Ares Capital Corp (ARCC) 2026 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Please stand by, your meeting is about to begin.

請稍候，您的會議即將開始。

Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Ares Capital Corporation's first-quarter ended March 31, 2026 earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions) As a reminder, this conference is being recorded on Tuesday, April 28, 2026.

各位下午好。歡迎參加 Ares Capital Corporation 截至 2026 年 3 月 31 日止第一季財報電話會議。（接線員指示）提醒您，本次會議將於 2026 年 4 月 28 日（星期二）錄音。

I will now turn the call over to Mr. John Stilmar, partner of Ares Public Markets Investor Relations. Please go ahead, sir.

現在我將把電話交給 Ares Public Markets 投資人關係合夥人 John Stilmar 先生。先生，請開始。

Thank you, and good morning, everybody. Let me start with some important reminders. Comments made during the course of this conference call and webcast as well as the accompanying documents contain forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties.

謝謝，各位早安。讓我先做幾點重要提醒。本次電話會議與網路直播期間的發言，以及隨附文件，包含前瞻性陳述，並受風險與不確定性影響。

The company's actual results could differ materially from those expressed in such forward-looking statements for any reason including those listed in its SEC filings. Ares Capital Corporation assumes no obligation to update any such forward-looking statements. Please also note that past performance or market information is not a guarantee of future results.

公司實際結果可能因任何原因而與該等前瞻性陳述所表達者有重大差異，包括其向 SEC 申報文件中所列之因素。Ares Capital Corporation 不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述之義務。另請注意，過去績效或市場資訊不保證未來結果。

During this conference call, the company may discuss certain non-GAAP measures as defined by SEC Regulation G, such as core earnings per share or core EPS. The company believes that core EPS provides useful information to investors regarding financial performance because it's one method the company uses to measure its financial condition and results of operation.

在本次電話會議中，公司可能討論 SEC Regulation G 所定義之若干非 GAAP 指標，例如每股核心盈餘（core earnings per share）或核心每股盈餘（core EPS）。公司認為核心 EPS 能為投資人提供有用的財務績效資訊，因為這是公司用以衡量其財務狀況與營運成果的方法之一。

A reconciliation of GAAP net income per share of the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure to core EPS can be found in the accompanying slide presentation for this call. In addition, the reconciliation of these measures may also be found in our earnings release filed this morning with the SEC on Form 8-K.

GAAP 每股淨利（與核心 EPS 最直接可比之 GAAP 財務衡量）與核心 EPS 之調節表，可於本次電話會議隨附的簡報中查閱。此外，該等衡量之調節表亦可於我們今晨向 SEC 以 Form 8-K 提交的財報新聞稿中查閱。

Certain information discussed in this conference call and the accompanying slide presentation, including credit ratings and information relating to portfolio of companies, was derived or obtained by third-party sources and has not been independently verified.

本次電話會議及隨附簡報中討論之部分資訊（包括信用評等及與投資組合公司相關之資訊）係由第三方來源取得或衍生，且未經獨立查證。

And accordingly, the company makes no representation or warranties with respect to this information. The company's first quarter ended March 31, 2026 earnings presentation can be found on the company's website at www.arescapitalcorp.com by clicking on the first quarter 2026 earnings presentation link on the homepage of the Investor Resources section. Ares Capital Corporation's earnings release and Form 10-Q are also available on the company's website.

因此，公司對該等資訊不作任何聲明或保證。公司截至 2026 年 3 月 31 日止第一季財報簡報可於公司網站 www.arescapitalcorp.com 取得，請於「Investor Resources」區首頁點選「first quarter 2026 earnings presentation」連結。Ares Capital Corporation 的財報新聞稿與 Form 10-Q 亦可於公司網站取得。

I'd like to now turn the call over to Kort Schnabel, Ares Capital Corporation's Chief Executive Officer. Kort?

接下來我想把電話交給 Ares Capital Corporation 執行長 Kort Schnabel。Kort？

Thanks, John, and hello, everyone, and thank you for joining our earnings call today. I'm joined by Jim Miller, our President, Jana Markowicz, our Chief Operating Officer; Scott Lem, our Chief Financial Officer; and other members of the management team who will be available during our Q&A session.

謝謝你，John。各位好，感謝各位今天參加我們的財報電話會議。與我一同出席的有：總裁 Jim Miller、營運長 Jana Markowicz、財務長 Scott Lem，以及管理團隊其他成員，他們將在問答環節提供協助。

Let me start by providing a few thoughts on Ares's performance, current market conditions and our positioning in this environment. We believe we are off to a strong start in 2026 with solid earnings and strong fundamental portfolio performance. Our core earnings of $0.47 per share represents an annualized ROE of 9.6% in what has historically been a seasonally slow quarter for originations.

我先就 Ares 的表現、目前市場狀況以及我們在此環境下的定位分享幾點看法。我們認為 2026 年開局強勁，盈餘穩健且投資組合基本面表現強勁。我們每股核心盈餘為 0.47 美元，換算年化股東權益報酬率（ROE）為 9.6%；而第一季在歷史上通常是放款承作（originations）季節性較慢的季度。

Our overall portfolio quality remains healthy with continued low levels of non-recruring loans and problem assets. We are seeing improving investment environment as terms and economics are becoming more attractive on new transactions. And we believe our strong balance sheet and available liquidity of approximately $6 billion provide us significant advantages in this environment.

我們整體投資組合品質仍然健康，非應計貸款與問題資產水準持續偏低。我們看到投資環境正在改善，新交易的條款與經濟條件變得更具吸引力。我們也相信，強健的資產負債表以及約 60 億美元的可用流動性，讓我們在此環境中具備顯著優勢。

Let's now discuss the changes we are seeing in overall market conditions. Titan Capital markets volatility and geopolitical uncertainty and net outflows from retail products exacerbated and already seasonally slow market period in the first quarter. These factors contributed to not only lower transaction volumes, but also diminished competition and improved lending conditions.

接著談談我們在整體市場狀況上看到的變化。資本市場波動、地緣政治不確定性，以及零售型產品的資金淨流出，使第一季原本就季節性偏慢的市場期間更加惡化。這些因素不僅導致交易量下降，也使競爭減弱並改善放款條件。

As lenders more heavily dependent on retail flows have retrenched and the syndicated bank loan market has been uneven with many banks exhibiting diminished risk appetite. As a result, we are seeing a reset underway with wider spreads, lower leverage levels and more attractive overall deal terms across the market. New transactions today are being discussed at 50 to 75 basis points of enhanced levels of fees and spread alongside half to full turn of lower leverage and tighter documentation versus the second half of last year.

由於更依賴零售資金流的放款人已收縮，而聯貸銀行貸款市場表現不均，許多銀行的風險偏好下降。因此，我們看到市場正在重置：利差擴大、槓桿水準降低，且整體交易條款更具吸引力。相較於去年下半年，目前新交易的討論條件包括：費用與利差提高約 50 至 75 個基點，同時槓桿降低約半圈至一圈，且文件條款更為嚴謹。

As risk premiums widened during the first quarter, overall market activity slowed as the market search for clearing prices during this period. However, over the past three to four weeks, we have seen a noticeable pickup in new deal activity as borrowers recalibrate expectations for economics and terms and continue to pursue their capital needs.

隨著第一季風險溢酬擴大，市場在此期間尋找可成交價格（clearing prices），整體市場活動放緩。然而，在過去三到四週，我們已看到新案活動明顯回升，因借款人重新校準對經濟條件與條款的預期，並持續推進其資金需求。

One of the key themes we see unfolding is that the ability to provide capital at scale and with certainty is becoming increasingly differentiated. We believe these types of situations are creating greater economic opportunities for the largest and most stable platforms with capital.

我們看到正在發展的一個關鍵主題是：能夠以規模提供資金並具備確定性的能力，正變得愈發差異化。我們認為，這類情境正在為擁有資本、規模最大且最穩健的平台創造更大的經濟機會。

Our healthy levels of available capital, combined with our connectivity to the broader Ares US direct lending platform and its significant dry powder from institutional sources positions us well to capitalize on these market conditions.

我們健康的可用資本水準，加上我們與更廣泛的 Ares 美國直接放款平台的連結，以及其來自機構資金來源的大量可投資資金（dry powder），使我們能在這些市場條件下把握機會。

Our diverse high-quality portfolio also continues to perform well. Our granular level of diversification further advantages us as loan concentration is one driver of growing dispersion in results across our market. With investments across 607 companies at an average position size of less than 20 basis points, we believe this level of diversification meaningfully limits idiosyncratic risk to any one position.

我們多元且高品質的投資組合也持續表現良好。我們細緻的分散程度進一步帶來優勢，因為貸款集中度是推動本市場結果分化加劇的因素之一。我們投資於 607 家公司，平均部位規模低於 20 個基點；我們認為此等分散程度能實質限制任何單一部位的特有風險（idiosyncratic risk）。

Our borrowers generate organic weighted average LTM EBITDA growth of approximately 9% through the end of the first quarter, in line with ARCC's 10-year average and more than twice the growth rate of the companies within the broader syndicated loan benchmark. Portfolio fundamentals also remained solid with broadly stable interest coverage and leverage levels, low loan-to-value ratios by historical standards and revolving credit facility utilization in line with historical norms.

截至第一季末，我們借款人之有機加權平均過去十二個月（LTM）EBITDA 成長約 9%，與 ARCC 的 10 年平均一致，且為更廣泛聯貸貸款基準中公司成長率的兩倍以上。投資組合基本面亦維持穩健：利息保障倍數與槓桿水準大致穩定，貸款價值比（loan-to-value）以歷史標準而言偏低，循環信用額度（revolving credit facility）使用率亦符合歷史常態。

Our nonaccruals also remained well below historical average levels. With this as context to the overall health of the portfolio, let me provide some important updates about our views on the specific strength and position of our software investments.

我們的非應計資產（nonaccruals）也仍遠低於歷史平均水準。在此作為投資組合整體健康狀況的背景下，讓我就我們對軟體投資之特定優勢與定位的看法，提供一些重要更新。

As I articulated on our last earnings call, not all software companies carry the same level of AI disruption. And in fact, many are embracing AI and seeing enhanced growth. We believe the most important question is not how much software exposure we have, but what types of companies we have invested in and what staying power, risks and opportunities our companies have through this latest technological cycle.

如同我在上次財報電話會議所述，並非所有軟體公司都承受相同程度的 AI 顛覆；事實上，許多公司正擁抱 AI 並看到成長提升。我們認為最重要的問題不是我們有多少軟體曝險，而是我們投資的是哪些類型的公司，以及在這一輪最新技術循環中，我們的公司具備何種持久力、風險與機會。

Nearly all of our software companies are focused on what we view as foundational infrastructure for complex businesses, and this infrastructure often powers customers' core operating systems. These software products generally operate as systems of record in regulated end markets, have high switching costs and benefit from proprietary data.

我們幾乎所有的軟體公司都聚焦於我們所認為的複雜企業之基礎性基礎設施，而這些基礎設施往往驅動客戶的核心營運系統。這些軟體產品通常在受監管的終端市場中作為「記錄系統」（systems of record）運作，具有高轉換成本，並受益於專有資料。

Importantly, our software investments are supported by large diversified businesses with a weighted average EBITDA of $340 million, strong cash flow and meaningful equity cushions even as valuation multiples have come down for most software companies broadly. Most of these companies are also protected by business models with strong contractual cash flows and continue to sign up new customer contracts as they move forward and invest in AI themselves.

重要的是，即使整體而言多數軟體公司的估值倍數已下修，我們的軟體投資仍由大型且多元化的企業所支撐，其加權平均 EBITDA 為 3.4 億美元，現金流強勁，且具備可觀的股權緩衝。多數公司亦受益於具有強勁合約性現金流的商業模式，並在持續前進的同時簽訂新客戶合約，且自身也在投資 AI。

To pressure test this view of our software investments, we proactively engaged a top-tier global management consulting firm in the fourth quarter of 2025 to challenge our AI risk assessment across our software-oriented portfolio companies. Prior to engaging this firm, we conducted extensive diligence in the middle of 2025 and ultimately selected this firm not only for its deep technical expertise, but also for its reputation as a rigorous and objective evaluator.

為了對我們對軟體投資的此一觀點進行壓力測試，我們於 2025 年第四季主動聘請一家頂尖的全球管理顧問公司，針對我們以軟體為導向的投資組合公司之 AI 風險評估提出挑戰。在聘請該公司之前，我們於 2025 年年中已進行廣泛的盡職調查，最終選擇該公司不僅因其深厚的技術專長，也因其嚴謹且客觀評估者的聲譽。

As part of this independent study, the consulting firm had direct access to each borrower, its financials and if relevant, the associated financial sponsors or other key owners of the business. This enabled them to assess whether AI is likely to be additive, whether it could enhance or hurt positioning depending on execution and product evolution or whether it poses a direct risk to the core business, absent significant strategy change.

在此獨立研究中，顧問公司可直接接觸每一位借款人、其財務資料，以及（如適用）相關的財務贊助方或其他主要企業所有人。這使其能評估 AI 是否可能帶來加分效果、是否可能因執行與產品演進而強化或削弱競爭定位，或在未進行重大策略調整的情況下，是否對核心業務構成直接風險。

The consultant study found the largest differences between higher and lower list companies to be system of record positioning, high switching costs, the benefit of regulatory barriers, proprietary data modes and control of data. The firm also assessed human dependency, data availability, risk of error and task structure, among other dimensions.

顧問研究發現，高風險與低風險公司之間最大的差異在於：作為「記錄系統」（system of record）的定位、高轉換成本、監管壁壘帶來的優勢、專有資料護城河（proprietary data moats）以及對資料的掌控。該公司亦評估了人力依賴程度、資料可得性、錯誤風險與任務結構等其他面向。

Overall, the independent review conducted over the past several months found that the AI-related risk across our software-oriented portfolio is relatively limited. Their report indicated that about 85% of our software portfolio at fair value represented low risk with only a small subset of companies categorized as higher risk.

