Arbor Realty Trust Inc (ABR) 2023 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the First Quarter 2023 Arbor Realty Trust Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded. (Operator Instructions) I would now like to turn the call over to your speaker today, Paul Elenio, Chief Financial Officer. Please go ahead.

女士們先生們，早上好，歡迎參加 2023 年第一季度 Arbor Realty Trust 收益電話會議。 （操作員說明）請注意，今天的會議正在錄製中。 （操作員說明）我現在想把電話轉給您今天的發言人，首席財務官 Paul Elenio。請繼續。

Okay. Thank you, Britney. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the quarterly earnings call for Arbor Realty Trust. This morning, we'll discuss the results for the quarter ended March 31, 2023. With me on the call today is Ivan Kaufman, our President and Chief Executive Officer. Before we begin, I need to inform these statements made in this earnings call may be deemed forward-looking statements that are subject to risks and uncertainties, including information about possible or assumed future results of our business, financial conditions, liquidity, results of operations, plans and objectives.

好的。謝謝你，布蘭妮。大家早上好，歡迎來到 Arbor Realty Trust 的季度收益電話會議。今天上午，我們將討論截至 2023 年 3 月 31 日的季度業績。今天與我通話的是我們的總裁兼首席執行官伊万考夫曼。在我們開始之前，我需要告知在本次財報電話會議中所做的這些陳述可能被視為受風險和不確定因素影響的前瞻性陳述，包括有關我們業務可能或假設的未來結果、財務狀況、流動性、經營結果的信息、計劃和目標。

These statements are based on our beliefs, assumptions and expectations of our future performance, taking into account the information currently available to us. Factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from Arbor's expectations in these forward-looking statements are detailed in our SEC reports.

這些陳述基於我們對未來業績的信念、假設和預期，並考慮了我們目前可獲得的信息。可能導致實際結果與 Arbor 在這些前瞻性陳述中的預期存在重大差異的因素在我們的 SEC 報告中有詳細說明。

Listeners are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of today. Arbor undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise these forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after today or the occurrences of unanticipated events. I'll now turn the call over to Arbor's President and CEO, Ivan Kaufman.

告誡聽眾不要過分依賴這些前瞻性陳述，這些陳述僅在今天發表。 Arbor 沒有義務公開更新或修改這些前瞻性陳述以反映今天之後的事件或情況或意外事件的發生。我現在將電話轉給 Arbor 的總裁兼首席執行官 Ivan Kaufman。

Thank you, Paul, and thanks to everyone for joining us on today's call. After coming off our best year as a public company in 2022, we've had a tremendous start to 2023 with another exemplary quarter, and our diverse business model continues to offer many significant advantages over everyone else in our peer group. We have a premium operating platform with multiple products that generate many counter-cyclical [financial] income streams, allowing us to consistently produce earnings well in excess of our dividend.

謝謝你，保羅，感謝大家參加今天的電話會議。在 2022 年作為一家上市公司度過了最好的一年之後，我們在 2023 年有了一個出色的開端，又是一個堪稱典範的季度，而且我們多元化的商業模式繼續提供許多優於我們同行中其他公司的顯著優勢。我們有一個優質的運營平台，擁有多種產品，可以產生許多反週期的[金融]收入流，使我們能夠持續產生遠遠超過股息的收益。

This has allowed us to increase our dividend another 5% or $0.02 a share to $0.43, reflecting our 11th increase in the last 13 quarters or 40% growth over that time period, all while maintaining the lowest payout ratio in the industry, which was 68% for the first quarter.

這使我們能夠將股息再增加 5% 或每股 0.02 美元至 0.43 美元，這反映了我們在過去 13 個季度中的第 11 次增長或在此期間增長了 40%，同時保持了業內最低的派息率，即 68第一季度的百分比。

Our performance continues to be head and shoulders above everyone else in our peer group. None of which have been able to increase their dividend at all in the last few years. In fact, several of our peers continue to cut their dividend in this market, while others are paying dividends of over 100% of their earnings.

我們的表現繼續領先於同行中的其他所有人。在過去的幾年裡，它們都無法增加股息。事實上，我們的一些同行繼續削減他們在這個市場上的股息，而其他人則支付超過其收益 100% 的股息。

Additionally and very significantly, we've grown our book value per share by 45% over the last 3 years from just under $9 a share to almost $13 a share, even with 11 dividend increases during that period, while many of our peer groups have not grown their book value at all, despite cutting their dividends or best only keeping their dividends flat.

此外，非常重要的是，在過去 3 年中，我們的每股賬面價值從略低於 9 美元增長到每股近 13 美元，即使在此期間增加了 11 次股息，而我們的許多同行集團儘管削減了股息或最好只保持股息持平，但賬面價值根本沒有增加。

Yet we still trade at similar dividend yields and price to book values as the rest of the space, despite our unquestionable outperformance, which is why we strongly believe we are completely undervalued and there has never been a better time to make a significant investment in our company.

然而，儘管我們的表現不容置疑，但我們仍然以與其他領域相似的股息收益率和賬面價值進行交易，這就是為什麼我們堅信我們被完全低估了，現在是對我們的重大投資進行重大投資的最佳時機公司。

As we discussed on our last earnings call, we have been laser focused over the last 18 months and prepare for what we felt would be a very challenging recessionary environment. Currently, we have all seen the negative pressure on the financial markets, banking industry and real estate sector, which has created additional uncertainty and volatility in the market. We are operating our business with expectation that this environment will persist for some time. And a result, we are very pleased on how well positioned we are as a firm to take advantage of what we believe will be accretive opportunities to go on a premium yield on our capital.

正如我們在上次財報電話會議上討論的那樣，我們在過去 18 個月中一直高度關注並為我們認為極具挑戰性的衰退環境做好準備。當前，我們都看到了金融市場、銀行業和房地產業的負面壓力，這增加了市場的不確定性和波動性。我們正在經營我們的業務，期望這種環境會持續一段時間。結果，我們很高興我們作為一家公司處於多麼有利的地位，可以利用我們認為將增加資本收益的機會。

We have taken a patient and selective approach to new investments and have been heavily focused on preserving and building up a strong liquidity position. This has allowed us to accumulate approximately $900 million of cash and liquidity on hand, which again provides us with the unique ability to remain offensive. I always said there are tremendous opportunities in down markets to make a significant return on your capital if properly positioned.

我們對新投資採取了耐心和有選擇性的方法，並一直專注於保持和建立強大的流動性頭寸。這使我們手頭積累了大約 9 億美元的現金和流動資金，這再次為我們提供了保持進攻性的獨特能力。我總是說，如果定位正確，在低迷的市場中有巨大的機會可以使您的資本獲得可觀的回報。

One of the best opportunities we have seen in recent months is the ability to repurchase our stock at significant discounts to book value and generate high double-digit returns on our capital. We repurchased approximately $37 million of stock at an average price of $10.53, which is a 17% discount to our book value and generates a current dividend yield of 16% and a yield of approximately 20% on our distributable earnings. This is a tremendous return on our capital. And again, it's something we are able to take advantage of how well positioned our firm is to be opportunistic in a volatile environment.

我們最近幾個月看到的最佳機會之一是能夠以低於賬面價值的大幅折扣回購我們的股票，並為我們的資本帶來兩位數的高回報。我們以平均 10.53 美元的價格回購了約 3700 萬美元的股票，這比我們的賬面價值低 17%，當前股息收益率為 16%，可分配收益的收益率約為 20%。這是我們資本的巨大回報。再一次，這是我們能夠利用我們公司在動盪環境中投機取巧的優勢。

We have also a best-in-class dedicated asset management team with tremendous expertise and loan works out and debt restructuring, which is something that is a key part of our business model, extremely valuable and unique throughout platform. A lot of misinformation has been published lately by a group of loans, totaling $229 million that we had in Houston, Texas. In order to exercise our remedies, we proceeded to foreclose on these assets and [went ahead with] one of the existing investors who was deeply committed to the project, recapitalize and restructure the debt with the appropriate guarantees, putting our loans in a much more favorably protected position.

我們還擁有一流的專業資產管理團隊，擁有豐富的專業知識和貸款工作以及債務重組，這是我們商業模式的關鍵部分，在整個平台上極具價值和獨特性。一組貸款最近發布了很多錯誤信息，我們在德克薩斯州休斯敦的貸款總額為 2.29 億美元。為了行使我們的補救措施，我們著手取消這些資產的抵押品贖回權，並 [繼續] 一位對項目有堅定承諾的現有投資者，通過適當的擔保對債務進行資本重組和重組，使我們的貸款投入更多有利的保護地位。

We recorded no loss on the original debt and recovered all the outstanding interest owed to us as part of the restructuring. This was an extraordinary successful debt restructuring, which clearly demonstrates the incredible depth and experience of our asset management payment. Unlike all those in this space, we've been conducting ourselves as that we've been in a recession for the last 4 quarters. And although we believe the bottom is near, we are well aware of the challenges that lie ahead. We feel we are (inaudible) doing an outstanding job in managing through this dislocation between our multifamily-centric portfolio, the quality and structure of our loans, our asset management skill set and tenured senior management team and a track record of managing through multiple cycles and the strength of our balance sheet and the versatility of our franchise.

作為重組的一部分，我們沒有記錄原始債務的損失，並收回了欠我們的所有未償利息。這是一次非常成功的債務重組，清楚地表明了我們資產管理支付的令人難以置信的深度和經驗。與這個領域的所有人不同，我們一直在表現自己，因為我們在過去 4 個季度一直處於衰退之中。儘管我們相信底部已經臨近，但我們也很清楚前方的挑戰。我們覺得我們（聽不清）在管理我們以多家庭為中心的投資組合、我們貸款的質量和結構、我們的資產管理技能組合和終身高級管理團隊以及通過多個週期進行管理的記錄之間的錯位方面做得非常出色以及我們資產負債表的實力和我們特許經營權的多功能性。

Before I talk about the first quarter results and highlights, I want to take a few minutes to address a significant amount of false and misleading information that has been recently published about our company to a short seller report. The report is replete with factual misstatements, all of the (inaudible) false information and (inaudible) that is cloaked in the form of an opinion and a transparent attempt to mislead the investing public.

在我談論第一季度的業績和亮點之前，我想花幾分鐘時間來解決最近發布的關於我們公司的大量虛假和誤導性信息。該報告充斥著事實性的錯誤陳述、所有（聽不清）虛假信息和（聽不清）以意見形式掩蓋的信息，以及企圖誤導投資大眾的透明嘗試。

It is clear to us and to be clear -- equally clear to everyone who has been diligently following the progress of our company for more than a decade that the report was written by somebody who apparently need to understand our business. No one has a sense of appropriate accounting treatment for certain transactions and who's motivated solely to profit on this short position through the dissemination of false and misleading information. While we will not go through a back and forth and every false and misleading allegations by the so-called research company. It should be obvious to everyone at this point that the reports and attempt to capitalize on fear instead of rational thought and what is so ironic is that they took one of the most successfully restructured transaction in our history that was highly lucrative to our shareholders and to try to turn it into a negative.

