Shift4 Payments Inc (FOUR) 2021 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good day, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Shift4 Payments First Quarter 2021 Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded. (Operator Instructions)

美好的一天，謝謝你的支持。歡迎參加 Shift4 Payments 2021 年第一季度收益電話會議。 （操作員說明）請注意，今天的會議正在錄製中。 （操作員說明）

I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Sloan Bohlen, Investor Relations. Please go ahead.

我現在想把會議交給今天的演講者，投資者關係部的 Sloan Bohlen。請繼續。

Thank you. I'd like to welcome everyone to Shift4's earnings conference call for the 3 months ended March 31, 2021.

謝謝。歡迎大家參加 Shift4 截至 2021 年 3 月 31 日止三個月的收益電話會議。

Before we begin, I'd like to remind everyone that this call will contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements made on this call that do not relate to matters of historical fact should be considered forward-looking statements, including statements regarding management's plans, strategies, goals and objectives; the expected impact of COVID-19 on our business and industry, including that with respect to the economic recovery, increases in vaccination rates and the reopening of the country and any volume recovery by us; gateway penetration and spend seen by our gateway merchants; expectations regarding new customers, acquisitions or other transactions; and anticipated financial performance, including our financial outlook for the year ended December 31, 2021.

在我們開始之前，我想提醒大家，本次電話會議將包含 1995 年《私人證券訴訟改革法案》含義內的前瞻性陳述。本次電話會議上做出的所有與歷史事實無關的陳述都應該是考慮的前瞻性陳述，包括有關管理層計劃、戰略、目標和目標的陳述； COVID-19 對我們企業和行業的預期影響，包括經濟復甦、疫苗接種率提高和國家重新開放以及我們的任何產量恢復方面的影響；我們的網關商家看到的網關滲透率和支出；對新客戶、收購或其他交易的期望；以及預期的財務業績，包括我們截至 2021 年 12 月 31 日止年度的財務展望。

These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, but involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors that may cause our actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results. Performance or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements, factors discussed in the Risk Factors section of our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2020, as updated by our quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the 3 months ended March 31, 2021, and our other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, could cause actual results to differ materially from those indicated by the forward-looking statements made on this call.

這些陳述既不是承諾也不是保證，而是涉及已知和未知的風險、不確定性和其他可能導致我們的實際結果、業績或成就與任何未來結果存在重大差異的重要因素。前瞻性陳述所表達或暗示的業績或成就，以及我們截至 2020 年 12 月 31 日的年度報告 10-K 表的風險因素部分中討論的因素，這些因素由我們的 10-Q 表季度報告更新為截至 2021 年 3 月 31 日的三個月，以及我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的其他文件，可能導致實際結果與本次電話會議上所做的前瞻性陳述所表明的結果存在重大差異。

Any such forward-looking statements represent management's estimates as of the date of this call. While we may elect to update such forward-looking statements at some point in the future, we disclaim any obligation to do so even if subsequent events caused our views to change. In addition, we may also reference certain non-GAAP measures on this call, which are reconciled to the nearest GAAP measure in the company's earnings release, which can be found on our Investor Relations website at investors.shift4.com.

任何此類前瞻性陳述均代表管理層截至本次電話會議之日的估計。雖然我們可能會選擇在未來某個時候更新此類前瞻性陳述，但我們不承擔任何義務，即使後續事件導致我們的觀點發生變化。此外，我們還可能在此次電話會議上引用某些非 GAAP 指標，這些指標與公司收益發布中最接近的 GAAP 指標相一致，可在我們的投資者關係網站 investors.shift4.com 上找到。

And with that, let me turn the call to our Chief Executive Officer, Jared Isaacman.

說到這裡，讓我把電話轉給我們的首席執行官賈里德·艾薩克曼 (Jared Isaacman)。

Thank you, Sloan. Good morning, and thank you, all, for joining us. If you recall from our last quarterly earnings update in early March, we were beginning to see signs of strong volume recovery across much of our merchant base. I'm happy to share with you all this morning that these volume trends exhibited during late February continued through March, resulting in a reasonably strong first quarter.

謝謝你，斯隆。早上好，謝謝大家加入我們。如果您還記得我們在 3 月初發布的上一季度收益更新，我們開始看到我們大部分商戶的交易量強勁復甦的跡象。我很高興今天上午與大家分享這些在 2 月下旬展示的銷量趨勢一直持續到 3 月，導致第一季度相當強勁。

Just to reiterate, at Shift4, we are an integrated payments company that focuses on some of the most demanding and complex environments in commerce. This includes a lot of larger restaurants, hotels and hospitality merchants as well as specialty retailers and sports and entertainment venues. We saw some nice year-over-year volume growth in Q1, but the majority of our growth throughout this pandemic has been as a result of new and larger merchants joining our platform.

重申一下，在 Shift4，我們是一家綜合支付公司，專注於商業中一些最苛刻和復雜的環境。這包括許多較大的餐廳、酒店和招待商以及專業零售商和體育和娛樂場所。我們在第一季度看到了一些不錯的同比銷量增長，但在整個大流行期間我們的增長大部分是由於新的和更大的商家加入我們的平台。

While our performance has been strong, most of our customers are, in fact, still operating below pre-pandemic levels, which is important on 2 accounts: one, our value proposition that's fueled year-over-year revenue growth for 21 consecutive years has proven to be compelling in the best and worst of economic times; two, as the country continues to reopen, we expect considerable volume recovery from our existing customers as well as from all the merchants joining our platform every single day.

儘管我們的業績一直很強勁，但實際上我們的大多數客戶的運營水平仍低於大流行前的水平，這在兩個方面很重要：第一，我們連續 21 年推動收入同比增長的價值主張已經在最好和最壞的經濟時期被證明是引人注目的；第二，隨著國家繼續重新開放，我們預計每天都會從現有客戶以及所有加入我們平台的商家那裡獲得可觀的銷量恢復。

With that stated, let me provide a brief overview of our first quarter performance. First, we reported another record quarter of end-to-end payment volume totaling nearly $8 billion, which is up approximately 30% over the same period last year. As I mentioned in my Shareholder Letter, we actually had some tough comps as January and February of 2020 were up over 50% year-over-year compared to 2019 levels. The volume growth was not isolated to this past quarter. April has also seen impressive sequential growth, as Taylor will talk about in just a bit.

話雖如此，讓我簡要概述一下我們第一季度的表現。首先，我們報告了另一個創紀錄的季度端到端支付量，總計近 80 億美元，比去年同期增長約 30%。正如我在股東信中提到的那樣，我們實際上有一些艱難的補償，因為與 2019 年的水平相比，2020 年 1 月和 2 月同比增長超過 50%。銷量增長並非孤立於上個季度。 4 月份也出現了令人印象深刻的環比增長，泰勒稍後將談到這一點。

We don't generally focus on our gateway-only volumes on this call, but it's also a very encouraging indicator that our annualized March gateway volumes totaled $150 billion, which is moving closer to our pre-COVID-19 2019 volumes. Put more plainly, our gateway merchants are seeing a rapid recovery in spend already this year in spite of colder weather in much of the Northeast and COVID-19-related occupancy restrictions.

在這次電話會議上，我們通常不會只關注我們的網關交易量，但這也是一個非常令人鼓舞的指標，表明我們 3 月份的年化網關交易量總計 1500 億美元，正在接近我們 2019 年 COVID-19 之前的交易量。更明確地說，儘管東北部大部分地區天氣變冷，而且與 COVID-19 相關的入住限制，但我們的門戶商戶今年已經看到了支出的快速回升。

I mentioned this also to address frequent questions from our investors as to how much of our gateway-only volume remains, considering it's one of the easiest growth opportunities to quantify inside of the Shift4 story. While we've exceeded early expectations on gateway penetration, there's still a long way to go, clearly.

我提到這一點也是為了解決我們的投資者經常提出的問題，即我們的僅網關交易量還剩下多少，考慮到這是在 Shift4 故事中量化的最簡單的增長機會之一。雖然我們已經超出了網關滲透的早期預期，但顯然還有很長的路要走。

Volume growth drove record revenue of $240 million and gross revenues less network fees of $97.5 million, which is up 23% compared to just a year ago. What many may not know about our business is that, in addition to typically being the lowest volume quarter for us on a seasonal basis, Q1 is also typically the lowest on a net spread basis, which Brad will talk about more later. Said plainly, we're very encouraged by how Q1 sets us up for the remainder of the year.

銷量增長推動收入達到創紀錄的 2.4 億美元，總收入減去網絡費用後達到 9750 萬美元，與一年前相比增長了 23%。許多人可能對我們的業務不了解的是，除了通常是我們季節性銷量最低的季度外，第一季度通常也是淨價差最低的季度，Brad 稍後將詳細討論這一點。坦率地說，我們對第一季度如何為今年餘下的時間做好準備感到非常鼓舞。

Our adjusted EBITDA of $22.2 million was up modestly year-over-year, but also included $7 million of accelerated expense and a onetime charge, which Brad will expand upon. As I mentioned in my Shareholder Letter, I do think it's important to explain why we didn't see more flow-through to adjusted EBITDA, and it's really attributed to 2 factors.

我們調整後的 EBITDA 為 2220 萬美元，同比小幅增長，但還包括 700 萬美元的加速費用和一次性費用，Brad 將對此進行擴展。正如我在股東信中提到的那樣，我確實認為解釋為什麼我們沒有看到更多的資金流向調整後的 EBITDA 很重要，這實際上歸因於兩個因素。

First, our first and only notable COVID-19-related business closure, which was an approximately $5 million risk loss attributed to the business failure of a specialty retailer. This is the only notable risk loss in my 21-year history with the company. And while we do expect some recovery, we have chosen to expense all charges at this time. Second, we are continuing to make investments in talent and systems to ensure the scalability and experience for our merchants, partners and employees.

首先，我們第一個也是唯一一個值得注意的與 COVID-19 相關的業務關閉，這是由於一家專業零售商的業務失敗造成的大約 500 萬美元的風險損失。這是我在公司 21 年曆史中唯一值得注意的風險損失。雖然我們確實希望有所恢復，但我們選擇此時將所有費用計入費用。其次，我們將繼續對人才和系統進行投資，以確保我們的商家、合作夥伴和員工的可擴展性和體驗。

As a company, we have performed well during some of the best and most difficult times imaginable for our customers, partners and employees. As we look at Q1 performance and the end-to-end volume contribution from April, we are very encouraged and excited about the year ahead. We see significant runway both from the recovery of the economy as vaccination rates increase, as well as new market share gains as our value proposition continues to resonate and win.

作為一家公司，在我們的客戶、合作夥伴和員工可以想像到的一些最好和最困難的時期，我們表現良好。當我們查看第一季度的業績和 4 月份的端到端銷量貢獻時，我們對來年感到非常鼓舞和興奮。隨著疫苗接種率的提高，我們看到了經濟復甦的重要跑道，以及隨著我們的價值主張繼續引起共鳴並贏得市場份額而獲得的新市場份額。

As many of you know, Shift4 is a company that has a hard time sitting still, so I'd also like to give you a few updates on some strategic initiatives that continue to accelerate our growth. In October of last year, we made a relatively small investment to acquire a professional services company that specializes in supporting some of the most recognizable merchants in the hospitality industry. Our objective was to use this world-class team to further enable our capabilities and to allow our software partners to lean on us more, while engaging the largest and most sophisticated hospitality merchants.

正如你們許多人所知，Shift4 是一家很難坐以待斃的公司，因此我還想向你們介紹一些繼續加速我們發展的戰略舉措的最新情況。去年 10 月，我們進行了一筆相對較小的投資，收購了一家專門為酒店業一些最知名的商家提供支持的專業服務公司。我們的目標是利用這個世界級的團隊進一步增強我們的能力，並讓我們的軟件合作夥伴更多地依賴我們，同時吸引最大和最成熟的酒店商家。

Since that acquisition, we've seen a 50% increase in end-to-end merchant production from these market segments. You may have seen our announcements regarding Petco Park in San Diego or my personal favorite, Junior's Cheesecake. These are just 2 examples of the accelerated growth this capability has afforded us in a market in which we were already performing reasonably well.

自那次收購以來，我們已經看到這些細分市場的端到端商家生產增加了 50%。您可能已經看到我們關於聖地亞哥 Petco Park 或我個人最喜歡的 Junior's Cheesecake 的公告。這些只是此功能在我們已經表現良好的市場中為我們提供的加速增長的兩個例子。

Our eCommerce platform, Ship4 Shop, is also off to a very promising start. Since our acquisition in November of 2020, we worked very quickly to deploy enhancements, implement a disruptive go-to-market pricing model and launched a promotional campaign to help shine a spotlight on this great platform. You will find in our Shareholder Letter that the traction generated by these efforts has exceeded our initial forecast. To date, we've added 21,000 incremental Web stores, which more than doubles the footprint of the business.

我們的電子商務平台 Ship4 Shop 也迎來了一個非常有希望的開端。自 2020 年 11 月被收購以來，我們非常迅速地部署了增強功能，實施了顛覆性的上市定價模型，並發起了促銷活動，以幫助突出這個偉大的平台。您會在我們的股東信中發現，這些努力產生的吸引力超出了我們最初的預測。迄今為止，我們已經增加了 21,000 家網上商店，這使業務足跡翻了一番還多。

As a reminder, doubling the customer count of Shift4Shop was our first-year objective, and it was surpassed in less than 6 months. I also want to emphasize that the Shift4Shop acquisition has given us good reason to explore and invest in technology, like capital offerings, buy-now-pay-later programs, cryptocurrency acceptance, crypto settlement, that would have really been a stretch for us to incorporate in our historic base of customers.