整體而言，過去數月進行的獨立審查發現，我們以軟體為導向的投資組合之 AI 相關風險相對有限。其報告指出，以公允價值計算，我們約 85% 的軟體投資組合屬於低風險，僅有少數公司被歸類為較高風險。

These higher-risk companies represented only 1% of reviewed names by fair value and 2% by count or only about 0.3% of ARCC's total investment portfolio at fair value. An additional 14% of reviewed companies by fair value and count were classified as medium risk, representing only about 3% of ARCC's total investment portfolio at fair value.

這些較高風險的公司，按公允價值計僅占已審查標的的 1%，按家數計占 2%；或按公允價值計僅約占 ARCC 總投資組合的 0.3%。另有按公允價值與家數計 14% 的已審查公司被歸類為中度風險，按公允價值計僅約占 ARCC 總投資組合的 3%。

Importantly, medium or higher risk classifications do not imply current business impairment. Rather, they reflect the need for continued investment and product evolution with many of these companies well positioned to adapt within the time necessary.

重要的是，中度或更高風險的分類並不意味著目前業務已受損。相反地，這反映出需要持續投資與產品演進，而其中許多公司在所需時間內具備良好條件進行調適。

Of the 85% of names categorized as low risk, these companies are well positioned to adapt and in the majority of cases, benefit from AI-driven enhancements. In these businesses, AI is primarily augmenting existing SaaS platforms through incremental or high-value features layered on top of core software with existing revenue streams largely maintained and incremental AI upside accruing to incumbent vendors.

在被歸類為低風險的 85% 標的中，這些公司具備良好條件進行調適，且在多數情況下可受益於 AI 驅動的強化。在這些業務中，AI 主要是透過在既有 SaaS 平台之核心軟體之上疊加增量或高價值功能來加值；既有營收來源大致得以維持，而 AI 帶來的增量上行空間則主要由既有供應商所獲得。

While we believe we have a solid view of the positioning of our portfolio, we recognize the need to remain vigilant with our portfolio companies on this topic. We also will remain disciplined in allocating new capital to the software sector. As we seek to take advantages of opportunities in the current market, it's critical that we are supported by a conservatively constructed balance sheet and a stable capital base.

雖然我們相信已對投資組合的定位有相當扎實的掌握，但也認知到在此議題上需與投資組合公司保持警覺。我們也將在對軟體產業配置新增資本時維持紀律。當我們尋求把握當前市場機會時，關鍵在於必須有保守建構的資產負債表與穩定的資本基礎作為支撐。

As Scott will address our substantial available liquidity of approximately $6 billion and our well-structured liability profile with minimal near-term maturities offer us the flexibility to pursue opportunities with both new and existing portfolio companies.

正如 Scott 將會說明，我們約 60 億美元的充裕可用流動性，以及結構良好、近期到期極少的負債概況，使我們能靈活把握新投資與既有投資組合公司的機會。

Our outlook for relative stability in our earnings leads us to maintain a stable level of quarterly dividends. Importantly, core EPS taken together with $0.15 per share of net realized gains was well in excess of the dividend this quarter, providing a strong underlying foundation for current distributions.

我們對盈餘相對穩定的展望，使我們維持穩定的季度股利水準。重要的是，核心每股盈餘（Core EPS）加上每股 0.15 美元的已實現淨收益，明顯高於本季股利，為目前配息提供了強勁的基本支撐。

That foundation is further supported by ample spillover income, modest leverage, a more stable rate environment and credit performance that aligns with our historical track record. Looking ahead, with spreads widening in terms improving, and given our strong competitive position, we continue to believe that ARCC's current dividend approximates the long-run underlying earnings power of our business.

該基礎亦受到充裕的結轉收益（spillover income）、適度槓桿、較穩定的利率環境，以及與我們歷史紀錄一致的信用表現所進一步支撐。展望未來，隨著利差擴大且條款改善，加上我們強勁的競爭地位，我們仍相信 ARCC 目前的股利水準大致反映本業長期的內在獲利能力。

And our significant level of spillover income provides an added degree of flexibility and can serve as a short-term bridge during periods of seasonally slow transaction levels. These factors position us to continue building on our track record of stable or growing regular quarterly dividends for 16 consecutive years.

此外，我們可觀的結轉收益水準提供了額外的彈性，並可在交易量季節性偏低期間作為短期的緩衝橋樑。這些因素使我們得以延續過去 16 年連續維持穩定或成長的例行季度股利之紀錄。

With that, I will turn the call over to Scott to take us through more details on our financial results and balance sheet.

接下來，我把電話會議交給 Scott，請他帶我們更深入了解財務結果與資產負債表。

Thanks, Kort. I will begin by reviewing certain key financial metrics from the first quarter followed by an analysis and discussion of our robust balance sheet and liquidity, and conclude with details of our dividend and the taxable spillover referenced earlier by Kort.

謝謝，Kort。我將先回顧 2026 年第一季的若干關鍵財務指標，接著分析並討論我們強健的資產負債表與流動性，最後說明股利以及 Kort 先前提到的應稅結轉收益（taxable spillover）。

This morning, we reported GAAP net income per share of $0.13, down from $0.41 in the fourth quarter of 2025 and $0.36 for the same period a year ago. The decline was largely driven by net unrealized losses primarily due to spread widening in private credit markets causing market-driven unrealized depreciation.

今天早上，我們公布每股 GAAP 淨利為 0.13 美元，低於 2025 年第四季的 0.41 美元，以及去年同期的 0.36 美元。下滑主要由未實現淨損所致，主因是私募信貸市場利差擴大，造成市場驅動的未實現減值。

Core earnings per share was $0.47 in the first quarter of 2026, down from the $0.50 we reported both last quarter and a year ago, primarily due to the impact of a full quarter of current base rates on our interest income as well as lower capital structuring service fees. The decline in capital structuring and service fees is largely due to reduced market activity typical in the first quarter in addition to softness from the broader credit market volatility that Kort mentioned earlier.

2026 年第一季核心每股盈餘為 0.47 美元，低於我們上季與去年同期皆為 0.50 美元的水準，主要因現行基準利率對我們利息收入的影響完整反映一整季，以及資本結構安排服務費較低。資本結構安排與服務費的下降，主要是由於第一季市場活動通常較少，另加上 Kort 先前提到的整體信貸市場波動所帶來的疲弱。

Now turning to the balance sheet. Our total portfolio at fair value at the end of the first quarter was $29.5 billion, consistent with the end of the fourth quarter and up from $27.1 billion a year ago. Our net asset value ended the quarter at $14.1 billion or $19.59 per share, which represents a decline of $0.35 per share from a quarter ago and $0.23 per share from a year ago. This decline in the first quarter in contrast with the long-term NAV growth we have generated alongside paying a stable level of dividends.

接著談資產負債表。第一季末我們以公允價值計的投資組合總額為 295 億美元，與 2025 年第四季末一致，並高於一年前的 271 億美元。我們的淨資產價值（NAV）季末為 141 億美元或每股 19.59 美元，較上季下降每股 0.35 美元，較去年同期下降每股 0.23 美元。第一季的下滑與我們在支付穩定股利的同時所創造的長期 NAV 成長形成對比。

For example, ARCC has delivered NAV growth exceeding 10% over the past five years and more than 30% since inception. Supporting the strength of our balance sheet, we had an active quarter enhancing our liability profile. By accessing over $1.25 billion of incremental debt financing to further build on what we believe is a best-in-class balance sheet structure.

例如，ARCC 在過去五年已實現超過 10% 的 NAV 成長，自成立以來更超過 30%。為支撐資產負債表的強度，我們本季積極優化負債結構，新增取得超過 12.5 億美元的增量債務融資，以進一步打造我們認為同業最佳的資產負債表架構。

Reflecting our long-standing strategy being a consistent issuer in the investment-grade notes market. We kicked off the year by issuing $750 million of long five-year unsecured notes at an industry-leading spread of 180 basis points over treasuries, which we swapped to SOFR plus 172 basis points. During the first quarter, we remain active with our diverse bank capital providers and specifically expanding our SMBC funding facility by $500 million at similar or improved terms, including a 5 basis point reduction in the spread.

這反映我們長期策略：在投資級票據市場中持續且穩定地發行。我們以發行 7.5 億美元、五年期長天期無擔保票據揭開新年度序幕，利差為較公債高 180 個基點，為業界領先水準；我們並將其交換為 SOFR 加 172 個基點。第一季期間，我們也持續與多元的銀行資本提供者保持活躍往來，並特別將我們的 SMBC 融資額度增加 5 億美元，條件相近或更佳，包括利差再下調 5 個基點。

On the topics of banks, I would like to take a few minutes to share our perspective on bank financing markets and the stability of banks providing capital to our sector. At ARCC, across our four credit facilities, we maintain relationships with more than 40 banks and lending institutions, many of which have been long-standing supporters of ours. The weighted average length of these relationships exceeds 13 years with several dating back more than 20 years to the early days of our company.

談到銀行，我想花幾分鐘分享我們對銀行融資市場以及銀行為本產業提供資本之穩定性的看法。在 ARCC，我們在四項信貸融資安排中，與超過 40 家銀行及放款機構維持合作關係，其中許多長期支持我們。這些關係的加權平均年限超過 13 年，且有數家可追溯至 20 多年前、公司創立初期。

Over that time, we have continued to broaden and deepen these partnerships with most of these banks and lenders working with us not only at ARCC, but across the Ares platform. We believe these well-established long-term relationships combined with our scale, capabilities and performance provide us with unique and consistent access to capital across multiple markets and especially with our banking and lending partners.

在此期間，我們持續擴大並深化與多數銀行與放款人的合作；他們不僅在 ARCC 與我們合作，也在 Ares 平台的其他業務與我們合作。我們相信，這些成熟且長期的關係，加上我們的規模、能力與績效，使我們能在多個市場、尤其是透過銀行與放款夥伴，獲得獨特且穩定的資本取得管道。

Additionally, drawing on our experience successfully navigating the global financial crisis, we view the structure, duration and diversification of our funding facilities as a central factors in ensuring balance sheet stability.

此外，憑藉我們成功度過全球金融危機的經驗，我們認為融資安排的結構、期限與多元化，是確保資產負債表穩定性的核心因素。

As a reminder, all our credit facilities are fully committed with no maturities before 2030 and no mark-to-market provisions. Unlike precrisis facilities, which often involve margin calls and shorter maturities that impacted capital availability and liquidity are current facilities to offer stable access to capital throughout the commitment periods.

提醒一下，我們所有信貸融資安排皆為全額承諾（fully committed），2030 年前無到期，且不含按市價調整（mark-to-market）條款。不同於危機前的融資安排常包含追繳保證金（margin call）與較短到期日、進而影響資本可得性與流動性；目前的融資安排旨在於承諾期間內提供穩定的資本取得。

Our experience through the global financial crisis also reinforced the importance of maintaining diverse funding sources, which has been one of the key to our success and will remain one of our most important strategic priorities. Reflecting this focus, we are the highest-rated BDC across all three major rating agencies, with the longest rating history, 19 years or two agencies and 16 years with the third and more than 15 years of experience issuing investment-grade and convertible notes.

我們在全球金融危機中的經驗也再次強化了維持多元資金來源的重要性；這一直是我們成功的關鍵之一，並將持續是最重要的策略優先事項之一。反映此一重點，我們是三大主要信評機構中評等最高的 BDC，且擁有最長的評等歷史：其中兩家機構為 19 年，第三家為 16 年；同時，我們亦有超過 15 年發行投資級與可轉換票據的經驗。

The combination of our ratings and the fact that the vast majority of our assets are funded by unsecured debt and the largest permanent equity capital base in the sector further bolsters our position in the eyes of our banking partners.

我們的信評，加上我們絕大多數資產由無擔保債務融資，以及本產業中最大的永久性股權資本基礎，進一步強化了我們在銀行合作夥伴眼中的地位。

More recently, in 2024, we further enhanced the diversity of our funding sources and broaden our lender base through the securitization market. By generally issuing only through the AA tranche, we are able to achieve similar advance rates to what we receive on our credit facilities while further advancing our financial goals and benefiting from Ares's strong imputation with investors.

更近期地，在 2024 年，我們透過證券化市場進一步提升資金來源的多元性並擴大放款人基礎。由於我們通常僅透過 AA 級分券發行，因此能取得與信貸融資安排相近的預支比率（advance rates），同時推進我們的財務目標，並受益於 Ares 在投資人間的良好聲譽。

Looking forward, while market participants may anticipate tighter credit conditions and reduced access for certain private credit managers, we believe BDCs affiliated with large-scale leading managers who possess long-term proven track records, extensive capabilities and deep and enduring relationships such as ourselves, we'll continue to receive strong support on attractive terms from debt capital stakeholders, including investors, banks and other lending institutions.

展望未來，儘管市場參與者可能預期信貸條件趨緊、部分私募信貸管理人取得資金的管道減少，但我們相信，像我們這樣與具規模的領先管理人相關聯、擁有長期可驗證的績效紀錄、廣泛能力，以及深厚且持久關係的 BDC，仍將持續獲得債務資本利害關係人（包括投資人、銀行及其他放款機構）在具吸引力條件下的強力支持。

Overall, our liquidity position remains strong, totaling approximately $6 billion. In terms of our leverage, we ended the fourth quarter with debt-to-equity ratio, net available cash of 1.1 times versus 1.08 times last quarter. Leaving us with meaningful headroom to support investing while maintaining ample cushion to absorb potential future volatility.

整體而言，我們的流動性部位仍然強勁，合計約 60 億美元。就槓桿而言，我們在第四季末的負債對股權比率（扣除可用現金）為 1.1 倍，相較上季的 1.08 倍。這使我們在支持投資的同時仍保有可觀的空間，並維持充足緩衝以吸收未來可能的波動。

Finally, our first quarter 2026 dividend of $0.48 per share is payable on June 30 to stockholders of record on June 15. ARCC has been paying stable or increasing regular quarterly dividends for 67 consecutive quarters. In terms of our taxable income spillover, we currently estimate that we will carry forward $988 million or $1.38 per share available for distribution of stockholders in 2026.

最後，我們 2026 年第一季每股 0.48 美元的股利將於 6 月 30 日支付給 6 月 15 日登記在冊的股東。ARCC 已連續 67 個季度支付穩定或增加的例行季度股利。就應稅所得結轉（taxable income spillover）而言，我們目前估計將結轉 9.88 億美元（或每股 1.38 美元），可於 2026 年分配予股東。

I will now turn the call over to Jim to walk through our investment activities.

