯然很獨特，我們過去也沒見過，但我想聽聽你們的看法：這是否屬於你們能夠掌握的一次性機會？還是說，在當前市場中，這更像是船東通常可以期待取得的常態？

Omar, this is Tom. I'll kick it off and no doubt George and Tassos will add. Yes, we're delighted with this transaction, as you say, 15 newbuilds derisked out of the gate to the tune of 75% of the contract price with the adjusted EBITDA implicit in the contracted charters. Not easy to put together such a deal. So I wouldn't say that it's the "new normal" to use your expression, either for us or for the market.

Omar，我是Tom。我先開頭，George和Tassos無疑也會補充。是的，我們對這筆交易非常滿意。正如你所說，這15艘新造船一開始就大幅去風險化：透過已簽約租約所隱含的調整後EBITDA，已覆蓋合約價格的75%。要組成這樣的交易並不容易。因此，我不會說這是你所稱的「新常態」，不論對我們或對市場而言都是如此。

Indeed, I would say, while obviously, we're willing to look at new buildings, as we've just demonstrated, we're not dogmatic on that front either. We're happy to look at new buildings, existing tonnage, sale and leasebacks, whatever really, as long as the numbers make sense and the risk profile makes sense. So this doesn't mark a departure from our existing strategy. I would say it marks simply an evolution of that same strategy focusing on minimizing downside risk and maximizing upside potential.

確實，我會說，雖然很明顯我們願意評估新造船（正如我們剛剛所展示的），但在這方面我們也並非教條式。我們樂於看新造船、現有船舶、售後回租等任何形式，只要數字合理、風險輪廓合理即可。因此，這並不代表我們既有策略的轉向；我會說這只是同一策略的演進，重點仍在於降低下行風險並最大化上行潛力。

But I'll pass the call to George in case he wants to add more to that.

不過我把電話交給George，看看他是否想再補充。

Yes. If I may say that by no means such a transaction is available in the market, and it's something that it's easy to make. We capitalize on our relationships with our clients and our know-how on designing ships that are not available in the market and that are very particular. So -- and the timing also. We chose to go into the newbuild market at a time where we felt it is an opportune time achieving relatively good prices.

是的。如果我可以這麼說，市場上絕非隨時都有這樣的交易，而且也不是一件容易做到的事。我們運用與客戶之間的關係，以及我們在設計市場上沒有、且非常特殊的船舶方面的專業能力。此外還有時機因素。我們選擇在我們認為是進入新造船市場的良機時點切入，以相對不錯的價格成交。

It is the same recipe. Timing is everything in what we look to do in container shipping, and we try to time our investments always very carefully. And our first priority is derisking the transactions that we do. That's what we have always been doing on the secondhand ships, same recipe here.

這是同樣的配方。對於我們在貨櫃航運想做的事情而言，時機就是一切，我們總是非常謹慎地掌握投資時點。而我們的首要任務是為我們所做的交易降風險（derisk）。這一直是我們在二手船上所做的事，這裡也是同樣的做法。

Yes. No, certainly from your history, you've been very nimble and methodical with your investments, and this is a very good example of that. And maybe just a follow-up, a separate topic. You've forward sold 4 ships so far. They're all generally older in age.

是的。不，當然，從你們的歷史來看，你們在投資上一直非常靈活且有條不紊，這就是一個很好的例子。也許再追問一下，換個話題。到目前為止你們已經預先出售了4艘船，它們整體而言船齡都比較大。

I know it's a bit tricky. It's a nice problem to have in terms of deciding whether to sell these older ships in your fleet or hold them and put them on more charters. But how are you thinking about, say, the dozen or so feeder ships you have left that are built pre-2010? Are those likely to be sold as well on a forward basis maybe? Or do you think there's an opportunity to keep fixing them out?

我知道這有點棘手。就決定是出售船隊中的這些老舊船舶，還是持有並讓它們簽更多租約而言，這算是一個「好問題」。但你們如何看待，例如你們剩下約十多艘2010年以前建造的支線（feeder）船？這些也可能會以預售方式出售嗎？還是你們認為有機會繼續把它們固定（fix）出去承租？

There isn't a sort of a general answer that I can give you on that front, Omar. We effectively run a sort of a hold or divest analysis as we're approaching the end of the charter on any ship. And if it makes sense to sell in our view at that particular time, and we think we're going to make more money for shareholders by selling as opposed to by holding the asset, then we will sell depending upon the opportunities that are available to us at that time.

Omar，在這方面我沒有一個可以一概而論的答案。基本上，當任何一艘船的租約接近到期時，我們都會做一個「持有或處分」的分析。如果在我們看來在那個特定時點出售是合理的，而且我們認為相較於持有資產，出售能為股東賺到更多錢，那麼我們就會視當時可得的機會而定進行出售。

On the other hand, I would say, more generally, at least, we think that you make more money out of holding and operating a containership through the cycle than you do by selling it. It's only because these vessels, these four ships that you referred to at the outset of your question were approaching inarguably close to the end of their economic lives that we felt that the option value attached to those vessels, at least for us, was somewhat reduced.

另一方面，更一般地說，至少我們認為，穿越景氣循環持有並營運一艘貨櫃船，比起把它賣掉更能賺錢。之所以會出售你在問題一開始提到的那四艘船，只是因為它們無可爭辯地已非常接近其經濟壽命的終點，因此我們覺得附著在那些船舶上的選擇權價值（option value），至少對我們而言，已經有所降低。

And as a result, it made sense to divest them on what we consider to be attractive terms. But it's not a general approach. Every transaction, every ship, every investment and divestment, we analyze on its own rights.