提醒一下，將 Shift4Shop 的客戶數量翻一番是我們第一年的目標，不到 6 個月就實現了。我還想強調，對 Shift4Shop 的收購讓我們有充分的理由去探索和投資技術，比如資本發行、先買後付計劃、加密貨幣接受、加密結算，這對我們來說真的很困難納入我們的歷史客戶群。

While it's only been 2 months since we announced our most recent acquisition of VenueNext, we are already finding early success. Entertainment venues and theme parks across the country are eagerly seeking to enable a fan-first technology, contactless payment method and adjust workflows for a more mobile-centric experience. As you may have seen in our Shareholder Letter, we're proud to count the Washington National as a new customer. Based on our visibility into the pipeline, we expect there to be many more.

雖然距離我們最近宣布收購 VenueNext 僅過去了 2 個月，但我們已經取得了初步的成功。全國各地的娛樂場所和主題公園都在急切地尋求啟用粉絲至上的技術、非接觸式支付方式，並調整工作流程以獲得更加以移動為中心的體驗。正如您在我們的股東信中所看到的那樣，我們很自豪能夠將華盛頓國民隊視為新客戶。根據我們對管道的可見性，我們預計會有更多。

Lastly, I want to comment on the M&A environment. Shift4 has a proven track record of identifying scarce assets that are complementary to our integrated payment strategy and build upon our ambition to provide a unified global commerce experience for our partners and customers. As evidenced by the acquisitions we just mentioned, acquiring these assets can often lead to accelerated growth and valuable diversification. We view the current landscape as ripe for numerous transactions, ranging from strategic tuck-ins to large-scale transformational deals. We are dedicating more resources towards these opportunities, while, at the same time, remaining disciplined with regard to valuations.

最後，我想談談併購環境。 Shift4 在識別稀缺資產方面有著良好的記錄，這些資產與我們的綜合支付戰略相輔相成，並建立在我們為合作夥伴和客戶提供統一的全球商務體驗的雄心之上。正如我們剛才提到的收購所證明的那樣，收購這些資產通常可以導致加速增長和有價值的多元化。我們認為當前的形勢對於許多交易來說已經成熟，從戰略性收購到大規模轉型交易。我們正在為這些機會投入更多資源，同時在估值方面保持紀律。

And with that, I will turn it over to Taylor Lauber to comment on some of our quarterly trends and other strategic updates.

有了這個，我將把它交給泰勒勞伯來評論我們的一些季度趨勢和其他戰略更新。

Thanks, Jared, and good morning, everyone. As Jared mentioned, this was quite a strong quarter for us. $8 billion in volume not only represents a record, but it's almost $1 billion higher than our previous record quarter for volume. To provide some context on why that's so exciting, the first 6 weeks of the quarter were actually quite suppressed. Additionally, we exited March with roughly 9% more active merchants than in December of 2020.

謝謝，Jared，大家早上好。正如 Jared 提到的，這對我們來說是一個非常強勁的季度。 80 億美元的交易量不僅創下了紀錄，而且比我們之前創紀錄的季度交易量高出近 10 億美元。為了說明為什麼如此令人興奮，本季度的前 6 週實際上受到了抑制。此外，與 2020 年 12 月相比，我們在 3 月份結束時的活躍商家數量增加了約 9%。

Because this is our first Q1 as a public company, I think it's worth setting the stage a bit for how Q1 would influence a typical year for us. Prior to COVID-19, we would expect Q1 to be our weakest quarter on both a volume and net spread basis. The holiday season hangover, as we like to call it, often results in reduced consumer spending across a less favorable mix of merchants and card types.

因為這是我們作為上市公司的第一個第一季度，所以我認為有必要為第一季度對我們典型年份的影響做一些準備。在 COVID-19 之前，我們預計第一季度將是我們在數量和淨利差方面最弱的季度。我們喜歡稱之為假期後遺症，通常會導致消費者支出減少，原因是商家和銀行卡類型的組合不太理想。

In a normalized environment, we'd expect roughly 20% of our annual volume to occur in Q1. As the weather warms across the country, travel and consumer spending typically increases significantly in Q2 and Q3, which are historically our strongest quarters. We would characterize the most recent quarters exhibiting typical seasonal trends, but still significantly impacted by COVID-19.

在正常情況下，我們預計大約 20% 的年銷量將出現在第一季度。隨著全國各地天氣變暖，旅遊和消費者支出通常在第二季度和第三季度顯著增加，這在歷史上是我們最強勁的季度。我們將描述最近幾個季度表現出典型的季節性趨勢，但仍受到 COVID-19 的顯著影響。

As you can imagine, we are very optimistic about the exit rates experienced in Q1 and how this positions us for the remainder of the year. Our April end-to-end volume continued this growth trend. It was the highest month in our history and 4% above our very strong March.

可以想像，我們對第一季度的退出率以及這對我們今年剩餘時間的定位非常樂觀。我們 4 月份的端到端交易量延續了這一增長趨勢。這是我們歷史上最高的月份，比我們非常強勁的三月份高出 4%。

While there's some seasonal factors that can influence volume week-to-week, we've seen a consistent sequential increase in volume and active merchant counts. For example, last week, we saw end-to-end volume of $830 million and active merchant counts 2.5% higher than the last week in March.

雖然有一些季節性因素會影響每週的交易量，但我們已經看到交易量和活躍商家數量持續連續增長。例如，上週，我們看到端到端交易量為 8.3 億美元，活躍商家數量比 3 月份的最後一周高出 2.5%。

The expansion of our total addressable market has also fueled an expansion in our pipeline of desirable M&A transactions. We've made the decision to launch Shift4 Ventures as a means of capitalizing on earlier-stage opportunities we've been seeing. While we did not expect this to be a significant portion of our balance sheet, we do believe that these partnerships will involve both capital and collaboration.

我們總目標市場的擴張也推動了我們理想的併購交易渠道的擴張。我們已經決定推出 Shift4 Ventures，以此作為利用我們已經看到的早期機會的一種方式。雖然我們預計這不會成為我們資產負債表的重要部分，但我們確實相信這些夥伴關係將涉及資本和合作。

We are specifically pursuing investments where we can have a role in helping drive growth in the business through our technology and customers. In April, we've invested in Sightline Payments, which is a unique digital commerce platform for casino resort operators. Jared mentioned the traction we're seeing with the 3 recent acquisitions.

我們特別尋求投資，我們可以通過我們的技術和客戶在幫助推動業務增長方面發揮作用。 4 月，我們投資了 Sightline Payments，這是一個針對賭場度假村運營商的獨特數字商務平台。 Jared 提到了我們在最近的 3 次收購中看到的牽引力。

I think it's important to note that, while these wins are encouraging, they don't influence our decision on the revenue guidance, which Brad will touch on in a moment. I think that's worth repeating. While we do include the increased operational expense from acquisitions, we do not include the revenue synergies until they are realized and more predictably modeled. We will provide regular updates on these new merchant cohorts as they mature, and we look forward to doing that.

我認為重要的是要注意，雖然這些勝利令人鼓舞，但它們不會影響我們對收入指導的決定，布拉德稍後會談到這一點。我認為這值得重複。雖然我們確實包括收購帶來的增加的運營費用，但我們不包括收入協同效應，直到它們實現並更可預測地建模。隨著這些新商戶群體的成熟，我們將定期提供更新，我們期待著這樣做。

And with that, I'll turn it over to Brad.

有了這個，我會把它交給布拉德。

Thanks, Taylor. Just like last quarter, I'm going to reference a few pages in the back end of our earnings material that will highlight several of the metrics that we're going to talk about. So for the first quarter, we generated $239.3 million in gross revenues and $97.5 million in gross revenue less network fees. Both of these figures represent our highest quarterly revenue production in the company's history.

謝謝，泰勒。就像上個季度一樣，我將在我們的收益材料的後端引用幾頁，這些頁面將突出我們將要討論的幾個指標。因此，在第一季度，我們產生了 2.393 億美元的總收入和 9750 萬美元的總收入減去網絡費用。這兩個數字都代表了我們公司歷史上最高的季度收入。

The $97.5 million in gross revenue less network fees represents a 23% increase over prior year and a 10% increase compared to last quarter. The year-over-year variance was driven by a 35% increase in net processing revenues, driven mostly by new merchants onboarding and the continued recovery in consumer spending across our merchant base.

扣除網絡費用後的總收入為 9750 萬美元，比上年增長 23%，比上一季度增長 10%。同比差異是由淨加工收入增長 35% 推動的，這主要是由於新商家的加入以及我們商家群中消費者支出的持續復甦。

First quarter net processing revenue made up 61% of our gross revenue less network fees, up from 56% from the same period last year. Our gateway and SaaS other revenue streams both grew modestly year-over-year due to continued recovery of our gateway merchants and the impact of our recent acquisitions.

第一季度淨處理收入占我們總收入減去網絡費用的 61%，高於去年同期的 56%。我們的網關和 SaaS 其他收入流都同比溫和增長，這是由於我們的網關商家持續復甦以及我們最近收購的影響。

Net spread in the quarter was approximately 75 basis points, which represents an 8% drop from prior quarter and 4% increase over prior year. The drop from Q4 of 2020 was driven by a combination of factors, including some seasonal increase in travel and higher-than-normal debit card usage.

本季度的淨利差約為 75 個基點，較上一季度下降 8%，較上年同期增長 4%。與 2020 年第四季度相比的下降是由多種因素共同推動的，包括旅行的季節性增加和高於正常水平的借記卡使用。

I'll note that April blended spreads have increased to approximately 78 basis points. This pattern is typical for our business. And while we do continue to expect blended spread compression as a result of boarding larger customers, Q1 is typically lower than average spread we experienced throughout the year.

我會注意到 4 月份的混合利差已經增加到大約 78 個基點。這種模式是我們業務的典型模式。雖然我們確實繼續預計由於寄宿更大的客戶而導致混合價差壓縮，但第一季度通常低於我們全年經歷的平均價差。

We reported $22.2 million in adjusted EBITDA for the quarter. If we apply consistent accounting treatment to our equipment leases in 2020, these results are largely consistent with prior year. As Jared mentioned in his opening comments, we have 2 extraordinary items worth mentioning that are affecting our adjusted EBITDA within the quarter.

我們報告本季度調整後的 EBITDA 為 2220 萬美元。如果我們對 2020 年的設備租賃採用一致的會計處理，這些結果與上一年基本一致。正如賈里德在開場白中提到的，我們有 2 個值得一提的特別項目正在影響我們本季度調整後的 EBITDA。

First, we recorded a loss of $5.2 million as a result of a multi-location specialty retailer that abruptly closed as a result of a business failure during the quarter. These losses are the result of customer chargebacks for pre-ordered goods not delivered to consumers. We do believe that some of the balance to be recoverable as we work with the business administrators, but we have chosen to record the maximum amount of Shift4's potential liability. Any amount recovered would positively impact a future quarter.

首先，我們記錄了 520 萬美元的損失，這是由於一家多地點專業零售商在本季度因業務失敗而突然關閉。這些損失是由於客戶對未交付給消費者的預購商品拒付造成的。我們確實相信，在與業務管理員合作時，部分餘額是可以收回的，但我們選擇記錄 Shift4 潛在負債的最大金額。收回的任何金額都會對未來的季度產生積極影響。

Second, given the faster-than-anticipated recovery in the merchant base, we elected to accelerate approximately $2.3 million of operating expenses that were previously budgeted for future quarters. These expenses primarily relate to increased software licenses to aid in the scaling of certain platforms and temporary staff to assist in customer boarding activities. Both of these events are isolated to Q1 and should not be considered contributors of ongoing expenses.

其次，鑑於商戶基礎的複蘇速度快於預期，我們選擇加快之前為未來幾個季度預算的約 230 萬美元的運營支出。這些費用主要與增加的軟件許可證有關，以幫助擴展某些平台和臨時員工以協助客戶登機活動。這兩個事件都與第一季度無關，不應被視為持續支出的貢獻者。

Our first quarter results represent an adjusted EBITDA margin of 23% against gross revenue less network fees. The impact of the previously discussed nonrecurring loss in our OpEx acceleration decreased margins in the quarter by approximately 8 percentage points.

我們第一季度的業績表明，相對於扣除網絡費用的總收入，調整後的 EBITDA 利潤率為 23%。之前討論的非經常性損失對我們 OpEx 加速的影響使本季度的利潤率降低了約 8 個百分點。

As we mentioned in our Q4 earnings discussions, we invested approximately $21 million in the first quarter on the integration and rebranding of Shift4Shop, a portion of which was done in cooperation with the Inspiration4 and Shift4Shop entrepreneur contests. These expenses have been treated as nonrecurring costs within our financials and are added back for EBITDA purposes.

正如我們在第四季度收益討論中提到的那樣，我們在第一季度投資了約 2100 萬美元用於 Shift4Shop 的整合和品牌重塑，其中一部分是與 Inspiration4 和 Shift4Shop 企業家競賽合作完成的。這些費用在我們的財務中被視為非經常性成本，並被加回用於 EBITDA 目的。

We did not execute on any significant capital transactions in the quarter. However, the adoption of ASU 2020-06 did trigger a balance sheet reclassification related to our outstanding convertible debt offering. In our Q1 balance sheet, you will notice $110 million has moved from equity to debt related to that adoption. With regard to liquidity, we ended 2020 with $845 million in cash and $99.5 million of available capacity on our revolving credit facility.

本季度我們沒有執行任何重大資本交易。然而，ASU 2020-06 的採用確實觸發了與我們未償還的可轉換債券發行相關的資產負債表重新分類。在我們第一季度的資產負債表中，您會注意到 1.1 億美元已從股權轉移到與該採用相關的債務。在流動性方面，我們在 2020 年底擁有 8.45 億美元的現金和 9950 萬美元的循環信貸額度。

Now I'll move on to guidance for the year. Given our performance in the first quarter, we will be increasing our full year guidance for each of our KPIs. Specifically, now, we expect full year end-to-end processing volumes to be between $44 billion and $46 billion. These volumes would drive gross revenues between $1.2 billion and $1.3 billion, and gross revenue less network fees between $480 million and $490 million.