我現在把電話交給 Jim，請他帶大家回顧我們的投資活動。

Thank you, Scott. I'll start with some additional context on our investment approach in the current environment. and then walk through our investment activity, portfolio performance and overall positioning. We have always viewed ourselves as patient, long-term relative value investors.

謝謝你，Scott。我先就目前環境下我們的投資方法補充一些背景，接著說明我們的投資活動、投資組合表現與整體配置。我們一向將自己定位為有耐心、長期的相對價值投資人。

And we believe that perspective instructs are constructive and opportunistic approach during periods of market volatility. In these environments, capital availability generally decreases lending terms may improve, and our partnership-oriented solution becomes increasingly pertinent and valuable to our borrowers.

我們相信，這樣的觀點指引我們在市場波動期間採取建設性且把握機會的作法。在這類環境中，資金可得性通常會下降、放款條件可能改善，而我們以夥伴關係為導向的解決方案，對借款人而言會變得愈發切中需求且更具價值。

Beyond the decade-long positioning of our platform around these principles, there's compelling empirical evidence supporting the resiliency and opportunity within the private credit sector, which we believe remains underappreciated in parts of [say's] broader market narrative.

除了我們的平台在過去十多年圍繞這些原則所建立的配置之外，亦有相當有力的實證證據支持私募信貸領域的韌性與機會；我們認為，在 [say's] 較廣泛的市場敘事中，部分面向仍被低估。

Our own Ares quantitative research team recently examined 25 years of aggregated private credit data to evaluate the association between managers' ability to invest during periods of market-wide volatility and the subsequent levels of returns.

我們自家的 Ares 量化研究團隊近期檢視了 25 年彙總的私募信貸資料，以評估管理人於市場整體波動期間的投資能力，與其後續報酬水準之間的關聯。

In short, this study found US private credit managers that invested more actively during periods of elevated volatility generated on average more than 10% higher levels of annual returns than those managers that were not as active during the same volatile market conditions. While this analysis does not address manager-specific outcomes, current market conditions reinforce the importance of manager selection in this environment and further underpin our strategy of maintaining plenty of flexible capital to invest during these periods.

簡而言之，該研究發現：在波動升高期間更積極投資的美國私募信貸管理人，其年度報酬水準平均比在相同波動市場條件下不那麼積極的管理人高出逾 10%。雖然此分析未涵蓋特定管理人的個別結果，但目前的市場狀況凸顯在此環境下選擇管理人的重要性，也進一步支持我們維持充足彈性資本、以便在這些期間進行投資的策略。

In the first quarter, our team originated over $3.2 billion in new investment commitments with 70% of transactions coming from existing borrowers. As transaction volumes slowed in the second half of the quarter, our strong relationships allowed us to selectively invest in top-performing existing portfolio companies. These opportunities focus on achieving attractive risk-adjusted returns and reinforce our ability to support our best borrowers and sponsors, particularly during periods of volatility.

第一季，我們團隊新承諾投資金額超過 32 億美元，其中 70% 的交易來自既有借款人。隨著本季後半段交易量放緩，我們憑藉穩固的關係得以有選擇地投資於表現最佳的既有投資組合公司。這些機會聚焦於取得具吸引力的風險調整後報酬，並強化我們支持最優質借款人與贊助方（sponsors）的能力，尤其是在波動期間。

Our first quarter originations reflected meaningful sector diversification across 22 different industries and 57 (inaudible) As Kort noted earlier, the shift in supply-demand dynamics across direct lending is beginning to translate into more favorable pricing and terms.

我們第一季的承作反映出顯著的產業分散，涵蓋 22 個不同產業與 57（聽不清）項。如 Kort 先前所提，直接放款的供需動態轉變正開始反映為更有利的定價與條款。

We are beginning to see this come through our new originations as spreads on first lien originations in the first quarter increased by approximately 20 basis points quarter over quarter, while leverage levels declined by nearly 0.5 turn of EBITDA.

我們開始在新承作中看到這點：第一季第一順位擔保（first lien）承作的利差較前一季約增加 20 個基點，而槓桿水準則下降近 0.5 倍 EBITDA。

We ended the quarter with a portfolio of $29.5 billion at fair value, which was stable quarter over quarter as new fundings were offset by fair value changes and repayments. Repayments during the quarter, excluding sales to Ivy Hill, totaled approximately 7% of the portfolio at cost and continue to serve as a source of natural liquidity that we can deploy into today's market.

本季末，我們以公允價值計的投資組合為 295 億美元，較前一季大致持平，因新增撥款被公允價值變動與償還所抵銷。本季償還（不含出售予 Ivy Hill）合計約占投資組合成本的 7%，並持續成為我們可部署於當前市場的自然流動性來源。

As part of this repayment activity, we exited four equity co-investments which were the primary drivers of our $114 million of net realized gains in excess of losses in this quarter. As a reminder, since inception, Ares Capital has generated more than $1 billion in net realized gains in excess of realized losses across more than $70 billion of exited investments over the last 21 years.

作為此償還活動的一部分，我們退出了四筆股權共同投資，這些交易是本季 1.14 億美元已實現淨收益（超過已實現損失）的主要來源。提醒一下，自成立以來，Ares Capital 在過去 21 年、超過 700 億美元的已退出投資中，已累計產生超過 10 億美元的已實現淨收益（超過已實現損失）。

These latest four exits generated a mid-teens weighted average realized IRR. Importantly, over the last 10 years, our equity co-investment portfolio generated an average gross IRR well in excess of the double-digit total return of S&P 500 Index. As we've discussed previously, these minority equity investments are made selectively generally alongside loans we originate and underwrite ourselves, allowing us to participate in the equity where we see particularly strong upside cases.

這四筆最新退出交易的加權平均已實現 IRR 為十幾%的中段水準。重要的是，過去 10 年，我們的股權共同投資組合所產生的平均總 IRR，明顯高於標普 500 指數的兩位數總報酬。如我們先前所述，這些少數股權投資是有選擇地進行，通常與我們自行承作與承銷的貸款同時進行，使我們能在看見特別強勁的上行情境時參與股權報酬。

Another important component of our repayments this quarter was the collection of PIK income. In the first quarter, our PIK income net of collections represented approximately 7% of total interest and dividend income, which is below our historical five-year average.

本季償還的另一個重要組成是 PIK 收入的回收。第一季，我們的 PIK 收入扣除回收後，約占總利息與股利收入的 7%，低於我們過去五年的歷史平均。

As we've discussed previously, we have selectively used PIK or our history and have been transparent in our PIK reporting, including explicitly disclosing PIK collections in the statement of cash flows. From a portfolio composition standpoint, approximately 90% of our PIK income is structured at origination and is associated with larger well-performing companies not reactive amendments.

如我們先前所述，我們在歷史上有選擇性地使用 PIK，並在 PIK 揭露上保持透明，包括在現金流量表中明確揭露 PIK 回收。就投資組合結構而言，我們約 90% 的 PIK 收入是在承作時即完成結構設計，且與規模較大、表現良好的公司相關，而非因應式修約（reactive amendments）。

As with all investments, PIK investments are underwritten with the same discipline as cash pay loans with a strong focus on structure, leverage and exit protections. Importantly, over our 21-year history and across more than 190 realized PIK investments, we have generated a return measured by a multiple of our invested capital, or MOIC, of 1.4x. This MOIC is a modest premium to the 1.3 MOIC on all of our exited investments since our inception in 2004.

與所有投資一樣，PIK 投資的承銷同樣遵循與現金付息貸款一致的紀律，並高度聚焦於結構、槓桿與退出保護。重要的是，在我們 21 年的歷史中、涵蓋超過 190 筆已實現的 PIK 投資，我們以投資資本倍數（MOIC）衡量的報酬為 1.4 倍。相較之下，自 2004 年成立以來，我們所有已退出投資的 MOIC 為 1.3 倍，因此 1.4 倍僅為溫和溢價。

We believe that this demonstrates the selective use of PIC does not create unnecessary levels of risk in our portfolio or correlates to future losses. On the contrary, it has supported our strong returns over the past 21 years for our shareholders. Repayments also offer us an opportunity to assess our valuation process over time.

我們認為，這顯示選擇性使用 PIK 並不會在投資組合中造成不必要的風險水準，也不會與未來損失呈現相關。相反地，它在過去 21 年支持了我們為股東創造的強勁報酬。償還也讓我們有機會隨時間檢視我們的估值流程。

We believe the scale we have built in portfolio management is a meaningful competitive advantage. The merits of our large team and time-tested process are reflected in our realized outcomes at exit. Specifically, when comparing realized investments exited over the past two years to their respective fair values one year prior to exit, we found that 99% of fully paid off US debt investments were realized at valuations in line with or better than their valuations one year prior. We believe these observations underscore the rigor of our valuation process.

我們相信，我們在投資組合管理上建立的規模是一項重要的競爭優勢。我們龐大團隊與經時間驗證流程的價值，反映在退出時的已實現結果上。具體而言，當我們將過去兩年退出的已實現投資，與其在退出前一年的各自公允價值相比，我們發現 99% 已全數償付的美國債務投資，其已實現估值與退出前一年的估值一致或更佳。我們認為，這些觀察凸顯了我們估值流程的嚴謹性。

Turning now to further details on borrower health. The financial position of our portfolio companies remain solid with interest coverage stable sequentially and improving year over year and leverage levels broadly stable.

接著進一步說明借款人健康狀況。我們投資組合公司的財務狀況仍然穩健，利息保障倍數環比持平、同比改善，槓桿水準整體亦大致穩定。

Our investments remain well protected by substantial equity cushion beneath us, with an aggregate loan-to-value ratio in the portfolio in the mid-40% range. Supported by these underlying portfolio trends, the credit performance of our portfolio remains solid.

我們的投資仍受到下方可觀的股權緩衝所良好保護，投資組合的整體貸款價值比（loan-to-value）約在 40% 中段區間。在這些投資組合基本面趨勢的支撐下，我們投資組合的信用品質表現仍然穩健。

Our non accruals at cost ended the quarter at 2.1% and a 30 basis point increase from prior quarter, but still well below approximately 3% historical average since the global financial crisis and the BDC historical average of approximately 4% over the same time frame.

以成本計，我們的不計息（non-accrual）資產於季末為 2.1%，較前一季增加 30 個基點，但仍明顯低於全球金融危機以來約 3% 的歷史平均，以及同期間 BDC 約 4% 的歷史平均。

Our nonaccrual rate at fair value also remained low at 1.2% of the portfolio, stable quarter over quarter, and well below our historical levels. Our overall risk ratings remain stable and the share of our portfolio companies in our higher risk categories, Grades 1 and 2 remain below our five-year average and notably lower than our portfolio companies in Grade 4, which are outperforming companies.

以公允價值計，我們的不計息比率亦維持在低檔，為投資組合的 1.2%，環比持平，且顯著低於我們的歷史水準。我們整體風險評等維持穩定；投資組合公司落在較高風險類別（第 1 與第 2 級）的占比仍低於五年平均，且明顯低於第 4 級（表現優於預期的公司）的占比。

With this backdrop of our portfolio continuing to perform well, we would note that as we have said several times in the past, we would not be surprised to see credit quality and non accruals across the industry revert closer to historical norms from what has been a period of unusually low levels in the industry, particularly given slower economic growth, repercussions from geopolitical issues and supply chain disruptions. We are already seeing higher levels of manager dispersion and we believe this trend will continue.

在投資組合持續良好表現的背景下，我們也要指出：如同我們過去多次提到的，我們不會對整體產業的信用品質與不計息水準，從先前異常偏低的水準回歸至更接近歷史常態感到意外，特別是在經濟成長放緩、地緣政治問題的後續影響，以及供應鏈中斷的情況下。我們已經看到管理人之間的表現分歧加大，並認為此趨勢將會延續。

Shifting to the second quarter. As Kort noted earlier, market activity has remained slow as participants continue to work through price discovery. Through April 23, 2026, a total commitments were approximately $200 million.

轉向第二季。如 Kort 先前所述，市場活動仍然偏慢，因為參與者持續進行價格發現。截至 2026 年 4 月 23 日，總承諾金額約為 2 億美元。

Our backlog was approximately $1.8 billion as of the same date and our activity levels as measured by discussions have increased in recent weeks. Additionally, our current backlog reflects a 35 basis point increase in spreads and a 40 basis point increase in fees as compared to the first quarter first lien loans.

截至同一日期，我們的待辦案量（backlog）約為 18 億美元；以討論量衡量的活動水準在近幾週有所增加。此外，與第一季第一順位擔保貸款相比，我們目前的待辦案量反映利差增加 35 個基點、費用增加 40 個基點。

As a reminder, our backlog contains investments that are subject to approvals and documentation and may not close or we may sell a portion of these investments post closing. While we are beginning to see deal flow pick up, we expect the slower start to affect both originations and exits in the second quarter.

提醒一下，我們的待辦案量包含仍需核准與文件作業的投資，可能無法完成交割，或我們可能在交割後出售其中一部分。雖然我們開始看到案源回升，但我們預期較慢的開局將同時影響第二季的承作與退出。

In summary, we believe ARCC is navigating this period of market transition from a position of strength. The current environment is reinforcing the advantages of scale, balance sheet strength, capital availability, underwriting discipline and portfolio management supported by a well-performing diversified portfolio and significant liquidity at ARCC and across the broader Ares platform.

總結而言，我們認為 ARCC 正以強勢姿態度過這段市場轉換期。當前環境正凸顯規模、資產負債表實力、資金可得性、承銷紀律與投資組合管理的優勢；這些優勢由 ARCC 及更廣泛 Ares 平台上表現良好且多元分散的投資組合，以及充足流動性所支撐。

We believe we are well positioned to thrive in this market and continue generating attractive dividends for our shareholders. As always, we appreciate you joining us today, and we look forward to speaking with you next quarter.

我們相信，我們已做好準備在此市場中茁壯，並持續為股東創造具吸引力的股利。一如既往，感謝各位今天與會，我們期待在下個季度再與各位交流。

With that, operator, please open the line for questions.