我們很清楚，也很清楚——對於十多年來一直勤奮關注我們公司進展的每個人來說，同樣清楚的是，這份報告是由顯然需要了解我們業務的人撰寫的。沒有人意識到某些交易的適當會計處理，也沒有人只想通過傳播虛假和誤導性信息從空頭頭寸中獲利。雖然我們不會經歷所謂的研究公司的來回和每一個虛假和誤導性指控。在這一點上，每個人都應該清楚，這些報告和企圖利用恐懼而不是理性思考，具有諷刺意味的是，他們進行了我們歷史上最成功的重組交易之一，這對我們的股東來說是非常有利可圖的，並且試著把它變成負面的。

Most importantly, we have reaffirmed with our auditors that all are accounting for the period in question is correct as evidenced by the filing of this morning of our first quarter 10-Q with no material changes. I urge our shareholders and the investment public to pay no attention to this noise that is clearly coming from biased source lacking incredibility and instead of focusing on fundamentals of our business, our tremendous operating results and in fact we are a leader in our space and continue to massively outperform our peers.

最重要的是，我們已與我們的審計師重申，所有對相關期間的會計處理都是正確的，今天上午提交的第一季度 10-Q 報告證明沒有任何重大變化。我敦促我們的股東和投資大眾不要關注這種顯然來自缺乏可信度的偏見來源的噪音，而不是關注我們業務的基本面、我們巨大的經營業績，事實上我們是我們領域的領導者，並繼續大大超越我們的同行。

Turning now to our first quarter performance. As Paul will discuss in more detail, our quarterly financial results were once again remarkable. We produced distributable earnings of $0.62 per share, which is well in excess of our current dividend, representing a payout ratio of around 68%. And clearly, with our extremely low payout ratio and multiple predictable reoccurring income streams, we are uniquely positioned as one of the only company in our space with a very sustainable protected dividend, even in this challenging environment.

現在轉向我們的第一季度業績。正如保羅將更詳細地討論的那樣，我們的季度財務業績再次引人注目。我們產生了每股 0.62 美元的可分配收益，遠遠超過了我們目前的股息，派息率約為 68%。顯然，憑藉我們極低的派息率和多個可預測的經常性收入來源，即使在這個充滿挑戰的環境中，我們也是我們所在領域唯一一家擁有非常可持續的受保護股息的公司之一。

In our balance sheet lending business, we continue to be very selective, focusing mainly on converting our bridge loans into agency product, allowing us to recapture a substantial amount of our invested capital and produce significant long-dated income streams. In the first quarter, we had a tremendous success in this area with another $1 billion of balance sheet runoff over $400 million of which was recaptured to new Agency loan originations.

在我們的資產負債表貸款業務中，我們繼續非常有選擇性，主要側重於將我們的過橋貸款轉換為代理產品，使我們能夠收回大量投資資本並產生可觀的長期收入流。第一季度，我們在這一領域取得了巨大成功，資產負債表又縮減了 10 億美元，其中超過 4 億美元重新用於新的機構貸款發放。

As a result, we're able to recoup $200 million of our invested capital and continue to build up our cash position to take advantage of the many opportunities we believe will exist in this downturn to generate outsized returns on our capital. And this strategy is a critical part of our business model and is unique to our platform, and we are both a top balance sheet lender and operate a very large agency business.

因此，我們能夠收回 2 億美元的投資資本，並繼續建立我們的現金頭寸，以利用我們認為在這次低迷時期將存在的許多機會來產生超額資本回報。而這一戰略是我們商業模式的關鍵部分，也是我們平台所獨有的，我們既是資產負債表最高的貸款人，又經營著非常龐大的代理業務。

In our GSE/Agency business, we had a strong first quarter originating $1.1 billion of loans, capped off by a very strong launch with over $530 million in originations. And with the current yield curve, and very little activity in the market for balance sheet lending. we are seeing a significant increase in our Agency pipeline, giving us confidence in our ability to continue to produce very strong Agency volumes going forward.

在我們的 GSE/Agency 業務中，我們第一季度發放了 11 億美元的貸款，表現強勁，並以超過 5.3 億美元的發放量非常強勁地推出而告終。根據目前的收益率曲線，資產負債表貸款市場活動很少。我們看到我們的 Agency 管道顯著增加，使我們相信我們有能力繼續產生非常強勁的 Agency 數量。

Additionally, we have a strategic advantage and that we focus on workforce housing part of the market and have a large multifamily balance sheet loan book that actually feeds our Agency business. In fact, we are one of the leading Agency lenders in the achievement of affordable housing goals. As a result, we continue to be viewed very favorable by the agencies. And again, this Agency business offers a premium value as it requires limited capital, generates significant long-dated particular loan constraints and producing significant annual cash flow.

此外，我們具有戰略優勢，我們專注於市場的勞動力住房部分，並擁有大量多戶資產負債表貸款簿，實際上為我們的代理業務提供支持。事實上，我們是實現經濟適用房目標的主要機構貸款人之一。因此，我們繼續受到各機構的青睞。同樣，該代理業務提供了溢價，因為它需要有限的資本，產生大量的長期特定貸款限制，並產生大量的年度現金流。

To this point, our $29 billion fee-based servicing portfolio, which grew 3% in the first quarter, generates approximately $117 million a year in reoccurring cash flow. We also see a significant increase in earnings on our escrows and cash balances as rates have risen conceivably, which, in fact, has a natural hedge against interest rates. In fact, we are now earning approximately 4% and around $2.8 billion of balances or roughly $100 million annually, which combined with our servicing income annuity, totaled over $217 million of annual cash flow or over $1 a share.

到目前為止，我們 290 億美元的收費服務組合在第一季度增長了 3%，每年產生約 1.17 億美元的經常性現金流。我們還看到我們託管和現金餘額的收益顯著增加，因為利率可以想像地上升，事實上，這對利率有自然的對沖。事實上，我們現在的收入約為 4%，餘額約為 28 億美元，即每年約 1 億美元，加上我們的服務收入年金，年度現金流總額超過 2.17 億美元或每股 1 美元以上。

This is in addition to the strong gain on sale margins we generate from our originations platform. And again, it's something that is completely unique to our platform, providing a significant strategic advantage over our peers. We continue to grow our single-family rental business as we are one of the only remaining lenders in this space, allowing us to produce as much business as we want. We remain committed to the business as it offers 3 turns on our capital through construction bridge and permanent lending opportunities and generate strong levered returns in the short term while producing significant long-term benefits by further diversifying our income streams and allowing us to continue to build our franchise.

這是我們從原創平台獲得的銷售利潤的強勁增長之外的補充。再次強調，這是我們平台獨有的東西，與我們的同行相比具有顯著的戰略優勢。我們繼續發展我們的單戶租賃業務，因為我們是該領域僅存的貸方之一，這使我們能夠隨心所欲地開展業務。我們仍然致力於這項業務，因為它通過建設橋樑和永久貸款機會提供了 3 個資本轉機，並在短期內產生強勁的槓桿回報，同時通過進一步多樣化我們的收入來源並使我們能夠繼續建立可觀的長期利益我們的專營權。

In summary, we are off to a fantastic start in 2023 with an exceptional first quarter that once again demonstrates our ability to generate strong earnings and dividends in all cycles. We understand very well the challenges that lie ahead in this volatile market and feel that we are very well positioned and the best positioned company in our space to succeed in this cycle. Our earnings significantly exceed our dividend rate -- We invested in the right asset class with very stable liability structures, highlighted by a significant amount of nonrecourse, non-mark-to-market CLO debt with pricing that is well below the current market. We're also well capitalized with significant liquidity, which has put us in a unique position to take advantage of the many accretive opportunities that will exist in this environment.

總而言之，我們在 2023 年有了一個出色的開端，第一季度表現出色，再次證明我們有能力在所有周期中產生強勁的收益和股息。我們非常了解在這個動蕩的市場中面臨的挑戰，並認為我們處於非常有利的位置，並且是我們所在領域中處於最佳位置的公司，可以在這個週期中取得成功。我們的收益大大超過我們的股息率——我們投資於具有非常穩定的負債結構的正確資產類別，突出表現在大量無追索權、非按市值計價的 CLO 債務，其定價遠低於當前市場。我們還擁有充足的資本和大量的流動性，這使我們處於獨特的位置，可以利用這種環境中存在的許多增值機會。

And again, with our best-in-class asset management capabilities and a seasoned executive team, we are very confident that when the smoke clears, we will continue to be the top-performing company in our space, significantly outperforming our peers. I will now turn the call to Paul to take you through the financial results.

再一次，憑藉我們一流的資產管理能力和經驗豐富的執行團隊，我們非常有信心，當硝煙散去時，我們將繼續成為我們所在領域表現最好的公司，遠遠超過我們的同行。我現在將電話轉給 Paul，向您介紹財務結果。

Okay. Thank you, Ivan. As Ivan mentioned, we had another exceptional quarter, producing distributable earnings of $122 million or $0.62 per share. These results translated into industry high ROEs once again of approximately 20% for the first quarter, allowing us to increase our dividend to an annual run rate of $1.68 a share, reflecting a dividend to earnings payout ratio of around 68% on those first quarter earnings.

好的。謝謝你，伊万。正如 Ivan 提到的，我們有另一個出色的季度，產生了 1.22 億美元或每股 0.62 美元的可分配收益。這些結果轉化為第一季度約 20% 的行業高股本回報率，使我們能夠將股息增加到每股 1.68 美元的年運行率，反映出第一季度收益的股息與收益支付比率約為 68% .

Our first quarter results significantly beat our internal projections, largely due to approximately $16 million of income received from equity investments in the first quarter, which included a large equity kicker we had related to a loan payoff and a distribution from our LexFord investment. We also experienced higher gain on sale income from increased sold loan volume, mainly due to a stronger origination volumes in the latter half of the quarter than we anticipated, and we continue to see increased earnings on our floating rate loan book, and our cash and escrow balances in the first quarter from higher interest rates.

我們第一季度的業績大大超出了我們的內部預測，這主要是由於第一季度從股權投資中獲得了大約 1600 萬美元的收入，其中包括與貸款償還和 LexFord 投資的分配相關的大量股權激勵。我們還從增加的已售貸款量中獲得了更高的銷售收入收益，這主要是由於本季度後半段的發起量強於我們的預期，我們繼續看到我們的浮動利率貸款賬簿收益增加，我們的現金和第一季度的託管餘額來自更高的利率。

We also recorded an additional $20 million in CECL reserves on our balance sheet loan book during the quarter as a result of using more conservative assumptions in our model due to a decline in the macroeconomic outlook for commercial real estate. These reserves are general in nature and do not affect distributable earnings as we have not experienced any realized losses this quarter.