現在我將繼續指導這一年。鑑於我們在第一季度的表現，我們將增加對每個 KPI 的全年指導。具體來說，現在，我們預計全年端到端處理量將在 440 億美元至 460 億美元之間。這些數量將推動總收入在 12 億美元至 13 億美元之間，總收入減去網絡費用將在 4.8 億美元至 4.9 億美元之間。

The revised range for adjusted EBITDA is now $165 million to $170 million. The update to adjusted EBITDA does include the impact of the risk loss and cost acceleration that was mentioned previously. If we were to normalize our guidance to exclude these charges, our adjusted EBITDA margin on the incremental gross revenue less network fees would be approximately 50%.

調整後的 EBITDA 的修訂範圍現在為 1.65 億美元至 1.7 億美元。調整後 EBITDA 的更新確實包括前面提到的風險損失和成本加速的影響。如果我們將我們的指導規範化以排除這些費用，我們調整後的 EBITDA 利潤率在增量總收入減去網絡費用後將約為 50%。

With that, I will turn it back to Jared for some final comments.

有了這個，我會把它轉回 Jared 以獲得一些最後的評論。

Thanks, Brad. And I think this is a good time to open it up for questions.

謝謝，布拉德。我認為現在是提出問題的好時機。

(Operator Instructions) Your first question comes from the line of Tim Chiodo with Crédit Suisse.

（操作員說明）您的第一個問題來自瑞士信貸銀行的 Tim Chiodo。

I wanted to talk about some of your underlying organic share gains. So in the past, you've talked about some of the very, very attractive payback periods that you have, meaning, essentially implying 9 months, 8 months, sometimes shorter, meaning very attractive LTV to CAC.

我想談談你的一些潛在的有機份額收益。所以在過去，你談到了一些非常非常有吸引力的投資回收期，也就是說，基本上意味著 9 個月、8 個月，有時更短，這意味著 LTV 對 CAC 非常有吸引力。

And you've talked about, at times, selectively increasing CAC because the numbers still work, it's still very attractive. I just wanted to see if you could touch on that? If you're employing that strategy to some? If you're seeing great success with it? And really just any update on that broader topic of your attractive payback period.

你有時談到有選擇地增加 CAC，因為這些數字仍然有效，它仍然非常有吸引力。我只是想看看你能不能談談這個？如果你對某些人採用這種策略？如果你看到它取得了巨大的成功？實際上只是關於您有吸引力的投資回收期這一更廣泛主題的任何更新。

Yes, sure. Hey, Tim, it's Taylor. It's a good question. I think we really started down this path in earnest, I want to say it's Q3 and Q4 of 2020. And just to remind sort of everyone else on the call, our payback methodology was pretty standardized across the company. It would result in anywhere between kind of a 6- and 9-month payback, as you mentioned, with our standard incentives and hardware deployments across our merchant base.

是的，當然。嘿，蒂姆，我是泰勒。這是個好問題。我認為我們真的開始認真地走這條路，我想說的是 2020 年第三季度和第四季度。只是為了提醒電話中的其他人，我們的投資回報方法在整個公司都非常標準化。正如您提到的，通過我們在整個商家群中的標準激勵和硬件部署，這將導致 6 到 9 個月之間的任何回報。

But what we found was that larger merchants would actually respond less favorably to financial incentives and much more favorably to technology incentives that actually cost less, in some cases. So we went down this path of modifying how we approach each of these segments, and I'd say it's worked tremendously well.

但我們發現，在某些情況下，較大的商家實際上對財務激勵措施的反應不那麼積極，而對實際上成本更低的技術激勵措施的反應要好得多。所以我們走上了這條修改我們處理每個細分市場的方式的道路，我想說它的效果非常好。

You'd see that evidenced by the increase in hotel volume that we saw over the past, really, 2 quarters. We boarded more hotels during that period -- during the last 6 to 9 months than in any other point in our history. And again, this is when hotels are pretty significantly impacted. Now I don't want to make it too much about financial engineering. It's really about getting surgical around what's going to motivate a particular merchant base at a given point in time.

你會看到我們在過去兩個季度看到的酒店數量的增加證明了這一點。在那段時間裡——過去 6 到 9 個月裡，我們入住的酒店比我們歷史上任何時候都要多。同樣，這是酒店受到相當大影響的時候。現在我不想過多地談論金融工程。這實際上是關於在給定的時間點圍繞將激勵特定商家群的因素進行外科手術。

So keep in mind, we've got 350 different software suites, each of them attracting a different quality of merchant. It can be the front desk of a hotel, all the way down to the gift shop inside of a hotel. And the incentives work differently. So we have pushed the lever forward a little bit in aggregate, but it hasn't been about increasing across the board. It's about giving more targeted incentives to higher-quality customers, and it's worked well thus far.

所以請記住，我們有 350 種不同的軟件套件，每一種都吸引了不同質量的商家。它可以是酒店的前台，一直到酒店內部的禮品店。並且激勵機制不同。因此，我們總體上將槓桿向前推了一點，但這並不是要全面增加。這是關於為更高質量的客戶提供更有針對性的激勵措施，到目前為止效果很好。

Yes, Tim. Hey, it's Jared here. Just to layer on to it a little bit. It is such a good question. I mean, we IPO-ed with really these best-in-class unit economics. And you're right, I mean, we lived for several years in these like 8- to 9-month payback periods from a customer acquisition cost perspective. And that was largely just due to constraints of having 5 to 6x leverage at the time of the IPO.

是的，蒂姆。嘿，我是傑瑞德。只是在上面加一點。這是一個很好的問題。我的意思是，我們 IPO 確實擁有這些一流的單位經濟學。你是對的，我的意思是，從客戶獲取成本的角度來看，我們在 8 到 9 個月的投資回收期中生活了幾年。這主要是由於在 IPO 時槓桿率達到 5 到 6 倍的限制。

Obviously, since delevered considerably, we have a lot of cash. So the question being, why don't we just put more of it to work to accelerate growth? I think what Taylor was saying is, we're doing it in a number of different ways, depending on the target market we're going after.

顯然，由於大幅去槓桿化，我們擁有大量現金。所以問題是，為什麼我們不把更多的錢用於加速增長呢？我認為泰勒所說的是，我們正在以多種不同的方式進行，具體取決於我們所追求的目標市場。

In the case of, say, our restaurant business, like we know we're going to continue to take share within that space by investing more in our research and development technology initiatives. Things like QR codes, contactless payments, is what's going to drive customers over to us just as they did during the pandemic, and they're continuing to do so now.

就我們的餐飲業務而言，就像我們知道的那樣，我們將通過加大對研發技術計劃的投資來繼續在該領域佔據份額。二維碼、非接觸式支付等功能將把客戶吸引到我們這裡來，就像他們在大流行期間所做的那樣，而且他們現在仍在繼續這樣做。

In the case of hospitality, hotels, it's a combination of solving some pain points that a lot of these legacy -- a lot of these legacy property management systems, which still dominate the market, need to address. Software database upgrades that support things like phone-based check-in, for example.

就酒店、酒店而言，它結合了解決許多遺留問題的一些痛點——許多仍然主導市場的遺留物業管理系統需要解決。例如，軟件數據庫升級支持基於電話的簽到等功能。

What I would say is, we've looked to sports and entertainment, for example, that's one area where additional financial incentives. This is an industry that was hit pretty hard due to the pandemic. Like they welcome things like sponsorships and such, which has absolutely been helping us incorporate our technology like VenueNext, like our mobile solutions and payments in that market. So I think the answer is, yes, we're just kind of like fine-tuning new strategies based on the verticals that we're trying to conquer.

我要說的是，例如，我們已經關注體育和娛樂，這是一個需要額外財政激勵的領域。這是一個因大流行而受到重創的行業。就像他們歡迎贊助之類的事情一樣，這絕對幫助我們整合了我們的技術，比如 VenueNext，比如我們在該市場的移動解決方案和支付。所以我認為答案是，是的，我們有點像根據我們試圖征服的垂直領域微調新戰略。

Okay. All right. That really helps. I hope to squeeze in one more. On Shift4Shop, the 21,000 new Web stores, and I apologize if you touched on this earlier, but could you describe the types of businesses? Are they eCom pure plays? Are they off-line stores or in-store that are expanding online? Is it start-ups? Is it a little bit of mix of everything? Some of your own merchants coming over? Any color there would be great.

好的。好的。這真的很有幫助。希望再擠一個。在 Shift4Shop 上，有 21,000 家新的網上商店，如果您之前提到過這個問題，我深表歉意，但您能描述一下業務類型嗎？他們是純粹的電子商務嗎？他們是在線下擴張的實體店還是實體店？是初創企業嗎？是不是有點混合了一切？你們自己的一些商人過來了？任何顏色都會很棒。

It's really a mix of everything. But I would say that, for the most part, they're pure-play eCom, simply because we haven't completed the integration to our online ordering products, our restaurant point-of-sale applications or card-present retail applications. So obviously, those are all road map items that we're working towards now.

這真的是一切的混合體。但我要說的是，在大多數情況下，它們是純粹的電子商務，僅僅是因為我們還沒有完成與我們的在線訂購產品、我們的餐廳銷售點應用程序或卡片零售應用程序的集成。很明顯，這些都是我們現在正在努力的路線圖項目。

We prioritized, in the first quarter, just frictionless onboarding, to have that kind of PayPal or Square-like onboarding experience, which is pretty vital for this type of market. So the fact that we haven't integrated some of our card presence technology yet, or it's in the works now, would suggest that most of the customers who are joining are just looking for a Web store at a really reasonable price point.

在第一季度，我們優先考慮的是無摩擦入職，以擁有那種 PayPal 或類似 Square 的入職體驗，這對這類市場來說非常重要。因此，事實上我們還沒有集成我們的一些卡片存在技術，或者它現在正在工作中，這表明大多數加入的客戶只是在尋找價格非常合理的網上商店。

As we've mentioned, we choose to monetize entirely through payments instead of SaaS or set-up fees or premium marketplaces and such that others have. It's kind of this whole like Bags Fly Free, but in our case, it's like, "Why pay rent for your online business?" marketing campaign. So that's what we're attracting customers with today.

正如我們所提到的，我們選擇完全通過支付而不是 SaaS 或設置費或高級市場等方式來獲利。這有點像 Bags Fly Free，但在我們的案例中，就像是“為什麼要為您的在線業務支付租金？”營銷活動。這就是我們今天吸引客戶的原因。

When we look at them every day, it's all across the spectrum. But I mean, generally, you're talking -- in terms of the products and goods being sold, but it's -- these are predominantly eCom players. And I would say it's weighted way towards share gain than it is existing customers.

當我們每天查看它們時，它們無處不在。但我的意思是，一般來說，你在談論 - 就所銷售的產品和商品而言，但它 - 這些主要是電子商務玩家。而且我會說它比現有客戶更能獲得份額收益。

Your next question comes from the line of Mike Colonnese with Bank of America.

你的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Mike Colonnese。

Nice to see this level of recovery in the business despite some of these ongoing headwinds from the pandemic here. So just to talk more about the outlook here. So can you discuss some of the underlying assumptions embedded in the revised outlook for end-to-end volume growth this year? What are you assuming for same-store sales growth, end-to-end conversions as well as new merchant wins? And also the expected contribution from recent M&A.

儘管這裡的大流行帶來了一些持續的不利因素，但很高興看到業務恢復到這種水平。因此，這裡只想多談談前景。那麼，您能否討論一下今年端到端銷量增長的修訂前景中包含的一些基本假設？您對同店銷售增長、端到端轉化以及新商戶的贏取有何假設？以及近期併購的預期貢獻。

Yes. Hey, Mike, this is Brad. I'll take part of that. And Taylor, perhaps, if I can tag team some of it.

是的。嘿，邁克，這是布拉德。我會參與其中。泰勒，也許，如果我能標記團隊中的一些。

So if we think about, yes, the guidance we've laid out, our biggest starting point is our current trends, right? We've had, as we've talked about, some pretty substantial recoveries that started in that back half of February. Those trends continued through March, and we've actually seen those trends continue into April. So that was our starting point.

因此，如果我們考慮一下，是的，我們制定的指南，我們最大的起點就是我們當前的趨勢，對嗎？正如我們所說，從 2 月下半月開始，我們已經有了一些相當可觀的複蘇。這些趨勢一直持續到 3 月，我們實際上已經看到這些趨勢一直持續到 4 月。這就是我們的出發點。

We do sense -- we build a bit of recovery back into the merchant base. It will come in over probably a 12-month period, but we don't necessarily break it out between all of the different components around same-store sales or new merchant boards. Remember, a dynamic for us is we have really good visibility of our current merchant base. And our current merchant base is still certainly not operating at its full capacity.

我們確實感覺到——我們在商業基礎上建立了一些復甦。它可能會在 12 個月的時間內出現，但我們不一定會在圍繞同店銷售或新商戶板的所有不同組件之間進行分解。請記住，對我們來說，動態是我們對當前的商家群有很好的了解。我們目前的商戶基礎肯定還沒有滿負荷運轉。

For all of those merchants that we have boarded in the last 12 months that we don't have that historical data on, we're still waiting to see how robust those merchants turn out over time. But I think the key point for you guys in building out your models and understanding our guidance is, it's really a function of where we sit today as March and April have been super strong. But we do sense some additional recovery throughout the rest of the year.

對於我們在過去 12 個月中加入的所有那些我們沒有歷史數據的商家，我們仍在等待觀察這些商家隨著時間的推移會變得多麼強大。但我認為你們建立模型和理解我們的指導的關鍵點是，這實際上是我們今天所處位置的函數，因為 3 月和 4 月非常強勁。但我們確實感覺到今年餘下時間會有一些額外的複蘇。

Yes. And I'll just sort of add a little bit there. So keep in mind that the merchants that joined us last year that always contribute the most growth to the current year. That's just the way the math rolls through, right, especially in a year where those merchants were depressed and there's some degree of recovery occurring inside of them.