那麼，接線員，請開放提問專線。

(Operator Instructions)

（接線員指示）

Rick Shane, JPMorgan.

Rick Shane，摩根大通。

Hey, guys, thanks for taking my questions this morning. Look, it's obviously an interesting time. You've talked about the widening of spreads and you've talked about better origination fees. I am curious when we look at some of the other elements of transaction structure, particularly things like covenants and control provisions if the market is readjusting as well, I think that when we sort of hear what's happened over the last couple of years, that's been one area of concern. And I'm curious if that's normalizing also.

各位早安，謝謝讓我提問。坦白說，現在顯然是個很有意思的時點。你們談到利差擴大，也談到更好的承作費用。我想問的是，當我們看交易結構的其他要素，特別是像契約條款（covenants）與控制條款（control provisions）這些，市場是否也在重新調整？我認為回顧過去幾年，這一直是大家關注的一個面向。我也想了解這部分是否也正在回歸正常。

Yeah, thanks for the question. This is Kort. I can jump in on that one and see if anyone else on the team wants to chime in. But I would say yes, those other noneconomic terms and documentation provisions are moving more positively in our direction as well as the economic points of fees and spread, as I mentioned in the prepared remarks.

好的，謝謝你的問題。我是 Kort。我可以先回答，看看團隊其他人是否也想補充。我會說是的，正如我在事先準備的發言中提到的，除了費用與利差等經濟條件之外，其他非經濟條款與文件條款也正朝著對我們更有利的方向發展。

So whether it's getting a financial covenant on companies that might have been previously on the margin of getting one. I would say that's tipping in our direction. I don't want to overstate it. Obviously, large cap borrowers of high quality are still able to access deals from the private credit market (inaudible)

例如，對於先前可能只是在邊緣、未必能取得財務契約條款的公司，現在更有機會把財務契約條款納入。我會說這個趨勢正在往我們這邊傾斜。我不想誇大其詞。顯然，高品質的大型借款人仍然能從私募信貸市場取得交易（聽不清）。

But at the margin, that's moving in our direction as well as collateral protection terms and other documentation terms that a lot of people have been talking about certainly of late. So yeah, it feels like certainly a better time. Obviously, our market moves a little bit more slowly. So we'll continue to watch and see how things change for them

但在邊際上，這也正朝我們的方向移動；同時也包括擔保品保護條款以及其他文件條款——最近很多人都在談這些。所以，是的，整體感覺確實是更好的時點。當然，我們的市場變動會慢一些，因此我們會持續觀察，看看情況如何演變。

Great. Kort, if I can just ask one quick follow-up to that. So I think what I'm hearing from you is in terms of all of deal structure mean reversion. It's not like we've swung from a wildly bullish market to a wildly bearish market in terms of wider spreads, et cetera. And given all of the noise and drama we had during the first quarter, is this just a reflection of the continued supply of capital from both the public and private BDCs sort of insulating those moves?

很好。Kort，我再追問一個很快的問題。我理解你在說的是，就整體交易結構的均值回歸而言，並不是說我們從極度多頭的市場一下子擺盪到極度空頭的市場，例如利差大幅走寬等等。考量第一季有那麼多雜音與波動，這是否只是反映了公募與私募 BDC 持續的資金供給，在某種程度上緩衝了這些變動？

I think it's probably that, I think it's probably a little bit of two things. I think it's one, supply of capital and the changes that we're seeing in the flows in the retail and wealth channel. But I think it's probably also just part of what Jim said in his prepared remarks, which is that I think people do recognize that the risks out there are a little bit higher now with some of the geopolitical developments and slowing economic growth.

我想可能是那樣，也可能是兩個因素的綜合。一是資金供給，以及我們在零售與財富管理通路看到的資金流向變化；但也可能如 Jim 在事先準備的發言中所說，大家確實意識到，隨著一些地緣政治發展與經濟成長放緩，當前外部風險略有上升。

And that probably is also influencing people's behavior when it comes to pricing new deals. So I think it's a little bit of both of those things. But in terms of your comments around reverting to the mean, I think that's correct. I don't think we're saying we're in an environment today where spreads are blown out super wide.

而這也可能影響大家在新交易定價時的行為。所以我認為兩者都有。至於你提到的均值回歸，我覺得是對的。我不認為我們是在一個利差被大幅拉得非常寬的環境。

Obviously, we got to a very tight place last year. And it's good to see them widening. But like we said 50 to 75 basis points of kind of total yield improvement between spread and fees doesn't indicate a blowing out of (inaudible).

顯然，我們去年曾經到過非常緊的水準。現在看到利差走寬是好事。但如我們所說，利差加上費用合計約 50 到 75 個基點的總收益率改善，並不代表（聽不清）出現大幅擴張。

Thank you, guys. I really appreciate you taking my questions this morning.

謝謝各位。我非常感謝你們今天早上回答我的問題。

Finian O'Shea, Wells Fargo Securities.

Finian O'Shea，富國證券。

Hey, everyone, good morning. Following up on that topic. And Jim, you talked about the benefits of investing in volatility. It does, this sort of activity on the runway does sound like the higher quality kind of deal that would reprice down when the retail vehicles, say, eventually recover and that could pressure NOI more. So as you approach book and can raise capital, how aggressive do you want to be in terms of growing into this environment?

各位早安。延續剛才的主題。Jim，你談到在波動中投資的好處。這類在跑道上的活動，聽起來像是較高品質的交易；當零售載具例如未來回復時，這些交易可能會被重新定價下調，進而對 NOI 造成壓力。因此，當你們接近淨值（book）且能夠募資時，在這樣的環境下，你們希望在成長上採取多積極的策略？

Yeah. I'll start by saying, thanks, Ben. But I'll start by saying that I don't think we're in need of growing the capital base right now with a $6 billion liquidity position that we have. We also do our best to, when we look, when a market like this to get the call protection on deals so that we can lock in terms when the market is favorable for us like it is today.

是的。我先說，謝謝你，Ben。不過我先講，我不認為我們目前需要擴大資本基礎，因為我們有 60 億美元的流動性部位。我們也會盡力在這樣的市場中，於交易上取得提前贖回保護（call protection），以便在像今天這樣對我們有利的市場環境下鎖定條件。

Certainly, there's some period of time that will pass, and you will end up in scenarios where repricing will come back to the market. I think we're seeing that pendulum actually swing both ways. We have opportunities right now to reprice many of the deals in our portfolio as they look for amendments or add-on acquisitions, things like that.

當然，時間推移後，你會遇到重新定價回到市場的情境。我認為我們也看到這個鐘擺其實是雙向擺動的。現在我們有機會在投資組合中，針對許多交易進行重新定價，因為借款人會因修約或附加併購（add-on acquisitions）等需求而來談條件。

And we're doing a lot of that right now. So that is sort of how the market works. It's not as rapid. And it is a public market. So you'll see insulation from those repricings to a certain extent, more in the private markets than in the public markets. So it's not as rapid.

而我們現在正在做很多這類事情。這就是市場運作方式。它不會那麼快，而且這是一個公開市場。因此，相較於公開市場，你會在私募市場中在某種程度上看到對重新定價的緩衝。所以它不會那麼迅速。

You don't, because it's not as active, the volatility is not as high. You just see a little bit more stability in the bands on either side or tighter. And then as it relates to raising capital, I mean we'll just evaluate that quarter to quarter, month-to-month as we see what's in the pipeline the nature of the market at that point in time and where the stock price is.

你不會——因為市場活動沒那麼頻繁、波動也沒那麼高——你只會看到兩側區間的穩定性稍微高一些，或區間更緊一些。至於募資，我們會按季、按月評估，視管線中的機會、當時的市場性質以及股價水準而定。

It's helpful. And follow-up, Scott, I appreciate your comment on the bank side. the funding arena. I think it's fair to say you're a desirable counterparty, but you've also done your job in fighting those borrowing spreads down for yourselves, and we have seen banks sort of push back. I think there were a bunch of repricings upward in, say, '22, '23. Do you see any of that on the runway as your spreads widen, will the banks do you think fight their spreads back up? Thanks.

這很有幫助。再追問一下，Scott，我很感謝你對銀行端、資金面的評論。我想可以說你們是很理想的交易對手，但你們也一直努力把自身的借款利差壓低，而我們也看到銀行端有些反彈。我記得在 2022、2023 年有不少向上重新定價。當你們的資產利差走寬時，你是否看到未來銀行也會把它們的利差再往上拉？謝謝。

Yeah. Thanks, Fin. Yes, I do think that there's potential for that. We're not seeing it at the moment. As you saw, during the quarter, we actually repriced our facilities down a little bit. So these things will ebb and flow. I think for us, if it does move, that it's not going to be just for us or for the whole sector.

好的，謝謝你，Fin。是的，我確實認為有這種可能性。我們目前還沒有看到。正如你所見，本季我們其實把部分融資額度的定價小幅下調。所以這些事情會有起有落。我認為對我們而言，如果真的發生變動，也不會只針對我們，而會是整個產業都會面臨。

So that's happening that should mean that we should be able to put pressure on the asset side, too. So our ability to take increases on our liabilities should be commensurate with the increases on the asset side. But it's too early to tell right now.

因此，如果那樣的情況發生，也應該意味著我們能在資產端施加壓力。我們承擔負債端成本上升的能力，應該能與資產端收益上升相匹配。但現在判斷還太早。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Arren Cyganovich, Truist Securities.

Arren Cyganovich，Truist Securities。

Thanks. The April-to-date trends were quite low. You highlighted that as borrowers are trying to adjust to the new spread and document environment. What, you mentioned that things have picked up in recent weeks. Should we expect kind of a similar slowdown that we saw last year due to the tariff stuff we saw in the second quarter. Or do you think that this could actually potentially pick up as you have had these conversations in recent weeks?

謝謝。你們提到截至 4 月的趨勢相當低迷，並強調借款人正在嘗試適應新的利差與文件條款環境。你也提到最近幾週已有所回升。我們是否應該預期會出現類似去年那樣的放緩——因為我們在第二季看到關稅相關的雜音？還是你認為，基於你們最近幾週的這些對話，活動其實可能會回升？

Yeah. Why don't I try to answer that one. It's obviously really hard to predict, and I probably don't want to venture a guess as to how we're going to see transaction activity evolve from here because it just has been very up and down.

好的。我來試著回答。這顯然很難預測，我可能也不想去猜測接下來交易活動會如何演變，因為它一直都非常起伏不定。

Obviously, you mentioned last year, kind of similar things really slowed down with the tariff noise and then the second half was extremely busy and we posted record volumes. It was really hard to see that coming when we were sitting here in April, May last year.

如你所提到的，去年在關稅雜音下，類似的情況確實讓活動大幅放緩；但下半年又非常忙碌，我們創下了創紀錄的量。當我們去年四、五月坐在這裡時，真的很難預見後面會那樣發展。

I guess what I would say about the backlog or the, I guess, the activity in the last few weeks since the end of the quarter. Obviously, there's a little bit of a lag effect. So the stuff that we're committing to in the first few weeks of April has been sort of teed up and discussed through investment committee for weeks, if not months prior to that, leading up to it.

我想我會說，關於待辦量或——我想——自季末以來最近幾週的活動。顯然存在一些滯後效應。因此，我們在 4 月前幾週所承諾的案子，其實在那之前的數週、甚至數月，就已經在投資委員會前進行鋪陳與討論。

So a little bit of a lag effect. We're starting to see the comments we had in the prepared remarks. Referred to the fact that we're starting to see a pickup just in terms of our cadence of deals that we're seeing come through investment committee, I would say, in the last three to four weeks.

所以會有一些滯後效應。我們在事先準備的發言中提到的評論，是指我們開始看到回升——就我們送進投資委員會審議的交易節奏而言——我會說在過去三到四週確實有所加快。

So we're at the front end of seeing that pick up and we did want to go out and make sure that people are aware we're seeing that. But whether it's sustained or not, I think it depends on a lot of different variables out there, maybe most notably just the geopolitical situation. I think if that can get resolved in a sustainable manner, then I think you could see things really pick back up meaningfully but that's something that's just really hard to predict. So hopefully, that helps a little bit.

所以我們正處於看到那股回升動能的前端，我們也確實想對外說明並確保大家知道我們正在看到這個現象。但它是否能持續，我認為取決於許多不同的外部變數，或許最值得注意的就是地緣政治情勢。我認為如果這件事能以可持續的方式獲得解決，那麼你可能會看到情況真正有意義地回升，但這確實很難預測。所以希望這多少能有幫助。

Yeah. No, absolutely. It's obviously something that's evolving rapidly. So I appreciate those comments. The other question I had was around the consultant that you hired, and I appreciate all the numbers and kind of fits with what you've been saying to us publicly in terms of the higher quality type of well-protected enterprise type of companies.

是的。不，完全同意。這顯然是正在快速演變的事情。所以我很感謝這些評論。我另外一個問題是關於你們聘請的顧問；我也感謝你們提供的所有數據，這也大致符合你們先前對外公開所說的：更高品質、保護性更強的企業型公司。

Some small risk from AI, some, I guess, medium risk as you kind of push pointed to that. I think the biggest question that people have, and this is going to take quite a while how to unfold is these companies are doing well now. They're going to probably continue to do well in the near term.

AI 帶來一些小風險，某種程度上也有一些中度風險，正如你剛才所指出的。我認為大家最大的疑問，而且這需要很長時間才會逐步明朗的是：這些公司現在表現良好，短期內可能也會持續表現良好。

But at some point, they have to be refinanced in the equity markets have repriced software down, I don't know, 40% or so. What are some of the options if you have a private equity firm that may be bought a company at 21 times EBITDA and now they're trading at [13]. And maybe not want to exit those and you probably don't want to hold on to those loans through the next cycle. So maybe you could just talk about the refinancing risk and some of the options that you'll have to use whenever you get to that kind of point of refinance whenever that occurs.

