Copart Inc (CPRT) 2026 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good day, everyone. Welcome to the Copart Incorporated first-quarter fiscal 2026 earnings call.

大家好。歡迎參加 Copart Incorporated 2026 財年第一季財報電話會議。

Just a reminder, today's conference is being recorded.

提醒一下，今天的會議正在錄影。

Before turning the call over to management, I will share Copart's Safe Harbor statement. The company's comments today include forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws, including management's current views with respect to trends, opportunities, and uncertainties in the company's industry.

在將電話轉交給管理層之前，我將分享 Copart 的安全港聲明。公司今天發表的評論包含聯邦證券法意義上的前瞻性聲明，包括管理階層目前對公司所在產業的趨勢、機會和不確定性的看法。

These forward-looking statements involve substantial risks and uncertainties. For more detail on the risks associated with the company's business, we refer you to the section titled Risk factors in the company's annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended July 31, 2025; and each of the company's subsequent quarterly reports on Form 10-Q.

這些前瞻性陳述涉及重大風險和不確定性。有關公司業務相關風險的更多詳細信息，請參閱公司截至 2025 年 7 月 31 日止年度的 10-K 表格年度報告中題為“風險因素”的部分；以及公司隨後的每個季度的 10-Q 表格季度報告。

Any forward-looking statements are made as of today. The company has no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements.

所有前瞻性陳述均截至今日。本公司沒有義務更新或修改任何前瞻性聲明。

I will now turn the call over to the company's CEO, Jeff Liaw.

現在我將把電話轉交給公司執行長廖傑夫。

Welcome and thanks for joining us for our first-quarter fiscal year 2026 earnings call.

歡迎各位參加我們2026財年第一季財報電話會議，感謝各位的參與。

I'll begin with some brief remarks on trends in our Insurance business; our progress in growing our Non-Insurance Vehicle business; and then, a short discussion of the key drivers behind our auction returns before passing the call to Leah to review our first-quarter financial results. We'll then take a few questions.

首先，我將簡要談談我們保險業務的趨勢；我們在發展非保險車輛業務方面取得的進展；然後，簡要討論一下我們拍賣收益背後的關鍵驅動因素，之後將電話交給莉亞，由​​她來回顧我們第一季度的財務業績。接下來我們會回答幾個問題。

First, on our Insurance business, our global insurance units for the first quarter of 2026 declined 8.4%; or a 5.6% decline, excluding catastrophic volumes from a year ago. Our US insurance units declined 9.5% for the same period; and 7.3%, excluding catastrophic activity, as well.

首先，就我們的保險業務而言，2026 年第一季的全球保險業務下降了 8.4%；如果排除去年同期的巨災保險業務量，則下降了 5.6%。同期，我們的美國保險業務下降了 9.5%；如果排除災難性事件，則下降了 7.3%。

The underlying drivers of these trends are consistent with what we have discussed in prior quarters. It's a combination of market share evolution among insurance carriers themselves; soft claims counts as a result of consumer retrenchment in their auto insurance purchasing behavior, offset by rising total loss frequency.

這些趨勢的根本驅動因素與我們在前幾季討論的內容一致。這是保險公司自身市場份額演變和消費者減少汽車保險購買行為導致的軟索賠數量增加，以及全損頻率上升所抵消的結果。

On that last point, total loss frequency has continued its long-term upward trend, consistent with nearly the entirety of the history of our company and our industry. In the US, for the calendar year 2025 through September, total loss frequency was 22.6%, an increase of 80 basis points or so year over year, according to CCC.

關於最後一點，全損頻率繼續保持長期上升趨勢，這與我們公司和我們行業的幾乎整個歷史都一致。根據美國消費者信貸委員會 (CCC) 的數據顯示，2025 年 9 月至 2025 年 9 月，美國總損失頻率為 22.6%，比上年同期增加約 80 個基點。

We continue to sustain and expand what we believe to be our advantage in generating best-in-class auction returns for our Insurance clients. Even including the highly inflationary 2021-2022 COVID era, when semiconductor shortages further increased vehicle prices, we are achieving all-time high average selling prices for our US insurance carriers.

我們將繼續保持並擴大我們認為的優勢，為我們的保險客戶創造一流的拍賣回報。即使算上 2021-2022 年新冠疫情期間通貨膨脹嚴重，半導體短缺進一步推高了汽車價格，我們美國保險公司的平均售價也達到了歷史最高水平。

In fact, for the quarter, our global insurance ASPs increased to 6.8%. Our US insurance APPs increased 8.4%. We know from public data and disclosures that our ASPs grew at a rate that eclipsed that of the Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index and grew at a rate more than threefold that of service providers similar to us. I'll talk in greater detail in my comments shortly on the underlying drivers of this performance.

事實上，本季我們的全球保險平均售價成長至 6.8%。我們的美國保險應用程式成長了 8.4%。我們從公開數據和揭露資訊中得知，我們的平均售價成長速度超過了曼海姆二手車價值指數的成長速度，並且比與我們類似的其他服務提供者的成長速度高出三倍以上。我稍後會在評論中更詳細地談談這一表現背後的驅動因素。

On the question of claims frequency, on our last call, we talked about this subject and its near-term effects on our business. According to [ISS FasTrak], paid claims frequency for collision coverage for the second calendar quarter of 2025 compared to the same period last year was down 7.5%. In fact, earned car years for that same period were down 4.1%.

關於索賠頻率的問題，我們在上次電話會議上討論了這個問題及其對我們業務的近期影響。根據[ISS FasTrak]的數據，2025年第二季碰撞險的賠付頻率比去年同期下降了7.5%。事實上，同期獲得的汽車使用年數下降了 4.1%。

At the same time, vehicles in operation for the second calendar quarter of 2025 actually increased to 1.4%. We see further data in the underlying activity that shows miles driven continue to remain robust and growing.

同時，2025 年第二季投入營運的車輛數量實際增加了 1.4%。我們從基礎活動中進一步看到，行駛里程數持續保持強勁成長動能。

We understand from many of our insurance partners in the industry that consumers are responding to late cycle insurance rate increases by reducing the scope of their coverage; or foregoing it, altogether. As a result of that consumer retrenchment, more vehicles that historically would have entered the insurance company and mediated total loss process now do not. Over the long-term, however, the penetration rate of auto insurance coverage and collision coverage, specifically, appeared to be cyclical.

我們從業內許多保險合作夥伴那裡了解到，消費者正在透過減少保險範圍或完全放棄保險來應對週期末期保險費率的上漲。由於消費者減少支出，以往會進入保險公司並進行全損理賠流程的車輛，現在卻不會進入理賠流程了。但從長遠來看，汽車保險覆蓋率，特別是碰撞險的覆蓋率，似乎呈現週期性變化。

I'll now turn our attention to Copart's Non-Insurance/Wholesale business. As we've talked about on prior calls, it's really rising total loss frequency in our insurance vehicles which enable our ongoing progress in this arena, as well. Rising total loss frequency means that an increasing portion of the cars that we sell on behalf of the insurance industry are actually cars that will be repaired and drivable again, both in the US and overseas. As we draw buyers of those types of vehicles to our platform, they are increasingly the right fit, as, well for sellers such as rental car companies, financial institutions, corporate fleets, and the like.

現在，我將把我們的注意力轉向 Copart 的非保險/批發業務。正如我們在先前的電話會議中討論過的，正是我們保險業務中全損頻率的不斷上升，才使得我們能夠在這一領域取得持續進步。全損率上升意味著，我們代表保險業銷售的汽車中，越來越多的汽車實際上是可以修復並再次行駛的汽車，無論是在美國還是在海外。隨著越來越多的這類車輛買家來到我們的平台，他們也越來越適合像租車公司、金融機構、企業車隊等這樣的賣家。

We've also contributed to this flywheel effect by building purpose-built enhancements for commercial sellers as well. With guidance from our Blue Car Advisory Board, a host of industry leaders from the aforementioned industries, we have built specialized systems for receiving inspection, condition reporting, and arbitration, all designed to meet the unique expectations and unique needs of those types of partners.

我們也透過為商業賣家建立專門的增強功能，為這種飛輪效應做出了貢獻。在藍車顧問委員會（由上述行業的眾多行業領袖組成）的指導下，我們建立了專門的系統，用於接收檢驗、狀況報告和仲裁，所有這些系統都旨在滿足這些類型合作夥伴的獨特期望和獨特需求。

The single most important lever we have in achieving excellent commercial outcomes for our sellers is our fundamental auction liquidity. In comparison to many other pathways of disposition for these sellers, we offer an always-on digital global marketplace that is committed to finding the highest and best use for that vehicle, anywhere it might be.