是的。我會在那裡添加一點。所以請記住，去年加入我們的商家總是為當年貢獻最大的增長。這就是數學的發展方式，對吧，尤其是在那些商人情緒低落並且他們內部出現某種程度的複甦的一年裡。

So while we trend merchant production, and that's, quite frankly, the single variable that we have the most confidence in, because we've seen production stay constant sort of throughout pretty wild cycles, including the pandemic, we trend that forward. But it's really what's the behavior within that base of merchants that joined us over the last year or 2 and what's going on there.

因此，當我們趨勢商業生產時，坦率地說，這是我們最有信心的單一變量，因為我們已經看到生產在整個相當瘋狂的周期中保持不變，包括大流行，我們傾向於向前發展。但這實際上是在過去一兩年內加入我們的商家群中的行為以及那裡發生的事情。

So I mentioned it on the call, but it's kind of quick. The last month in April was $830 million of all these -- I'm sorry, the last week of April was $830 million in end-to-end volume. So you can annualize that, and you can get to a certain number. However, if you think about the fact that April is nowhere near the average week in a year, for us, from a seasonal basis, you can be optimistic sort of beyond that number.

所以我在電話中提到了它，但它有點快。 4 月的最後一個月是所有這些中的 8.3 億美元——對不起，4 月的最後一周是 8.3 億美元的端到端交易量。所以你可以把它年化，你可以得到一個特定的數字。然而，如果你考慮到 4 月遠不及一年中的平均一周，對我們來說，從季節性的角度來看，你可以樂觀地超過這個數字。

So that kind of underpins, all right, we're going to take our merchant base. We're going to trend them forward. We're going to look at current trends and see what would happen if you annualize those. It points you to a pretty reasonable path to the guidance that Brad laid out.

所以這種支撐，好吧，我們將佔據我們的商業基礎。我們將推動他們前進。我們將研究當前的趨勢，看看如果將這些趨勢年化會發生什麼。它為您指明了通往 Brad 制定的指南的相當合理的途徑。

I'd say, with your comment regarding M&A, we do it in a very methodical way. We take the revenue associated with M&A. In the case of VenueNext, for example, it's subscription revenue, they were earning prior to our acquisition. And we trimmed that down under the assumption that merchants are going to adopt our platform for payments, and we will discount that revenue in exchange for that trade.

我想說，根據您對併購的評論，我們以一種非常有條理的方式進行。我們計算與併購相關的收入。例如，就 VenueNext 而言，訂閱收入是他們在我們收購之前賺取的。我們在假設商家將採用我們的支付平台的情況下削減了這一數字，我們將對該收入進行折扣以換取該交易。

We also burden our guidance with the OpEx associated with running that business, but we do not model in the volume contribution. So that's going to sound a little bit counterintuitive. And we said we penalize the revenue of the business for cross-selling, but we don't count the benefit of that cross-sell. That's exactly right, because the profile of these merchants looks different, and we just want to let that roll through.

我們還用與運營該業務相關的 OpEx 來負擔我們的指導，但我們沒有在數量貢獻中建模。所以這聽起來有點違反直覺。我們說我們會懲罰交叉銷售業務的收入，但我們不計算交叉銷售的好處。這是完全正確的，因為這些商家的資料看起來不同，我們只是想讓它通過。

So VenueNext -- I'm sorry, Shift4Shop is a phenomenal example where we're carrying the burden of that OpEx. We boarded a boatload of great customers, but we want to let those customers see them and see the volume contribution and the spread contribution of those before we include that in the guidance.

所以 VenueNext -- 對不起，Shift4Shop 是一個非凡的例子，我們承擔了 OpEx 的負擔。我們登上了一大堆偉大的客戶，但我們希望讓這些客戶看到他們，並在我們將其納入指南之前看到這些客戶的數量貢獻和傳播貢獻。

Your next question comes from the line of Dan Perlin with RBC.

你的下一個問題來自 RBC 的 Dan Perlin。

I just had a question, probably for Brad. You talked about maybe the progression of spreads, and first quarter is going to be the lowest. But you also made mention of kind of maybe some compression throughout the year as you move to larger merchants. I'm just -- I'm trying to understand maybe the interplay between the larger merchants.

我只是有一個問題，可能是針對布拉德的。你談到了利差的進展，第一季度將是最低的。但是你也提到了隨著你轉向更大的商家，全年可能會有一些壓縮。我只是 - 我試圖了解大商家之間的相互作用。

I kind of understand, but there's also a lot of this movement towards omnichannel and maybe even what you just described as pure eCom merchants. So maybe can you just talk through a little bit of the dynamics of how the mix shift is going to impact spreads throughout the year and maybe even as we think about into the future?

我有點理解，但也有很多轉向全渠道的運動，甚至可能是你剛才所說的純電子商務商家。那麼，也許你能談談混合轉變將如何影響全年乃至我們考慮未來的利差的一些動態嗎？

Yes, sure, Dan. There's actually a couple of moving parts in here. One is what you mentioned is this ongoing kind of migration towards larger merchants. And we've talked about that's probably 1 to 2 basis points a quarter of impact as that mix shift takes place over time.

是的，當然，丹。這裡實際上有幾個活動部件。一個是你提到的這種持續向大商家的遷移。我們已經討論過，隨著時間的推移，這種混合轉變會產生四分之一的影響，這可能是 1 到 2 個基點。

What's becoming evident, although we assure these people grasp, is also there's a seasonal component as to how spreads normally behave, right? When we went public last summer, we didn't have a full year of kind of normal seasonality to put in front of everybody because the way of everything behaves in response to COVID. But what Taylor mentioned in his discussion earlier is the way we're trying to make sure people understand that there is spread dynamics as well as far as how the year rolls out.

越來越明顯的是，儘管我們向這些人保證理解，但價差的正常表現也存在季節性因素，對吧？當我們去年夏天上市時，我們沒有一整年的正常季節性可以擺在每個人面前，因為一切都在響應 COVID。但泰勒在他之前的討論中提到的是我們試圖確保人們了解傳播動態以及這一年如何展開的方式。

So Q1 will typically be your lower spreads. They will start to boost into Q2 and Q3, and then it will start to come back slightly again in Q4. But what you will see is this ongoing mix shift that will impact that as well. So I think when you think about your model, it's important to note that our Q1 spreads, even though they were lower than Q4, they're still up from prior year.

所以 Q1 通常是你的較低點差。他們將開始進入第二季度和第三季度，然後在第四季度再次開始小幅回升。但你將看到的是這種持續的混合轉變也會對其產生影響。所以我認為當你考慮你的模型時，重要的是要注意我們的第一季度利差，即使它們低於第四季度，它們仍然高於去年。

So that's still a sign that prior year in 2020 felt that same dynamic for the most part in terms of it was a lower portion of the year, but we actually grew the spreads year-over-year. But we do see spreads coming up slightly in April, we mentioned that in our previous comments. And that's going to be more of the seasonal pattern you're going to see from Q2 into Q3. We do expect some form of compression, but also some form of seasonality impact as well.

因此，這仍然是一個跡象，表明 2020 年的前一年在很大程度上感覺相同的動態是今年較低的部分，但我們實際上同比增長了利差。但我們確實看到 4 月份利差略有上升，我們在之前的評論中提到過。從第二季度到第三季度，您將看到更多的季節性模式。我們確實預計會出現某種形式的壓縮，但也會出現某種形式的季節性影響。

Okay. And then just kind of a quick big picture one. As you have been moving into these larger merchants, you've done these acquisitions that have taken you into some exciting verticals. I'm just wondering what the competitive landscape looks like for you guys now?

好的。然後只是一個快速的大圖。當您進入這些更大的商家時，您已經完成了這些收購，這些收購將您帶入了一些令人興奮的垂直領域。我只是想知道你們現在的競爭格局是什麼樣的？

Obviously, you've had a lot of success over the years. But as you've jumped into some of these newer and bigger verticals, I'm just wondering what that competitive landscape looks like going forward? And how you end up competing against maybe some of those other companies that have lower unit cost of process?

顯然，這些年來你取得了很大的成功。但是當你進入這些更新和更大的垂直領域時，我只是想知道未來的競爭格局會是什麼樣子？以及您最終如何與其他一些單位流程成本較低的公司競爭？

Sure. So Jared here, I'm happy to take that. And I think the answer is it depends on the vertical, right? So we're specialists in simplifying the most complex commerce environments, like that's where Shift4 is a key.

當然。 Jared 在這裡，我很樂意接受。我認為答案取決於垂直方向，對嗎？因此，我們是簡化最複雜的商業環境的專家，這就是 Shift4 的關鍵所在。

So If you were to take hospitality, upmarket restaurants, kind of the core original Shift4 business, nothing has changed in that regard. There's still only really 3 payment platforms out there that have the capabilities to address these verticals, the 350-plus software integrations and all that version history to compete for a pebble beach or a snowmass sort of killing pen or something of that nature. So in that respect, nothing's changed in the competitive environment. Obviously, we're growing volume at a pretty wicked fast rate. So we continue to find success in those core verticals.

因此，如果您選擇酒店、高檔餐廳，以及 Shift4 的核心原始業務，那麼在這方面沒有任何變化。仍然只有 3 個支付平台有能力解決這些垂直領域、350 多個軟件集成和所有版本歷史，以爭奪卵石灘或雪堆之類的殺戮筆或類似性質的東西。因此，在這方面，競爭環境沒有任何變化。顯然，我們的銷量增長速度非常快。因此，我們繼續在這些核心垂直領域取得成功。

If you look at how we've expanded our TAM and take stadiums, for example, we were very thoughtful. And I should say like, by the way, just our long history in integrated payments, the idea that you can buy an ISV or partner or build the capability to go after certain verticals, all of the consideration that goes into it is not lost on us.

如果你看看我們是如何擴展我們的 TAM 並以體育場館為例，我們是非常周到的。我應該說，順便說一下，我們在集成支付方面的悠久歷史，即您可以購買 ISV 或合作夥伴或建立能力以追求某些垂直領域的想法，所有的考慮都不會丟失我們。

So before buying ISV, like then we had to size at the competitive landscape and say, "Okay, there are 4 software companies that pretty much try and compete for the sports and entertainment market, 2 are very, very legacy and 1 is dependent on multiple other providers to deliver a solution." That's what gave us the confidence to acquire VenueNext and say, "A vertically integrated solution in this market is going to find success and be differentiated." So we can pull the figure on an ISV acquisition versus a pure partner play.

因此，在購買 ISV 之前，我們不得不評估競爭格局並說，“好吧，有 4 家軟件公司幾乎都在嘗試競爭體育和娛樂市場，其中 2 家非常非常傳統，1 家依賴於多個其他供應商提供解決方案。”這就是讓我們有信心收購 VenueNext 並說：“這個市場上的垂直整合解決方案將會取得成功並脫穎而出。”因此，我們可以得出 ISV 收購與純合作夥伴關係的數據。

So that really is a long way of saying we have a lot of confidence in our ability to take like substantial share in sports and entertainment venues, like we have. I mean we've been pretty much announcing stadium like every month right now. That funnel is awesome.

因此，這真的是一個很長的說法，我們對我們有能力在體育和娛樂場所佔據相當大的份額充滿信心，就像我們擁有的那樣。我的意思是我們現在幾乎每個月都在宣布體育場。那個漏斗真棒

Now if we want to talk about Shift4Shop and eCommerce, I totally would agree with you. I mean that is a very competitive environment. You're up against $200-billion-market-cap behemoths. But I would say like our entry into that space was at like a really reasonable rate.

現在，如果我們想談談 Shift4Shop 和電子商務，我完全同意你的看法。我的意思是這是一個競爭非常激烈的環境。你面對的是市值 2000 億美元的龐然大物。但我想說的是，我們進入該領域的速度非常合理。

As we talked about before, we acquired Shift4Shop on a reasonable EBITDA multiple to give us the capabilities to explore where is a highly desirable vertical, a disruptive pricing strategy. I mean I don't think the big guy is going to drop their SaaS pricing strategy anytime soon. I think that would be really hard for them.

正如我們之前談到的，我們以合理的 EBITDA 倍數收購了 Shift4Shop，使我們能夠探索哪裡是非常理想的垂直市場，這是一種顛覆性的定價策略。我的意思是，我認為大人物不會很快放棄他們的 SaaS 定價策略。我認為這對他們來說真的很難。

And our expectation there was not to be the next Shopify necessarily, but to learn and use our entry into eCommerce to justify some investments in some of the things I mentioned before, crypto capital offerings, things that we never could have done if we just focused on our core markets. So I would acknowledge, yes, the most competitive environment that we've entered since the IPO is certainly that turnkey Web store eCommerce environment, the Shift4Shop. But like we're coming at it from an underdog where we have very, very little to lose.

我們的期望不一定是下一個 Shopify，而是學習和利用我們進入電子商務的機會來證明對我之前提到的一些事情的一些投資是合理的，加密資本產品，如果我們只專注於我們永遠不可能做的事情在我們的核心市場。所以我承認，是的，自 IPO 以來我們進入的最具競爭力的環境肯定是交鑰匙網上商店電子商務環境，即 Shift4Shop。但就像我們是從一個失敗者那裡來的，我們幾乎沒有什麼可失去的。

Your next question comes from the line of Andrew Jeffrey with Truist Securities.

你的下一個問題來自 Truist Securities 的 Andrew Jeffrey。

Jared, we're at a pretty dynamic point in the economy as we reopen. And I think that we're about to see a significant ramp in new SMB creation. Can you talk about how you view Shift4's share of those new SMBs, especially in the context of your partner business that serves merchants that might be using more legacy software? Is there any trade-off -- or legacy point-of-sale systems, is there any trade-off? Like what's the dynamic in interplay between maybe share of new business versus the installed base?