但在某個時間點，它們必須在股權市場再融資，而股市已經把軟體類股的估值下修了，我不知道，大概 40% 左右。如果你有一家私募股權公司可能以 21 倍 EBITDA 買了一家公司，而現在市場交易在 [13] 倍。它們可能不想退出，而你們大概也不想把那些貸款一路持有到下一個週期。所以也許你可以談談再融資風險，以及當你們走到那個需要再融資的時間點（無論何時發生）時，你們有哪些可用的選項。

Yeah, sure. So obviously, a fair amount to unpack on the software topic. I guess just specifically to the refinancing risk. Number one, there already is a market that exists currently despite the fact that the deal flow is low, we are seeing deals get done in the software space.

好的，當然。關於軟體這個主題，顯然有不少內容可以拆解。我想就再融資風險本身來說，第一，目前其實已經存在一個市場；儘管成交量偏低，我們仍然看到軟體領域有交易完成。

There have been a couple in the last month or two, where the market has been able to finance these transactions, they're for higher-quality borrowers without AI risk, they're coming in at obviously a little bit wider spreads, but they're getting done.

過去一兩個月就有幾筆，市場已經能夠為這些交易提供融資；它們是更高品質、且沒有 AI 風險的借款人，利差當然更寬一些，但交易確實完成了。

We actually had one company in our portfolio that we didn't think was particularly risky, but sort of on the stride of the low to medium risk category, and we decided to not extend maturity and the lending, the lender group took us out of that name.

我們投資組合裡其實有一家公司，我們不認為特別高風險，但大概介於低到中度風險的邊界；我們決定不延長到期日，而放款人團（lender group）把我們從那個標的中買出（take us out）。

So just as one case study of our ability to exit when there's a maturity if we're not willing to provide an extension. I guess, again, there's so many names in the book. It's hard to go kind of granular on a call like this, but I would just remind everyone that our loan to values on our software book as a whole still are very healthy and low relative to the broader book.

所以這是一個案例研究，說明當遇到到期、而我們不願意提供展期時，我們有能力退出。我想再說一次，帳上標的很多，很難在這種電話會議上講得很細；但我想提醒大家，我們整體軟體投資組合的貸款價值比（LTV）仍然非常健康，而且相較於整體投資組合更低。

So we took a lot of markdowns on the equity values on our software names in our portfolios and the LTV and our debt software book still stands in the low 40s, below the LTV of the total book. The growth rate, the EBITDA growth rate of our software companies remains consistent with the growth rate of the rest of the book at 9% year over year.

我們在投資組合中的軟體標的，其股權價值確實做了不少下調（markdown），但我們的軟體債務投資組合的 LTV 仍在 40% 出頭，低於整體投資組合的 LTV。我們軟體公司的成長率、也就是 EBITDA 成長率，仍與整體投資組合一致，年增 9%。

And I guess, I would also say we can spend more time if people want to on the consultant study and the different categories and risk ratings. We obviously have a lot of detail there. But we did actually make an effort to unpack and do a maturity waterfall on the entire software book and compare the maturities in the lower-risk category versus the higher medium risk category.

另外，如果大家想，我們也可以花更多時間談顧問研究以及不同的分類與風險評等；我們手上確實有很多細節。但我們也確實做了一個努力：把整個軟體投資組合做出到期結構（maturity waterfall），並比較低風險類別與較高中度風險類別的到期分布。

And the maturity profile actually for the higher and medium-risk names is materially shorter. It's 2.4 years versus [3.9 years] on the total book. So the low risk names are about 4.2 years. So when it comes to trying to mitigate technology risk, obviously, shorter maturities is better. And when, I guess, to the final specific point of your question, when we get to the point of the maturity and if we're not willing to give an extension, then we're going to have a conversation with the owner of that business, if it's a financial sponsor.

而較高與中度風險標的的到期結構其實明顯更短：2.4 年，相較於整體投資組合的 [3.9 年]。低風險標的大約是 4.2 年。所以在降低科技風險方面，顯然到期越短越好。至於你問題最後那個更具體的點：當我們走到到期點、而我們不願意提供展期時，我們會與該企業的所有人（如果是財務贊助商）進行對話。

Then we're going to in most cases, probably request that a capital injection is made in order to pay down our debt and derisk us to get a maturity extension. Obviously, it's a case-by-case basis. It's hard to generalize, but we are not unfamiliar with having some difficult conversations with sponsors about needing to exit names. We've done it over a long period of time, and we feel confident we'll be able to do that again now.

在多數情況下，我們可能會要求注入資本（capital injection），用以償還部分債務，降低我們的風險，從而換取到期展延。當然這要視個案而定，很難一概而論；但我們並不陌生於與贊助商進行一些艱難的對話、討論需要退出某些標的。我們長期以來一直這麼做，也有信心現在同樣能做到。

Thanks. I appreciate it. I know it's a tough question.

謝謝。我很感謝。我知道這是個很難的問題。

John Hecht, Jefferies.

John Hecht，Jefferies。

Good afternoon, guys. Thanks for taking my question. And maybe a little bit of a tack on to the prior question. I really appreciate all the context you gave us around your software portfolio and understand you had a highly regarded third-party management consulting firm evaluate your exposures.

各位下午好。謝謝讓我提問。我可能稍微延伸一下前一個問題。我非常感謝你們就軟體投資組合提供的所有背景說明，也理解你們請了一家備受推崇的第三方管理顧問公司來評估你們的曝險。

I'm wondering, are you able to give us any, call it, a sensitivity analysis around like impacts or disruptions to revenue as revenue model shift within the portfolio? And what that did to call it, leverage calculations during that exercise?

我想請問，你們是否能提供一些所謂的敏感度分析，例如：當投資組合內的營收模式發生轉變時，對營收的影響或擾動？以及在那次分析中，這對所謂的槓桿（leverage）計算造成了什麼影響？

I'm sorry. So just, you're asking about how are the revenue trends changing within the different categories.

抱歉。所以你的問題是：不同類別裡的營收趨勢如何變化？

When you analyzed sensitivity or exposure to AI disruption, did that include like an assessment of potential revenue model shifts for the software companies? And if so, can you give us any, call it, materiality of the revenue shift as the industry changes?

當你們分析對 AI 造成的擾動之敏感度或曝險時，是否包含對軟體公司潛在營收模式轉變的評估？如果有的話，你們能否提供一些所謂的重大性（materiality），也就是隨著產業變化，營收轉移的幅度？

Sure. Yeah. I think I get it. Why don't I just give a little bit of color around kind of the definitions of these three categories. And I was anticipating we might, people might want to go into this because I think it will help with your question.

當然。是的。我想我理解了。不如我先補充一些背景，說明這三個類別的定義。我原本就預期大家可能會想深入這一塊，因為我認為這會有助於回答你的問題。

The first thing I would say is we're not seeing any significant deterioration in the performance of these companies regardless of whether they're in the low or the medium risk, I should say, in the high-risk category, again, that's only 0.3% of the entire portfolio at fair value.

我首先要說的是：無論是在低風險或中度風險（我應該說也包括高風險）類別，我們都沒有看到這些公司表現出現任何顯著惡化。再次強調，高風險類別按公允價值計僅占整體投資組合的 0.3%。

And it actually is only three names in that high-risk category. One of them is plural sight, which people know is not performing well. So within that high-risk category, there is performance issues. But in the medium risk and low risk category, this portfolio as a whole continues to perform very, very strongly. So to the prior question, nothing's happening yet in the numbers.

而且高風險類別其實只有三個標的。其中之一是 PluralSight，大家都知道它表現不佳。所以在高風險類別裡確實存在經營表現問題。但在中度風險與低風險類別，整體投資組合仍持續非常、非常強勁地表現。所以回到前一個問題，數字上目前還沒有發生什麼。

It's all about the look forward into the future that everybody is wants to talk about and is focused on. So maybe just on the definitions of these categories, the low-risk names are companies that were identified by the consultants and us, by the way, they validated the work that we've been doing ourselves rating these names for the past six months.

大家想談、也聚焦的，都是對未來的前瞻。那我先說明這些類別的定義：低風險標的是由顧問與我們共同辨識的公司；順帶一提，他們也驗證了我們過去六個月自行對這些標的所做的評等工作。

But companies that have lots of layers of mitigants to AI risk. And we've talked about this before, whether it's system of record positioning, proprietary data, regulated end markets, networks business models, all of these things that insulate a company from being disrupted.

這些公司具備多層次的 AI 風險緩釋因素（mitigants）。我們之前也談過：不論是作為系統記錄（system of record）的定位、專有數據、受監管的終端市場、網路型商業模式（networks business models）等，這些因素都能讓公司免於被顛覆。

That low risk category, these companies have lots and lots of those mitigants. And what I would just kind of say is they don't have to do a lot to prevent disruption. And they actually will likely benefit from AI. The 85% of the companies that are in that low-risk category in our software book, much more poised to benefit from AI than to be disrupted.

在低風險類別中，這些公司擁有非常多這類緩釋因素。我想說的是：它們不需要做太多就能避免被顛覆，而且很可能會從 AI 中受益。我們軟體投資組合中屬於低風險類別的公司占 85%，它們更有機會從 AI 受益，而不是被 AI 顛覆。

The medium risk category, which is 14% of the software portfolio were 3% of the total portfolio. What I would say about this category is there are still mitigants that exist, some of those mitigants I mentioned before, less than in the low-risk category and these companies need to execute on their own AI strategy and keep evolving their products in order to stay competitive.

中度風險類別占軟體投資組合的 14%，約占整體投資組合的 3%。對這個類別，我會說：仍然存在一些緩釋因素，包括我剛才提到的那些，但相較於低風險類別要少一些；而且這些公司需要落實自身的 AI 策略，並持續演進其產品，才能保持競爭力。

So to your point, I don't know if it's, it's not a revenue model change but it's just making sure that they're evolving their product suite to incorporate AI so that they could stay competitive and ahead of the curve. And that is how I categorize those names.

所以就你提到的點，我不確定這是否算是營收模式的改變；更像是確保它們持續演進產品組合，把 AI 納入其中，才能維持競爭力並領先趨勢。我就是這樣來歸類這些標的。

And really importantly, in this medium risk category, we're not saying nor is the consultant saying, there's going to be disruption. And actually, the study specifically states that, many of these companies are well positioned to adapt within a time necessary to adapt, but it's just that there are less mitigants than the company is in the low-risk category.

而且非常重要的是，在這個中度風險類別中，我們並不是在說——顧問也不是在說——一定會出現顛覆。事實上，研究報告明確指出，這些公司當中有許多都具備良好條件，能在所需的時間內完成調整與適應；只是相較於低風險類別的公司，它們可用的緩衝與對沖因素較少。

And then the high-risk category, the definition there is these companies really need to transform their business model in order to get, in order to sort of survive the disruption risk. So I don't know if that helps with your question, John or not. But hopefully, that color helps provide some more insight into the study that we can measure.

接著是高風險類別，其定義是：這些公司確實需要轉型其商業模式，才能——某種程度上——在顛覆風險下存活下來。我不確定這是否回答了你的問題，John，但希望這些補充說明能讓你對我們可衡量的研究結果有更深入的理解。

That helps a lot. I really appreciate that. Second question is, and you talked about the deal environment, how it was, it's temporarily been impacted by all the global stuff. Maybe you're seeing some early indications of a renormalization. We've been waiting for a long time for this wave of, call it, private equity, call it portfolio maturities and how there's a lot of pressure to liquidate and return capital to LPs.

這幫助很大，我非常感謝。第二個問題是：你提到交易環境，以及它如何因為全球各種因素而暫時受到影響。也許你們已經看到一些早期跡象顯示正在回歸常態。我們已經等了很久，期待這一波——不管你稱之為私募股權也好、投資組合到期也好——因為有很大的壓力需要變現並把資金返還給LP。

I'm wondering what are the, assuming this geopolitical stuff stabilizes, is there anything obstructing that, call it, a wave of potential activity beyond this? And do you guys have an opinion about when and if that wave might occur.

我想問的是，假設這些地緣政治因素趨於穩定，是否還有任何因素會阻礙這一波潛在活動在此之後出現？以及你們對於這一波何時、以及是否會發生，有沒有看法？

It feels like all the ingredients are still in place. If you take out the volatility that's going on in the world in the market right now. So the pressures on the private equity firms to return capital is only increasing. The hold periods are lengthening. Again, even though economic growth overall is slowing a little bit in the sectors that we invest in, growth is still really strong.

感覺所有要素仍然都到位——如果把目前市場與全球正在發生的波動先排除的話。因此，私募股權公司返還資本的壓力只會持續增加；持有期間也在拉長。再者，即便整體經濟成長略有放緩，但在我們投資的產業領域，成長仍然非常強勁。

So I really don't see any other barriers that would prevent us from being able to get back to a really active deal environment. Obviously, all the noise around software is likely to hamstring volume within that sector specifically. But other than that, I don't really see any other barriers.

所以我真的看不出還有其他障礙會阻止我們回到非常活躍的交易環境。當然，圍繞軟體產業的各種雜音，可能會特別壓抑該產業的交易量。但除此之外，我不太看到其他障礙。

Yeah, maybe I'll add, Kort, there is a fair amount of healthy discussion dialogue in the sectors and areas that are unaffected either with geopolitical or software. So I think there's an optimism around deal flow it's not optimal for a private equity firm to go, bring their company to market in the midst of the most intense moments.

是的，Kort，我補充一下：在那些不受地緣政治或軟體因素影響的產業與領域，確實有相當多健康的討論與對話。所以我認為市場對交易流量是抱持樂觀的；對私募股權公司而言，在最緊張、最劇烈的時刻把公司推向市場並不是最佳選擇。

But there's a lot of interest in migrating towards companies and having, getting invested in companies that are sheltered from some of those issues. And I think there's a lot of optimism there. So I think those will lead the way, probably. And then you'll see a more active broader market if history repeats itself, that's what we should expect to see over the next few quarters.

但市場對於轉向那些能避開部分問題、相對更具防護性的公司並進行投資，興趣很高；我認為那裡有很大的樂觀情緒。所以我想這些交易可能會先帶頭。然後如果歷史重演，我們應該會在接下來幾個季度看到更活躍、範圍更廣的市場。

Wonderful. Thank you guys very much.

太好了。非常感謝各位。

Paul Johnson, KBW.