我們為賣家實現卓越商業成果的最重要槓桿是我們基本的拍賣流動性。與其他許多處置這些車輛的途徑相比，我們提供了一個全天候在線的全球數位市場，致力於為車輛找到最高和最佳的用途，無論車輛身在何處。

That brings us to our last topic, which is the question of auction returns at Copart and why we believe the underlying indicators show that this advantage is not just a durable one but, in fact, is expanding.

這就引出了我們的最後一個主題，即 Copart 的拍賣回報問題，以及為什麼我們認為基本指標表明，這種優勢不僅持久，而且實際上還在擴大。

We propose five core indicators for the auction liquidity that has long distinguished us in the insurance industry. We believe that auction liquidity and returns have been a pronounced advantage for us since we became the first online-only salvage auction marketplace in 2003. But I'll focus, in particular, on the post-COVID, post-semiconductor, period since 2022.

我們提出了五個核心指標，用於衡量拍賣流動性，這五個指標長期以來使我們在保險業中脫穎而出。我們相信，自 2003 年我們成為首個純線上殘值拍賣市場以來，拍賣的流動性和回報一直是我們的顯著優勢。但我將重點放在自 2022 年以來的後新冠疫情、後半導體時代。

The first indicator of the health of a marketplace is the portion of its sales that are achieved via pure sale auction. Even in 2022, a strong majority of our insurance units were sold on a pure-sale basis. But the mix has increased today to comprise a strong supermajority of insurance units sold.

衡量一個市場健康狀況的第一個指標，是透過純拍賣方式實現的銷售佔比。即使到了 2022 年，我們絕大多數的保險業務也是以純粹銷售的方式售出的。但如今，這種組合已經增加，在售出的保險產品中佔了絕對多數。

Our consignors know that with an always-on global digital marketplace, they will trust the platform to find the highest and best value for a vehicle, based on the attendance of any given auction of Copart. In fact, for the typical institutional carriers, they hold only unique exotic vehicles on occasion to be managed with reserve prices and such.

我們的委託人知道，憑藉 Copart 全天候線上的全球數位市場，他們可以信賴該平台，根據 Copart 任何一場拍賣會的參與人數，找到車輛的最高和最佳價值。事實上，對於一般的機構承運商而言，他們只是偶爾持有獨特的稀有車輛，並設定底價等進行管理。

The second indicator for a strong marketplace like ours is international participation in our auctions. Global demand leads to more bidders, more competition, higher price, and better price discovery. Again, since 2022, against the backdrop of global economic uncertainty, tariffs, and so forth, the share of our US vehicles and auction value that have been purchased by International buyers has continued to grow.

衡量我們這樣強大市場的第二個指標是國際參與者對我們拍賣的動機。全球需求導致競標者增加、競爭加劇、價格上漲，以及價格發現機制更加完善。再次強調，自 2022 年以來，在全球經濟不確定性、關稅等背景下，國際買家購買的美國車輛和拍賣價值的份額持續成長。

In the first quarter of 2026, International buyers have purchased vehicles that are 38% higher in value than comparable US buyers by comparison. We believe that these are long-term durable trends, as population growth and mobility demand growth, outside the United States, outside the UK, Canada, and so forth, continues to outpace what we're experiencing, firsthand, in our origin markets.

2026 年第一季度，國際買家購買的車輛價值比美國同類買家高出 38%。我們認為這些是長期的持久趨勢，因為美國以外、英國以外、加拿大以外等地的人口增長和流動需求增長，繼續超過我們在原產市場親身經歷的情況。

The third indicator we would propose would be the unique bidders per auction. We sometimes face the question as to whether a marketplace like ours can ever experience saturation; that is, the unit volume can grow so much that it eclipses the buyer base's ability to absorb it. I would argue that most historical marketplace analyses in other industries would say quite the opposite. Liquidity begets liquidity. In fact, since 2022, our unique bidders per auction instance have grown steadily to today's all-time highs, as well.

我們建議的第三個指標是每次拍賣的獨立競標者數量。我們有時會面臨這樣的問題：像我們這樣的市場是否會達到飽和；也就是說，銷售成長如此之快，以至於超過了買家群體的吸收能力。我認為，其他行業的大多數歷史市場分析都會得出截然相反的結論。流動性帶來流動性。事實上，自 2022 年以來，我們每次拍賣的獨立競標者數量也穩步增長，並達到了今天的歷史最高水平。

The fourth indicator we look at is to assess preliminary bid activity. Our live-auction technology is distinctive in its ability to dynamically draw full and fair prices. But preliminary bids are also one indicator of auction health, i.e., the quantity of proxy bids submitted before the auction even begins. In fact, preliminary bids, as a portion -- preliminary bids per lot auction instance have increased steadily since 2022, as well.

我們考察的第四個指標是評估初步投標活動。我們的即時拍賣技術具有獨特的動態產生完整公平價格的能力。但初步出價也是衡量拍賣健康狀況的指標，即在拍賣開始前提交的代理商出價的數量。事實上，從 2022 年開始，預估出價（即每件拍品拍賣的預估出價）的比例也穩定上升。

Finally, the one measure that much of the insurance industry uses is gross returns, i.e., selling price for a salvage vehicle divided by its ACV or pre-accident value. This is a single, simple metric that the industry commonly uses.

最後，保險業普遍採用的衡量標準是總收益，即報廢車輛的售價除以其事故前車輛的現金價值（ACV）。這是業界常用的簡單指標。

Since 2022, again, our US insurance returns have increased substantially; and are, in fact, at an all-time high watermark during my own personal 10-year journey here at Copart.

自 2022 年以來，我們的美國保險收益再次大幅增長；事實上，在我本人加入 Copart 的 10 年歷程中，已經達到了歷史最高水平。

Taken together, we believe that higher pure-sale rates, expanding International demand, greater bidder participation, stronger pre-auction engagement, and rising gross returns collectively attest to our principal competitive advantage with our consigners. That is delivering full and fair prices, according to the global marketplace.

綜上所述，我們認為更高的純銷售額、不斷擴大的國際需求、更多的競標者參與、更強大的拍賣前互動以及不斷增長的總回報，共同證明了我們與委託人之間的主要競爭優勢。這意味著要根據全球市場提供充分且公平的價格。

They, in turn, are the hard-won results of our aggressive investments in storage capacity, technology, and people for years and decades. They're also the best long-term indicators of the strength of our business.

而這些成果，正是我們多年來在儲存容量、技術和人才方面大力投資的來之不易的成果。它們也是衡量我們業務長期實力的最佳指標。

With that, I'll turn it over to our CFO, Leah Stearns; and then, we'll take your questions, thereafter.

接下來，我將把發言權交給我們的財務長莉亞·斯特恩斯；之後，我們將回答大家的問題。

Thank you, Jeff. Good afternoon to everyone on the call.

謝謝你，傑夫。各位下午好。

I'll begin by walking through our financial results for the quarter, beginning with our consolidated performance, followed by a review of our US and International segment performance.

我將首先介紹我們本季的財務業績，首先是我們的綜合業績，然後是我們的美國和國際業務部門的業績回顧。

For the first quarter, total global units sold decreased 6.7%, with fee units decreasing 6.3%. During the prior year period, Copart responded to several catastrophic events around the world, from Hurricanes Helene and Milton in the US to catastrophic flooding in the Middle East, Germany, and Brazil. These events, which did not recur this year, impacted our reported year-over-year unit growth. Normalizing for the impact of these cat events, our global units sold decreased 4.6%. Global Insurance units declined 8.1% or 5.6%, adjusted for cat; while global Non-Insurance units declined 1.5%.

第一季度，全球總銷量下降 6.7%，其中付費銷量下降 6.3%。在上一年期間，Copart 應對了世界各地發生的幾起災難性事件，從美國的颶風海倫和米爾頓到中東、德國和巴西的災難性洪水。這些事件雖然今年沒有再次發生，但影響了我們報告的同比單位增長。在剔除這些貓科動物事件的影響後，我們的全球銷售量下降了 4.6%。全球保險業務部門下降 8.1% 或經巨災調整後下降 5.6%；而全球非保險業務部門下降 1.5%。

For the first quarter, consolidated revenue grew just under 1% year over year -- or 2.9%, excluding cat -- to $1.16 billion, with service revenue increasing just under 1% and purchased vehicle sales increasing nearly 2%. Our fee revenue per unit increased over 7% during the quarter, which was primarily driven by growth in our average selling prices, which have increased 8.5% from the prior year period.