我們還在本季度的資產負債表貸款賬簿上記錄了額外的 2000 萬美元 CECL 儲備，這是由於商業房地產的宏觀經濟前景下降導致我們在模型中使用了更保守的假設。這些準備金屬於一般性質，不會影響可分配收益，因為我們本季度沒有經歷任何已實現的虧損。

Our balance sheet loan book continues to perform well in this market with no increases in default or delinquencies in the first quarter. And as Ivan mentioned earlier, we believe we are well positioned given our multifamily focus, strong liquidity position and our best-in-class dedicated asset management team with tremendous experience giving us confidence in our ability to successfully manage through this cycle.

我們的資產負債表貸款簿在這個市場上繼續表現良好，第一季度違約或拖欠率沒有增加。正如 Ivan 之前提到的，我們相信我們處於有利地位，因為我們專注於多戶家庭、強大的流動性狀況以及我們一流的專業資產管理團隊，他們擁有豐富的經驗，使我們相信我們有能力成功管理這個週期。

In our GSE/Agency business, we had a strong first quarter with $1.1 billion in originations and $800 million of loan sales. The loan sale numbers were less than our fourth quarter sales, as we mentioned last quarter, due to a large portfolio deal that closed in December that also settled in the same month in order to help the agencies meet their affordable lending caps.

在我們的 GSE/代理業務中，我們第一季度表現強勁，發放金額為 11 億美元，貸款銷售額為 8 億美元。正如我們上個季度提到的那樣，貸款銷售數量低於我們第四季度的銷售額，這是由於 12 月份完成的一項大型投資組合交易也在同月結算，以幫助各機構達到其負擔得起的貸款上限。

The margin on our first quarter sales was up substantially to 1.72% compared to 1.33% in the fourth quarter, again mainly due to a large deal that closed in December of last year would have reduced margin and from a higher percentage of FHA loan sales in the first quarter that contain much higher margins. We also recorded $18.5 million of mortgage servicing rights income related to $1.5 billion of committed loans in the first quarter, representing an average MSR rate of around 1.23% compared to 1.12% last quarter, mainly due to reduced servicing fees on the large portfolio deal we closed in December.

我們第一季度銷售額的利潤率大幅上升至 1.72%，而第四季度為 1.33%，這再次主要是由於去年 12 月完成的一筆大交易本應降低利潤率，以及 FHA 貸款銷售百分比較高第一季度的利潤率要高得多。我們還記錄了第一季度與 15 億美元承諾貸款相關的 1850 萬美元抵押貸款服務權收入，平均 MSR 率約為 1.23%，而上一季度為 1.12%，這主要是由於我們減少了大型投資組合交易的服務費12 月關閉。

Our fee-based servicing portfolio grew another 3% in the first quarter to approximately $29 billion at March 31, with a weighted average servicing fee of 40 basis points and an estimated remaining life of 9 years. This portfolio will continue to generate a predictable annuity of income going forward of around $117 million growth annually. We did see substantially less accelerated runoff in our Agency loan book again in the first quarter due to market conditions, which has resulted in reduced prepayment fees.

截至 3 月 31 日，我們的收費服務組合在第一季度又增長了 3%，達到約 290 億美元，加權平均服務費為 40 個基點，預計剩餘壽命為 9 年。該投資組合將繼續產生可預測的收入年金，每年增長約 1.17 億美元。由於市場狀況，我們確實在第一季度再次看到我們的機構貸款賬簿中的加速徑流大大減少，這導致預付費用減少。

In the first quarter, we received $2 million in prepayment fees as compared to $6 million last quarter. And again, given the current rate environment, we're estimating that prepayment fees will continue to run around $2 million a quarter going forward.

第一季度，我們收到了 200 萬美元的預付費用，而上一季度為 600 萬美元。同樣，鑑於當前的利率環境，我們估計預付費用將繼續保持每季度 200 萬美元左右。

In our balance sheet lending operation, our $13.6 billion investment portfolio had an all-in yield of 8.83% at March 31 compared to 8.42% at December 31 mainly due to increases in LIBOR and SOFR rates during the first quarter. The average balances in our core investments was $14.1 billion this quarter as compared to $14.8 billion last quarter, due to runoff exceeding originations in the first quarter. The average yield on these assets increased to 8.94% from 7.91% last quarter, excluding $8 million in back interest collected on the repayment of a nonperforming loan in the fourth quarter, mainly due to increase in SOFR and LIBOR rates and from more acceleration of fees in the first quarter.

在我們的資產負債表貸款業務中，我們 136 億美元的投資組合在 3 月 31 日的總收益率為 8.83%，而在 12 月 31 日為 8.42%，這主要是由於第一季度 LIBOR 和 SOFR 利率的上升。本季度我們核心投資的平均餘額為 141 億美元，而上一季度為 148 億美元，這是由於第一季度的徑流超過了發起。這些資產的平均收益率從上一季度的 7.91% 上升至 8.94%，不包括第四季度因償還不良貸款而收取的 800 萬美元返利，這主要是由於 SOFR 和 LIBOR 利率的上升以及費用的加速增長在第一季度。

Total debt on our core assets was approximately $12.6 billion at March 31, with an all-in debt cost of approximately 6.97%, which was up from a debt cost of around 6.50% on December 31, mainly due to increases in the benchmark index rates. The average balance in our debt facilities was approximately $13 billion for the first quarter compared to $13.7 billion last quarter.

截至 3 月 31 日，我們核心資產的總債務約為 126 億美元，總債務成本約為 6.97%，高於 12 月 31 日約 6.50% 的債務成本，這主要是由於基準指數利率上升.第一季度我們債務融資的平均餘額約為 130 億美元，而上一季度為 137 億美元。

The average cost of funds in our debt facilities was 6.69% for the first quarter compared to 5.80% for the fourth quarter, again primarily due to increases in the benchmark index rates. Our overall net interest spreads in our core assets increased to 2.25% this quarter compared to 2.11% last quarter, excluding $8 million of defaulted interest we collected in the fourth quarter. And our overall spot net interest spreads were 1.86% at March 31 and 1.92% at December 31.

第一季度我們債務融資的平均資金成本為 6.69%，而第四季度為 5.80%，這同樣主要是由於基準指數利率上升。我們核心資產的總體淨利差從上一季度的 2.11% 增加到本季度的 2.25%，不包括我們在第四季度收取的 800 萬美元違約利息。我們在 3 月 31 日和 12 月 31 日的整體即期淨利差分別為 1.86% 和 1.92%。

Lastly, we believe it's important to emphasize some of the significant advantages of our business model, which gives us comfort in our ability to continue to generate high-quality, long-dated recurring earnings in the future. As Ivan mentioned earlier, we have several diverse and countercyclical income streams that allow us to produce strong earnings in all cycles, the most significant of which is the value of our Agency platform, which is capital light and generates very high ROEs through strong gain on sale margins, long-dated service and annuity income and increased escrow balances that earn significantly more income in today's higher interest rate environment.

最後，我們認為強調我們商業模式的一些顯著優勢很重要，這讓我們對未來繼續產生高質量、長期經常性收益的能力感到欣慰。正如 Ivan 之前提到的，我們有幾個多樣化的反週期收入流，使我們能夠在所有周期中產生強勁的收益，其中最重要的是我們代理平台的價值，該平台資本輕，通過強勁的收益產生非常高的 ROE銷售利潤、長期服務和年金收入以及增加的託管餘額，在當今利率較高的環境下賺取更多收入。

Additionally, we're multifamily-centric and have a substantial amount of non-mark-to-market, nonrecourse CLO debt outstanding with pricing that is well below the current market. We're also well capitalized with significant liquidity and have a best-in-class asset management and senior management team that have tremendous experience and expertise in operating through multiple cycles. And we believe these features are unique to our platform, giving us confidence in our ability to continue to outperform our peers and deliver high-quality and sustainable earnings and dividends in the future.

此外，我們以多家庭為中心，並且有大量未按市值計價、無追索權的 CLO 未償債務，其定價遠低於當前市場。我們還擁有充裕的資本和大量的流動性，並擁有一流的資產管理和高級管理團隊，他們在多個週期的運營方面擁有豐富的經驗和專業知識。我們相信這些功能是我們平台獨有的，使我們相信我們有能力繼續超越同行，並在未來提供高質量和可持續的收益和股息。

That completes our prepared remarks for this morning, and I'll now turn it back to the operator to take any questions you may have at this time. Britney?

我們今天早上準備好的發言到此結束，現在我將把它轉回給接線員，以回答您此時可能提出的任何問題。布蘭妮？

(Operator Instructions) We'll take our first question from Steve Delaney with JMP Securities.

（操作員說明）我們將從 JMP 證券公司的 Steve Delaney 那裡回答我們的第一個問題。

Congratulations on another strong quarter to start the year. Big news, I'd been in the banking world, of course. And I'm curious, given Signature's presence in New York, if they were a material competitor to Arbor in any way? And how does the demise of that bank impact your opportunity set in New York going forward?

祝賀今年又一個強勁的季度開始。大新聞，當然，我一直在銀行業工作。我很好奇，考慮到 Signature 在紐約的存在，他們是否在任何方面都是 Arbor 的實質性競爭對手？那家銀行的倒閉如何影響你在紐約的未來機會？

Sure. That's a good question. And I think what things people are not focusing on many, many of these regional banks were strong competitors of ours. And they really took over a large part of the market, in particular, when rates rose they were well below the market. And their model is an interesting model, but if they don't necessarily have their own originations, they get fed by brokers, and they build their portfolios based on being the lowest price. And very often as we're seeing now, not just the lowest price, but having assets that are really nonsalable.

當然。這是個好問題。而且我認為人們沒有關注很多事情，這些地區性銀行中有許多是我們的強大競爭對手。他們確實佔據了市場的很大一部分，特別是當利率上升時，它們遠低於市場。他們的模型是一個有趣的模型，但如果他們不一定有自己的起源，他們就會被經紀人餵養，並根據最低價格建立他們的投資組合。正如我們現在所看到的那樣，不僅是最低價格，而且擁有真正滯銷的資產。

So getting rid of a lot of these regional banks who lend improperly, right, by being below the market line on short-term deposits is something that we believe is very healthy for companies like ours who maintain a huge amount of discipline. And as we stated on our call and consistently do, we have a very matched asset liability structure.

因此，通過低於短期存款市場線的方式擺脫大量不當放貸的區域性銀行，我們認為這對像我們這樣保持大量紀律的公司來說是非常健康的。正如我們在電話會議上所說並一貫做的那樣，我們擁有非常匹配的資產負債結構。

Anybody can generate loans, right? When they don't match their assets and liabilities correctly (inaudible) and then they underprice their loans. So I think, like us, we have a tremendous origination set. We're very disciplined in the way we do our business and eliminating these lenders who don't even know how to originate all they do is really take over loans from brokers at the lowest price. I think we'll create a better landscape for us. And it's going to be very clear, It's definitely in the interim that being an Agency lender with the ability to underwrite sell and securitize loans into the market with Fannie, Freddie and FHA is just an invaluable tool specifically in line in times of illiquidity like today.