賈里德，隨著我們重新開放，我們的經濟正處於一個充滿活力的時刻。而且我認為我們即將看到新 SMB 創建的顯著增長。您能否談談您如何看待 Shift4 在這些新 SMB 中的份額，尤其是在您的合作夥伴業務為可能使用更多舊版軟件的商家提供服務的情況下？是否存在任何權衡——或遺留銷售點系統，是否存在任何權衡？比如新業務份額與已安裝基礎之間相互作用的動態是什麼？

Yes. Andrew, I'm happy to comment. I'm not sure I'm going to totally answer the question correctly there. But just kind of clarify if I get something wrong here. I mean, no matter what, today, still 50% of our production comes from just winning share of the addressable market and 50% comes from our gateway conversions, which we obviously have a very, very long way to go there with $150 billion-plus of gateway volumes still remains on our platform.

是的。安德魯，我很樂意發表評論。我不確定我是否會在那裡完全正確地回答這個問題。但是，如果我在這裡弄錯了，請澄清一下。我的意思是，無論如何，今天，我們仍然有 50% 的產量來自剛剛贏得的目標市場份額，50% 來自我們的網關轉換，顯然我們還有很長的路要走，達到 1500 億美元-加上網關卷仍然留在我們的平台上。

And I guess, it's really just what -- where do you pick your positioning in the market to win, right? So there is nothing about how Shift4 is equipped today to win the next food truck away from Square. There is -- we are very well equipped to win the Junior's Cheesecake, or the TowerGroup, or the [hackathon] sites.

而且我想，這真的只是 - 你在市場上選擇什麼定位才能取勝，對吧？所以今天沒有關於 Shift4 是如何裝備來贏得下一輛遠離 Square 的食品卡車的。有——我們有能力贏得 Junior's Cheesecake、TowerGroup 或 [hackathon] 網站。

So really, look, for sure, there are a lot of new businesses being created every single day and a lot of them fit within our sweet spot. And when they do, we have a greater chance to win, a better right to win than I would say the competitors that we compete against. And that's what's contributing to all the volume growth you've been seeing since these IPO to now in the guidance we're providing.

所以，真的，看，可以肯定的是，每天都有很多新業務被創造出來，其中很多都符合我們的最佳選擇。當他們這樣做時，我們有更大的機會獲勝，比我所說的與我們競爭的競爭對手更好的獲勝權利。這就是自從這些首次公開募股到現在我們提供的指導中你所看到的所有數量增長的原因。

Yes, I think, as I've mentioned in the past with my [10G] analogy, the market is shifting. These tectonic plates are moving pretty significantly. And legacy merchant acquirers that don't have a mature integrated payment strategy are donating share to those tech-enabled, vertically integrated platforms.

是的，我認為，正如我過去用 [10G] 類比提到的那樣，市場正在發生變化。這些構造板塊正在顯著移動。沒有成熟的集成支付策略的傳統商戶收單機構正在向那些支持技術的垂直集成平台捐贈份額。

And you have some on one end of the spectrum that focuses on the extreme simplicity, the simplest aspect of the market like a Square, for example, that's going to win like crazy on that end. Shift4 has the vertically integrated solutions to cater to the more complex and demanding merchant environment. So we continue to win share in that space.

在光譜的一端，你有一些專注於極端簡單，市場最簡單的方面，例如 Square，它會在這一端瘋狂地獲勝。 Shift4 擁有垂直整合的解決方案，可以滿足更加複雜和苛刻的商業環境。因此，我們繼續在該領域贏得份額。

Yes. I'd just [interpret] it somewhat differently. I just see different lens on the issue. I think it's not a function of Shift4 having the legacy software integrations. We have big established merchants, and big established merchants use mature software. It's just a by-product of the type of business they're in.

是的。我只是[解釋]它有點不同。我只是在這個問題上看到了不同的視角。我認為這不是 Shift4 具有遺留軟件集成的功能。我們有大的老牌商家，大的老牌商家使用成熟的軟件。這只是他們所處業務類型的副產品。

Now with that being said, any time an interesting piece of innovative software enters sort of the marketplace, Shift4 gets a call. And the reason for that is, think about the largest hotel chains in the world, anytime one of those hotel chains wants that piece of software in their ecosystem, it's a phone call to Shift4 to integrate.

話雖這麼說，只要有一款有趣的創新軟件進入市場，Shift4 就會接到電話。這樣做的原因是，想想世界上最大的連鎖酒店，只要其中一家連鎖酒店想要在他們的生態系統中使用該軟件，只需打電話給 Shift4 即可進行集成。

So we've got a library of 350-plus integrations that grows constantly. The newer hip cloud-based stuff that might attract an SMB, we get the phone call on those just as often. It's just the reality as big established merchants don't adopt that software very quickly.

因此，我們擁有一個包含 350 多個集成且不斷增長的庫。可能會吸引 SMB 的較新的基於雲的東西，我們同樣經常接到這些電話。這只是現實，因為大型老牌商家不會很快採用該軟件。

So I would argue we've got as much of a right to win the SMB merchant through those software integrations as others, with the heavy caveat being that if a single piece of software can run your business, that is a fiercely competitive market and one that we're less inclined to aggressively pour into, versus the established merchants that we know have high barriers to entry through complex software and, quite frankly, more than one piece of complex software.

因此，我認為我們與其他軟件集成一樣，擁有通過這些軟件集成贏得 SMB 商家的權利，但需要注意的是，如果一款軟件可以運行您的業務，那將是一個競爭激烈的市場，並且與我們知道的成熟商家相比，我們不太願意積極投入，因為我們知道通過複雜軟件進入市場的門檻很高，坦率地說，不止一種複雜軟件。

Okay. That's really helpful color, sort of what I was looking for. And if I could just follow up with VenueNext and some of these larger venues, stadiums you're winning. I assume that's contributing to this really nice volume outlook. What about -- how do we think about yield over time as perhaps you've seen these products (inaudible) platform?

好的。這是非常有用的顏色，正是我一直在尋找的顏色。如果我能跟進 VenueNext 和其中一些更大的場館，你就贏了。我認為這有助於實現這種非常好的銷量前景。怎麼樣 - 我們如何考慮隨著時間的推移收益率，因為也許你已經看到了這些產品（聽不清）平台？

Look, I'll just hit the first part of that. This is Jared here. I mean, just to be clear, as Taylor mentioned, we are not forecasting -- in the revised guidance we provided, we are not including any volume as it relates to any of our recent acquisitions. So that would include Shift4Shop and VenueNext.

看，我只講第一部分。我是賈里德。我的意思是，就像泰勒提到的那樣，我們沒有預測——在我們提供的修訂後的指導中，我們沒有包括與我們最近的任何收購相關的任何數量。所以這將包括 Shift4Shop 和 VenueNext。

So despite the wins we're announcing, we're just -- we're still getting our arms around the sports entertainment vertical. So I mean pretty safe assumption that those venues are going to contribute pretty substantial volume, it's just not included in our forecast and to the second part, [here's Taylor].

因此，儘管我們宣布了勝利，但我們只是 - 我們仍在圍繞體育娛樂垂直領域。所以我的意思是非常安全的假設，即這些場館將貢獻相當大的數量，它只是不包括在我們的預測和第二部分中，[這裡是泰勒]。

Yes. That's exactly right. So the venue environment is like everything else we embrace, it's complex. It depends on the type of venue you're in and the cadence of events within those venues. But I will say, even if you look at the largest stadiums in the country, the volume is phenomenal, but it happens on, I don't know, I'm not a football fan, but like some-odd-teen weekends per year.

是的。這是完全正確的。所以場地環境就像我們所擁抱的其他一切一樣，它很複雜。這取決於您所在的場地類型以及這些場地內活動的節奏。但我會說，即使你看看這個國家最大的體育場，數量也是驚人的，但它發生在，我不知道，我不是足球迷，但就像每個奇怪的青少年周末一樣年。

It's really the concerts and all the other things that layer in around that. And that volume is 0, not to mention the fact that we don't have a football season going on. We have very modest volume participation, if at all, quite frankly, from VenueNext in any of the numbers we would have signaled. And quite frankly, it's just too early to forecast it out.

這真的是音樂會和圍繞它的所有其他事情。而且這個數量是 0，更不用說我們沒有正在進行的足球賽季了。坦率地說，VenueNext 的參與量非常小，如果有的話，我們會發出任何信號。坦率地說，現在預測還為時過早。

There is a really interesting trend going on and, quite frankly, one we're going to benefit from tremendously in this space, which is -- just bear with me a moment while I explain VenueNext technology one more time. This is fan-first mobile ordering inside of stadiums. This volume, prior to the pandemic, was like 5% to 10% of ordering in a modern stadium would be coming through these applications. Early evidence from theme parks and sports and entertainment venues that are open to some degree during the pandemic, we're seeing 90% of the ordering is coming through these applications.

有一個非常有趣的趨勢正在發生，坦率地說，我們將從這個領域中受益匪淺，那就是 - 請耐心等待我再解釋一次 VenueNext 技術。這是球迷優先的體育場館內移動訂購。在大流行之前，這個數量大約有 5% 到 10% 的現代體育場訂單將來自這些應用程序。來自主題公園以及在大流行期間在一定程度上開放的體育和娛樂場所的早期證據表明，我們看到 90% 的訂單來自這些應用程序。

Yes, there's much more modest dependence. So we are tremendously excited about the opportunity. We think there's going to be a massive seed shift towards mobile ordering that -- and the likes of which has never really been seen before. The kiosks that you'd stand in front of behind 15 other people to order your beer or your hotdog is going to go away over time. But it's just too early to put that in the forecast. If you tend us to it, we'd tell you that, that's volume we'd expect in probably the second half of 2022.

是的，有更溫和的依賴。所以我們對這個機會感到非常興奮。我們認為移動訂購將會發生巨大的種子轉變——而且這種轉變以前從未真正出現過。隨著時間的推移，您要站在其他 15 個人後麵點啤酒或熱狗的售貨亭將會消失。但現在將其納入預測還為時過早。如果您傾向於我們，我們會告訴您，這是我們可能在 2022 年下半年預計的數量。

Your next question comes from the line of Chris Donat with Piper Sandler.

你的下一個問題來自 Chris Donat 和 Piper Sandler 的台詞。

I wanted to follow up on the VenueNext one, because it seems just like there's an enormous opportunity there, particularly with what you just said, Taylor. Is it fair to assume that, that whole space of stadiums, theme parks, concert venues and large resorts has essentially just gone to RFP with the pandemic, and you are in discussions with almost every provider?

我想跟進 VenueNext，因為那裡似乎有一個巨大的機會，特別是你剛才所說的，泰勒。假設整個體育場館、主題公園、音樂會場地和大型度假村的空間基本上剛剛隨著大流行進入 RFP，並且您正在與幾乎所有供應商進行討論，這是否公平？

Whereas, normally, there'd be like, I don't know, people would look at their point-of-sale system every like 5 years, and now just everyone is looking at it? And is that top of the funnel? Do you have enough like salespeople and things like that to cover all the potential opportunity there? I mean am I right in saying it's all at RFP right now? Or is that a bit of an exaggeration?

然而，通常情況下，我不知道，人們會每隔 5 年查看一次他們的銷售點系統，而現在每個人都在查看它？那是漏斗的頂部嗎？你有足夠的銷售人員和類似的人來涵蓋那裡的所有潛在機會嗎？我的意思是，我現在說的都在 RFP 中是對的嗎？或者這有點誇張？

Yes. So Jared here, happy to address that. So first, I mean, Brad kind of touched on it in our prepared remarks that we have accelerated some of our OpEx investments. We've actually been pretty open about that since the second half of last year that we're going to invest in talent.

是的。 Jared 在這裡，很高興解決這個問題。所以首先，我的意思是，布拉德在我們準備好的發言中提到了我們已經加速了一些運營支出投資。自去年下半年以來，我們實際上一直對此持開放態度，我們將投資於人才。

I can tell you, specifically, we invested in talent, entrusting up the business development resources for VenueNext because we are talking to everybody. We're talking to everybody for a couple of reasons here. So number one is to drive more towards a fan-first mobile experience, as Taylor referenced previously.

我可以告訴你，具體來說，我們投資於人才，委託 VenueNext 的業務發展資源，因為我們正在與每個人交談。我們在這裡與每個人交談有幾個原因。因此，正如 Taylor 之前提到的那樣，首要任務是更多地推動粉絲至上的移動體驗。

This is not just ordering a burger and a beer and having it delivered to your seats, which is long overdue anyway. This is like ordering like your jersey from the merchandise store going in, taking it off the rack and just walking out without having a way to check that line. This is like integrations to Ticketmaster so you can buy your seats for the next game. This is potentially gaming integration.

這不僅僅是點一個漢堡和一杯啤酒，然後把它送到你的座位上，無論如何，這早就應該了。這就像從商品商店訂購球衣一樣，從貨架上取下來，然後直接走出去，卻無法檢查那條線。這就像與 Ticketmaster 的集成，因此您可以為下一場比賽購買座位。這可能是遊戲集成。

So you win your first half bet on a football game and then you use the proceeds to buy food from the concessions. So this is like this is long overdue in this market. And even though there's a couple stadiums out there that maybe embraced this a little early on, probably using VenueNext technology, the vast majority are in the stone age. That's one.

因此，您在一場足球比賽中贏了上半場賭注，然後用所得款項購買特許經營區的食物。所以這在這個市場上早就應該這樣做了。儘管有幾個體育場可能很早就接受了這一點，可能使用了 VenueNext 技術，但絕大多數都處於石器時代。那是一個。

Second, I mean, just from seeing an e-mail, if you announced a win in one stadium, every other stadium looks in that direction. It's like, "What are they doing?" Because they don't want to be at a disadvantage. So every time we put out a press release, there's like 40 other stadiums that lob inbounds because they want -- they want to know what Raiders is doing or what Petco Park is doing.