第一季度，合併收入年增率略低於 1%（若不計入巨災損失則為 2.9%），達到 11.6 億美元，其中服務收入成長略低於 1%，購車銷售額成長近 2%。本季度，我們的單位費用收入成長超過 7%，這主要是由於平均售價的成長，比去年同期成長了 8.5%。

Global gross profit increased 4.9% -- or 3.7%, excluding cat -- to $537 million. Gross profit per fee unit increased 12.3%. Purchase unit gross profit decreased 3% to $22 million from the prior year period. Gross margin improved 184 basis points to 46.5%, reflecting the non-recurrence of one-time expenses related to our cat response.

全球毛利成長 4.9%（若不計入巨獸產品則成長 3.7%），達到 5.37 億美元。每單位收費的毛利增加了 12.3%。採購單位毛利較上年同期下降 3% 至 2,200 萬美元。毛利率提高了 184 個基點，達到 46.5%，這反映出與應對貓災相關的一次性支出不再發生。

Operating income rose 6% -- or 4.5%, excluding cat -- to $431 million, while net income was $404 million, up 11.5% versus last year. Earnings per diluted share increased 10.8% to $0.41. This was driven by revenue growth, margin expansion, and the continued growth in interest income we've earned due to our growing cash balance.

營業收入成長 6%（若不計巨災損失則成長 4.5%），達到 4.31 億美元；淨收入為 4.04 億美元，比去年成長 11.5%。稀釋後每股收益成長 10.8% 至 0.41 美元。這主要得益於收入成長、利潤率擴張以及現金餘額不斷增長帶來的利息收入持續增長。

Turning to our US segment, in the first quarter, total units sold declined 7.9% -- or 5.2%, excluding cat -- in direct-buy units. US Insurance volumes declined 9.5% or 7.3%, excluding cat. Our Insurance unit volume trends are consistent with the industry themes Jeff described a few moments ago. Our US Non-Insurance business continues to perform well, led by dealer unit sales, which increased 5.3%.

再來看我們的美國業務，第一季總銷量下降了 7.9%——如果排除貓類產品，則下降了 5.2%——這是直接購買的銷量。美國保險業務量下降了9.5%，若不計巨災損失則下降了7.3%。我們的保險業務量趨勢與傑夫剛才描述的行業趨勢一致。我們的美國非保險業務持續表現良好，主要得益於經銷商銷售成長，增幅達 5.3%。

Commercial consignment units, which are marketed through our Blue Car channel, were down just over 1%, which was primarily a result of timing related to the sale of rental units, as our fleet and bank and finance seller volumes continue to grow.

透過我們的 Blue Car 管道銷售的商業寄售車輛數量下降了 1% 多一點，這主要是由於租賃車輛的銷售時間表所致，因為我們的車隊、銀行和金融賣家的數量仍在持續增長。

We continue to focus on driving higher value units through our marketplace and have developed a more profitable channel for Copart to manage lower value units through, which we have branded direct-buy. These are units which Copart would have previously purchased through its Copart Direct, Cash for Cars business unit and, instead, now is earning a referral fee to connect a junk buyer to the individual seller.

我們繼續專注於透過我們的市場推動更高價值的商品銷售，並為 Copart 開發了一個更有利可圖的管道來管理低價值的商品，我們將其命名為直接購買。這些車輛原本是 Copart 透過其 Copart Direct 和 Cash for Cars 業務部門收購的，而現在 Copart 則透過向廢品收購商和個人賣家牽線搭橋來賺取推薦費。

As a result, the units are not part of Copart's inventory. We do not incur costs associated with the processing and handling of the unit. Normalizing for this shift, US purchase units increased 6.2% for the prior year period compared to a decline of 19.2% on a reported basis.

因此，這些物品不屬於 Copart 的庫存。我們不承擔與該設備的加工和處理相關的費用。考慮到這一變化，美國購買量較上年同期增長 6.2%，而按報告數據計算則下降了 19.2%。

US purchased vehicle sales, which is primarily comprised of our Copart direct units, increased 10.9%, which reflects the lower unit volume being offset by substantially higher average sale prices, which increased over 50% from the prior year period.

美國購置車輛的銷量（主要包括我們的 Copart 直接銷售車輛）增長了 10.9%，這反映出銷量下降被大幅上漲的平均銷售價格所抵消，平均銷售價格比上年同期增長了 50% 以上。

From an operational perspective, we continue to drive forward initiatives, which are reducing our overall cycle time. This includes managing title procurement on behalf of our insurance customers, which has grown at a double-digit rate over the past year; while simultaneously reducing aged inventory at our facilities.

從營運角度來看，我們不斷推進各項舉措，以縮短整體週期時間。這包括代表我們的保險客戶管理產權採購，該業務在過去一年中以兩位數的速度成長；同時減少我們設施中的過期庫存。

In addition, as Non-Insurance units are contributing a greater percentage of our overall unit volumes, we naturally have a greater proportion of units, which have substantially shorter cycle times being processed through our facilities.

此外，由於非保險業務在我們整體業務量中所佔比例越來越大，因此我們工廠處理的周期時間明顯較短的業務比例也越來越高。

During the quarter, in the US, our cycle times have decreased by 9% from the prior year period. While these improvements in cycle time are decreasing inventory levels, they are increasing the overall processing capacity of our existing facilities. As of the end of the quarter, these trends were the main driver of our US inventory decline of just over 17% from the year ago period, while US assignments declined 9.5% or low-single digit, excluding cat.

本季度，在美國，我們的週期時間比去年同期減少了 9%。雖然這些週期時間的改進降低了庫存水平，但它們提高了我們現有設施的整體處理能力。截至本季末，這些趨勢是導緻我們美國庫存較上年同期下降略超過 17% 的主要驅動因素，而美國訂單量下降了 9.5%，即個位數低降幅（不包括類別）。

We also continue to invest in Purple Wave, our online equipment auction platform. Purple Wave's GTV growth of over 10% over the last 12 months continues to outperform the broader industry and reflects strong buyer engagement in our expansion markets, growth in our enterprise accounts, and sustained demand in the heavy equipment category.

我們也會繼續投資我們的線上設備拍賣平台 Purple Wave。Purple Wave 在過去 12 個月中 GTV 成長超過 10%，持續優於整個產業，反映出我們在擴張市場中買家的積極參與、企業客戶的成長以及重型設備類別的持續需求。

The market continues to experience the impact of broad uncertainty, which is causing customers to delay decisions around equipment purchases and sales, as they contemplate the impact of the broader macro and geopolitical environment.

市場持續受到廣泛不確定性的影響，導致客戶推遲設備購買和銷售決策，因為他們正在考慮更廣泛的宏觀和地緣政治環境的影響。

From a US segment perspective, total revenue increased 0.5% -- or 2.3%, excluding cat -- which reflects the decline in unit volume, offset by an increase in revenue per unit. On a per unit basis, US fee revenue increased 7.5%, which reflects the positive impact of higher average selling prices, including our US Insurance ASPs, which have increased 8.4% from the year-ago period.

從美國市場來看，總收入成長了 0.5%——如果排除貓咪產品，則成長了 2.3%——這反映了銷量下降，但被單位收入的成長所抵消。以單位計算，美國手續費收入增長了 7.5%，這反映了平均售價上漲帶來的積極影響，其中包括我們的美國保險平均售價，該價格較上年同期增長了 8.4%。

US gross profit increased 3.7% to $464 million. US gross profit per fee unit increased 13.2%, supporting an increase in our US segment gross margin up to 48.7%.

美國毛利成長3.7%，達到4.64億美元。每單位費用毛利成長 13.2%，推動美國業務毛利率成長至 48.7%。

As a result, US segment operating income was $375 million, up 5.6% year over year, reflecting strong execution and continued cost control, even against the backdrop of lower insurance volumes in the prior year cat. US segment operating margin was 39.4%, reflecting a nearly 200 basis points increase from the prior year period.

因此，美國業務部門的營業收入為 3.75 億美元，年增 5.6%，這反映出即使在上一年保險量下降的背景下，公司依然保持了強勁的執行力和持續的成本控制。美國業務部門的營業利潤率為 39.4%，比去年同期成長了近 200 個基點。

In our International segment, total units sold declined by less than 1% or grew 4.5%, excluding the cat units in the prior year. International Insurance units increased less than 1% or 8.3%, excluding cat. International Non-Insurance units declined 2.2%. We continue to see strong Insurance growth across our diversified International footprint, including in the UK and Canada.