任何人都可以產生貸款，對嗎？當他們沒有正確匹配他們的資產和負債時（聽不清）然後他們低估了他們的貸款。所以我認為，像我們一樣，我們有一個巨大的起源集。我們在開展業務的方式上非常自律，並消除了這些甚至不知道如何發起的貸方，他們所做的一切實際上是以最低價格從經紀人那裡接管貸款。我想我們會為我們創造一個更好的風景。這將是非常明確的，這絕對是在過渡期間，作為一個代理貸款機構，有能力通過 Fannie、Freddie 和 FHA 承保銷售和證券化貸款進入市場，這只是一個非常寶貴的工具，特別是在像今天這樣的流動性不足的時候.

Ivan, do you think that this is -- goes far beyond Signature and that there's a broader many banks, I guess, playing that game or playing that card and possibly the FDIC is going to come down on them from a regulatory standpoint. So beyond just New York, are you expecting to see this broadly across the country with respect to the banks that do the broker Fed lending model?

伊万，你認為這遠遠超出了 Signature，而且我猜還有更多的銀行在玩那個遊戲或玩那張牌，而且 FDIC 可能會從監管的角度對他們下手。因此，除了紐約之外，您是否期望在全國范圍內看到這種情況，涉及到採用美聯儲貸款模式的銀行？

Yes. I mean it's huge. I mean, this is just a tip of the iceberg, but I believe the FDIC will keep these people afloat and they're always amazing on the First Republic when you saw that the government gave them $90 billion from their treasury to keep them alive. So anybody who has fixed rate loans, who originated fixed rate loans in the 3s and they're sitting with fixed rate loans in the 3s, they're paying on deposits in the 4s, they can't raise equity to sell their assets, it's probably a 30% haircut.

是的。我的意思是它很大。我的意思是，這只是冰山一角，但我相信 FDIC 會讓這些人維持生計，當你看到政府從國庫中撥出 900 億美元來維持他們的生計時，他們總是對第一共和國感到驚奇。因此，任何擁有固定利率貸款的人，他們在 3 年代發起固定利率貸款，並且他們在 3 年代持有固定利率貸款，他們在 4 年代支付存款，他們不能籌集股權來出售他們的資產，這可能是一個 30% 的理髮。

I would say that the Fed is going to have to decide who stays and who doesn't stay. And then there are other institutions that are much healthier because they have more floating rate loan books so they've been able to manage their book. but they're on the parts with losing deposits, right? So they're losing deposits and yet they still have to fund up a lot of their assets that they put on their books, and they're being grouped in a little bit unfairly.

我會說美聯儲將不得不決定誰留下誰不留下。然後還有其他更健康的機構，因為他們有更多的浮動利率貸款賬簿，所以他們能夠管理他們的賬簿。但他們在損失存款的部分，對吧？所以他們正在損失存款，但他們仍然必須為他們放在賬面上的大量資產提供資金，而且他們被歸類在一起有點不公平。

so I believe to the extent like Pac West who has billions and billions and billions, that's just 1 of many, of 5-year loans in the 3s. Anybody can do the math, a 5-year loan in the 3 is when rates are 5.5 in a liquid piece of collateral poorly underwritten but it is worth $0.20, $0.30, $0.40, that wipes out their regulatory capital. And you can't raise capital when you're in that situation. When you're losing deposits, you have a run.

所以我相信，就像擁有數十億、數十億和數十億的 Pac West 一樣，這只是 3 年期 5 年期貸款中的眾多貸款之一。任何人都可以算算，3 年期的 5 年期貸款是指流動性抵押品的利率為 5.5，承保不佳，但價值 0.20 美元、0.30 美元、0.40 美元，這會耗盡他們的監管資本。當你處於那種情況時，你無法籌集資金。當你失去存款時，你就會擠兌。

So I think the Fed has done a reasonable job in at least providing lines. I would love to see the disclosed amount of the lines that were provided to all these regions and all these local banks and that would tell you the significance of the run on deposits and how much you (inaudible) these people up. But when your asset values are so significantly less and you're really insolvent on a mark-to-market basis, because you went ahead and you originated fixed rate loans with your term liability costs. And you have an inverted yield curve, you're in tough shape.

所以我認為美聯儲至少在提供額度方面做得很合理。我很想看到提供給所有這些地區和所有這些本地銀行的線路的公開數量，這會告訴你存款擠兌的重要性以及你（聽不清）這些人的數量。但是，當你的資產價值如此之低，並且按市值計價時，你確實資不抵債，因為你繼續前進，並以定期負債成本發放了固定利率貸款。而且你的收益率曲線倒掛，你處境艱難。

So I believe this will continue. A lot will do with what the Fed does. And where rates elevated on the short term and of course, the cost of deposits being so high, this problem is not going away. And then, of course, what you'll see is for those people who are borrowing from the Fed, I don't know what them borrow, but you'll have negative earnings to some extent because your assets are less than your cost to fund them. So this is a real issue. But more importantly, it's a real long-term issue. It doesn't seem fair in a sense that we just got through the great financial crisis such a short time ago, and we're actually doing the exact same thing just under a different mantra. So some reason the system never learns and we're back where we were and if the Fed didn't step in, it would be worse in (inaudible) way financial crisis, [would] have a total eradication of the banking system.

所以我相信這會繼續下去。很多事情都與美聯儲的所作所為有關。在短期利率上升的地方，當然還有存款成本如此之高的地方，這個問題不會消失。然後，當然，你會看到那些從美聯儲借錢的人，我不知道他們藉了什麼，但你在某種程度上會有負收益，因為你的資產低於你的成本資助他們。所以這是一個真正的問題。但更重要的是，這是一個真正的長期問題。從某種意義上說，我們在這麼短的時間前剛剛度過了巨大的金融危機，而且我們實際上在做完全相同的事情，只是在不同的口頭禪下，這在某種意義上似乎是不公平的。因此，出於某種原因，系統永遠不會吸取教訓，我們又回到了原來的狀態，如果美聯儲不介入，金融危機的（聽不清）方式會更糟， [would] 徹底根除銀行系統。

So I think we'll manage through this. I think there'll be others, and there'll be winners and losers and mergers. But unfortunately, I think there was (inaudible) the big 4, 5 or 6 banks are just going to get bigger. So it's going to really affect -- to your first question, the competitive landscape (inaudible) for lenders like us who I think will have more flexibility because we won't be competing unfairly against government-sponsored banks who get to operate in really inappropriate way. So we're optimistic that will be great for companies like ourselves.

所以我認為我們會解決這個問題。我認為還會有其他人，會有贏家、輸家和合併。但不幸的是，我認為（聽不清）四大、五大或六大銀行只會變得更大。所以這將真正影響 - 關於你的第一個問題，像我們這樣的貸方的競爭格局（聽不清）我認為他們將具有更大的靈活性，因為我們不會與政府資助的銀行進行不公平競爭，這些銀行以非常不適當的方式運營方式。因此，我們樂觀地認為這對像我們這樣的公司來說將是一件好事。

And was a much more substantial response than I expected. So -- but I'm going to pass on my other couple of questions. I know there are other analysts on the line, but I appreciate the conversation.

並且是一個比我預期的更實質性的回應。所以 - 但我要提出其他幾個問題。我知道還有其他分析師在線，但我很欣賞這次談話。

Thank you and thanks for your support Steve, you have been a great friend to the company.

謝謝你，也謝謝你的支持史蒂夫，你是公司的好朋友。

We will take our next question from Stephen Laws with Raymond James.

我們將與 Raymond James 一起接受 Stephen Laws 的下一個問題。

Surprising on the dividend increase. And I guess along those lines, I don't know how much credit you're getting for it, probably very little. But can you talk about how you think about allocating capital between buying more stock or something else in your capital stack or new investments attractive opportunities you talked about. I enjoyed the response to Steve's question a second ago. So maybe how do you think about the trade-off there with your use of cash?

股息增加令人驚訝。我想按照這些思路，我不知道你為此獲得了多少榮譽，可能很少。但是你能談談你如何考慮在購買更多股票或資本堆棧中的其他東西或你談到的新投資有吸引力的機會之間分配資本嗎？我喜歡一秒鐘前對史蒂夫問題的回答。那麼，也許您如何看待現金使用的權衡？

So first of all, we bought back $37 million out of $50 million when you go into a blackout period like we are, it's problematic. So we sort -- set different ranges. We don't have the ability to have this question. I would love to have bought back more, but the stock never got into the last range that we wanted in order to buy them back. It's funny because my only regret and I told Paul, we're so quick to do that (inaudible) $100 million share buyback and not only $50 million. So our intentions would be probably to go back to the Board and increase that level and if the market continues to improperly value us, then we certainly will continue to buy stock at these levels, especially when we're out of a blackout period. So we have significantly more capital. We will increase that once the dust settles here and go back to the Board to try and increase more. It's just a tremendous way to get a return on investment. It's a tremendous way to increase our book value. And we like it at these levels. We're -- as I said, we're a little frustrated, we couldn't get it all used.

所以首先，當你像我們一樣進入停電期時，我們從 5000 萬美元中回購了 3700 萬美元，這是有問題的。所以我們排序——設置不同的範圍。我們沒有能力提出這個問題。我很想回購更多，但股票從未進入我們想要回購的最後範圍。這很有趣，因為我唯一的遺憾是我告訴保羅，我們很快就完成了（聽不清）1 億美元的股票回購，而不僅僅是 5000 萬美元。因此，我們的意圖可能是回到董事會並提高這一水平，如果市場繼續對我們進行不當估值，那麼我們肯定會繼續以這些水平購買股票，尤其是當我們走出停電期時。所以我們有更多的資本。一旦塵埃落定，我們將增加它，然後返回董事會嘗試增加更多。這是獲得投資回報的絕佳方式。這是增加我們賬面價值的絕佳方式。我們喜歡這些級別。我們 - 正如我所說，我們有點沮喪，我們無法全部使用它。

But you have to balance things. There are so many different aspects of our business. While we would love to buy back and use all our capital for that, we run a business, we run a franchise. And the idea is to build our business in this great opportunistic time and build long-term relationships and reoccurring revenue. When we can get mid to high teens on our loan portfolio and investing in going to clients and also produce multiple terms on that capital by getting long-dated servicing, that's extraordinarily compelling.

但你必須平衡事情。我們的業務有很多不同的方面。雖然我們很樂意回購併為此使用我們所有的資金，但我們經營一家企業，我們經營一家特許經營權。我們的想法是在這個機會主義時期建立我們的業務，建立長期關係和經常性收入。當我們可以在我們的貸款組合中獲得中高青少年並投資於客戶並通過獲得長期服務為該資本產生多個條款時，這非常引人注目。

So we balance all the different things. In addition, as you know, we really can't access capital. It's really to Paul's testament and the company's estimate that we did our better offering last year even despite the negative environment. we're one of the only firms who not only access the debt markets and sometimes the equity markets and different instruments, but do it in a very efficient and appropriate way. So we're sitting on a great deal of cash. We're seeing great opportunities and as I mentioned on the call, the single-family business, which we've been talking about for years, is an amazing business, and it's funny. We competed against a lot of regional banks and the regional banks were crazily priced, but we still garnered a decent amount. So now we're extraordinarily well positioned for that business. It's a great business, and we are a leader in it.