其次，我的意思是，僅從一封電子郵件來看，如果你宣佈在一個體育場獲勝，其他所有體育場都會朝那個方向看。就像，“他們在做什麼？”因為他們不想處於劣勢。因此，每次我們發布新聞稿時，都會有大約 40 個其他體育場因為他們想要 - 他們想知道 Raiders 在做什麼或 Petco Park 在做什麼。

So the point is there's just like a ton of demand there. And we've absolutely had to press -- plus up these dev resources. This is absolutely going to be a volume contributor for us. We just haven't baked it in the forecast. I mean any one of you can [prompt] through anything in Q1.

所以關鍵是那裡有大量的需求。而且我們絕對必須加壓 - 加上這些開發資源。這絕對會成為我們的貢獻者。我們只是沒有在預測中提及它。我的意思是你們中的任何人都可以 [提示] 通過 Q1 中的任何內容。

I think some of the first MLP stadiums that were lit up with us only really began contributing either in the last week or so of March or early April. But the opportunity there, for sure, is pretty exciting. That's why we acquired the business, I mean, I would say, like in terms of technology capabilities or just even architecture, VenueNext is the sexiest software we've ever acquired or built.

我認為一些最早與我們一起點亮的 MLP 體育場在 3 月的最後一周左右或 4 月初才真正開始做出貢獻。但可以肯定的是，那裡的機會非常令人興奮。這就是我們收購業務的原因，我的意思是，我想說，就技術能力甚至架構而言，VenueNext 是我們收購或構建的最性感的軟件。

Got it. And then just wanted to shift over to something for Brad on a comment you made about higher debit volumes. I'm just wondering if you have any view on if that's the higher debit represents debit displacing cash? Or if you're seeing more debit -- like Visa and Mastercard talked about more debit volume in the United States being driven by the stimulus payments, and if you have a view on that, if that's cash displacement or stimulus payments and higher debit or it's just a seasonal issue?

知道了。然後只是想根據你對更高借記量的評論轉移到 Brad 的事情上。我只是想知道您是否對更高的借記是否代表借記取代現金有任何看法？或者如果你看到更多的借記——比如 Visa 和 Mastercard 談到美國更多的借記量是由刺激支付驅動的，如果你對此有看法，如果這是現金置換或刺激支付以及更高的借記或只是季節問題？

Yes, Chris. No, I personally think it's stimulus-riven. It looks like more of event than a trend to me when you look at the data, how it played out through the first quarter and how it's playing out through the first part of April. I think it's much more event-driven than a general trend of credit to cash.

是的，克里斯。不，我個人認為這是刺激性的。當你查看數據時，它看起來更像是事件而不是趨勢，它是如何在第一季度發揮作用的，以及它是如何在 4 月上旬發揮作用的。我認為這比信貸變現的一般趨勢更受事件驅動。

And Jared here, just to layer on to that then, too, because it kind of ties back to some of the spread conversations before. I mean, obviously, there's 0 corporate, 0 foreign card, 0 signature, I mean, some of the interchange categories associated with these card types naturally yield to a higher spread, and it's still like relatively nonexistent.

Jared 也在這裡，只是為了進一步說明這一點，因為它有點回到之前的一些傳播對話。我的意思是，很明顯，有 0 個公司、0 個外國卡、0 個簽名，我的意思是，與這些卡類型相關的一些交換類別自然會產生更高的價差，而且它仍然相對不存在。

So when you think about Q1, and you have this greater percentage of debit, which is pretty much going to be your -- next to PIN debit is going to be like your lowest spread-type transactions will naturally get offset as some of these other -- whether it's business travel or international travel start to resume and these card types be utilizing it.

因此，當你考慮第一季度時，你有更大比例的借記，這幾乎就是你的 - 僅次於 PIN 的借記就像你的最低差價類型交易一樣自然會被抵消，因為其中一些其他--無論是商務旅行還是國際旅行都開始恢復，這些卡類型都在使用它。

Your next question comes from the line of James Faucette with Morgan Stanley.

你的下一個問題來自 James Faucette 與 Morgan Stanley 的對話。

This is Priscilla Russo on for James. Two quick questions for me. The first is, to the extent that the economy rebounds faster than expected, how are you thinking about your expense base? And where would you put in the incremental dollars that you capture? And then to clarify on the modeling side, last quarter, you guided to 60% gross profit margins. Is that still attainable? It sounds like it is, I just wanted to confirm. That's it for me.

這是詹姆斯的 Priscilla Russo。我有兩個簡單的問題。首先是，就經濟反彈快於預期的程度而言，您如何看待您的支出基礎？你會把你捕獲的增量美元放在哪裡？然後在建模方面澄清一下，上個季度，你指導了 60% 的毛利率。這仍然可以實現嗎？聽起來是這樣，我只是想確認一下。對我來說就是這樣。

Hey, Priscilla, it's Brad. I'll take both of those. So on the first one, on expense deployment, Jared mentioned our #1 priority is to make sure we can fuel the top line growth. So that comes in a couple of forms. It's mostly in people. It comes from a BD resource perspective and also some of the back-office functionality around boarding and underwriting, et cetera.

嘿，普里西拉，我是布拉德。這兩個我都要。因此，在第一個方面，關於費用部署，Jared 提到我們的第一要務是確保我們能夠推動收入增長。所以這有幾種形式。它主要存在於人身上。它來自 BD 資源的角度，以及一些圍繞登機和承保等的後台功能。

There are some investments we also mentioned in the earnings -- in the earlier statements around making sure the platforms are scalable for growth. So the 2 categories I would emphasize are our talent related to sales and onboarding and technology in terms of scalability. So that's where the investments are going to come from.

我們在收益中也提到了一些投資——在早期關於確保平台可擴展以實現增長的聲明中。因此，我要強調的兩個類別是我們與銷售和入職相關的人才以及可擴展性方面的技術。這就是投資的來源。

In terms of gross profit, yes, we are still targeting a 60% gross profit number, obviously influenced in Q1 by that loss. But we certainly see 60% is achievable at the gross profit level.

就毛利而言，是的，我們的目標仍然是 60% 的毛利數字，這顯然在第一季度受到了該虧損的影響。但我們肯定看到 60% 在毛利水平上是可以實現的。

The other thing I'd mention, because Brad talked about sort of scalability, there's also some really interesting innovation trends that we've tried to capitalize on as a result of our recent acquisitions. So keep in mind, while we had some card-not-present volume prior to the acquisition of Shift4Shop, it's really large enterprise merchants leveraging our gateway technology for their own websites.

我要提到的另一件事，因為 Brad 談到了某種可擴展性，還有一些非常有趣的創新趨勢，我們試圖通過最近的收購來利用這些趨勢。所以請記住，雖然在收購 Shift4Shop 之前我們有一些不存在的卡，但實際上是大型企業商家在他們自己的網站上利用我們的網關技術。

And when -- suddenly, when you're in that eCom world, you get a lot of great ideas about what your eCom experience for every merchant should look like, whether it's a restaurant QR code payment experience or it's a Web store or it's like a large enterprise's website. Now layer in VenueNext, where we've got fans paying mobilely inside of a stadium and you get more. So it's an area where we're very excited. We found more interesting places to invest in R&D than we have in the past, where we were a little bit more centric to push and pull of verticals as opposed to a bunch more now.

突然間，當你身處電子商務世界時，你對每個商家的電子商務體驗應該是什麼樣子有了很多好主意，無論是餐廳二維碼支付體驗還是網上商店，或者類似某大型企業的網站。現在在 VenueNext 中分層，我們讓球迷在體育場內移動支付，您會得到更多。所以這是一個我們非常興奮的領域。與過去相比，我們發現了更多有趣的研發投資領域，過去我們更專注於推動和拉動垂直領域，而不是現在更多。

So I'd just layer that on because payments as a product is something that we're spending a ton of time on. And it's been, quite frankly, really, really interesting when you get all this talent and these different organizations around the table talking about what the Shift4 experience should be like 1, 2 to 3 years now.

所以我只是把它疊加起來，因為作為一種產品的支付是我們花費大量時間的事情。坦率地說，當你讓所有這些人才和這些不同的組織圍坐在一起討論現在 1、2 到 3 年的 Shift4 體驗時，這真的非常有趣。

Your next question comes from the line of John Davis with Raymond James.

你的下一個問題來自 John Davis 和 Raymond James 的台詞。

First, you've given a lot of good color around April trends, but I just wanted to ask maybe a different way. If we were to look at April versus 2019 and kind of compare that to March versus 2019, maybe comment a little bit on the acceleration. Or if you have those numbers, that would be super helpful.

首先，您圍繞 4 月的趨勢給出了很多很好的顏色，但我只是想問問也許不同的方式。如果我們看看 4 月與 2019 年的對比，並將其與 3 月與 2019 年進行比較，或許可以對加速進行一些評論。或者，如果您有這些數字，那將非常有幫助。

Yes. It's a great question. It's exactly sort of the right place to focus. There's nothing notable about April versus March in a seasonal environment. I think it's the Easter calendar and school spring break calendar that typically defines which of those 2 months gets the balance of trade, right?

是的。這是一個很好的問題。這正是值得關注的地方。在季節性環境中，4 月與 3 月相比沒有什麼值得注意的。我認為是複活節日曆和學校春假日曆通常定義了這 2 個月中的哪一個月獲得貿易平衡，對嗎？

So to see an April up, reasonably -- notably, it's up 4% over March, it's a good sign. To see merchant count -- or active merchant count up 2.5% April over the last week in March, that's a great sign as well. So those are all encouraging. I would say that the calendar tended to favor March, in this case, although pandemic impacted. So we see April, where it's up, we're incredibly encouraged.

因此，要合理地看到 4 月份的增長——值得注意的是，它比 3 月份增長了 4%，這是一個好兆頭。 4 月份的商家數量或活躍商家數量比 3 月份的最後一周增加了 2.5%，這也是一個很好的跡象。所以這些都是令人鼓舞的。我想說的是，在這種情況下，日曆傾向於有利於 3 月，儘管受到了大流行病的影響。所以我們看到四月，它在哪裡，我們感到非常鼓舞。

But really, you have to look at the last week that we experienced. The last full week we had is the one that we talked about being $830 million in volume. And then the one I think that is perhaps more encouraging than even our end-to-end volume is the $150 billion in gateway volume in March. Keep in mind, that is a cohort that's much more pandemic-impacted than our end-to-end bucket, which includes a lot of restaurants, retailers and other things.

但實際上，你必須看看我們經歷的最後一周。我們度過的最後一周是我們談到的 8.3 億美元的交易量。然後我認為可能比我們的端到端交易量更令人鼓舞的是 3 月份 1500 億美元的網關交易量。請記住，這是一個比我們的端到端存儲桶更受流行病影響的隊列，其中包括許多餐館、零售商和其他東西。

So to have $150 billion of March gateway volume should give a sense for what the funnel looks like. Remember, that was $185 billion on an annualized basis in 2019, and it's $150 billion in March. So as we think about sort of continued merchant production, that is perhaps the most encouraging sign because none of us can control when the various -- as the various restrictions lift, when vaccines occur, when optimism grows, but that sign is immensely encouraging.

因此，擁有 1500 億美元的 3 月門戶交易量應該讓人了解漏斗的樣子。請記住，2019 年按年計算為 1850 億美元，而 3 月份為 1500 億美元。因此，當我們考慮某種持續的商業生產時，這可能是最令人鼓舞的跡象，因為我們都無法控制各種限制何時解除，疫苗何時出現，樂觀情緒何時增長，但這個跡象非常令人鼓舞。

Okay. Great. And then, Brad, maybe a numbers question. If I just look at the increase in the $8 billion in the volume guide for the year for end-to-end and revs up $30 million, that implies, what, 38 basis points on incremental volume. Just any commentary there on what's at play and why you wouldn't see a little bit more revenue flow-through on that incremental volume?

好的。偉大的。然後，布拉德，也許是一個數字問題。如果我只看今年端到端交易量指南中 80 億美元的增長，並增加了 3000 萬美元，這意味著增量交易量增加了 38 個基點。關於正在發生的事情的任何評論以及為什麼您看不到增量數量的更多收入流？

Yes. On the midpoint of the guide, we look at 50 basis points of additional revenue coming in off of that volume. And a 50 basis point number is in line with kind of the larger merchants we've talked about, right? We've talked about gateway conversions coming over anywhere in the 40 to 60 basis point range. So I think somewhere in the middle of that is the right place.

是的。在指南的中點，我們看到了 50 個基點的額外收入來自該數量。 50 個基點數字符合我們談到的大型商家的類型，對嗎？我們已經討論過 40 到 60 個基點範圍內任何地方的網關轉換。所以我認為中間的某個地方是正確的地方。

But also, and a factor in the point Taylor made a minute ago is, we are intentionally kind of eroding some of the SaaS revenue streams in order to convert these over to end-to-end. So there's an upside coming from the volume and, call it, a 50 basis point spread, but there's also a little bit of degradation on the SaaS and the gateways, that those will be flat or come down slightly.

而且，泰勒一分鐘前提出的觀點的一個因素是，我們有意侵蝕一些 SaaS 收入流，以便將這些收入流轉換為端到端。因此，交易量有一個好處，可以稱之為 50 個基點的利差，但 SaaS 和網關也有一點退化，這些將持平或略有下降。

Okay. That makes sense. And then last one, Jared, just talk a little bit about the Sightline partnership. You guys made an investment there. It seems pretty interesting. Just curious kind of what exactly it is? And with the investment, did you get any sort of processing agreement or any sort of commercial relationship with that investment?