在我們的國際業務板塊，總銷量下降不到 1%，或成長了 4.5%（不包括上一年的大宗商品銷售）。國際保險業務量成長不到 1%，或 8.3%（不包括巨災）。國際非保險業務單位下降 2.2%。我們在多元化的國際業務範圍內，包括英國和加拿大，持續看到保險業務的強勁成長。

International revenue increased 1.6% -- or 5.7%, excluding cat -- year over year, an increase to $202 million. International service revenues increased 7.9% -- or 13.9%, excluding cat -- which primarily reflects higher International fee revenue per unit, which increased 8.1%.

國際營收年增 1.6%（若不計入 Cat 業務則為 5.7%），達到 2.02 億美元。國際服務收入增加了 7.9%——如果排除巨災，則增加了 13.9%——這主要反映了每單位國際費用收入的增加，增加了 8.1%。

Our average selling price for International Insurance units declined 2.4% from a year-ago period. Purchased vehicle revenue declined 9.4%, which reflects the impact of a few of our Insurance customers who have migrated from a purchase contract to a consignment contract structure.

國際保險業務的平均售價較上年同期下降了 2.4%。購置車輛收入下降了 9.4%，這反映了部分保險客戶從購買合約轉向寄售合約結構的影響。

Gross profit for the International segment grew 13%. Operating income was $56 million or a 27.5% operating margin, which continues to expand, even as we invest in yard capacity, technology, and logistics infrastructure to support our long-term International growth.

國際業務部門毛利成長13%。營業收入為 5,600 萬美元，營業利潤率為 27.5%，隨著我們投資於堆場容量、技術和物流基礎設施以支持我們的長期國際成長，營業利潤率仍在持續增長。

Turning to our balance sheet, Copart remains in an exceptionally strong position. We ended the quarter with liquidity of approximately $6.5 billion, including cash and cash equivalents of $5.2 billion, and no debt. We continue to generate robust free cash flow, supported by disciplined capital allocation into assets which position us to efficiently support our growth to serve both Insurance and Non-Insurance clients, while also delivering strong operational efficiency.

從資產負債表來看，Copart 的財務狀況依然非常穩健。本季末，我們的流動資金約為 65 億美元，其中包括 52 億美元的現金及現金等價物，且無任何債務。我們持續產生強勁的自由現金流，這得益於我們嚴格的資本配置，使我們能夠高效地支持業務成長，為保險和非保險客戶提供服務，同時實現強大的營運效率。

With that, we thank you. We'll open up the call for your questions.

在此，我們表示感謝。我們將開放提問環節。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作說明）

Bob Labick, CJS Securities.

Bob Labick，CJS Securities。

I know you don't talk about specific clients, accounts, and things like that. But I'm having a little trouble reconciling the larger-than-expected decline in unit volumes. I don't know if there's any way you could talk about -- because the trend changed both versus expectations and versus what we've been seeing. At the same time, the explanations are similar to previous trends, right?

我知道你不會談論具體的客戶、帳戶等等。但我有點難以理解銷量下降幅度為何超出預期。我不知道你是否可以談論這件事——因為這種趨勢既與預期相反，也與我們一直以來所看到的相反。同時，這些解釋與先前的趨勢類似，對吧？

The US Insurance's less collision coverage and then, share shifts between the carriers, those trends have been happening for a little while now. So maybe help us understand what the inflection in the change is.

美國保險公司減少碰撞險承保，以及保險公司之間的市場份額轉移，這些趨勢已經持續了一段時間。所以或許可以幫助我們理解這變化中的轉捩點是什麼。

Is there any, like, actual market share shift between carriers, as opposed to from you to a competitor or a competitor set, et cetera? Anything we can think about this -- the change in the speed of unit change -- if that makes sense?

是否存在實際的市場份額轉移，例如，運營商之間的市場份額轉移，而不是從你轉移到競爭對手或競爭對手組合等等？我們能不能思考這個問題──單位變化速度的變化──如果這樣說有意義的話？

I don't think so, Bob. I think it is the factors you just described, which is principally that insurance coverage itself has changed. But I think, notably, to see earned car years down 4% and change; while, literally, vehicles and operation and miles driven are up, I think, speaks to the underlying activity. So our unit trends, I don't think, is substantially different.

我不這麼認為，鮑伯。我認為正是你剛才描述的那些因素造成的，主要是保險範圍本身就改變了。但我認為，值得注意的是，汽車年收入下降了 4% 多一點；而車輛數量、營運量和行駛里程卻在上升，我認為這反映了潛在的經濟活動。所以我認為，我們的單位趨勢並沒有實質的差異。

If you can envision, literally, 4% of policies no longer having coverage of any kind; and then, some other portion migrating down the value chain, so to speak, from collision coverage to liability only or what have you, I don't think it's far-fetched to extrapolate from that to the unit trends that we're seeing in our business.

如果你能想像，實際上有 4% 的保單不再提供任何形式的保險；然後，還有一部分保單的保障範圍向下轉移，比如從碰撞險轉移到僅提供責任險等等，我認為從這種情況推斷出我們業務中正在看到的單位趨勢並不算牽強。

Okay. Great. And then, a slightly different question. Just trying to think forward.

好的。偉大的。然後，還有一個略有不同的問題。只是想展望未來。

Total loss frequency, I know it was up 80 basis points year over year. But it's been, like, modestly flattish for the last four quarters or so.

總損失頻率，我知道它比去年同期上升了 80 個基點。但在過去四個季度左右的時間裡，情況一直比較平穩。

I know one year through Copart's lens is like a minute for the rest of us; meaning, it's too short to register or matter. But that said, what do you think has caused the pause in the expansion over the last four quarters of total loss frequency? What are you seeing beneath the hood, so to speak, for decisions at carriers? Can it be as simple as one carrier is gaining share and they generally have a lower total loss frequency rate and that's impacting it? Or what could be driving this? What do you think it takes to get that to grow again?

我知道，從 Copart 的角度來看，一年就像我們其他人的一分鐘；也就是說，它太短了，不足以引起注意或產生影響。但話說回來，您認為是什麼原因導致過去四個季度總損失率的成長停滯？換句話說，你認為營運商決策背後的真正原因是什麼？會不會是因為某位業者的市佔率不斷成長，而他們的總損失率通常較低，因而產生了影響？或者，究竟是什麼原因導致了這種情況？你認為需要什麼才能讓它重新成長？

Yeah. I think your first observation is the very correct one, which is that measured in the kinds of investment cycles through which we have to manage our business because the nature of our business is such that investments in anything -- tech, land, people, et cetera -- requires years of conviction.

是的。我認為你的第一個觀察非常正確，那就是以我們必須經歷的投資週期來衡量我們的業務，因為我們業務的性質決定了對任何東西——技術、土地、人才等等——的投資都需要多年的堅定信念。

We have that conviction in space; meaning, over a good horizon. You know this story. I think maybe most of the folks listening to the call already do, as well.

我們對太空充滿信心；也就是說，我們對太空有著廣闊的視野。你聽過這個故事。我想，或許大多數收聽電話會議的人也已經意識到了這一點。

The total loss frequency in as recently as 1990 was 5%.1980, it was 4%. Today, it's 22% and change. So it's up 80 basis points versus a year ago.

1990 年的總損失頻率為 5%，1980 年為 4%。今天，這個數字是22%多一點。所以比一年前漲了80個基點。

I think, Bob, you know, already, that even the data in any given quarter often gets corrected the same way that the Bureau of Labor Statistics will later revise unemployment, looking backwards, because you now know more cars were actually totaled that were in the repair chain or cars intended to be totaled were actually owner-retained.

鮑勃，我想你應該已經知道，即使是任何一個季度的數據，也經常會像勞工統計局後來回顧性地修正失業率數據一樣進行修正，因為你現在知道，實際上報廢的汽車中，有更多是在維修鏈中報廢的，或者原本打算報廢的汽車實際上被車主保留了下來。

So I think reading a whole lot into 80 basis points versus [130] or versus plus [30], I think, is more noise than it is signal. I don't think anything has fundamentally changed in the commercial logic that the industry will use, going forward.