Paul Johnson，KBW。

Thanks. Good afternoon. Thanks for taking my questions. Credit is still relatively strong today, but I was wondering in relation to the, just the NAV decline this quarter, how much of that would you say is kind of just the broader mark-to-market with spreads this quarter versus kind of credit-specific write-downs?

謝謝。下午好。感謝讓我提問。當前信用狀況仍相對強勁，但我想就本季NAV下滑來問一下：你們認為其中有多少是本季利差變動所帶來的整體按市價（mark-to-market）影響， versus 多少是偏向信用事件/信用特定的減記？

Yeah, happy to take that. More than two-third of the marks we've had around 70% are mark-to-market related rather than credit related. So the significant majority of it is from mark-to-market.

好的，很樂意回答。就我們的評價調整而言，超過三分之二——大約70%——是按市價相關，而不是信用相關。所以絕大多數來自按市價調整。

Got it. Appreciate that. And then you guys have done, I mean, you've clearly done some extensive analysis on the book. You've provided a lot of transparency on top of that. But I was wondering if I could just ask kind of a higher level on marks, more specifically on software investments, how do the discount rate, I guess, move quarter-to-quarter and is the assumption that the fundamentals of these companies, because it sounds like a lot of them still have very strong performance.

了解，謝謝。接著你們顯然對投資組合做了非常深入的分析，也提供了很多透明度。我想從更高層次問一下估值調整，特別是軟體投資：折現率大概是如何在季度之間變動的？以及你們是否假設這些公司的基本面——因為聽起來其中很多仍然表現很強——

Is the fundamental performance just strong enough to offset any sort of spread widening that we would have seen in the quarter? Or is it just more of a lag, the fact that we might expect to see throughout the year if spreads continue to widen out?

其基本面表現是否足以抵消本季我們看到的任何利差擴大？還是說這只是時間落後效應，如果利差持續走寬，我們可能會在今年陸續看到？

Yeah. Look, I think it's, I think everyone would like to try and create a generalization around how to approach the answer to that question, which is just not easy to do. It's probably a good moment in time just to express, and we had said some of it in our prepared remarks, but we have an extraordinarily extensive valuation process that's worked for a really long period of time, and it's proven out to be quite effective. It's really a bottoms-up company-by-company analysis, right?

是的。你看，我想大家都希望能把這個問題的回答一般化、做出一個通用框架，但這其實不容易。這也許是個好時機再強調一下——我們在事先準備的講稿裡也提到了一部分——我們有一套非常嚴謹且長期運作的估值流程，而且已被證明相當有效。它本質上是自下而上、逐家公司分析，對吧？

And every company is distinctly different to answer that question. You have to go look at that company, you have to look at the comparables that are very specific to that company. And that's even within software. There are so many categories that exist within software.

而每家公司都截然不同。要回答這個問題，你必須去看那家公司本身，並檢視與該公司高度相關的可比公司；即便都在軟體領域也是如此。因為軟體之內還有非常多不同的子類別。

So broadly speaking, you want to draw parallel to probably syndicated market or to sort of mark-to-market issues there, but it's not something that we should do we should just look at them one-off. So there isn't a simple answer to that question. What I will say is there's clearly an impact on EV and it was more pronounced in software, right, for the quarter.

所以從大方向來說，你可能會想把它與聯貸市場或按市價的議題做類比，但我們不應該這樣做；我們應該把它們視為個案逐一評估。因此這個問題沒有簡單答案。我能說的是，企業價值（EV）確實受到影響，而且本季在軟體領域更為明顯。

So the assumption is fair. But that EV doesn't just flow directly into mark-to-market on the loan, right? And once again, the private market court said it, the private market is active and still active in software. And so there is some movement, but what we are looking at a lot in the analysis, which is a bottoms up again, is what is the private market doing for these companies and were indications there. And so that's a better, that is a better source of one of the more important variables, I should say, that go into the equation.

所以這個假設是合理的。但EV並不會直接、線性地反映到貸款的按市價評價上，對吧？再一次，正如Kort所說，私募市場仍然活躍，軟體領域也仍然活躍。因此確實有一些變動；但我們在分析中（同樣是自下而上）非常關注的是：私募市場對這些公司給出的價格/條件是什麼、是否有相關的市場訊號。這會是更好的來源——我應該說，是方程式中更重要的變數之一。

Yeah. Maybe I'll just add one more bit of color to just further illustrate what Jim was talking about that it's not so simple. Obviously, spreads widened that affects the value of the loans and marks should go down. But it's not that simple on a portfolio-wide basis because on each individual name, that might not occur.

是的。我再補充一點，進一步說明Jim提到的：事情沒那麼簡單。當然，利差走寬會影響貸款價值，估值（marks）理論上應該下調。但在整體投資組合層面並不那麼簡單，因為對每一個個別標的而言，未必會發生同樣的情況。

For instance, if we have a software company that has performed extremely well and delevered such that the pricing and the spread on that loan is actually somewhat wide relative to the risk. We don't mark that loan above par.

例如，如果我們有一家軟體公司表現非常好、槓桿下降（delevered），使得該筆貸款的定價與利差相對於其風險其實偏寬，我們不會把那筆貸款估到票面價值以上（above par）。

We market at par. And so when spreads then widen that loan can stay at par because the performance indicates that the risk is still, that the pricing is still appropriate for the risk. So that loan might not get a markdown even in a spread-widening environment, whereas another software name that is more levered would get a markdown in a spread winding environment.

我們會估在票面價值（par）。因此當利差再走寬時，那筆貸款仍可能維持在par，因為其表現顯示風險仍然——也就是說，定價仍然與風險相匹配。所以即便在利差走寬的環境下，那筆貸款也可能不需要下調；但另一個槓桿更高的軟體標的，在利差走寬環境下就會被下調。

So just one example of like 50 of why it's, you have to do it name by name, you can't do it on a portfolio-wide basis. But obviously, we're paying very close attention to each one of these names. We've got third parties in here validating all of our marks, and as Jim said, 70% or so of the write-downs were mark related.

所以這只是眾多例子之一（可能有50種情況）來說明：你必須逐一標的評估，不能用投資組合整體的方式一概而論。但很明顯，我們正非常密切地關注每一個標的。我們也有第三方在這裡驗證我們所有的估值；而如Jim所說，大約70%左右的減記是估值（mark）相關。

Got it. Appreciate that. Very good answer, a very helpful answer. Thanks, Kort there. My last question here was just in terms of Cornerstone software that was marked lower this quarter, Medallia, which you were not an investor, not a lender to, but Medallia getting restructured this quarter, Pluralsight, which you have a very small investment, also that company is struggling a little bit.

了解，謝謝。回答得很好，也非常有幫助。謝謝你，Kort。我最後一個問題是：就本季被下調估值的Cornerstone Software而言，還有Medallia——你們不是投資人也不是放款人，但Medallia本季進行了重整——以及Pluralsight（你們只有非常小的投資），那家公司也有點吃力。

I was wondering if you could just kind of tell us broadly for these companies, what exactly do you think it is that those companies are lacking in terms of the challenges that they're going through today? I mean, was it lack of a system critical system of record, that sort of thing for these companies to be running into trouble today?

我想請你們大致談談：對於這些公司，你們認為它們在面對當前挑戰時，究竟缺少了什麼？我的意思是，是否因為它們缺乏那種「系統關鍵、作為系統記錄（system of record）」的能力，之類的原因，才會讓這些公司今天遇到麻煩？

Yeah, I appreciate the question. I really, just think we always hesitate to dive into any individual name discussion and really start getting into trends or performance results on individual names. So I just don't think I'm going to necessarily go there and get into that level of detail. On any portfolio when you have 600 some names and whatever 130 software names, you're going to have some names that are going to underperform. We thankfully only have a few of them.

是的，謝謝你的問題。我們一向會猶豫去深入討論任何單一公司，並且真的開始談個別標的的趨勢或經營表現結果。所以我不一定會在這裡展開到那樣的細節。任何一個投資組合，當你有大約600個標的、以及大概130個軟體標的時，總會有一些標的表現不如預期；所幸我們只有少數幾個。

(inaudible) has been underperforming for a while. People understand what's going on there. Some of the other names you mentioned performance actually fine, more of a just mark-to-market issue based on what we're seeing in the market, how the market is viewing those kinds of credits. So not everything is what it seems a lot of it isn't really performance-related. But really, other than that, I just think it's not appropriate to dive into individual name discussions.

（聽不清）已經表現不佳一段時間了。大家都明白那邊發生了什麼事。你提到的其他一些名稱其實表現還可以，更多只是依市價評價（mark-to-market）的問題，取決於我們在市場上看到的情況，以及市場如何看待那類信用。所以並非所有事情都如表面所見，很多其實並不是與經營表現相關。不過，除此之外，我只是覺得不適合深入討論個別標的。

Okay. Fair enough. Thank you very much.

好的。可以理解。非常感謝。

Brian McKenna, Citizens.

Brian McKenna，Citizens。

Great. Thanks. So one more follow-up. Great. So one more follow-up on your software exposure, how much of the $1 billion roughly of the more at risk software investments are sponsor-backed and then you also have the largest portfolio management platform in the industry. So I'm curious how you can leverage that entire team to get out ahead of any potential AI risk and really how you can ultimately and that team ultimately drives better outcomes within this part of the portfolio?

很好，謝謝。所以再追問一個。關於你們在軟體的曝險，你們大約10億美元、風險較高的軟體投資中，有多少是由贊助商（sponsor）支持的？另外你們也擁有業界最大的投後管理平台。所以我想了解，你們如何運用整個團隊，提前因應任何潛在的AI風險，以及最終你們與該團隊如何在這一部分投資組合中帶來更好的結果？

Sure. So again, in that high-risk category, I think all of the names response are backed actually. There's only three names. We'll go back and check, but I believe they're all three-year sponsor backed. In terms of our portfolio management and our playbook, I'm glad you raised it, something that we're, we think is differentiating for our platform.

當然。再說一次，在那個高風險類別裡，我認為那些標的其實全部都是有贊助商支持的。只有三個標的。我們會再回去確認，但我相信三個都是由贊助商支持的。至於我們的投後管理以及處置（playbook），很高興你提到這點，這也是我們認為平台具有差異化的地方。

It's something we try to highlight a lot. We have over 50-person portfolio management and restructuring team. We've operated over 21 years here through lots of different cycles, including the GFC. We are not afraid to have tough conversations with the owners of businesses as I already mentioned, I think once on this call before. Look, the first thing we look for is if there's a liquidity problem, the owner of the business has to put in capital to support the liquidity problem.

這是我們經常強調的。我們有一支超過50人的投後管理與重整團隊。過去21年我們歷經許多不同景氣循環，包括全球金融危機（GFC）。我們不害怕與企業所有人進行艱難的對話，我想我在這通電話中之前也提過一次。你看，我們首先會看是否存在流動性問題；如果有，企業所有人就必須投入資本來支撐流動性缺口。

And if the other of the business is not willing to do that, then we are not afraid to restructure and own the company ourselves. Never what we want to do. It's never the plan, but we have the expertise and the team in place to own these companies, to be patient with them to provide additional capital to come out the other side and over our history, we've generated an enormous amount of gains by doing that.

如果企業所有人不願意這麼做，那我們也不害怕進行重整，並由我們自己持有公司。這從來不是我們想做的事，也從來不是計畫，但我們具備專業能力與團隊來持有這些公司，耐心陪伴，提供額外資本讓公司走出困境；而在我們的歷史中，透過這樣做我們創造了非常可觀的收益。

Just this year, we posted a big gain on portfolio company that was a mezzanine investment that we restructured and owned for 10 years and posted a big gain on it. So there's lots of examples like that over the course of time. So it might be hard to work if I take more involvement, but we absolutely have the expertise in place to do that.

就今年而言，我們在一家投資組合公司上實現了很大的收益；那是一筆次級債（mezzanine）投資，我們重整後持有了10年，並在其上取得了很大的收益。長期以來還有很多類似的例子。所以如果我更深入介入，可能會很難運作，但我們絕對具備相應的專業能力。

Okay. Great. That's helpful. And then if you were to mark-to-market the portfolio today to reflect quarter-to-date trends, how much of the first quarter markdowns would be reversed?

好的，很好，這很有幫助。那如果你們今天把投資組合按市價評價，以反映本季迄今（quarter-to-date）的趨勢，第一季的減記（markdown）大概會回轉多少？

I'm not sure we're in a position to answer that one at this point in time. I think that requires a whole, our valuation market process is extremely extensive, as you can imagine. So that would be a difficult one to address as a one-off.

目前這個時間點我不確定我們是否能回答。我想那需要一整套流程；如你所想像，我們的估值流程非常繁複。所以要把它當作一次性的問題來回答會很困難。

Yeah. And our market doesn't move as fast as the liquid market does either. So really tricky to say.

而且我們的市場也不像流動性市場那樣變動那麼快。所以真的很難說。

Yes, thought I'd give it a try. Thanks.

是的，我想說試試看。謝謝。

Kenneth Lee, RBC Capital Markets.

Kenneth Lee，RBC Capital Markets。

Hey, good afternoon, and thanks for taking my question. Just another one one on the software loan side. It sounds like the private markets are still originating software loans. But for Ares in particular, wonder if you could talk a little bit more about some of the more recently originally software loans? What sorts of economics and terms are you seeing and also roughly what's sort of like the average LTVs that you're underwriting at. Thanks.

嗨，午安，謝謝讓我提問。再問一個關於軟體貸款的問題。聽起來私募市場仍在承作軟體貸款。但就Ares而言，想請你多談談近期新承作的軟體貸款？你們看到的經濟條件與條款是什麼樣子？另外，你們承作時大概的平均貸款價值比（LTV）是多少？謝謝。

Yeah, sure. I appreciate the question. There really have not been there just a handful or less in the last few months of deals. Some of them were existing portfolio companies of ours where the sponsor may be looking for a little bit of incremental capital to do a tuck-in acquisition.

好的，當然。謝謝你的問題。過去幾個月其實沒有太多交易，只有少數幾筆甚至更少。其中一些是我們既有的投資組合公司，贊助商可能想要一些額外資本來做補強式併購（tuck-in acquisition）。

There have not been any that have come across our transom here that are sort of larger kind of bellwether type software names where we can really point to and say this is where the market is. Smaller deals get price sometimes a little bit more indiscriminately if we have another lender who might just really want to own that name and can clear the deal.