好的。這就說得通了。最後一位，Jared，請談談 Sightline 合作夥伴關係。你們在那裡投資了。這似乎很有趣。只是好奇它到底是什麼？通過投資，您是否與該投資達成任何形式的加工協議或任何形式的商業關係？

Sure. So I think I can speak a little bit more openly just in general about what we're doing with our kind of mini Shift4 BC efforts And I'll try and give you what I can on Sightline. I mean that's a pretty strategic relationship. So some stuff we got to just wait for the press release.

當然。因此，我想我可以更公開地談談我們正在通過我們的迷你 Shift4 BC 努力所做的事情，我會盡力在 Sightline 上為您提供我能做的事情。我的意思是這是一種非常具有戰略意義的關係。所以有些東西我們只能等待新聞稿。

But I think, one, in general, we created the Shift4 BC effort because we are recognizing just the rapid transformation that's happening in eCommerce right now. We want to make sure we're -- we have not -- we have seat at the table of some early-stage businesses that we think could have an interesting payments opportunity for us in the long run. And that's one reason that brought us the Sightline, but it's bringing us to a lot of other opportunities that we're looking at as well.

但我認為，總的來說，我們創建 Shift4 BC 的努力是因為我們認識到電子商務中正在發生的快速轉型。我們想確保我們——我們還沒有——在一些我們認為從長遠來看可能為我們提供有趣支付機會的早期業務中佔有一席之地。這就是給我們帶來 Sightline 的原因之一，但它也給我們帶來了我們正在尋找的許多其他機會。

In terms of Sightline, so like what's publicly out there? I mean this is probably the most important piece of technology in -- that's going to support the rise of regulated gaming in the -- mobile-regulated gaming in the U.S. market. So if you think about a lot of card issuers do not directly authorize gaming-related transactions on their credit cards, like a Bank of America or Chase, so essentially, an intermediary or something, which is like the Sightline, but then add substantial value in terms of its digital wallet and its integrations into really card-present and card-not-present gaming applications.

就視線而言，就像公開的東西一樣？我的意思是，這可能是最重要的技術——它將支持受監管遊戲在美國市場上的移動監管遊戲的興起。因此，如果您考慮很多發卡機構並不直接授權其信用卡上與博彩相關的交易，例如美國銀行或大通銀行，那麼本質上是中介機構或類似 Sightline 的機構，但隨後會增加實質性價值在其數字錢包及其與真正有卡和無卡遊戲應用程序的集成方面。

So there's a lot of volumes that's flowing through that world today, and there's going to be a lot of volume flowing through in the kind of years ahead. Now we've said from the start that one of the big kind of home run opportunities we see with VenueNext acquisition is the integration of like sports stadium applications. So like, I don't know, hypothetically, the Washington Nationals' application, San Diego Padres' consumer application with a like a gaming platform. So that when you're at the stadium, you could make a wager out of a game, you could see the proceeds from a win and then you could use it to spend in a merchandising shop or something to that effect. So that gives you one potential opportunity we're looking at.

所以今天有很多流量流經那個世界，在未來的幾年裡也會有很多流量流過。現在我們從一開始就說過，我們在 VenueNext 收購中看到的一個巨大的本壘打機會是類似體育場應用程序的集成。所以，我不知道，假設，華盛頓國民隊的應用程序，聖地亞哥教士隊的消費者應用程序與類似的遊戲平台。所以當你在體育場時，你可以對一場比賽下注，你可以看到獲勝的收益，然後你可以用它在商品商店或類似的地方消費。所以這給了你一個我們正在尋找的潛在機會。

But in general, like we have made the statement before that we are interested in fantasy sports, regulated gaming, sports betting. And we are looking to position ourselves strategically to have a seat at the table in that exciting market.

但總的來說，就像我們之前發表的聲明一樣，我們對夢幻體育、受監管的遊戲、體育博彩感興趣。我們正在尋求戰略性定位，以便在這個令人興奮的市場中佔有一席之地。

Your next question comes from the line of David M. Togut with Evercore ISI.

您的下一個問題來自 Evercore ISI 的 David M. Togut。

I apologize if this was asked earlier, but in your updated 2021 guidance, did you discuss your expectations for how quickly the stadium payments business comes online, for example, Petco Park, Nationals -- Raiders' Stadium?

如果之前有人問過這個問題，我深表歉意，但在您更新的 2021 年指南中，您是否討論過您對體育場支付業務上線速度的期望，例如 Petco Park、Nationals -- Raiders' Stadium？

Yes, we did, David. This is Taylor. But no worries, happy to address it again. The truth is we're just not forecasting any of it. It's too soon. A normalized environment for these is not just that they're sporting events inside the stadium, but it's also full occupancy. And then it's also a series of events around the concerts and things like that.

是的，我們做到了，大衛。這是泰勒。但不用擔心，很高興再次解決這個問題。事實上，我們只是沒有預測任何它。太快了。這些的標準化環境不僅是體育場內的體育賽事，而且還是滿員。然後還有一系列圍繞音樂會的活動等等。

So it's way too early. I'd say, where we start to have some confidence is like the back half of 2022. But in a full year guide like this, we just don't include it. But we do include the OpEx because we're going to carry those people through while the world normalizes, but we don't include that one.

所以現在還為時過早。我會說，我們開始有信心的地方就像 2022 年下半年。但在像這樣的全年指南中，我們只是不包括它。但我們確實包括了 OpEx，因為我們將在世界正常化的同時讓這些人渡過難關，但我們不包括那個。

I see. Any thoughts on sort of baseball policy versus football? I think NFL has said they'll be at full occupancy, or at least they'll allow full occupancy this fall?

我懂了。關於棒球政策與足球的任何想法？我想 NFL 已經說過他們會滿員，或者至少他們會在今年秋天允許滿員？

David, this is Jared. I think your question is exactly why we haven't included volume in our guidance. I mean, for sure, look, we know there's going to be volume there. Like we already -- we put out a press release almost every month that the stadium has gone live with Shift4 and either VenueNext or one of our other integrations.

大衛，這是賈里德。我認為你的問題正是為什麼我們沒有在我們的指南中包括數量。我的意思是，當然，看，我們知道那裡會有成交量。就像我們已經一樣——我們幾乎每個月都會發布一份新聞稿，說明體育場已經使用 Shift4 和 VenueNext 或我們的其他集成之一上線。

We absolutely, in April, seen volume flow through from some of those MLB stadiums that are using our technology. It's just we don't know enough about what kind of the future holds. We know we're going to win a lot of stadiums. We know we're going to capture their volume. We just don't know if rules are going to change and what the occupancy restrictions are going to be. So kind of better when we put out that guidance and said, "Look, we're pretty optimistic about the year ahead." We're just not including stadiums in it.

我們絕對在 4 月份看到了一些使用我們技術的 MLB 體育場的流量。只是我們對未來是什麼樣的知之甚少。我們知道我們會贏得很多場館。我們知道我們將捕獲他們的數量。我們只是不知道規則是否會改變以及入住限制會是什麼。當我們發布該指南並說“看，我們對未來一年非常樂觀”時，情況會更好。我們只是不包括體育場館。

So I mean, look, from a fan perspective, I certainly hope that vaccines continue to roll out as they are, and that we can get a lot of fans packed in the stadiums in a safe way. But we just don't have enough like kind of visibility in it, where it's too early for us in sports and entertainment to kind of make predictions.

所以我的意思是，從球迷的角度來看，我當然希望疫苗繼續按原樣推出，我們可以讓很多球迷以安全的方式擠進體育場。但我們只是沒有足夠的知名度，我們在體育和娛樂領域做出預測還為時過早。

So I guess, this is a really long way of saying that, if you see a lot of press releases from us in stadiums, and you know there's a lot of fans going to them, and you're watching that on TV and then expect the volume to probably exceed what was in that guidance, so we just didn't include any of it.

所以我想，如果你在體育場看到我們的很多新聞稿，並且你知道有很多球迷去看他們，你在電視上看，然後期待數量可能超過該指南中的數量，因此我們沒有包括任何內容。

Yes. This is not over engineered when we put out guidance. I think we'd probably do that internally, and then we sort of step back and say, "What's the world telling us?" I mentioned this before, but the last week in April for us was $830 million of end-to-end volume. That is not an average week in an average year. That is a slightly below-average week in an average year, meaning the last week of April from a seasonal basis.

是的。當我們發布指南時，這並沒有過度設計。我想我們可能會在內部這樣做，然後我們退一步說，“世界告訴我們什麼？”我之前提到過這一點，但 4 月的最後一周對我們來說是 8.3 億美元的端到端交易量。這不是平均一年中的平均一周。這是平均一年中略低於平均水平的一周，這意味著從季節性的角度來看是 4 月的最後一周。

So when you simply take that and you multiply it by 52, you get to a certain point, and we say, "All right. What's merchant production doing? What would any amount of recovery do?" And hopefully, that brings you sort of inside our guidance process and how we get to where we are.

所以當你簡單地把它乘以 52 時，你會得到一個特定點，我們會說，“好吧。商業生產在做什麼？任何數量的恢復都會做什麼？”希望這能讓您了解我們的指導流程以及我們如何到達現在的位置。

Quite frankly, merchants joining us in a current year don't contribute much. It's actually the merchants who joined the prior year annualizing that contributes the most growth in the year. And then when there's recovery inside of it, that's outsized. So a lot more to come.

坦率地說，當年加入我們的商家貢獻不大。實際上，前一年加入年度化的商家貢獻了當年的最大增長。然後當它內部有恢復時，那是超大的。所以還有很多。

That's fair enough, and I appreciate all the insights. Just a quick follow-up. Are you seeing any halo effect on kind of new bookings from Inspiration4?

這很公平，我很欣賞所有的見解。只是快速跟進。您是否看到 Inspiration4 的新預訂有任何光環效應？

So I guess I should probably take that, Jared here. So Inspiration4 is -- well, it certainly raised the visibility of Shift4, and specifically the Shift4Shop platform, which was our objective. Obviously, all the marketing and space competition ended several months ago, but the production on the Shift4Shop platform has really not slowed down.

所以我想我應該接受 Jared 的發言。所以 Inspiration4 是——嗯，它確實提高了 Shift4 的知名度，特別是 Shift4Shop 平台，這是我們的目標。顯然，所有的營銷和空間競爭在幾個月前就結束了，但 Shift4Shop 平台上的生產確實沒有放緩。

If you recall, just a couple of months ago, we did our year-end earnings. We've provided a Shift4Shop update and said, "Yes, we think we'll be -- I think that's like 18,000 sites by the end of the year." It was because we believe that production would slow down after the competitions had ended in terms of new merchant sites or new Web stores. And they didn't, and we end up exceeding our expectations in a pretty meaningful way. That's Shift4Shop, specifically.

如果你還記得，就在幾個月前，我們做了年終收益。我們提供了 Shift4Shop 更新並說，“是的，我們認為我們會——我認為到今年年底會有 18,000 個站點。”這是因為我們認為，在新商家網站或新網上商店的競爭結束後，生產會放緩。他們沒有，我們最終以一種非常有意義的方式超出了我們的預期。具體來說就是 Shift4Shop。

Now Shift4, the company, yes, I mean, our visibility of these rates to extend -- I mean, we are having conversations with customers that we wouldn't have anticipated before. So I think there's a little bit more -- I mean, we do a lot of attention to the organization. A lot of people probably didn't realize how big and how much commerce Shift4 touched previously until an interesting new story developed about it.

現在 Shift4，公司，是的，我的意思是，我們對這些利率的可見性要擴大——我的意思是，我們正在與客戶進行我們以前沒有預料到的對話。所以我認為還有一點 - 我的意思是，我們對組織給予了很多關注。很多人可能沒有意識到 Shift4 以前觸及的商業規模有多大，直到關於它的一個有趣的新故事發展起來。

So I mean, just speaking for myself, but in the organizations that I'm speaking to, whether it's ISV partners, enterprise merchants, just really interesting opportunities that are coming our way, like some of the investments we've been fortunate to be able to make would not have been possible, obviously, without that kind of Inspiration4 [commerce]. Sorry, I know it's not very specific, but hopefully it's helpful.

所以我的意思是，只是為我自己說話，但在我與之交談的組織中，無論是 ISV 合作夥伴、企業商家，都是真正有趣的機會，就像我們有幸參與的一些投資一樣顯然，如果沒有那種 Inspiration4 [商業]，就不可能實現。對不起，我知道它不是很具體，但希望它有幫助。

Well, good to see. Congratulations.

嗯，很高興看到。恭喜。

Your next question comes from the line of Darrin Peller with Wolfe Research.

你的下一個問題來自 Wolfe Research 的 Darrin Peller。

Just a quick logistical question on the comment you made around the merchant growth. It's really, obviously, great to see the sequential growth in merchant numbers. Is that also including the Shift4Shop merchant base that you've added?

關於您對商家增長所做的評論，只是一個快速的後勤問題。很明顯，很高興看到商家數量的連續增長。這是否也包括您添加的 Shift4Shop 商家群？

And then on a side topic I'm modeling also, just touch on the -- and if I missed this, sorry, but increase in advertising and marketing costs in the quarter. Was that just the incremental spending around these initiatives, Super Bowl ads, or anything else?

然後在一個側面話題上，我也在建模，只是觸及 - 如果我錯過了這個，對不起，但是本季度的廣告和營銷成本增加了。這僅僅是圍繞這些舉措、超級碗廣告或其他任何東西的增量支出嗎？

Yes. So I'll touch the first one, and Brad can touch the second one. To the extent it is an active volume-producing Web store, yes. But -- and this could -- sort of gets to this sort of part of the "do you include these things in guidance or not" question and why we don't specifically include it in the guidance.

是的。所以我會觸摸第一個，Brad 可以觸摸第二個。在某種程度上，它是一個活躍的批量生產網絡商店，是的。但是——這可能——有點涉及“你是否將這些內容包含在指南中”的問題，以及為什麼我們沒有明確地將其包含在指南中。

The Web store platform is a totally different phenomenon. Our products being -- a gateway conversion contributes volume the next day for us. An established merchant who signs up is contributing volume within a week or 2 to our platform and its volume and scale.