所以我認為，過度解讀 80 個基點與 [130] 或與加 [30] 的對比，我認為更多的是噪聲而不是信號。我認為，從根本上來說，該行業未來將採用的商業邏輯並沒有任何改變。

I think we believe as much as we ever have the total loss frequency as a matter of time. Different analysts will draw different conclusions on that front. But we'll reach 25%. We'll reach 30% because it's actually not -- I think the intuition people struggle with is that they think what it means is you're abandoning a car, right? You're not fixing it. You're giving up on it.

我認為我們和以往一樣相信，總損失頻率只是時間問題。不同的分析家會對此得出不同的結論。但我們會達到25%。我們將達到 30%，因為實際上並非如此——我認為人們難以理解的直覺是，他們認為這意味著你要棄車，對嗎？你根本解決不了問題。你放棄它了。

That's fundamentally not true. For the marginal car, you're not choosing not to repair it. You're choosing to let somebody else manage it, who has a different cost base, a different regulatory regime, and a different economic calculus than you do as a US-Massachusetts insurance carrier.

這根本不是事實。對於車況一般的車，你並不是選擇不去修理它。你選擇讓其他人來管理它，而他們的成本基礎、監管制度和經濟計算方式都與你（美國麻薩諸塞州的保險公司）不同。

So the last comment I'd make, Bob, is there's also, probably, unprecedented volatility in some of these input variables, right, in the form of tariffs, parts prices, shop utilization. I think it's been quite a bit more volatile over the course of the past three years than it has been probably at any point in your career or mine.

鮑勃，我最後要說的是，這些投入變數中可能也存在前所未有的波動，例如關稅、零件價格、店鋪利用率等等。我認為過去三年來的市場波動性可能比你我職業生涯中的任何時期都要大得多。

There have been shocks to the system of that sort and how those exactly unfold in any given month or quarter or year is harder to speak to but our long-term conviction remains the same.

這類衝擊確實為系統帶來了衝擊，而這些衝擊在任何特定的月份、季度或年份中究竟會如何發展則很難說，但我們的長期信念依然不變。

Craig Kennison, Baird.

克雷格·肯尼森，貝爾德。

I'll follow a similar line of questions. But Jeff, are you confident that this broader trend in accident claims, which are down, is more of a cyclical phenomenon tied to this increase in uninsured motorists? Or is there any evidence that ADAS technology is finally starting to move the needle?

我將提出類似的問題。但是傑夫，你是否確信事故索賠數量下降的這種大趨勢，更多的是一種與無保險駕駛員數量增加相關的周期性現象？或者，有沒有證據顯示ADAS技術終於開始產生影響？

Yeah. It's a very good question, Craig.

是的。克雷格，你問得好。

I would tell you that safety technologies very much have moved the needle and have done so for 40 years, right? If you go over decades of history and divide police reported crashes or fatalities, which are often published a little bit further in arrears, and divide that by vehicle miles traveled, you'll find that it's declined forever, right.

我會告訴你，安全技術已經取得了巨大的進步，而且這種進步已經持續了40年，對吧？如果你回顧幾十年的歷史，將警方報告的交通事故或死亡人數（這些數字通常會滯後一段時間才公佈）除以車輛行駛里程，你會發現它一直在下降，對吧。

Very steadily, very slightly but very constantly, with one historical blip in the 2013, '14, '15 timeframe -- I may have my years off by one year or the other -- when smartphone adoption and the more addictive apps really began achieving adoption levels that had previously not been seen.

非常穩定，非常輕微但非常持續，在 2013、2014、2015 年期間出現過一次歷史性的波動——我的年份可能差了一兩年——當時智慧型手機的普及和更令人上癮的應用程序的普及率真正開始達到以前從未見過的水平。

So that caused a blip and upward increase in accident frequency, with the same numerators and denominators. But, otherwise, over the course of long-run history, it has declined.

因此，這導致事故發生頻率出現短暫的上升趨勢，而分子和分母則保持不變。但除此之外，從長遠歷史來看，它已經衰退了。

It's been more than offset by total loss frequency. That's the importance of Bob's question from a moment ago. It's always been dwarfed by that, right? Accident frequency has decreased but not nearly enough to offset the fivefold, five-and-a-half-fold increase in total loss frequency over that same 45-year horizon.

但這已被總損耗頻率完全抵消了。這就是鮑伯剛才提出的問題的重要性。它一直都比不上那個，對吧？事故發生頻率有所下降，但遠遠不足以抵消在同一 45 年的時間範圍內總損失頻率的五倍、五倍半的增長。

I think the algebra is such that even if there were excellent technologies that were being released now that would, altogether, arrest vehicles from colliding, the algebra as such with annual shipments into the existing fleet that it still takes decades to turn the fleet over.

我認為，即使現在有一些優秀的技術被推出，可以完全阻止車輛碰撞，但由於每年向現有車隊的交付量，仍然需要數十年才能完成車隊的更新換代。

So I don't think you could see something in a year's time that would reflect a fundamental change in vehicle mix and ADAS penetration.

所以我認為一年之內不會出現任何能夠反映車輛組成和ADAS滲透率發生根本性變化的情況。

And then, just following up on something you said earlier, Jeff. But what happens to those cars that are involved in a severe accident but are not covered by insurance? Are those vehicles you're able to capture on your platform somehow?

傑夫，我還要補充你之前說過的話。但是，如果車輛發生嚴重事故但沒有保險，該怎麼辦？你們的平台能夠捕捉到這些車輛的影像嗎？

Craig, the answer to that is, yes. I think, somewhat less efficiently, right? So we have a consumer business in Cash for Cars that sources vehicles directly from consumers.

克雷格，答案是肯定的。我認為效率會稍低一些，對吧？所以我們有一項面向消費者的業務，叫做“現金換車”，它直接從消費者那裡購買車輛。

While you and others on this call certainly recognize the Copart brand name, we are not yet a household consumer name. So we have a different business that purchases those cars from consumers. They don't sell on a consignment basis through us. They sell the cars to us directly.

雖然您和本次通話中的其他人肯定都聽說過 Copart 這個品牌，但我們還沒有成為家喻戶曉的消費者品牌。所以我們有另一家公司專門從消費者手中購買這些車。他們不透過我們進行寄售。他們直接把車賣給我們。

Those are often the types of cars that our Cash for Cars platform will acquire because those are vehicles that are much less easily traded into dealers to buy the next car. So we are a natural outlet for those cars.

這些通常是我們「現金換車」平台會收購的車輛類型，因為這些車輛不太容易置換給經銷商購買下一輛車。所以，我們自然而然地成為了這些車輛的銷路。

But as you might imagine, it's a far less efficient pathway for that kind of sourcing of vehicles than is a longstanding institutional relationship with a major insurance carrier.

但正如你所想，對於這類車輛採購而言，與和大型保險公司建立長期機構關係相比，這種途徑的效率要低得多。

Chris Bottiglieri, BNP Paribas.

克里斯‧波蒂列裡 (Chris Bottiglieri)，法國巴黎銀行。

I have two for me.

我給自己留了兩個。

What is the [delve-in] to the 38% disparity between International and US bidders? Are you saying that International bidders bid, on average, 38% more than domestic vehicles in the same vehicle?

如何深入探究國際競標者和美國競標者之間 38% 的差距？你是說，國際競標者對同一款車型的平均出價比國內競標者高出 38% 嗎？

That's the case, I would think, with your International mix versus your peer, that that 38% price differential in a $5,000 vehicle would be pretty insurmountable, given the average fee is only $1,000.

我認為情況確實如此，考慮到你的國際車型組合與你的同行相比，一輛 5000 美元的車 38% 的價格差異是相當難以逾越的，因為平均費用只有 1000 美元。

Just curious how you think about that, this advantage you have on international mix, why it's not leading to -- it almost seems irrational not to use (inaudible) at that point since the disparity is that big.

我只是好奇你對此有何看法，你在國際化融合方面擁有的這種優勢，為什麼沒有帶來——考慮到差距如此之大，在這一點上不使用（聽不清）幾乎是不理智的。

Just curious how you think about the backdrop of all that.

我只是好奇你對這一切的背景有什麼看法。

Chris, the impact that Jeff was alluding to is that, on average, International buyers, the ASP of the vehicles that they purchase, is 38% higher than the average ASP of buyers from the US. And so their inclination is to pursue lighter-damage, higher-value vehicles. That trend has persisted over that timeframe.