因此，我們認為以具吸引力的條件處分它們是合理的。但這不是一個普遍性的做法。每一筆交易、每一艘船、每一項投資與處分，我們都會就其本身進行分析。

Congratulations on those new buildings.

恭喜你們的那些新造船。

(Operator Instructions)

（接線員指示）

Stephanie Moore, Jefferies.

Stephanie Moore，Jefferies。

I wanted to follow up on the new buildings as well. To your point, obviously, congrats on unlocking in those -- locking in those time charter rates on those assets. But I wanted to maybe talk through how sensitive is the investment case for these newbuilds around recharter rates after those first contract periods expire? And then I guess, what are your underlying market assumptions embedded in this analysis that supports the newbuild investment. So great to see the first set locked in, but wanted to get your thoughts on kind of even after that, what your underlying outlook is.

我也想追問一下新造船。就你剛才的重點而言，顯然恭喜你們在那些資產上鎖定了那些定期租船（time charter）租金。但我想進一步談談：在第一段合約期間到期後，這些新造船的投資論點對於再租（recharter）租金的敏感度有多高？另外，我想問支撐這項新造船投資分析的、你們內含的市場假設是什麼。很高興看到第一批已經鎖定，但也想聽聽你們對於之後、以及你們底層展望的看法。

Stephanie, thanks for the question. This is Tom. So going back to a point George was making earlier, we focus on risk first and that drives always our investment analysis. So we need to get ourselves comfortable that the downside risk is covered and that the upside potential is attractive before we move forward on anything of this nature. So I think it's significant to say that we're covering off 75% of the contract price of these assets within essentially the first 25% of their respective lives, which means in a cyclical industry such as ours, there is plenty of time to get it right on the up cycle after they come off their initial charters.

Stephanie，謝謝你的問題。我是Tom。回到George先前提到的一點，我們以風險為先，這也一直驅動我們的投資分析。因此，在推進任何這類事項之前，我們必須先讓自己確信下行風險已被覆蓋，且上行潛力具有吸引力。我認為很重要的一點是：我們在基本上這些資產各自壽命的前25%期間內，就能覆蓋其合約價格的75%。這意味著在像我們這樣的景氣循環產業中，當它們結束初始租約後，在上行周期仍有充足時間把握機會。

And I think while it's impossible to gaze into the future, if you look at various sort of historic rates within the sector, we're certainly assuming follow-on rates below those long-term historic averages in order to drive this as an attractive investment. And the rest is (technical difficulty) .

而且我認為，雖然不可能預知未來，但如果你看該產業各種歷史租金水準，我們在假設後續租金時，確實是以低於長期歷史平均的水準來推導，從而使其成為一項具吸引力的投資。其餘部分是（技術問題）。

And I think it's also worth pointing out that in the case, I think it's five of these newbuilds, the charterers negotiated charter extension options with us on those units. And for those charter extension options, the rates are over 25% higher than for the initial charters. So I think that suggests that the end users are aligned in thinking that these are likely to be in-demand, valuable, high-earning assets, not just for this initial period, but thereafter, too.

另外我也認為值得指出的是，在其中我想是五艘新造船的案例裡，承租人與我們談定了這些船舶的租約延長選擇權。對於這些延長選擇權，其租金比初始租約高出25%以上。我認為這顯示終端用戶的想法一致：這些資產不僅在初始期間，之後也很可能是需求旺盛、價值高、且能帶來高收益的資產。

Yes, absolutely. Maybe just as a follow-up, maybe any help you can provide in terms of just, I guess, cadence of cash flows for the newbuilds as well? That's it for me.

是的，完全同意。也許再追問一下，你能否在新造船的現金流節奏（cadence）方面提供一些協助？我這邊就這些。

You mean in terms of installment payments?

你是指分期付款（installment payments）方面嗎？

Correct. Yes.

對。是的。

Yes. Okay. So we provide, I think, in the F pages, which you probably haven't had a chance to look at, some fairly granular detail on the stage payments as they materialize. But more broadly speaking, the payments tend to be backloaded. So between 50% and 60% of the contract amount is actually only payable upon delivery of the assets themselves.

好的。是的。我們在我想是F頁面中提供了一些相當細的分期付款（stage payments）資訊，說明它們在各階段如何落實；你可能還沒來得及看。但更廣泛地說，付款通常是後置（backloaded）的。也就是說，合約金額的50%到60%其實要到資產交付時才需要支付。

So you're looking at somewhere between 40% to 50%, which crystallizes as payment obligations in the lead up to the delivery of the assets, and those payments tend to be linked to certain milestones such as steel cutting, keel laying, that sort of thing. So the lion's share of the installments are backloaded.

因此，在資產交付前，你會看到約40%到50%會逐步確定為付款義務，而這些付款通常會與某些里程碑掛鉤，例如鋼材切割、龍骨安放（keel laying）之類。因此，大部分分期款項是後置的。

Stephanie, this is Tassos. Tomorrow probably it will be the filing of the 6-K, and you will see there a breakdown of future commitments by year, if I remember correct. So we will have these details.

Stephanie，我是Tassos。明天大概會提交6-K文件，如果我沒記錯的話，你會在那裡看到按年度拆分的未來承諾明細。所以我們會提供這些細節。

That concludes our question-and-answer session. I'd like to turn the call back over to Thomas Lister for closing remarks.

我們的問答環節到此結束。接下來我想把電話交回給Thomas Lister作結語。

Well, thank you all for joining us, particularly in the middle of the holiday season, and we look forward to reconnecting with you for our third-quarter results later in the year. Many thanks.

非常感謝各位參與，尤其是在假期季節的期間。我們期待在今年稍晚公布第三季業績時再與各位交流。非常感謝。

This concludes today's meeting. You may now disconnect.

今天的會議到此結束。您現在可以斷線。