所以我們平衡所有不同的東西。此外，如您所知，我們確實無法獲得資金。這確實符合 Paul 的遺囑和公司的估計，即使在不利的環境下，我們去年也提供了更好的產品。我們是僅有的幾家不僅進入債務市場，有時還進入股票市場和不同工具，而且以非常有效和適當的方式進行的公司之一。所以我們坐擁大量現金。我們看到了巨大的機會，正如我在電話中提到的，我們多年來一直在談論的單一家族企業是一項了不起的業務，而且很有趣。我們與許多地區性銀行競爭，地區性銀行的定價非常瘋狂，但我們仍然獲得了可觀的收入。所以現在我們在這項業務上處於非常有利的位置。這是一項偉大的業務，我們是其中的領導者。

We're using our capital extraordinarily well. We'll continue to build that business. The bridge lending business, we don't feel is a good time right now because where SOFR is to be lending at 9% roughly on a 1-year situation. It doesn't make a lot of sense from people buying 5 (inaudible) assets and have cap costs. So we'll look at the yield curve. We'll look at the opportunities, we'll look at where cap rates are and we'll look to see how we can build our franchise in the long term.

我們的資金使用得非常好。我們將繼續建立這項業務。過橋貸款業務，我們認為現在不是一個好時機，因為在 1 年的情況下，SOFR 的貸款利率大約為 9%。人們購買 5 種（聽不清）資產並設置成本上限沒有多大意義。所以我們來看看收益率曲線。我們會看看機會，我們會看看資本化率在哪裡，我們會看看我們如何才能長期建立我們的特許經營權。

But yes, we would like to go to the Board and increase that buyback. We think if the market continues to be rational, and clearly, as we all can see that we're totally improperly valued. And that's okay. That's just opportunity for all of us as long as we're patient. We are natural [indisceernible] if you've been following us. We are never short term of my thinking, and that's why we're so well positioned because when everybody was doing loans at the top of the market, we were pulling back and pulling back heavily.

但是，是的，我們想去董事會並增加回購。我們認為，如果市場繼續保持理性，並且很明顯，我們都可以看到我們的估值完全不正確。沒關係。只要我們有耐心，這對我們所有人來說都是機會。如果您一直關注我們，我們很自然 [音頻不清晰]。我們的想法從來都不是短期的，這就是為什麼我們處於如此有利的位置，因為當每個人都在市場頂部提供貸款時，我們正在撤退並大幅撤退。

And when everybody was using short-term leverage, we were very heavily into our CLOs in the market. So we think this dislocation will create extraordinary long-term value. We're good stewards of management of capital, and we think these are extraordinary times to build long-term value.

當每個人都在使用短期槓桿時，我們在市場上大量投入了我們的 CLO。所以我們認為這種錯位將創造非凡的長期價值。我們是資本管理的好管家，我們認為現在是建立長期價值的非凡時期。

Great. I appreciate those comments. A quick follow-up, if I may. Paul, you mentioned in your prepared remarks that gain on sale margins, I think, improved in the late part of the quarter. Can you talk about -- are those still looking having redone it from earlier this year due to the second quarter to date?

偉大的。我很欣賞這些評論。如果可以的話，快速跟進。保羅，你在準備好的評論中提到，我認為銷售利潤率在本季度末有所改善。你能談談 - 由於第二季度至今，那些人是否仍在尋找從今年早些時候重做的事情？

Yes, I think it's a great question, Steve. Thanks. And yes, we did see a nice pop in our gain on sale margin. Some of that, as I said in my prepared remarks, had to do with we had some large portfolio deals. We did at the end of last quarter with like a 1 point margin. So it was dragging that margin down a little bit in the fourth quarter, and we had more FHA sales this quarter, which obviously that's a 3-, 4-point business, as you know. But we are seeing a trend of some strong margins here on our April product. I think we closed $425 million of Agency product in April. So off to a really good second quarter start as we talked about our pipeline is building as the agencies are kind of the only game in town right now with the yield curve where it is and the balance sheet business, not really attractive for everyone and a lot of players not in the market today.

是的，我認為這是一個很好的問題，史蒂夫。謝謝。是的，我們確實看到了銷售利潤率的大幅上漲。正如我在準備好的發言中所說，其中一些與我們進行了一些大型投資組合交易有關。我們在上個季度末以大約 1 個百分點的優勢做到了。因此，第四季度的利潤率有所下降，本季度我們的 FHA 銷售額增加了，這顯然是一個 3 點、4 點的業務，正如你所知。但我們在 4 月份的產品上看到了一些強勁利潤率的趨勢。我認為我們在 4 月份關閉了 4.25 億美元的代理產品。因此，當我們談到我們的管道正在建設時，第二季度的開局非常好，因為這些機構是目前唯一具有收益率曲線和資產負債表業務的遊戲，對每個人來說並不是真正有吸引力，而且很多球員今天不在市場上。

But we are seeing really solid margins. I always guide to like [101 35] to [101 50]-ish range. But -- and I think we'll be in that range, maybe towards the middle to the top of that range, but margins are holding strong.

但我們看到了非常可觀的利潤率。我總是引導喜歡 [101 35] 到 [101 50] 左右的範圍。但是——我認為我們會在那個範圍內，可能會在這個範圍的中間到頂部，但利潤率保持強勁。

We will take our next question from Crispin Love with Piper Sandler.

我們將接受 Crispin Love 和 Piper Sandler 的下一個問題。

My first one is on credit. I'm just curious if you'd be able to share some of the underlying credit stats for the CLOs structured loan book and the Fannie loss share. I'm just curious how they're faring in expectations over the near to intermediate term?

我的第一個是賒賬。我只是想知道您是否能夠分享 CLO 結構性貸款賬簿和 Fannie 損失份額的一些基本信用統計數據。我只是好奇他們在近期和中期的預期中表現如何？

Yes. Ivan, do you want me to take some of that?

是的。伊万，你想讓我拿走一些嗎？

Yes, go ahead.

好，去吧。

Yes, sure. So as you saw, Crispin, we were certainly more conservative this quarter with our CECL reserves. As you know, those CECL reserves don't really translate always into realized losses. So we've got some specific reserves against some balance sheet assets that we've had for a while, some legacy assets. We've not seen a significant amount of stress, a little bit of stress. We've had a little bit of a migration some loans from past watch to special mention.

是的，當然。因此，正如你所見，Crispin，本季度我們在 CECL 儲備方面肯定更加保守。如您所知，這些 CECL 儲備並不總是真正轉化為已實現的損失。因此，我們有一些針對我們已經擁有一段時間的資產負債表資產的特定儲備金，一些遺留資產。我們沒有看到很大的壓力，一點點壓力。我們已經將一些貸款從過去的手錶轉移到特別提及。

But again, special mention is not a category that means to us that we're going to have a loss. So there's going to be a default imminent. It's just changes in where maybe values have gone or where interest rates have gone. So overall, I think the balance sheet book is holding up well in this market. We do expect the market to be challenging over the next few quarters.

但同樣，特別提及並不是一個對我們來說意味著我們將有損失的類別。因此，即將出現違約。它只是改變了價值可能消失的地方或利率已經消失的地方。所以總的來說，我認為資產負債表在這個市場上表現良好。我們確實預計未來幾個季度市場將充滿挑戰。

As Ivan said, we think the bottom is near, but it will take time to rebound, but it's been performing well. We've put some CECL reserves away. But we're not seeing really a lot of stress on the balance sheet side and on the CLO side as well. On the Agency side, we do have as you know, loss share component with Fannie Mae. We saw a little bit of a tick up in delinquencies this quarter, but not significant and things move in and out all the time.

正如 Ivan 所說，我們認為底部已經接近，但反彈需要時間，但它一直表現良好。我們已經存入了一些 CECL 儲備金。但我們在資產負債表方面和 CLO 方面並沒有看到太多壓力。在代理機構方面，如您所知，我們確實與 Fannie Mae 有損失分擔部分。本季度我們看到拖欠率略有上升，但並不明顯，而且事情一直在進進出出。

We've put a couple of million more in specific reserves on our books this quarter related to our agency book. But for the most part, things are pretty stable. We haven't seen a tremendous move negatively on the credit of either side of our portfolio, both the balance sheet or the Agency. Ivan, would you say that's accurate?

本季度，我們在與代理賬簿相關的賬簿上增加了數百萬美元的特定儲備金。但在大多數情況下，情況相當穩定。我們還沒有看到我們投資組合的任何一方（資產負債表或機構）的信用出現巨大的負面變化。伊万，你會說那是準確的嗎？

Yes, I would say that's accurate. The one thing that we have seen, which is worth noting because I think it's a transitory and work itself out. We're still seeing in some of the jurisdictions, people having tough time affecting their tenants really, really long. You'd think with COVID, it's all behind us. It's not. So you're seeing economic occupancy a lot lower, which is putting a lot of stress on our borrowers because they don't have the income to support their debt service and they're coming out of pocket, which they should and they will.

是的，我會說這是準確的。我們已經看到的一件事值得注意，因為我認為它是暫時的並且會自行解決。我們仍然在一些司法管轄區看到，人們在影響租戶方面的艱難時期真的非常非常長。你會認為 COVID，這一切都在我們身後。它不是。所以你看到經濟入住率低了很多，這給我們的借款人帶來了很大壓力，因為他們沒有收入來支持他們的債務償還，他們正在自掏腰包，他們應該而且他們會這樣做。

And that's causing some of our 30- and 60-day delinquencies on the agency side to pop up. We think that we're 50%, 60% (inaudible) in the back end of that as the court systems are loosening up. But there are some jurisdictions who are just not moving quickly. And it's not fair to the landlords to allow tenants to stay in their property for years and not pay rent and not be able to evict them.

這導致我們在代理方面出現一些 30 天和 60 天的拖欠。我們認為隨著法院系統的放鬆，我們在後端有 50%、60%（聽不清）。但有些司法管轄區並沒有迅速採取行動。對於房東來說，允許租戶在他們的房產中居住多年而不支付租金並且無法驅逐他們是不公平的。

So that has caused a little bit of a tick up in delinquencies. Our borrowers are holding on. They're committed to their assets. They're struggling, but they're getting there. But I think the worst is over on that. I think that we will turn the corner on those kind of things, but people don't really talk about that, but we see it in fund center. We see it in certain specific geographic locations. And we see it if a borrower has 5 or 6 or 8 or 10 properties across his portfolio, he's dealing with that. And that will work itself out over time because the value is still in the real estate. The operator is a good real estate. They've dipped into a pocket of good deal and they're looking to solve those problems they're solvable over time, and we're working with a lot of these borrowers to get through some of those issues.