克里斯，傑夫所指的影響是，平均而言，國際買家購買的車輛的平均售價比美國買家購買的車輛的平均售價高出 38%。因此，他們傾向於追捕損壞較輕、價值較高的車輛。這一趨勢在這段時間內一直持續存在。

So we continue to see them be more focused on those borderline total losses and repairable vehicles.

因此，我們看到他們繼續更加關注那些接近全損或可修復的車輛。

Got you. Do you have stats on the question I asked? Do you have a sense for how much more International bidders bid on the same vehicle than domestic? Do you have the other parts of any of that, Leah?

抓到你了。您有關於我所提問題的統計數據嗎？您是否了解國際競標者對同一輛車的出價通常比國內競標者高出多少？莉婭，你還有其他部分嗎？

Of course, that's a function of literally a microeconomic question per auction instance, right. Almost by definition, if the institutional buyer wins the vehicle. That speaks for approximately half of our US auction value -- is going to an International buyer. Or they are the "push bidder", where they're the second highest bidder, which dictates the ultimate sale price of the vehicle.

當然，這實際上是每個拍賣實例中一個微觀經濟問題的函數，對吧。幾乎可以肯定的是，如果機構買家贏得該車輛。這意味著我們美國拍賣品價值的大約一半——將落入國際買家手中。或者他們是“推價者”，即出價第二高的競標者，他們的出價決定了車輛的最終售價。

That is a strong majority of the vehicles that we sell today. They are there. They do drive value upwards and very meaningfully so.

這占我們目前銷售車輛的絕大多數。它們就在那裡。它們確實能顯著提升價值。

To your question from a moment ago, to make sure you understood the algebra precisely, it is literally that the average car bought by an International buyer is 38% more valuable than the average car bought by domestic buyer. That is largely because, yes, they favor the higher-end vehicles.

關於你剛才提出的問題，為了確保你準確了解代數運算，簡單來說，國際買家購買的汽車平均比國內買家購買的汽車價值高出 38%。這主要是因為他們確實偏愛高階車型。

You can imagine that if you are incurring the freight cost to move a car from here to Poland, it has to be worth your while, right? You're not moving a $400 vehicle that's mostly -- just is metal, right? That will never be worthwhile to move halfway across the world.

您可以想像，如果您要承擔將汽車從這裡運到波蘭的運費，那這筆錢肯定花得值，對吧？你運的不是一輛價值 400 美元、大部分都是金屬做的車，對吧？為了這個目的搬到地球另一端，永遠都不值得。

And so, by definition, you're buying cars that are valuable enough. You can add and capture enough value downstream.

因此，從定義上講，你購買的是價值不斐的汽車。你可以在下游增加和獲得足夠的價值。

Got you. Okay.

抓到你了。好的。

And then, unrelated big-picture question. If I got to zoom out, your gross pre-pay in land is up 155% since 2019. Your volumes are up about 30%, let's call it, since then. So just curious how you think about capacity investment, not only for '26 and beyond.

然後，還有一個無關的宏觀問題。如果從更宏觀的角度來看，自 2019 年以來，您的土地預付款總額增加了 155%。自那時以來，你的交易量增加了大約 30%，我們姑且這麼稱呼吧。所以，我很好奇您是如何看待產能投資的，而不僅僅是針對 2026 年及以後的情況。

Like, obviously, that is a ton of capacity, no matter how you cut the data the last six years. Like, what do you do from here, given how much you've already grown the capacity?

顯然，無論你如何分析過去六年的數據，這都是巨大的容量。鑑於產能已經成長到如此程度，接下來該怎麼做呢？

Sure, Chris. I think some of the assets that we've acquired over the last several years have been for events, particularly around hurricanes, in the US. Those may operate at a lower average utilization than the average Copart facility.

當然可以，克里斯。我認為我們在過去幾年購買的一些資產是用於應對各種事件，特別是美國颶風災害相關的事件。這些設施的平均利用率可能低於 Copart 設施的平均利用率。

So taking those out of the mix, I think we continue to have certain areas of the country where we continue to have capacity needs or projecting capacity needs over the next 5 to 10 years. I would say the population or the size of that list is much smaller today than what it was, clearly, five years ago.

因此，排除這些因素後，我認為在未來 5 到 10 年內，我國某些地區仍有產能需求，或預期會出現產能需求。我認為，如今這個名單上的人數或規模顯然比五年前小得多。

And so we'll continue to, in a disciplined manner, allocate capital into assets that fit that classification, in terms of our capacity needs. We do also continuously look for ways to bring down our logistics cost to the extent that we can add another node to the overall network that can materially bring down the distance that we need to tow units into our facilities. That's another consideration for us to make.

因此，我們將繼續以嚴謹的方式，根據我們的產能需求，將資金分配到符合該分類的資產。我們也一直在尋找降低物流成本的方法，以便在整個網路中增加一個節點，從而大幅縮短將設備拖曳到我們設施所需的距離。這是我們需要考慮的另一個因素。

But I would say, certainly, the list of areas of the country where we do have needs over the next 5 to 10 years is shorter than it was five years ago.

但我可以肯定地說，未來 5 到 10 年內，我們需要援助的地區清單肯定比五年前短了。

Bret Jordan, Jefferies.

Bret Jordan，傑富瑞集團。

Going back to one of the early questions around market share; and, obviously, the optics, given Progressive having gained share within the Insurance business. You either need your partners to gain share from Progressive or you need to gain Progressive volume.

回到早期關於市場份額的問題之一；顯然，考慮到 Progressive 在保險業務中獲得了份額，這也會引發一些看法上的爭議。你要么需要你的合作夥伴從 Progressive 公司獲得市場份額，要么你需要自己獲得 Progressive 公司的業務量。

Is there any outlook for that, either any indication that you see that some of the insurers that you do business with are becoming relatively more competitive with Progressive? Or is there an outlook for picking up some of that volume, given your higher ASPs?

這方面是否有任何前景？或者說，是否有任何跡象表明，您認為與您有業務往來的一些保險公司在與 Progressive 的競爭中變得更加具有競爭力？或者，鑑於你們較高的平均售價，是否有可能提升部分銷售量？

Yeah. Those are totally reasonable questions.

是的。這些都是非常合理的問題。

As you know, we don't comment on individual accounts. I would say that the insurance industry, itself, has proven, over the long haul, very dynamic, with different players gaining and losing share, episodically, over many years, right? So we have observed that trend.

如您所知，我們不對個別帳戶發表評論。我認為，從長遠來看，保險業本身已經證明是一個非常動態的行業，不同的參與者在多年來不斷獲得和失去市場份額，對吧？我們已經觀察到了這種趨勢。

There certainly have been some long-term secular gainers, as well; Progressive being one of them.

當然，也有一些長期受益者；進步主義就是其中之一。

But, generally, over the very long haul, we do see a very dynamic picture in that regard, right, both for and against us, in that sense, assuming a static set of accounts.

但總的來說，從長遠來看，我們確實看到了一個非常動態的局面，對吧，從這個意義上講，既有對我們有利的，也有對我們不利的，假設假設一組靜態的帳戶。

But, as for the prospects of winning or losing any individual account, as you've heard at great length today, the overwhelming focus is on delivering excellent gross and net returns. We trust that the rest of it will take care of itself over the long haul.

但是，就任何單一帳戶的盈虧前景而言，正如您今天所聽到的，最重要的還是實現優異的總收益和淨收益。我們相信，從長遠來看，其餘的事情都會迎刃而解。

Do the optics of the share improve as you lap? Did Progressive pick up share that if the market stabilizes, at least the year-over-year compares become more favorable? Or is their share continuing to trend up?

隨著圈數的增加，股份的視覺效果是否有改善？Progressive 是否認為，如果市場穩定，至少比起數據會變得更有利？或者他們的份額繼續呈上升趨勢？

Yeah. Probably a better question or analysis of their data than of ours.

是的。或許他們提出的問題或對他們數據的分析比我們的更好。

But I would point you in their direction. I'm probably not positioned to comment in great detail on their relative market share growth in comparison to the industry, overall. Obviously, they have outgrown the market over the course of the past few years and, in general, over many, many years.

但我會給你指示他們的方向。我可能不太適合詳細評論他們相對於整個行業的市場份額增長情況。顯然，在過去幾年裡，以及總的來說，在很多很多年裡，它們已經超越了市場。

But as for what happens from here on out, we have some visibility but, frankly, not better than what you and a good analyst would figure out in a hurry.