網上商店平台是一種完全不同的現象。我們的產品是 - 網關轉換在第二天為我們貢獻了數量。註冊的成熟商家會在一兩週內為我們的平台及其數量和規模貢獻數量。

A new Web store, especially sort of an eCommerce-first business, is not contributing volume instantly. I mean, it is a multi-week effort as they build out their product catalog, as they design their website, and then it's attracting customers to it. So if there's volume being produced, sure, it's included in that number. But I want to caution that the majority of these Web stores are not yet producing volume, nor should they be. They're building out their business for the first time.

一家新的網上商店，尤其是電子商務優先的企業，不會立即貢獻銷量。我的意思是，他們需要花費數週的時間來構建產品目錄，設計網站，然後才能吸引客戶。因此，如果有產量，當然，它包含在該數字中。但我要提醒的是，這些網上商店中的大多數尚未產生量，也不應該產生量。他們是第一次建立自己的業務。

Right. Okay. Let me take the others, on the second part about advertising. You're exactly right. A lot of the -- I mentioned the rebranding of Shift4Shops, a lot of that took place in Q1. The majority of that, including that advertising marketing line, a little bit of it improved along the way as well. But a lot of that's in nonrecurring, kind of onetime stuff for Q4, but you're not going to see repeated going forward.

正確的。好的。讓我談談其他人，關於廣告的第二部分。你完全正確。很多——我提到了 Shift4Shops 的品牌重塑，其中很多發生在第一季度。其中大部分，包括廣告營銷線，也有一點點在這個過程中得到了改善。但其中很多都是非經常性的，是第四季度的一次性東西，但你不會看到重複的前進。

All right. And just a quick follow-up. Jared and Taylor, I guess, when we think about M&A, obviously, you guys have been successful with a couple of deals so far, and you talked about a good environment. But thinking about what we should expect over the next 12 months or so? Is there -- are there things that are that near term in the horizon from your perspectives that are -- that you're excited about? And then, I guess, maybe just talk about transformational versus tuck-ins as well, what you see in near term?

好的。并快速跟進。 Jared 和 Taylor，我想，當我們考慮併購時，顯然，到目前為止，你們已經成功地完成了幾筆交易，並且你們談到了一個良好的環境。但想想我們在接下來的 12 個月左右應該期待什麼？是否有 - 從您的角度來看，短期內是否有您感到興奮的事情？然後，我想，也許也只是談談轉型與收緊，你在短期內看到了什麼？

Yes. I mean, I'm happy to start this off, Jared here, and then Taylor should definitely jump in because his team's keeping a pulse on the various opportunities we're pursuing on a daily basis. But I guess nothing really has changed since a couple of months ago. It's really the same story, which is, we have an incredible team of professionals that's out exploring opportunities that, I would suspect, if any one of them was announced, people would say, "Well, that was unexpected," because that's kind of our MO over the last 5 or 6 years.

是的。我的意思是，我很高興開始這件事，Jared 在這裡，然後 Taylor 肯定會加入進來，因為他的團隊每天都在關注我們正在尋求的各種機會。但我想自幾個月前以來，一切都沒有真正改變。這真的是同一個故事，也就是說，我們有一個令人難以置信的專業團隊，他們正在探索機會，我懷疑，如果其中任何一個被宣布，人們會說，“好吧，那是出乎意料的，”因為那有點我們過去 5 或 6 年的 MO。

As we do try and find these off, under-the-radar, underappreciated assets that we think we can unlock a pretty substantial integrated payments opportunity inside. And whether that's capability enhancements so we can continue to win share, accelerate share within our current target verticals, or an entry into a new vertical like what we did with sports and entertainment with VenueNext, or whether it's expanding our reach into new geographic areas, it's all the same story, right? We're just keeping tabs on everything.

當我們確實嘗試找到這些不為人知的、被低估的資產時，我們認為我們可以在內部釋放出相當可觀的綜合支付機會。這是否是能力增強，以便我們可以繼續贏得份額，在我們當前的目標垂直市場中加速份額，或者進入一個新的垂直市場，就像我們在體育和娛樂領域對 VenueNext 所做的那樣，或者它是否正在將我們的影響力擴展到新的地理區域，都是同一個故事，對吧？我們只是密切關註一切。

And I'd tell you that like the pipeline has what I would refer to as kind of some of those small-ball tuck-ins, transactions kind of similar to the last cancel that we would have announced. And it also has a couple of real transformational kind of game-changer deals. It's just an interesting environment right now, where we just don't -- we don't want to be pressured to make a decision that we're not going to be happy with from a valuation perspective. It's a really interesting climate. So we're just trying to stay really disciplined on that.

而且我會告訴你，就像管道有我所說的一些小球塞入，交易有點類似於我們宣布的最後一次取消。而且它還有一些真正的變革性交易。現在這只是一個有趣的環境，我們只是不想——我們不想被迫做出從估值角度來看我們不會滿意的決定。這是一個非常有趣的氣候。所以我們只是想在這方面保持真正的紀律。

And yes, Taylor, feel free to join.

是的，泰勒，隨時加入。

Yes. I would actually say a bunch has changed, not to sort of contradict it, but just to present a different lens. We get a heck of a lot more phone calls now. Some of that, I would say, is due to our capital position. I'm sure, and as sort of David mentioned, the notoriety of things like Inspiration4 has raised the profile of the business. There's a heck of a lot in our pipeline that we're evaluating.

是的。我實際上會說一堆已經改變了，不是為了反駁它，而是為了展示一個不同的鏡頭。我們現在接到了很多電話。我想說，其中一些是由於我們的資本狀況。我敢肯定，就像 David 提到的那樣，Inspiration4 這樣的惡名已經提升了公司的知名度。我們正在評估的管道中有很多東西。

To be skeptical, though, I think if we get a phone call about it, we should question what our right to win that business is in an M&A transaction. And our right to win will certainly not be that we pay more than anyone else, like that's just not how we do M&A transactions.

不過，要持懷疑態度，我認為如果我們接到有關此事的電話，我們應該質疑我們在併購交易中贏得該業務的權利是什麼。我們獲勝的權利當然不會是我們支付的費用比其他任何人都多，就像我們做併購交易的方式不一樣。

So we continue to invest in the team, which is good, so that we don't make sure none of this falls to the cutting room floor that we don't want to. And then we've deliberately tried to be a little bit more pragmatic about opportunities that make a lot of sense from a capital standpoint. But where us controlling the business is not the right answer for those entrepreneurs.

所以我們繼續投資於團隊，這很好，這樣我們就不會確保這一切都不會落到我們不希望的剪輯室地板上。然後我們故意嘗試對從資本角度來看很有意義的機會更加務實。但是對於那些企業家來說，我們控制業務的地方並不是正確的答案。

So we've made 2 investments, thus far, both sort of wildly different. Examples where, quite frankly, I think in the Sightline case, it is better for us to be a capital partner and a partnering guidance than it is for us to control that business. It's a massive market. They've got a great opportunity to win share.

所以到目前為止，我們已經進行了兩項投資，兩者都有很大的不同。坦率地說，我認為在 Sightline 案例中，我們成為資本合作夥伴和合作夥伴指南比我們控制該業務更好。這是一個巨大的市場。他們有一個很好的機會來贏得份額。

And so that's sort of the ventures angle that we're taking on this is we can lend expertise. We can come up with commercial partnerships. But cycling the growth of that business by saying every one of your deals is going to come through us is not the right thing to do.

因此，這就是我們正在採取的風險投資角度，我們可以提供專業知識。我們可以提出商業合作夥伴關係。但是，通過說您的每筆交易都將通過我們來循環該業務的增長並不是正確的做法。

So we widened the aperture quite a bit. We've actually maintained discipline in this environment. We try not to get overheated, regardless of the cost of capital on an opportunity.

所以我們把光圈擴大了很多。我們實際上在這種環境中保持了紀律。無論機會的資本成本如何，我們都盡量不要過熱。

And the other thing I'd say is, there's always something we're very excited about. We just -- we're not going to jump without making sure it's incredibly thought through, and that it's going to answer every question that our investors would have as to how it's going to grow.

我要說的另一件事是，總有一些事情讓我們非常興奮。我們只是——我們不會在沒有確保它經過深思熟慮之前就跳槽，並且它會回答我們的投資者關於它如何增長的每一個問題。

Your next question comes from the line of Matt O'Neill with Goldman Sachs.

你的下一個問題來自高盛的馬特奧尼爾。

I just have something you could maybe help us triangulate, the $150 million in run rate gateway volumes that you talked about on this call, did you think about how that might compare to the $185 million? Presumably, in between, you guys have been converting very successfully a lot of that gateway volumes to end-to-end. So is there any like same-store sales or apples-to-apples way of thinking about like how close that $150 million is back to what it would have been in 2019?

我只是有一些你可以幫助我們進行三角測量的東西，你在這次電話會議上談到的 1.5 億美元的運行率網關量，你有沒有想過這與 1.85 億美元相比如何？據推測，在這兩者之間，你們已經非常成功地將許多網關卷轉換為端到端。那麼，是否有任何類似的同店銷售額或同類產品的思考方式，比如這 1.5 億美元與 2019 年的水平有多接近？

There really isn't. It's the right question to ask. I would just ask yourself is a basket of -- is a large basket of merchants that's predominantly hospitality-focused down 10% year-over-year as a result of the pandemic? Is it down 20%? Is it down 30%? All of those are really compelling arguments to be made.

真的沒有。這是正確的問題。我只想問問自己是一籃子——由於大流行，主要以酒店業為重點的一大批商人同比下降了 10% 嗎？跌了20%？是不是跌了30%？所有這些都是真正令人信服的論據。

The point we're trying to make with that statistic is it has -- we've been very hesitant to talk about our gateway volume because it is so pandemic-impacted. And I think, when you give a low number, people start to say, "Oh, you eroded it all through end-to-end conversions, and that's where all your growth is coming from." The reality is our end-to-end volume growth is coming in equal portions from a steady penetration of that gateway volume and lots of new customers joining, albeit at depressed levels over the past year.

我們試圖用這個統計數據來說明的一點是——我們一直很猶豫要不要談論我們的網關數量，因為它受到了大流行的影響。而且我認為，當你給出一個較低的數字時，人們會開始說，“哦，你通過端到端的轉換侵蝕了它，這就是你所有增長的來源。”現實情況是，我們的端到端流量增長與網關流量的穩定滲透和許多新客戶的加入等量增長，儘管在過去一年中處於低迷水平。

So choose your own adventure on this one, you could say that the gateway volume is 10% impacted, you could say it's 40% impacted. And looking out of market research, I could make compelling arguments for both of those things. But what it tells you is there's still plenty to go. And it is not a flash in the pan. All of our end-to-end volume growth comes from this embedded base of customers.

所以選擇您自己的冒險，您可以說網關卷受到 10% 的影響，您可以說它受到 40% 的影響。從市場研究來看，我可以為這兩件事提出令人信服的論據。但它告訴你的是，還有很多事情要做。這不是曇花一現。我們所有的端到端銷量增長都來自於這個嵌入式客戶群。

It's what we've been saying all along, which is that the gateway affords you a phenomenal sticky basket of really thoughtful partnerships in the form of ISVs and a nice Rolodex of customers. And those partnerships bring us both. They bring us gateway conversions, and they bring us net new wins. And then, hopefully, things like M&A and product innovation, over time, skew your growth towards more and more net new wins in the gateway volume, contributes steadily.

這就是我們一直在說的，網關以 ISV 的形式為您提供了一個非常周到的合作夥伴關係的非凡粘性籃子和一個不錯的客戶 Rolodex。這些夥伴關係給我們帶來了兩者。他們給我們帶來了網關轉換，他們給我們帶來了新的淨胜利。然後，希望隨著時間的推移，諸如併購和產品創新之類的事情會使您的增長朝著網關數量中越來越多的淨新勝利傾斜，從而穩步做出貢獻。

So that's sort of how we're looking at it. I think to say $150 billion would have looked like x in 2019 is probably not the right answer, except that I would guess it's reasonably impacted still in a month like March.

這就是我們看待它的方式。我認為說 1500 億美元在 2019 年看起來像 x 可能不是正確的答案，但我猜它在像 3 月這樣的一個月內仍然受到合理影響。

Yes. No, I fear that was probably going to be the answer. It's a couple of different points to try to triangulate around. I mean, from a high-level perspective, would you say it leans more towards that down 10% or down 40% still, or somewhere in the middle? Just anything anecdotal will be helpful as we think through like the remainder of the recovery on the hospitality side.

是的。不，我擔心這可能就是答案。嘗試圍繞幾個不同的點進行三角測量。我的意思是，從高層次的角度來看，你會說它更傾向於下降 10% 還是下降 40%，或者介於兩者之間？任何軼事都會對我們有所幫助，就像我們在酒店方面的其餘復甦一樣。

Yes. This is entirely anecdotal, but I would say it's down a lot more than that. If you think about the top half of the country in every hotel that sits there, it's -- those are down far more than 10% year-over-year.

是的。這完全是軼事，但我會說它的下降幅度遠不止於此。如果你想一想那裡的每家酒店的上半部分，那就是——這些酒店的同比下降幅度遠遠超過 10%。

All right. There are no further questions at this time. I'll now hand the call back to Jared Isaacman.

好的。目前沒有其他問題。我現在將電話轉回 Jared Isaacman。

Yes. Thank you very much. I appreciate everyone dialing in today to discuss our Q1 earnings, and wish everyone well. Thank you.

是的。非常感謝。感謝大家今天撥通電話討論我們第一季度的收益，並祝大家一切順利。謝謝。

Thank you. And that concludes today's conference. Thank you all for joining. You may now disconnect.

謝謝。今天的會議到此結束。謝謝大家的加入。您現在可以斷開連接。