因此，這導致拖欠率有所上升。我們的借款人正在堅持。他們致力於保護自己的資產。他們正在掙扎，但他們正在到達那裡。但我認為最壞的情況已經過去。我認為我們會在這類事情上扭轉局面，但人們並沒有真正談論它，但我們在基金中心看到了它。我們在某些特定的地理位置看到它。我們看到，如果借款人在其投資組合中擁有 5、6、8 或 10 處房產，他就會處理這個問題。隨著時間的推移，這會自行解決，因為價值仍在房地產中。經營者是好樓盤。他們已經投入了大量資金，他們正在尋求解決隨著時間的推移可以解決的問題，我們正在與許多藉款人合作以解決其中的一些問題。

Great. I appreciate all the detail there. And then just looking at the income statement for the quarter. I note that the income from equity affiliates was elevated in the quarter at $14 million. I think, Paul, you alluded to some of this in your prepared remarks, but can you just expand on that a little bit deeper? And what were some of the key drivers that drove that increase in the quarter?

偉大的。我很欣賞那裡的所有細節。然後只看本季度的損益表。我注意到本季度來自股權附屬公司的收入增加到 1400 萬美元。我想，保羅，你在準備好的發言中提到了其中的一些內容，但你能否更深入地闡述一下？推動本季度增長的一些關鍵驅動因素是什麼？

Sure. So Crispin, as I mentioned in my prepared remarks, we had 2 components that drove that line item to be higher than it has been in the past. One of them was we got a distribution from our Lexford investment, and that happens. We'll get that sometimes quarterly, sometimes biannually. It depends on the performance of that investment, and that's our share of that. And that was about just under $5 million.

當然。因此，正如我在準備好的發言中提到的那樣，Crispin 有兩個因素推動該訂單項的價格高於過去。其中之一是我們從我們的 Lexford 投資中獲得了分配，而這種情況發生了。我們有時每季度一次，有時每半年一次。這取決於該投資的表現，這就是我們的份額。那大約不到 500 萬美元。

But the other $11 million was an equity kicker that we had on the preferred equity loan that we had built into the document many, many years ago. I don't know that we have any of those left, but that's a legacy type structure we had when we were doing preferred equity years ago, and we had an equity kicker in there that if certain things happen or transpired and there was a certain amount of proceeds from a sale, we would get a piece of that.

但另外 1100 萬美元是我們在很多很多年前在文件中建立的優先股權貸款的股權激勵。我不知道我們還剩下這些，但這是我們多年前做優先股時的遺留類型結構，我們在那裡有一個股權踢球者，如果某些事情發生或發生，並且有一定的銷售所得的金額，我們會從中分得一杯羹。

And to our surprise, -- the borrower did a great job of selling his asset for a significant dollar amount, significantly more than maybe we had expected. And that equity kicker became viable. And so we ended up with 22% of the excess proceeds from the sale after certain waterfalls happen in certain debt repayments. So we got paid back our preferred equity, all our interest and we ended up with an $11 million equity kicker.

令我們驚訝的是，借款人在出售其資產方面做得很好，獲得了可觀的金額，遠遠超出了我們的預期。那個股權踢球者變得可行了。因此，在某些債務償還發生某些瀑布之後，我們最終獲得了出售超額收益的 22%。所以我們得到了我們優先股的回報，我們所有的利息，我們最終獲得了 1100 萬美元的股權。

I can't tell you that we have any -- many or any of those left. They're left over from the days when they were enhancing your yield on a potentially enhancing your IRR on a preferred equity instrument. But that's -- that's just an example of the things we've done over the years and the value we create, and that's something that came in real positive in the first quarter.

我不能告訴你我們有任何 - 許多或任何剩下的。它們是在提高您的收益時遺留下來的，因為它們可能會提高您在優先股本工具上的內部收益率。但這只是我們多年來所做的事情和我們創造的價值的一個例子，這是第一季度真正積極的事情。

Paul, what's worth noting on that is really a form of interest because when we do a PE loan, we take less of a coupon of return and a trade-off for a little bit of a higher return down the road. So what you're seeing with some of these equity (inaudible) is really just an accumulation of interest that we've foregone and on front, which we really believe that would be better down the road.

保羅，值得注意的是，這實際上是一種利息形式，因為當我們進行私募股權貸款時，我們獲得的回報券較少，並且需要權衡以換取更高的回報。因此，您所看到的其中一些股權（聽不清）實際上只是我們已經放棄並在前面的利益積累，我們真的相信這會在未來變得更好。

So while it may be a little bulky, it really is a representation of a level of interest that we foregone for that number of years. And we do that from time to time where we believe that the opportunities will be greater on a return basis to take a kicker than current interest. And it's also more conservative. It's almost like pay and accrue.

因此，雖然它可能有點笨重，但它確實代表了我們多年來放棄的興趣水平。我們不時這樣做，我們相信在回報的基礎上，採取比當前興趣更大的機會。而且它也更保守。這幾乎就像支付和累積。

But sometimes, we just say, listen, we're just happy with taking an equity and kicking it down the road and diversifying our income streams, which is the benefit that we did here, and it does happen from time to time with the firm, and we've always had a history of doing these things.

但有時候，我們只是說，聽著，我們只是很高興獲得股權並將其踢下去並使我們的收入來源多樣化，這是我們在這裡所做的好處，而且它確實不時發生在公司，我們一直都有做這些事情的歷史。

We will take our next question from Rick Shane with JPMorgan.

我們將從摩根大通的 Rick Shane 那裡回答下一個問題。

First of all, a topic we've been raising throughout earnings season is related to repurchases. And so I want to acknowledge the commitment to buying back shares in the context of what's going on in the market. That said, we've had a number of questions, and I think it's a very fair point related to interest rate caps and extensions on loans. If you guys could just walk through a little bit given the impact of higher rates on borrowers the magnitude or the coverage your borrowers have in terms of interest rate caps. And if you could provide some information in terms of the tenure of those caps versus the tenure of the fully extended structured portfolio?

首先，我們在整個財報季提出的一個話題與回購有關。因此，我想承認在市場正在發生的情況下回購股票的承諾。也就是說，我們有很多問題，我認為這是與利率上限和貸款延期相關的一個非常公平的問題。考慮到較高利率對借款人的影響程度或借款人在利率上限方面的覆蓋範圍，如果你們可以稍微了解一下。如果你能提供一些關於這些上限的期限與完全擴展的結構化投資組合的期限的信息？

Sure. First of all, everything is on a case-to-case basis and what's unique about all that's relative to other lenders, which we compete a bit consistently, is we have a lot of structure on our loans, and it's just not making the real estate loan with no responsibility to the borrower. So in many cases, there's an obligation by the borrower to buy interest rate caps, to refund the interest and do things of that nature.

當然。首先，一切都根據具體情況而定，相對於我們一直在競爭的其他貸方，所有這些的獨特之處在於我們的貸款有很多結構，而且它並沒有真正實現對借款人不承擔任何責任的房地產貸款。所以在很多情況下，借款人有義務購買利率上限，退還利息並做這種性質的事情。

It's been actually a great opportunity for us because 6 months ago, 9 months ago with the inverted yield curve, the cost of caps and the negative carry, we've had a lot of people say, okay, it doesn't really pay to pay 9% or 8% to buy cap and have negative carry and they've elected to actually pay down their loans and convert themselves into Agency loans, which in today's market, you can borrow between 4.75% and 5.5%. And that's been very, very, very effective for us.

這對我們來說實際上是一個很好的機會，因為 6 個月前，9 個月前收益率曲線倒掛，上限成本和負利差，我們有很多人說，好吧，它並沒有真正支付支付 9% 或 8% 的費用購買上限並持有負利差，他們選擇實際償還貸款並將自己轉換為代理貸款，在當今市場上，您可以藉到 4.75% 至 5.5% 的貸款。這對我們來說非常、非常、非常有效。

We do monitor very closely any caps that are expiring. and we work with the borrowers to either put new caps on or to figure out alternatives in order to make sure that they're in a good position. So there's no one specific answer to that because it's case by case. Management works at it very intensively. And I actually am very involved in that as well. So we deal with that. Many of our borrowers have multiple loans with us. And it's carefully crafted for each situation.

我們會非常密切地監控任何即將到期的上限。我們與借款人合作，要么設置新的上限，要么找出替代方案，以確保他們處於有利地位。所以沒有一個具體的答案，因為它是個案。管理工作非常集中。我實際上也參與其中。所以我們處理那個。我們的許多藉款人向我們提供了多筆貸款。它針對每種情況精心設計。

So far, we've been extraordinarily effective month by month, quarter by quarter in managing all these upcoming issues and getting them repositioned appropriately. So that's the general answer. It's hard to get specific in our book, and we don't disclose all the specifics. But so far, we've done an outstanding job. We're batting 1,000% even in the most difficult market.

到目前為止，我們在管理所有這些即將發生的問題並適當地重新定位方面，每個月、每個季度都非常有效。這就是一般的答案。在我們的書中很難具體說明，我們也不會透露所有細節。但到目前為止，我們做得非常出色。即使在最困難的市場中，我們也能做到 1,000%。

But I think my outlook is worth talking about a little bit because so far, we've been spot on in terms of where the market is. We believe we're already halfway through this debacle. We believe it's been already at least 9 months to 11 months of real difficult times, rising short-term interest rates, extraordinarily high borrowing cost, which is fueled by an inverted yield curve when SOFR goes up from 25 basis points to 5.25%, that's extraordinary, right?

但我認為我的前景值得討論一下，因為到目前為止，我們一直在關注市場的位置。我們相信我們已經度過了這場災難的一半。我們認為，已經經歷了至少 9 到 11 個月的真正困難時期，短期利率上升，借貸成本異常高，當 SOFR 從 25 個基點上升到 5.25% 時，反向收益率曲線助長了這種情況，這是非同尋常，對吧？

We believe the real work here is getting through the next 9 months. We've gotten through the first 9 months, extraordinarily successfully. We have 9 more months to go. And it's our thought process that after that period of time, short-term rates will come down. But with this inverted yield curve, every time we see a drop in the tenure, we see a tremendous number of our borrowers say, okay, let's lock in every time the tenure hits [3 30], [3 10], [3 25] and it drops a little bit, people are just saying, okay, let's convert from a variable rate loan with negative carry, and let's put a little bit more equity into the capital call.

我們相信這裡真正的工作是在接下來的 9 個月裡完成。我們已經度過了前 9 個月，非常成功。我們還有 9 個月的時間。我們的想法是，在那段時間之後，短期利率將會下降。但是，由於這種反向收益率曲線，每次我們看到任期下降時，我們都會看到大量借款人說，好吧，每當任期達到 [3 30]、[3 10]、[3 25] 時，讓我們鎖定] 它下降了一點，人們只是說，好吧，讓我們從負進位的可變利率貸款轉換，讓我們在資本要求中投入更多的股權。

We capped the transaction and convert it to a fixed rate. So this yield curve has been really beneficial for us even though it puts a lot of stress on our asset management group. But all in all, it's worked in our favor.