但至於接下來會發生什麼，我們有一些了解，但坦白說，並不比你和一位優秀的分析師迅速推斷出來的更好。

A quick housekeeping for Leah, the Non-Insurance CDS versus Blue Car, could you give us a size, rough estimate, versus (inaudible) CDS's, larger than Blue Car or Blue Car larger than CDS, just so we can get a feeling for measuring these growth rates?

Leah，關於非保險 CDS 與 Blue Car 的比較，你能給我們一個大致的規模估計嗎？ （聽不清楚）CDS 比 Blue Car 大，或 Blue Car 比 CDS 大？這樣我們就能對衡量這些成長率有個大致的了解了。

Sure. No. CDS is larger; continues to be larger. It's been growing. While Blue Car has been growing at a very healthy clip, it still remains a larger business unit for us in the first quarter.

當然。不。CDS 規模更大；並且持續保持較大規模。它一直在增長。雖然 Blue Car 的成長速度非常健康，但它仍然是我們第一季規模較大的業務部門。

The potential breadth of both is huge, in terms of the total volume mediated by dealers and by institutions of the sort that we described earlier today.

就交易商和我們今天早些時候描述的那種機構所促成的總交易量而言，兩者的潛在影響範圍都非常巨大。

Yeah. The TAM is larger than salvage, isn't it?

是的。TAM 比打撈量大，對吧？

Right. Yes. Yeah.

正確的。是的。是的。

Jeff Lick, Stephens.

傑夫·利克，史蒂芬斯。

Jeff, Leah, I apologize for the background noise. I'm stuck in the airport.

傑夫、莉婭，很抱歉背景噪音太大。我被困在機場了。

Jeff, I was wondering if you could just maybe opine a little bit. If you look at the factors that would drive the business, going forward, we have vehicle depreciation now picking up. That probably picks up a little more with lease returns so the cost of replacing could go down; whereas on the flip side, you've got parts inflation that's up 4%, 5%.

傑夫，我想問你能不能稍微發表一下意見。如果觀察未來推動業務發展的因素，我們會發現車輛折舊正在加速。租賃車輛歸還可能會帶來更多收益，因此更換成本可能會下降；但另一方面，零件通膨率卻上漲了 4% 到 5%。

CCC did talk about the cost of repair not growing quite that much. And then, obviously, you've got Insurance rates appear to be coming down in certain instances. Obviously, to get the combined ratio at all-time lows, those are all going to point towards total loss frequency picking up and then, the issue with the uninsured and less insured.

CCC確實提到維修成本不會增加那麼多。而且，很顯然，在某些情況下，保險費率似乎也在下降。顯然，要使綜合比率達到歷史最低水平，所有這些都將指向全損頻率的上升，然後是未投保和投保較少的人群的問題。

Do you view that -- obviously, should view that as a tailwind maybe picking up in your business?

您是否認為——顯然，應該將其視為對您業務發展的順風？

Got it. Let me try to address them one by one.

知道了。讓我逐一解答這些問題。

I think when you say vehicle depreciation, you just mean softness, in general, in the used car market possibly on the horizon. All else equal, that is a supportive factor for volume for our business. A soft market means that the economics of total loss, all else equal, are less costly to the insurance carriers than, otherwise, (inaudible) they're writing a check for $16,000 instead of $17,000 to total the vehicle. They would, on the margin, drive more volume to us.

我認為你所說的車輛貶值，只是指二手車市場整體疲軟，這種情況可能即將出現。在其他條件相同的情況下，這對我們業務的銷售是一個有利因素。疲軟的市場意味著，在其他條件相同的情況下，全損的經濟效益對保險公司來說比正常情況下要低，否則（聽不清楚）他們只需支付 16,000 美元而不是 17,000 美元來賠償車輛全損。從邊際上看，它們會為我們帶來更多的銷售量。

It probably also means though the US market can be divorced somewhat from the International market, they do overlap in some regards. But it could also be to somewhat softer selling prices for us, which, of course, has the opposite effect. So you can imagine more unit volume, somewhat lesser unit economics, if it were to happen to a meaningful degree.

這也可能意味著，雖然美國市場在某種程度上可以與國際市場分開，但它們在某些方面確實存在重疊。但這也可能導致我們的售價略微降低，當然會產生相反的效果。所以你可以想像，如果這種情況發生到相當嚴重的程度，單位銷售量可能會增加，但單位經濟效益會略有下降。

Your second question about parts prices and repair costs and others tracking that, that's been the million-dollar question of this era, in light of the various tariff regimes proposed, implemented, unwound, and, otherwise -- is what is the total landed cost of a given repair.

你提出的第二個問題是關於零件價格和維修成本以及其他相關問題，鑑於各種關稅制度的提出、實施、取消等等，這一直是這個時代價值百萬美元的問題——即特定維修的總到岸成本是多少。

We do think there's still fundamentally inflation there, not just because the like-for-like part has inflated, relative to where it was before; but also because of vehicle complexity; also because there are more sensors on the perimeter of a car that are increasingly difficult to repair. That drives more cars, certainly, to total loss, as well.

我們認為，從根本上來說，這裡仍然存在通貨膨脹，不僅是因為同類產品的價格相對於以前上漲了；還因為車輛的複雜性；也因為汽車周圍的傳感器越來越多，維修起來越來越困難。當然，這也會導致更多車輛徹底報廢。

For another day, we can talk about how so many of those complex parts and modules actually are necessarily fundamental to the operation of the car itself, which makes that car acutely valuable to South America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and the like.

改天我們可以討論一下，為什麼這麼多複雜的零件和模組對於汽車本身的運行來說是必不可少的，這使得汽車對南美洲、東歐、非洲等地來說具有極大的價值。

And then, the last question you asked was about the potential softening in the insurance rates, as well. That would be supportive of our business, as well. That would cause the cyclical phenomenon we described earlier about underinsurance or foregoing insurance, presumably, to reverse, right, increases or enhances the affordability of insurance policies.

然後，您問的最後一個問題也與保險費率可能下調有關。那對我們的業務也有好處。這可能會導致我們先前描述的關於保險不足或放棄保險的周期性現象發生逆轉、糾正、增加或提高保險單的負擔能力。

The more cars that are effectively covered by one of our clients or one of the folks in the industry, the more cars that are processed in an accident through their funnels, so to speak.

我們的客戶或業內人士投保的車輛越多，發生事故後透過他們的管道處理的車輛就越多。

Just a quick follow-up: I'm wondering, with respect to the whole car business and the non-damaged total car business and dealer to dealer, do you have any more evolved -- or thoughts, in terms of how you guys may address that market vis-à-vis organic versus acquisition?

還有一個後續問題：我想問一下，就整個汽車行業以及非事故車市場和經銷商之間的交易而言，你們對於如何透過自身發展還是收購來開拓這個市場，是否有更成熟的想法或見解？

Yeah. It's a fair question. I think you're aware, probably from having followed us for a while, our default approach is always organic, right? We prefer to build on the back of the liquidity we have; the technology, the facilities, the people, the capabilities we've built over decades. That is often the best, most harmonious way to build a business within Copart.

是的。這是一個很合理的問題。我想您可能已經注意到，因為您已經關注我們有一段時間了，我們預設的做法始終是自然而然的，對嗎？我們更傾向於依賴我們現有的流動資金、技術、設施、人員以及我們幾十年來積累的能力而發展。這通常是在 Copart 平台內建立業務的最佳、最和諧的方式。

That said, from time to time, we have made strategic moves, as well. We acquired National Powersports Auctions some years ago; made a big investment in Purple Wave to step into the yellow or heavy equipment space, as well.

話雖如此，我們有時也會採取一些策略舉措。幾年前我們收購了 National Powersports Auctions；同時，我們也對 Purple Wave 進行了大量投資，以進軍黃色或重型設備領域。

So those arrows are both in the quiver. To date, we've been satisfied with the levers available to us to build organically, piggybacking largely off of the liquidity we've talked about at great length on this call.

所以這兩支箭都在箭筒裡。到目前為止，我們對現有的有機成長手段感到滿意，這主要得益於我們在本次電話會議中詳細討論過的流動性。

But could there be an acquisition that is compelling enough to pursue? We would always look at it, as we always have.

但是否存在足夠有吸引力的收購機會，值得進行收購呢？我們會一直關注它，就像我們一直以來所做的那樣。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作說明）

John Healy, Northcoast Research.

John Healy，北海岸研究公司。

Jeff, I'd love to get your thoughts just on where you think we are in the continuum of premium to the consumer from the insurance industry.