目前沒有任何那種較大型、具指標性（bellwether）的軟體公司案子送到我們這裡，讓我們可以明確指出市場水位在哪。較小型的交易有時定價會比較不那麼精準，因為可能有另一家放款人真的很想持有那個標的，並且能把交易做成。

So I think it's really a hard question to answer. I guess I would probably say on the deals that we have seen clear the spread and fee increase on those transactions is a little bit wider than the 50 to 75 basis point average that we put out in our prepared remarks.

所以我認為這確實很難回答。我想我大概會說，在我們看到能成交的交易上，利差與費用的提升幅度，會比我們在事先準備的發言中提到的平均增加50到75個基點還要更寬一些。

And these are higher quality companies. It's not like, if a software company has some kind of material question around the AI risk. That type of company is not really outraising capital right now. So these are the higher quality companies and it's a little bit wider than the average is probably what I would say.

而且這些是品質較高的公司。並不是說，如果一家軟體公司在AI風險上有重大疑慮，那類公司現在其實不太可能在外面募資。所以這些是較高品質的公司，而條件比平均值更寬一些，大概就是我會說的。

Got you. Very helpful there. And then one follow-up, if I may, once again, just on the software side, broadly across the portfolio there, how do you think about potential downside protection for software investments there, especially production that could potentially put a floor on recoveries. I'm thinking about, for example, intangible assets, any sorts of IP, I wonder if you could just give a little bit more color around that. Thanks.

了解，這很有幫助。那我再追問一個，還是關於軟體這塊：就整體投資組合而言，你們如何看待軟體投資的潛在下行保護，尤其是可能為回收率提供底部支撐的保障？例如無形資產、任何形式的智慧財產（IP）等，想請你多補充一些細節。謝謝。

Yeah. Look, again, so first of all, we are cash flow lenders in our core and always have been. And our underwriting thesis are always -- not always, but most of the time underpinned by very high degree of recurring revenues and predictability of cash flow conversion through lots of different cycles, as it pertains to software, technological cycles.

好的。你看，再次強調，我們核心一直都是現金流放款人（cash flow lenders），也一直如此。我們的承作假設（underwriting thesis）總是——不一定永遠，但多數時候——建立在非常高比例的經常性收入，以及在各種不同循環下、現金流轉換的可預測性之上；就軟體而言，也包括技術循環。

And as we think about downside protection here, I think we'll just keep coming back to the fact that these companies have again, the vast majority, as we've been saying is now third parties have validated, vast majority of our companies have very high barriers that insulate them from technology and obsolescence risk.

至於我們如何看待下行保護，我想我們會一直回到一點：這些公司——如我們一直在說的，而且現在也有第三方驗證——我們絕大多數的公司都有非常高的護城河，能隔絕技術變遷與被淘汰（obsolescence）風險。

The retention rates of the revenues on these companies continues to be very, very high. the cash flow conversion is strong. The EBITDA growth is strong and the loan to value, again on our software book through for our debt investments is 41%. So even today after the markdowns we took on the equity values.

這些公司的收入留存率仍然非常、非常高；現金流轉換很強；EBITDA成長很強；而我們軟體投資組合中、就債務投資而言的貸款價值比（loan-to-value）是41%。即使在我們對股權價值做了減記之後，今天仍是如此。

So I think we rely on the significant amount of enterprise value cushion and the strategic value of these companies to lots of different acquirers, either strategic acquirers or private equity acquirers for values that are well in excess of our debt if we needed to sell these companies to recover our principal. I don't know.

所以我認為我們仰賴的是相當可觀的企業價值緩衝（enterprise value cushion），以及這些公司對許多不同買家的策略價值——不論是策略買家或私募股權買家——其估值都遠高於我們的債務；如果我們需要出售這些公司來回收本金的話。我不知道。

Maybe just one additional point. I don't know if this is what you're referencing, but we think we do a pretty good job with documentation. We obviously care a lot about the IP and protected as part of our documentation. And I think we do a better job in private markets than the public markets do in that point.

也許再補充一點。我不確定你是否指的是這個，但我們認為我們在文件條款（documentation）上做得相當好。我們當然非常重視IP，並在文件中將其納入保護。我認為在這一點上，我們在私募市場做得比公開市場更好。

Got you. No, that's very helpful. Thanks again.

了解。不，這非常有幫助。再次感謝。

Sean-Paul Adams, B. Riley Securities.

Sean-Paul Adams，B. Riley Securities。

Hi, good afternoon. While non-accruals are still relatively within low levels. It seems like there was a couple outsized markdowns, totaling almost $100 million for the quarter, and that was across just two names that aren't captured within the nonaccrual figure. I understand not wanting to delve into portfolio specific names.

嗨，午安。雖然不計息（non-accrual）仍維持在相對偏低的水準，但看起來本季有幾筆較大幅度的減記，合計接近1億美元，而且集中在兩個名稱上，並未反映在不計息數字裡。我理解你們不想深入談投資組合的個別名稱。

However, if your headline nonaccrual exposure metrics are capturing AI-based positions marked below $0.75 on the dollar, how are you trying to really express true exposure for mark-to-market risk in the next couple of quarters.

不過，如果你們對外揭露的不計息曝險指標，已經涵蓋那些與AI相關、按每1美元低於0.75美元計價的部位，那你們打算如何更真實地呈現未來幾季的按市價評價（mark-to-market）風險曝險？

I was following you until the very end when the question, the actual question came out there. Not sure exactly the point of the question. I get the one thing I'll say, and then maybe I'll have you rephrase it is, obviously, in volatile markets like we're in today, we see more dispersion of valuations and marks. And we see what the broadly syndicated market is doing to a bunch of names in the software space.

我一直聽得懂你在說什麼，直到最後你把問題本身問出來那一刻。我不太確定問題的重點是什麼。我理解——我先說一點，然後也許你可以再換個方式問：很顯然，在像我們今天所處這種波動較大的市場裡，我們會看到估值與評價（marks）更分歧。我們也看到廣泛聯貸市場（broadly syndicated market）對軟體領域一堆名稱的處理方式。

And so that is going to be reflected in our remarks. We have to mark our portfolio based on where the comps and the market is saying, these debt positions are, should be valued. That is, that mark is independent of our analysis of whether the loan is covered by enterprise value and whether we deem the principal and interest collectible. And so there certainly could be in a more volatile market, loan valuations that trend lower but where we still feel that the principal and interest is collectible because we're covered by enterprise value.

因此，這將反映在我們的發言中。我們必須依據可比交易與市場對這些債務部位應該如何估值的指示，來對我們的投資組合進行估值標記。也就是說，這個估值標記獨立於我們對該筆貸款是否由企業價值所覆蓋、以及我們是否認定本金與利息可收回的分析。因此，在更為波動的市場中，確實可能出現貸款估值走低的情況，但我們仍然認為本金與利息可收回，因為我們有企業價值作為覆蓋。

And my guess is that, that would apply to the names that you're fighting, again, without getting into individual name discussions. So I don't know if that was specifically what you were asking, but I want to make sure that point does come across clearly.

我猜這也適用於你正在關切的那些名稱，再次強調，我不會進入個別名稱的討論。所以我不確定這是否正是你在問的，但我想確保這一點能夠清楚傳達。

Right. So to refine the question, if you're having a position with an exposure of $350 million at cost, right, and you're having a $50 million difference quarter over quarter. 25% of the marks at debt, you're, like it's not calling out the full risk to that name

對。所以為了更精準地問，如果你有一個部位以成本計的曝險是3.5億美元，對吧，而你有一個季度對季度的差異是5,000萬美元。債務端的估值標記有25%，你會覺得這並沒有把該名稱的全部風險點出來。

It's price, it's valuing the loan at the level that the market today is pricing that loan at. So that's a fair value market. It is reflected in our NAV, which these markdowns this quarter is why we saw NAV decline this quarter for the first time in a pretty long time here at its capital.

這是價格問題，是把該筆貸款按市場今天對這筆貸款的定價水準來估值。所以那是一個公允價值的市場價格。它反映在我們的NAV中，而本季的這些減記正是我們在Ares Capital這裡相當長一段時間以來首次看到NAV下滑的原因。

So it's reflected in the NAV. It's reflected in the marks. It is not, if we still deem that were covered by enterprise value, it is not reflected in the nonaccruals. Because I think the point that you're making and that is accurate. We reflected in the nonaccruals when we believe there is risk of impairment and that the full interest and principal is not collectible

所以它反映在NAV裡，也反映在估值標記裡。如果我們仍然認定有企業價值覆蓋，那它就不會反映在不計息（nonaccruals）上。因為我認為你提出的點是正確的：當我們相信存在減損風險、且全部利息與本金不可收回時，我們才會把它反映在不計息上。

Okay, perfect. I appreciate the color. Thank you.

好的，完美。我很感謝這些補充說明。謝謝。

Peter Troisi, Barclays.

Peter Troisi，Barclays。

Hi, thanks for taking the question, And I appreciate all the comments on the -- on funding on the call so far. I'm just wondering if you could talk a little bit more about the mix of funding. Just looking at the ratio of unsecured debt to total debt has been gradually declining over the past few quarters and ended March at about 59% and obviously secured funding is always going to be cheaper for you, especially now given where BDC unsecured spreads are generally, but wondering if you had a target for the ratio of unsecured debt to total debt or maybe even to total assets and where we could expect that ratio to go over the next few quarters?

嗨，謝謝讓我提問，也感謝你們到目前為止在電話會議上對融資的所有評論。我想再多問一點關於融資組合的配置。從無擔保債務占總債務的比率來看，過去幾季逐步下降，3月底約為59%。顯然，有擔保融資對你們來說通常會更便宜，尤其是在目前BDC無擔保利差普遍所處的水準下。但我想問，你們對無擔保債務占總債務（或甚至占總資產）的比率是否有目標？以及未來幾季我們可以預期這個比率會往哪個方向走？

Sure. Peter, thanks for the question. I think we certainly have run at fairly high levels of funded unsecured debt in the past. I think even at the current level, you site, it's still pretty healthy and relative to the rest of the sector.

當然。Peter，謝謝你的問題。我們過去確實曾在相當高的無擔保融資債務水準下運作。我認為即便在你提到的目前水準，仍然相當健康，且相較於同業也算不錯。

Certainly, early part of this year, post our deal, the spreads gapped out quite a bit in the unsecured market and we're fairly unattractive. Let's say, the past two weeks have been very productive. So certainly makes it a little better. But I think the point is we have a fair amount of liquidity on hand, and we like doing that on purpose to make sure we can be very opportunistic about our issuances.

當然，今年年初在我們完成交易之後，無擔保市場的利差大幅拉開，對我們而言相當不具吸引力。可以說，過去兩週非常有成果，確實讓情況好一些。但重點是，我們手上有相當多的流動性，而我們刻意維持這樣的狀態，以確保我們在發行時能非常機動、把握機會。

So yeah, I think the way we look at it is that we've got to still do no issuance for the rest of the year and we know you have a maturity coming up, still puts us at majority funded and unsecured. So probably our target is to make sure that a majority of our funded debt is unsecured. So it does, I think some room to go there. But certainly, it's a more productive market than it has been.

所以，是的，我們的看法是：即使今年剩下的時間完全不再發行，而且我們也知道還有一筆到期在前方，我們仍會維持以無擔保為主的融資結構。因此我們的目標大概是確保我們已融資的債務中，多數是無擔保。也就是說，這方面我認為仍有一些調整空間。但可以確定的是，市場比之前更具建設性。

Okay. Thanks very much.

好的，非常感謝。

Casey Alexander, Compass Point.

Casey Alexander，Compass Point。

Good afternoon. I want to badge of honor for being the last question on the longest quarterly conference call in Ares Capital history. And I do have two. First one is, in the last six years, we've heard multiple periods where all of a sudden spreads widen out, and it looked like it was going to be durable in better terms and better documentation.

各位下午好。我想把「榮譽徽章」頒給自己，因為我是Ares Capital史上最長季度電話會議的最後一個提問者。而且我有兩個問題。第一個是，在過去六年裡，我們聽過好幾次，利差突然擴大，看起來會在更好的條款與更好的文件條件下持續一段時間。

And then just immediately, almost immediately competition came in and slammed the right back to where they were. So why should we believe that this cycle is different and that wider spreads and better terms can be a little bit more durable?

但接著幾乎立刻，競爭就進來把利差又壓回原來的水準。所以我們為什麼要相信這一輪會不一樣，利差擴大與更好的條款能更持久一些？

Jim and I can maybe tag team on that answer, Casey. I don't know that we're actually sitting here saying, pounding our chest saying that anybody should expect it to be more durable than in past cycles. I think we're just saying we're seeing it widen.

Casey，Jim和我也許可以一起回答。我不確定我們是否真的坐在這裡拍胸脯說，大家應該預期它會比過去循環更持久。我想我們只是說，我們看到利差正在擴大。

We are watching the factors as to what's creating the widening, which we talked about before. I think both flows within private credit and maybe risk premiums in the market. I think the other thing I should say is banks, bank behavior is also driving the widening, and we're seeing banks be less risk on in terms of new commitments.

我們正在觀察造成利差擴大的因素，我們之前也談過。我認為包括私人信貸內部的資金流向，以及市場中的風險溢酬。還有一點我應該補充的是，銀行的行為也在推動利差擴大，我們看到銀行在新增承諾方面變得更不願意承擔風險。

We've seen the broadly syndicated market widen out as well in terms of their implied spreads and the pricing in that market. So there's lots of different things they're creating it. Every period is different. I mean we did see wider spreads be pretty darn sustained when they started to wind down in mid-2022.

我們也看到廣泛聯貸市場在其隱含利差與該市場定價方面同樣走寬。所以有很多不同因素在促成這件事。每一段時期都不一樣。我的意思是，我們確實在2022年年中開始走弱時看到利差擴大相當持續。

And that lasted for 18 to 24 months. We saw spreads peak out at 650 to 700 and fees were 2 to 2.5 points, and that was pretty well sustained. If you're referring to. Yeah, look, last year, the tariff taxing period, obviously, we garnered some premium economics through that.