我們限制了交易並將其轉換為固定利率。因此，這條收益率曲線對我們確實有利，儘管它給我們的資產管理團隊帶來了很大壓力。但總而言之，它對我們有利。

Ivan, that raise is a really interesting point, which is that when I compare your results for the quarter versus our expectations, one of the things that stands out is that the repayments on the structured portfolio remain substantially higher than we would have anticipated. I think our expectation is that borrowers would have delayed the financing into the fixed rate markets because of the long-term and lockouts on those loans.

伊万，那次加薪是一個非常有趣的觀點，那就是當我將你本季度的結果與我們的預期進行比較時，其中一件突出的事情是結構化投資組合的還款額仍然大大高於我們的預期。我認為我們的預期是，由於這些貸款的長期和鎖定，借款人會推遲向固定利率市場融資。

Is there a way that you are able to -- is this a purely borrower-driven activity where they're looking at saying, Hey, let's just get this locked in. It might not be great economically. We're going to lock in long-term financing costs, but let's move on. Or are there incentives that you're able to structure and the deals in order to basically move from making hole to moving them off the balance sheet.

有沒有一種方法可以——這是一個純粹由借款人驅動的活動，他們正在考慮說，嘿，讓我們鎖定它。它在經濟上可能不是很好。我們將鎖定長期融資成本，但讓我們繼續前進。或者是否存在您能夠構建的激勵措施和交易，以便基本上從製造漏洞轉變為將它們從資產負債表中移出。

It's a good question. And the reason we're able to do it is what's extraordinarily proactive. We look ahead a year, we look at all loans that have expiring rate caps, have negative carry that are under stress, and our originators are working with our portfolio refinance group and re-underwriting all the loans, getting them in position, getting them in front of the agencies. And when the market drops, these people are ready to go.

這是個好問題。我們能夠做到這一點的原因是非常主動。展望未來一年，我們會查看所有利率上限到期、負利率且承受壓力的貸款，我們的發起人正在與我們的投資組合再融資小組合作，重新承銷所有貸款，讓它們到位，讓它們在機構面前。當市場下跌時，這些人就準備好了。

I just want to let you know the agencies are very backed up. They're the only game in town, and they're going to be very busy. The key is to look at your portfolio look down the road and see at what levels they can be in a good position and get ready to lock them. If you react today to say you want to take advantage of some, but your loans are not in a position, your borrowers not in a position, you can't execute. So this is all about execution.

我只是想讓你知道這些機構非常有後盾。他們是鎮上唯一的遊戲，他們會很忙。關鍵是要審視你的投資組合，展望未來，看看它們在什麼水平上可以處於有利位置，並準備好鎖定它們。如果你今天反應說你想利用一些，但你的貸款沒有位置，你的借款人沒有位置，你無法執行。所以這一切都與執行有關。

This is all about the skill set to know how to help the borrower put themselves into a better position. There's also a tremendous mentality right now with the borrowers, which we're working with them is don't have any problems. You have problems you can't participate in today's market. Remember, if you default on a loan, you can borrow from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac anymore. Once you default on a loan and you can't borrow for Fannie and Freddie, you might as well get out of the industry. So what we're doing is saying, listen, you may need to put another 5% or 10% into the loan to go fixed rate. Let's get in that position. live to fight another day, stabilize your assets. And this way you can go out in the market and take advantage of good opportunities, you'll still get a good return. Convince your investors to lower your shelf to put a little bit more in. And we do have some tools that other people don't. We're willing to put some preference on mezz with the right returns.

這都是關於了解如何幫助借款人將自己置於更好位置的技能。借款人現在也有一種巨大的心態，我們正在與他們合作沒有任何問題。您有無法參與當今市場的問題。請記住，如果您拖欠貸款，您可以再向房利美和房地美借款。一旦你拖欠貸款而無法為房利美和房地美借款，你還不如退出這個行業。所以我們正在做的是說，聽著，你可能需要在貸款中再投入 5% 或 10% 才能達到固定利率。讓我們進入那個位置。活著再戰，穩住資產。這樣你就可以進入市場並利用好機會，你仍然會獲得豐厚的回報。說服您的投資者降低您的貨架以投入更多資金。我們確實有一些其他人沒有的工具。我們願意優先考慮回報合適的夾層。

We're one of the only approved agency lenders that allow the mezzanine over our own book. And we've been doing that from time to time to help our borrowers get to where they need to go. So we have a lot of tools, but it's really the management and looking forward and repositioning these borrowers. Remember, when things happen like this, your borrowers are like a deer in headlights. They don't even know what's going on. They don't believe it. They don't believe in changes. We do. We've been through the cycles. We understand the market, and we understand different levels of execution.

我們是唯一允許在我們自己的賬簿上使用夾層的經批准的機構貸方之一。我們一直在不時這樣做，以幫助我們的借款人到達他們需要去的地方。所以我們有很多工具，但實際上是管理、展望和重新定位這些借款人。請記住，當事情發生這種情況時，您的借款人就像頭燈下的鹿。他們甚至不知道發生了什麼。他們不相信。他們不相信改變。我們的確是。我們經歷了周期。我們了解市場，我們了解不同的執行水平。

So we really work to get ahead of the curve and get everybody in a position. So if crazy day the banks are failing and the tenure drops from [3 60] to [3 200. And at [3 20], it works, we can lock in a lot of borrowers, and we've really helped them reposition their portfolio into a better circumstance.

因此，我們真的努力走在曲線的前面，讓每個人都處於有利地位。因此，如果瘋狂的一天銀行倒閉並且任期從 [3 60] 下降到 [3 200]。在 [3 20]，它起作用了，我們可以鎖定很多藉款人，我們真的幫助他們重新定位他們的投資組合進入更好的情況。

Got it. Look, I agree with you. It's hard to look at a building, look at the land, see the lights on, see the people going in and out and view it as changing in value based on numbers on a spreadsheet.

知道了。看，我同意你的看法。很難看建築物、看土地、看燈、看進出的人，並根據電子表格上的數字將其視為價值變化。

We are in an adjustment period, it's slow. Cap rates have gone up considerably to high 3s, low 4s and now you're in the 4.75% to 5.5% range, and that's been a significant movement. And depending on interest rates, we'll dictate whether there's movement. But obviously, even at these levels, as you've been reading, there are very few sales right now. It's still hard to buy a 5-cap asset when you got to put on 5.5% financing, right? That's still negative leverage and you can't borrow short term.

我們正處於調整期，它很慢。資本化率大幅上升至高 3s、低 4s，現在你處於 4.75% 至 5.5% 的範圍內，這是一個重大的變化。根據利率，我們將決定是否有變動。但顯然，即使在這些水平上，正如您一直在閱讀的那樣，目前的銷售量也很少。當你必須進行 5.5% 的融資時，仍然很難購買 5 盤資產，對吧？那仍然是負槓桿，你不能短期借貸。

So either cap rates are going to continue to move or interest rates are going to change. But clearly, there's a little bit of a lock on sales right now. And of course, you have the backdrop, as we all know, the banks have a lot of assets, which the FDIC has to spit out. and how that's going to affect, what's going to be done with the invested capital in the market.

因此，要么上限利率將繼續變動，要么利率將發生變化。但很明顯，現在銷售有點受限。當然，眾所周知，銀行擁有大量資產，FDIC 必須吐出這些資產。以及這將如何影響，將如何處理市場上的投資資本。

We'll take our next question from Jason Sabshon with KBW.

我們將與 KBW 一起接受 Jason Sabshon 的下一個問題。

Given all the recent stress that banks have come (inaudible) And do you expect margin (inaudible) in some cases?

考慮到銀行最近面臨的所有壓力（聽不清），在某些情況下您是否期望保證金（聽不清）？

Listen, there's always an issue in margin calls. We manage that very good. We have great counterparty for the big history with them. And knock on wood, so far, we've been in really good shape. We have a lot of our assets and CLOs. We constantly have a capability of CLOs, which are not mark-to-market. So we have a smaller fraction of our book in those lines. We have diversified lines with good partners .

聽著，追加保證金總是有問題的。我們管理得很好。我們與他們的大歷史有很好的交易對手。敲木頭，到目前為止，我們的狀態非常好。我們有很多資產和 CLO。我們始終擁有 CLO 的能力，它不是按市值計價的。所以我們在這些行中只佔本書的一小部分。我們擁有多元化的業務線和良好的合作夥伴。

I forgot how many lines we have. We probably have 10 different lines from 10 different institutions. So it's something we always plan for, something we always keep a level of capital available for, but knock on wood, it's been fairly good and nothing material. We're in communication consistently. So we don't see any major, major concerns, but there's always something that is part of our liquidity and capital plan to handle those prospective margin goals.

我忘記了我們有多少行。我們可能有來自 10 個不同機構的 10 個不同的線路。所以這是我們一直計劃的事情，我們總是保持一定水平的可用資金，但是敲木頭，它相當不錯，沒有什麼實質性的。我們始終保持溝通。因此，我們沒有看到任何重大的重大問題，但我們的流動性和資本計劃中總有一些東西可以處理這些預期的利潤率目標。

So for that vintage of multifamily originations late (inaudible) are you guys thinking about potential up from that (inaudible) vintage?

那麼對於那個晚（聽不清）的多家庭起源的年份，你們是否在考慮那個（聽不清）年份的潛力？

Yes. I think you got a little cut off Paul, could you hear the comment.

是的。我覺得你有點被保羅打斷了，你能聽到評論嗎？

Yes. I couldn't. Jason, your phone is cutting in and out. Can you try to ask the question again?

是的。我做不到。傑森，你的電話正在斷電。你能試著再問一遍嗎？

I was just saying for that late 2021, early '22, when competition was high and the rates were a lot lower. Are you guys thinking about any more in that vintage?

我只是說 2021 年底，22 年初，當時競爭激烈，利率要低得多。你們還在想那個年份的更多東西嗎？

Look, I think that it's loan specific, case specific and sponsor specific. There are many situations where -- on the flip side, people bought assets, and they didn't execute their plan and they didn't get the increase in the rents they wanted to. On the other side, there are many sponsors who executed their plans very well and did an extraordinary job.

看，我認為它是針對特定貸款、特定案例和特定贊助商的。在很多情況下——另一方面，人們購買了資產，但他們沒有執行他們的計劃，也沒有得到他們想要的租金增長。另一方面，也有很多贊助商，他們的計劃執行得很好，做得非常出色。

So we look at the entire portfolio very, very carefully. And then you have a lot of people who bought long-dated caps with low rates and can hang in there a lot more. So each one is a case by case. We have a good sized portfolio. We manage it very carefully. And we are fund center. We go quarter-to-quarter. We have an outlook for everything in the next 12 months, and we're managing extraordinarily well.