傑夫，我很想聽聽你對保險業向消費者提供優質服務這一發展進程的看法。

Do you view '26 as a year where the consumer might still feel some headwinds there? Or as you look at insurance industry profitability and what goes on to the prices that are offered in terms of the different ratios, I think that they're mandated to abide by -- how do you see that playing out, in terms of the repairable claim equation for '26?

您認為2026年消費者是否仍會感受到一些不利因素？或者，當你審視保險業的盈利能力以及不同比率對所提供​​價格的影響時，我認為他們必須遵守——你認為這在 2026 年可修復索賠方程式方面會如何體現？

Yeah. John, that is both a great question and, probably, the wrong one for us; probably, meaning, if you just imagine the tapestry of variables that will dictate that outcome, it's some combination of the general consumer sentiment, in turn, a function of unemployment, wage growth, et cetera, inflation in a whole wide variety of different baskets of goods and services and then, inflationary in the insurance rates, themselves, right? So there are so many moving parts there that offering my own prognostication is probably just reckless conjecture, at this point.

是的。約翰，這既是一個很好的問題，但可能對我們來說又不太合適；之所以說“可能”，是因為如果你想像一下決定結果的各種變量，就會發現它是總體消費者信心的某種組合，而消費者信心又取決於失業率、工資增長等等，以及各種不同商品和服務籃子的通貨膨脹，然後，保險費率本身也會受到通貨膨脹的影響，對吧？因此，其中涉及的因素太多，在這一點上，我做出自己的預測可能只是魯莽的猜測。

It does seem like there are insurance carriers committed to growing and growing again. Some of them have talked more publicly about that, as well. (inaudible)

看來確實有一些保險公司致力於不斷發展壯大。他們中的一些人也曾公開談論過此事。（聽不清楚）

They've been (inaudible), in their defense. It's not that long ago. In 2020, insurance carriers were issuing policy credits because, suddenly, people weren't driving accident frequencies way down. They feared the churn that would come from folks who are sitting at home and not driving again. So they issued credits.

為自己辯護的是，他們（聽不清楚）。時間並不久遠。2020 年，由於人們突然不再開車，保險公司開始發放保單抵扣，事故發生率大幅下降。他們擔心人們待在家裡不再開車會導致車輛流失。所以他們發行了信用額度。

They literally were giving money back to consumers. They walk up a year later. ACV spiked. Parts price spiked. Labor wage rates went crazy. The repair cost spiked.

他們實際上是在給消費者返現。一年後，他們走了過來。蘋果醋濃度升高。零件價格飆升。勞動力工資水準失控了。維修費用飆漲。

They suddenly found themselves underwater. They retrenched. They pursued rate release. They made all the operational decisions you might in that environment.

他們突然發現自己身處水下。他們進行了裁員。他們尋求利率釋放。在那種環境下，他們做出了所有你可能會做出的營運決策。

Now, some are, of course, asking the question have we overcorrected. Are we now foregoing growth too much in pursuit of combined ratios and so forth? That is such a dynamic puzzle that you're better off pursuing those avenues, rather than asking us.

當然，現在有些人會問，我們是不是矯枉過正了。我們是否為了追求綜合比率等指標而過度犧牲了經濟成長？這是一個很複雜的問題，與其來問我們，不如你自己去探索這些途徑。

We have a view. But it's indirect enough that I think it's better to ask them directly.

我們有自己的觀點。但這話說得有點委婉，我覺得最好還是直接問他們。

Understood.

明白了。

Maybe switching gears to something unique to you guys. The cash on the balance sheet, at record levels. I think the multiple on the shares, right now, are very close to the multiples that you last time bought stock back.

或許可以換個話題，聊聊你們獨有的東西。資產負債表上的現金處於歷史最高水準。我認為目前這些股票的本益比與你上次買入股票時的本益比非常接近。

Just given all of the noise in the ecosystem, what are the reasons for maybe not being active on the buyback front maybe over the next 6 to 12 months? Would there be gating factors? Or do you just view the economic outlook is too uncertain? What are your thoughts there?

鑑於目前生態系中的各種幹擾因素，未來 6 到 12 個月內，企業在股票回購方面可能不活躍的原因是什麼？是否存在准入門檻？還是您只是認為經濟前景太不明朗？你對此有何看法？

John, on that, I would just say, I think, generally, you can expect that Copart will continue to focus on deploying capital when we see areas that we believe will create meaningful long-term value for the business and for our shareholders. We'll continue to do that. That's our responsibility, from a management perspective and our Board.

約翰，關於這一點，我只想說，我認為，總的來說，你可以預期 Copart 將繼續專注於在我們認為能夠為公司和股東創造有意義的長期價值的領域部署資本。我們會繼續這樣做。從管理階層和董事會的角度來看，這是我們的責任。

Today, as we think about opportunities to reinvest back into the business, our first priority remains being to drive as much expansion as possible for the business through investments, whether it's in CapEx or M&A. We'll continue to evaluate opportunities to do that and drive long-term growth of the business.

今天，當我們考慮如何將資金再投資於業務時，我們的首要任務仍然是透過投資（無論是資本支出還是併購）來推動業務盡可能地擴張。我們將繼續評估各種機會，以推動業務的長期成長。

And then, to your point, to the extent that we have a view that long term, from a valuation perspective, there's an opportunity to create meaningful value, well, we've historically used the share repurchase program through a couple of different means, open market purchases, tenders, et cetera. That would be our lever to return capital to shareholders.

然後，正如您所說，如果我們認為從估值的角度來看，從長遠來看，存在創造有意義價值的機會，那麼，我們歷來都通過幾種不同的方式使用股票回購計劃，例如公開市場購買、要約收購等等。這將是我們向股東返還資本的手段。

Nothing has changed on that front.

這方面沒有任何變化。

John, just add a slightly finer point to it: I think the fear wasn't that long ago. I suppose, a decade and change ago that I was actively investor myself.

約翰，再補充一點：我認為那種恐懼並沒有持續太久。我想，大概是十多年前，我自己也曾經是個積極的投資者。

One of the fears for a given company in accumulating too much cash or too strong a balance sheet is that they would, in turn, become reckless with their capital. I think the evidence is there. That there's very little risk of that at Copart.

對於一家公司來說，累積過多現金或資產負債表過於強勁的一個擔憂是，它們反過來會變得肆意揮霍資本。我認為證據就在那裡。在 Copart，這種風險非常小。

We still treat each dollar as though as it's as precious as the last. Our P&L should reflect that. Our capital spending and our M&A activities should reflect that, as well; meaning, the standards for what we will invest capital in have not changed in the 10 years I've been here. I don't think they changed in the 20 years before I got here either.

我們依然像對待上一美元一樣珍惜每一分錢。我們的損益表應該反映這一點。我們的資本支出和併購活動也應該反映這一點；也就是說，在我在這裡的 10 年裡，我們投資資本的標準並沒有改變。我覺得在我來這裡的前20年裡，他們也沒什麼變化。

So we will treat that cash as though it is dear to us as it is to anyone. We understand how important it is to our shareholders so we'll do the right thing with it.

所以我們會像對待珍寶一樣對待這筆現金，就像對待任何人的珍貴現金一樣。我們明白這對股東來說非常重要，所以我們會妥善處理。

As we articulated, we know it ultimately belongs to shareholders. We have bought shares back in the past. That's always been the mechanism by which we return cash to shareholders. There, for sure, will come a day that we do that again.

正如我們之前所闡述的，我們知道它最終屬於股東。我們過去曾經買入過股票。我們一直以來都是透過這種方式向股東返還現金。可以肯定的是，總有一天我們會再做一次。

Exactly as to how, when, and where, I think we always defer. We always suggest that that's a conversation for another day.

至於具體如何、何時、何地，我認為我們總是會延後處理。我們總是建議這個問題留到以後再討論。

Understood. Thank you, guys.

明白了。謝謝大家。

Thank you. This concludes the question-and-answer session.

謝謝。問答環節到此結束。

I'd like turn the call back over to Jeff Liaw for closing remarks.

我想把電話轉回給 Jeff Liaw，請他做總結發言。

Thanks, everybody. We'll talk to you in a quarter. Have a good holiday soon.

謝謝大家。我們一個季度後再跟你談。祝你假期愉快。

This concludes today's conference. You may disconnect your lines at this time. Enjoy the rest of your day.

今天的會議到此結束。您可以在此時斷開線路。祝您今天餘下的時間愉快。