而且那持續了18到24個月。我們看到利差在650到700的水準見頂，費用是2到2.5個點，且相當程度上維持住了。如果你指的是這個。是的，看看，去年那段關稅「課稅」時期，很明顯我們從中取得了一些溢價的經濟條件。

Right through the teeth of that period when everything was extremely uncertain and then things changed immediately when our government decided to do their announcement and things were right back on track. So really hard to predict, and I don't think we are actually predicting whether it's going to be sustained or not, I think time will tell.

就在那段一切都極度不確定的時期最激烈的時候，然後當政府做出公告後，情勢立刻改變，一切又回到正軌。所以真的很難預測，而我不認為我們其實在預測它是否會持續；我想時間會告訴我們。

Okay, thanks for that. And my follow-on is Pluralsight, which you were involved in Medallia, which are not involved two of the highest profile sponsors within the space. and two very large deals. And I'm just curious, internally, how has that impacted your thinking in terms of sponsor selection and also sizing of investments going forward.

好的，謝謝。我的追問是Pluralsight（你們有參與）以及Medallia（你們沒有參與），這兩筆都是該領域中最具代表性的贊助商之一所主導、而且是兩筆非常大的交易。我很好奇，在內部，這對你們未來在贊助商選擇以及投資部位規模配置方面的思考，有什麼影響？

I think we have good relationships with both of those sponsors. I would say on Pluralsight, the way that, that deal resulted itself with the sponsor worked consensually with us to effectuate a restructuring and hand over the keys to the lender group.

我認為我們與這兩家贊助商都有良好的關係。就Pluralsight而言，該交易最後的結果是，贊助商與我們以共識方式合作，促成重整，並把控制權交給貸款人團體。

We were not the lead in that lender group. We didn't need those negotiations. We were a smaller holder but they certainly behaved ultimately in the way that, obviously, we would have liked to see them support the company with capital. But they did work consensually with us.

我們不是那個貸款人團體的主導方。我們不需要主導那些談判。我們是較小的持有人，但他們最終的行為確實是以我們能接受的方式進行；當然，我們原本會希望他們以資金支持公司，但他們確實與我們以共識方式合作。

And I don't think it's materially changing our view of whether we want to work with those sponsors or not. Not every deal is going to go on to plan. And we didn't really, again, we didn't see any sort of nefarious behavior on the part of those sponsors.

我不認為這會實質改變我們是否想與那些贊助商合作的看法。不是每一筆交易都會按計畫發展。而且我們也沒有看到那些贊助商有任何惡意行為。

All right, thank you for taking my questions.

好的，謝謝你回答我的問題。

(Operator Instructions)

（接線員指示）

Robert Dodd, Raymond James.

Robert Dodd，Raymond James。

Thank you for taking the question, and sorry, Casey, but I guess, I'm after you. A question on the management consultant hiring them, and I apologize for the back Less about the output and more about the why. I mean to your point, a year ago, there was the tariff tantrum, et cetera, and you didn't have a consultant at that point to evaluate embedded tariff risk in the portfolio or anything like that.

謝謝讓我提問，也抱歉，Casey，但我想我是在你之後。關於聘請管理顧問這件事，我想問一個問題，也為我回頭追問致歉：我關心的比較不是產出，而是為什麼。我的意思是，照你們的說法，一年前有關稅恐慌等等，當時你們並沒有顧問來評估投資組合中隱含的關稅風險或類似事項。

You did it in-house with your in-house expertise, et cetera. So my question is, is it feels different this time, right? You've hired a consultant who might be agreeing with what you said, but was there a level of complexity increase and uncertainty about the capabilities of the in-house expertise or what motivated the decision to bring in that third party when that's not typically been the patent in the past when there's been some theme, be it tariffs or something else?

你們是用內部團隊與內部專業來做的等等。所以我的問題是：這次感覺不一樣，對吧？你們聘請了一位顧問，他可能會同意你們所說的，但是否是因為複雜度提高、或對內部專業能力的不確定性增加？或者是什麼因素促使你們決定引入第三方——因為過去在出現某個主題時，不論是關稅或其他，你們通常並沒有這樣做？

Yeah, I love the question. So with tariffs, it's a math-based equation pretty much, and we were able to pretty quickly speak to all of our portfolio companies, asked them to break down their cost of goods sold from not all of our portfolio companies, but the ones that actually import products and break down the cost of goods sold and do a quick analysis as to the impact based on various tariff rates and come up with an exposure.

是的，我很喜歡這個問題。關於關稅，基本上幾乎是一個以數學為基礎的方程式；我們很快就能與我們的投資組合公司溝通，請他們（不是所有投資組合公司，而是那些實際進口產品的公司）拆解其銷貨成本，並針對不同的關稅稅率做快速分析，評估影響並得出曝險程度。

And we put that number out with a clear explanation of how we did it. And people seem satisfied and agreed with the analysis. And by the way, then the tariff thing went away, like we said in the prior quarter. This is a much more complicated situation. It's becoming apparent to us.

我們把那個數字公布出來，並清楚說明我們是如何計算的。大家似乎都滿意，也同意這個分析。順帶一提，正如我們在上一季所說，關稅這件事後來就淡掉了。這次的情況要複雜得多，而且我們也越來越明顯地感受到這一點。

And it's not exactly numbers based is what I would say. Because the numbers continue to be very, very strong in the software portfolio and yet the concern really from the outside world, not from the inside world, continues to be present. Even as we continue to talk about why we feel good about the software portfolio and the underwriting we've done.

而且我會說，這不完全是以數字為基礎的問題。因為軟體投資組合的數字仍然非常、非常強勁，但真正的擔憂其實是來自外部世界，而不是內部世界，這種擔憂仍然存在。即便我們持續說明為什麼我們對軟體投資組合以及我們所做的承作審查（underwriting）感到有信心。

And I guess I'll just remind people a couple of things. So first, two years ago, right around now, we had a public Investor Day in New York and by anybody who wanted to show up and we had a whole slide we had on AI risk and how it might impact the software business and how we felt good about our underwriting and how we've always underwritten again, mitigating against technology risk. That was two years ago. And that wasn't even the beginning of when we started thinking about that topic.

我想我就提醒大家幾件事。首先，兩年前，大概就在這個時候，我們在紐約舉辦了一場公開的投資人日，任何想來的人都可以參加；我們當時有一整張投影片談到 AI 風險、它可能如何影響軟體業務，以及為什麼我們對我們的承作審查有信心，並且我們一直以來都是在承作時納入對科技風險的緩解。那是兩年前。而且那甚至不是我們開始思考這個議題的起點。

And as we said in the prepared remarks, it was middle of last year that we started to think about bringing in a consultant because we just felt like as we kept talking about the underwriting we've done in the mitigants, the fact that it wasn't a map-based equation and the fact that everybody was looking forward and not backward meant that we should probably bring in a third party to help us validate our opinions.

而且正如我們在事先準備的發言中所說，從去年年中開始，我們就開始思考要引入顧問，因為我們覺得，當我們不斷談到我們做過的承作審查與各項緩解措施時，由於這不是一個以數學公式就能描述的方程式，加上大家看的都是未來而不是過去，這意味著我們可能應該引入第三方來協助驗證我們的觀點。

And obviously, we feel good about our opinions, but like any, I think, prudent investment manager, you want to test your own thesis. And you want to figure out, do we have some bias potentially because we are the ones that have been underwriting this portfolio, and we wanted to bring in a third party not only just to help satisfy the external world, but also to test around thesis.

當然，我們對自己的觀點有信心，但我想任何審慎的投資管理人都會希望檢驗自己的論點。你會想弄清楚：我們是否可能因為自己就是承作這個投資組合的人而產生某些偏誤？因此我們想引入第三方，不僅是為了讓外部世界更安心，同時也是為了檢驗我們的論點。

And we started viewing those parties and decided on the consultant at the end of last year, we actually had in our prepared remarks in the October earnings call, a lot of comments about AI. Again, that didn't seem to satisfy people because in February, it seemed like the world woke up and everybody thought all of a sudden, there was going to be massive explosions in software in private credit portfolio.

我們開始評估這些機構，並在去年年底選定了顧問。其實在 10 月的財報電話會議、我們的事先準備發言中，就已經有很多關於 AI 的評論。再次強調，那似乎仍未能讓大家滿意，因為到了 2 月，彷彿全世界突然醒來，大家一下子都認為私募信貸投資組合中的軟體領域會出現大規模的爆發式變化。

So I think just the continued concern by the external world, the lack of math-based formulas and the desire to test our own thesis were the reasons why we went and did it this time. And hopefully, it's helping give people a little more color around the situation.

所以我認為，外部世界持續的擔憂、缺乏以數學為基礎的公式，以及我們想檢驗自身論點的需求，就是我們這次去做這件事的原因。希望這能幫助大家對這個情況有更多的脈絡與理解。

And maybe clarify, if you don't mind, I'm just going to clarify a little, maybe just the response a little bit. We often engage third parties to help us evaluate transactions, right, and sectors and white paper, new spaces, and we utilize third-party work from consultants like this as part of our diligence, as part of our ongoing review of portfolio companies, too.

另外如果你不介意，我想再補充澄清一下，可能把回應再說得更清楚一些。我們經常聘請第三方來協助我們評估交易，對吧？也包括產業、白皮書、新領域；我們也會把像這樣顧問的第三方研究，作為我們盡職調查的一部分，也作為我們對投資組合公司持續檢視的一部分。

So that's not, that part of it is not new. I think what, the scale of this and maybe the disclosure or the outbound to the community is what's new here. But I do think we, this is a part of our work in a regular way, too. So it's a combination of the circumstances correlate out. And just this is a good practice for us and we do it often.

所以那一部分並不新。我想新的地方在於規模，或許還有揭露方式、以及對外向社群溝通的程度。但我確實認為，這也是我們日常工作的一部分。因此這是多種情況交織下的結果；而且這對我們來說是良好的作法，我們也經常這麼做。

Got it. Thank you. Yeah. I can understand as part of the process. It's not normally a footnote in the presentation . On the, kind of a follow-up sort of related. I mean, you said the medium risk assets have about 2.4%. I think 2.5-year maturity left I mean from the review, did you get a takeaway on like what's the time line for these AI risks?

了解，謝謝。是的，我能理解這是流程的一部分；只是通常不會在簡報裡以註腳的形式出現。接著有個算是相關的追問：你提到中度風險資產大約是 2.4%（我想是 2.4 年的剩餘到期年限？或 2.5 年？）。從這次檢視中，你們有沒有得到一些結論，例如這些 AI 風險的時間軸大概是什麼？

If they happen, right? If a medium business does get impacted and it's in the next nine months than the maturity being a year, plus a lot further out is one thing. If it's five-year horizons, then most of these assets are going to be matured and possibly gone before it ever becomes an issue. So can you give us any color on like what the outputs were on like where the maturities are versus what time horizon the risks actually really exist on.

如果它真的發生，對吧？如果某個中度風險的企業會受到影響，而且是在接下來九個月內，那麼到期年限是一年、或更久就是一回事；但如果是五年的時間跨度，那麼這些資產大多在問題真正出現之前就已到期，甚至可能已經退出。所以你能否提供一些資訊：例如到期結構相對於風險實際存在的時間跨度，研究輸出大概是怎麼說的？

Yeah. It's a good question, Robert. I guess the more detail, the more facts we disclosed, the more questions that come up when you talk about the 2.4-year maturity. There was not really a strong part of the study or conclusion that delved into the amount of time that it would take it, I'm sure, obviously, that's very company-specific and not something that can necessarily be calculated.

是的，這是個好問題，Robert。我想，披露越多細節、越多事實，當你談到 2.4 年到期時，就會引出更多問題。這份研究或結論並沒有特別深入探討「需要多久時間才會發生」這件事；我想很顯然那會非常因公司而異，也不一定能被量化計算。

Again, this is a very complex topic. And I think it's a great question, but not something that I'm really in a position to answer other than to say that the consultants did report, I already said it once, but I'll say it again, the medium risk company, they felt the medium-risk companies in our portfolio do have ample time to execute on their own AI strategy in order to avoid being disrupted. So that was the specific commentary, but I didn't really talk about the actual specific length of time.

再次強調，這是一個非常複雜的議題。我認為這是個很好的問題，但我目前不太能回答得更具體；我只能說，顧問確實有提到——我之前說過一次，但我再說一次——他們認為我們投資組合中的中度風險公司，擁有充足的時間去執行自身的 AI 策略，以避免被顛覆。這是他們的具體評論，但並沒有談到實際的具體時間長度。

Got it. Thank you.

了解，謝謝。

Thank you. And ladies and gentlemen, this does conclude our question-and-answer session. I would like to turn the conference back over to Mr. Kort Schnabel for any closing remarks.

謝謝各位。各位女士、先生，我們的問答環節到此結束。接下來我想把會議交回給 Kort Schnabel 先生，請他做任何結語。

Great. No closing remarks. Thanks, everybody, for joining today and for your support and engagement, and we look forward to connecting with you on our next quarterly call.

很好，沒有結語。謝謝大家今天參與，也謝謝各位的支持與互動；我們期待在下一次季度電話會議再與各位聯繫。

Thank you, Mr. Schabel. Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes our conference call for today. If you missed any part of today's call play of the call will be available approximately 1 hour after the end of today's call through May 28, 2026 at 5:00 PM Eastern Time.

謝謝您，Schabel 先生。各位女士、先生，今天的電話會議到此結束。如果您錯過了今天會議的任何部分，會議重播將在今天會議結束後約 1 小時提供，並可一路收聽至 2026 年 5 月 28 日美東時間下午 5:00。

You can access the replay for domestic callers by dialing 1 (800) 727-6189 and international callers 1 (402) 220-2671. An archived replay will also be available on a webcast link located on the homepage of the Investor Resources section of Ares Capital website. Again, thanks for joining us, everyone, and we wish you all a great day.

美國境內來電者可撥打 1 (800) 727-6189 收聽重播，國際來電者請撥 1 (402) 220-2671。網站存檔重播也將透過 Ares Capital 官網「投資人資源」專區首頁上的網路直播連結提供。再次感謝各位的參與，祝大家有美好的一天。