因此，我們非常非常仔細地審視整個投資組合。然後你有很多人以低利率購買了長期上限，並且可以長期持有。所以每一個都是個案。我們有一個很好的投資組合。我們非常小心地管理它。我們是基金中心。我們一個季度一個季度地進行。我們對未來 12 個月的一切都有展望，而且我們的管理非常好。

Certainly, the lowest cap rates were in that vintage, we did back off the market probably 6 months earlier than everybody else as we felt the market was getting irrational. And when the market was really getting a rationale, which is where we don't really deviate is on structure on your loans, people are lending without structure. So if you're just looking at the real estate, where a lot of these institutions have problems if the real estate has gone down and the borrowers have no level of recourse responsibility, those are the greatest risks, and that's not something that we really changed our standards on. We're known for having proper structure. We're known having loans that if the real estate itself has some issues that we're not just dependent on the real estate. So it puts us in a different set of circumstances than most of our peers.

當然，最低的資本化率是在那個年份，我們確實比其他人早 6 個月退出市場，因為我們覺得市場變得不合理了。當市場真正找到理由時，我們並沒有真正偏離你的貸款結構，人們在沒有結構的情況下放貸。因此，如果你只關注房地產，如果房地產價格下跌並且借款人沒有追索責任，那麼很多這些機構都會遇到問題，這是最大的風險，這不是我們真正想要的改變了我們的標準。我們以擁有適當的結構而聞名。我們知道有貸款，如果房地產本身有一些問題，我們不僅僅依賴房地產。因此，它使我們處於與大多數同行不同的環境中。

We will take our next question from Leon Cooperman with Omega Family Office.

歐米茄家族辦公室的萊昂·庫珀曼 (Leon Cooperman) 將提出下一個問題。

First, I'd like to just congratulate you. I've been involved with the company for many, many years and I think you have a well-deserved shout-out for how you position the company and through this whole period. And I know that a year ago, you were very cautious a little ahead of your time, but you turn out to be 100% right. I congratulate you.

首先，我想祝賀你。我在公司工作了很多很多年，我認為你對公司的定位以及整個時期的定位是當之無愧的。我知道一年前，你非常謹慎，有點超前，但事實證明你是 100% 正確的。我祝賀你。

I also want to add, I've been doing this about 60 years. And I've never seen a situation where a short report came out, where I couldn't find a phone number of the firm, no Internet address and no name with the firm. So this guy is an idiot and the SEC should be looking into -- I don't know if it's him or her, but it's totally bogus. I think they talked about a large mobile home portfolio of loans that bother them.

我還想補充一點，我從事這項工作已有 60 年了。而且我從來沒有見過這樣的情況：一份簡短的報告出來後，我找不到公司的電話號碼，沒有互聯網地址，也沒有公司名稱。所以這個人是個白痴，美國證券交易委員會應該調查——我不知道是他還是她，但這完全是假的。我認為他們談到了困擾他們的大量移動房屋貸款組合。

And if I'm correct, you don't have a dollar of loan to mobile home. So this is a bogus and crap like this should not have allowed to take place. I'm glad to see your repurchasing stock. Given your track record, you're smarter than me. I'm just curious, what are you think worth? I look at our payout ratio. I look at our return on equity. It seemed to me that if our stock yield at 8% or 9%, it would not be a reasonable that would put it at 20. So buying buy stock at these prices seems me very reasonable, very intelligent you have a view of value that's motivating your decision to buy back stock?

如果我是對的，你沒有一美元的貸款給移動房屋。因此，這是不應該允許發生的虛假和廢話。很高興看到你們回購股票。鑑於你的記錄，你比我聰明。我只是好奇，你覺得值多少錢？我看看我們的支付率。我看看我們的股本回報率。在我看來，如果我們的股票收益率為 8% 或 9%，將其定為 20 是不合理的。因此，以這些價格購買股票對我來說似乎非常合理，非常聰明，你的價值觀是促使您決定回購股票？

Yes. Well, listen, as I mentioned earlier, we would buy back a lot more, but we have to ration our capital and use it strategically. So we bought back, as I said, we'll probably go back to the Board and increase that buyback. And if the market becomes dislocated, as it currently is, we'll use part of our capital to do that as well as continue to build our franchise.

是的。好吧，聽著，正如我之前提到的，我們會回購更多，但我們必須配給我們的資本並有策略地使用它。所以我們回購了，正如我所說，我們可能會回到董事會並增加回購。如果市場變得混亂，就像現在這樣，我們將使用我們的部分資金來做到這一點，並繼續建立我們的特許經營權。

And Leon, I just want to say, we go back 30 years, you were an investor in of my original public companies in 1992. And you've been strong, not the easiest shareholder but you're always vocal a good friend of the company and has given us a lot of good perspectives, especially on the buyback side of the client.

里昂，我只想說，我們回到 30 年前，你是我 1992 年最初上市公司的投資者。你一直很堅強，不是最簡單的股東，但你總是直言不諱是我們的好朋友公司，給了我們很多好的觀點，尤其是在客戶的回購方面。

So in terms of valuation, listen, we've grown our book, we continue to grow our book. It's amazing to see our book grew 45% for years. We've increased our dividend now 11x, right? It's really 12, we missed last quarter because it was very conservative. So this was a little bit of a catch-up.

因此，就估值而言，聽著，我們已經擴大了我們的賬簿，我們將繼續擴大我們的賬簿。很高興看到我們的圖書多年來增長了 45%。我們現在的股息增加了 11 倍，對嗎？真的是 12，我們錯過了上個季度，因為它非常保守。所以這有點趕上了。

Our payout ratio is like 70%, extraordinarily low. So there's room there if we want -- I look at things in the long run. For me, as they say obviously, I'm the largest shareholder in the company, and these moves don't even phase me. They're just great opportunities to create value. if you take our dividend rate and you take what we typically trade in terms of dividend to price and you apply a conservative number, like an 8 we've traded between 7 and 8. Just to take 8, right, as a dividend yield that the market usually pays for in a stable market, take our dividend. You guys can do the math. I mean, Paul, what's the math on that?

我們的派息率大約是 70%，非常低。所以如果我們願意的話，那裡有空間——我從長遠來看。對我來說，正如他們所說的那樣，我是公司的最大股東，這些舉措甚至都沒有影響到我。它們只是創造價值的絕佳機會。如果你採用我們的股息率，你採用我們通常在股息方面交易的價格，你應用一個保守的數字，比如我們在 7 和 8 之間交易的 8。就拿 8，對，作為股息收益率市場通常會在穩定的市場中付出代價，拿走我們的紅利。你們可以算一下。我的意思是，保羅，這有什麼數學依據？

It's a $21 price, that math. And I think Ivan, what I would add to that is the piece of this is we have a very large capital-light agency business. And lots of companies that are not in our space that have those types of businesses trade on a PE, don't trade on a price to book or a dividend yield. We understand we're in the mortgage REIT space and you've got some level that you have to trade with. But clearly, we think that the value of that platform is much, much in excess of just trading on a price to book.

這是一個 21 美元的價格，那個數學。我認為伊万，我要補充的是，我們有一個非常大的輕資本代理業務。許多不在我們領域內的公司在 PE 上進行這些類型的業務交易，不以預定價格或股息收益率進行交易。我們知道我們在抵押房地產投資信託基金領域，你有一定的水平，你必須與之交易。但很明顯，我們認為該平台的價值遠不止以預定價格進行交易。

But even if you just did a price to book, at a 7 -- an 8% dividend yield, you're at $21. We probably traded between 7 and 8%, like you said, Ivan. So clearly, just to price us the way others get priced in this space, which we think is unfair, it's a $21 price.

但即使你只是做了一個預訂價格，在 7 - 8% 的股息收益率下，你的價格是 21 美元。正如你所說，我們可能交易了 7% 到 8%，伊万。很明顯，只是按照其他人在這個領域定價的方式給我們定價，我們認為這是不公平的，這是 21 美元的價格。

Yes. And what's incredible to me in the way people misevaluate in all the companies. And I say either the value us improperly or the value in the other companies improperly. These companies are posting huge CECL reserves and huge actual losses, right? So it's very easy to make interest spread on risky assets than book current earnings. But what the bottom line is, that the assets you're in are losing money and you should really reevaluate maybe they are priced improperly, maybe we're priced okay for now for this dislocation, but the losses they're taking on their office sector and all the other sectors that are in, they're massive.

是的。人們對所有公司的錯誤評估方式對我來說是不可思議的。我說要么我們的價值不正確，要么其他公司的價值不正確。這些公司公佈了巨大的 CECL 儲備和巨大的實際虧損，對吧？因此，與賬面當前收益相比，風險資產的利差非常容易。但最重要的是，你所擁有的資產正在虧損，你真的應該重新評估，也許它們的定價不當，也許我們現在的定價對這種錯位來說還不錯，但他們正在承受的損失是他們的辦公室部門和所有其他部門，它們是巨大的。

And if they wanted to say, okay, it's too bad where it's a sign of the market, it's this, it's that. we should be rewarded for an extraordinary discipline in sticking to the multifamily industry and not getting out of our expertise and our experience and having an asset class that even if it does suffer the losses are not huge, they're manageable, right?

如果他們想說，好吧，這是市場的標誌，就是這個，就是那個，這太糟糕了。我們應該因為堅持多戶家庭行業的非凡紀律而受到獎勵，而不是擺脫我們的專業知識和經驗，並擁有一種資產類別，即使它確實遭受損失也不大，但它們是可控的，對吧？

And I think that these are the companies in our space, in our peer group, that they should be valued lower or we should be valued higher, but not the same. It makes no sense to me whatsoever. And we also have a diversified operating platform. Before we even open the door between our services and escrow balances, we have tremendous income streams. Their income stream is one income stream. It's based on the loans they put on their books, how they borrow and how those loans perform. It's a monoline business which in these kind of times with those kind of assets are very, very scary. And I think the whole industry is looped by that fear. So either we outperform them or for they really hit a level that's really reflective of their asset quality.

我認為這些是我們這個領域的公司，在我們的同行群體中，他們應該被低估，或者我們應該被高估，但不一樣。這對我來說毫無意義。而且我們還有一個多元化的運營平台。在我們打開我們的服務和託管餘額之間的大門之前，我們就有了巨大的收入來源。他們的收入流是一種收入流。它基於他們記入賬簿的貸款、他們如何借貸以及這些貸款的表現。這是一個單線業務，在這樣的時代，擁有這樣的資產是非常非常可怕的。我認為整個行業都被這種恐懼所籠罩。因此，要么我們跑贏他們，要么他們真的達到了真正反映其資產質量的水平。

Anyway, I give you a well-deserved shout out, and I'm comfortable to be in your hands and stock looks very undervalued to me. I appreciate your response and your performance.

不管怎樣，我給你一個當之無愧的吶喊，我很高興能在你手中，股票在我看來被低估了。感謝您的回復和您的表現。

Thanks, Leon.

謝謝，萊昂。

We have reached a lot of time for questions. I will now turn the program back over to Ivan for any additional or closing remarks.

我們已經有很多時間提問了。我現在將把程序轉回給 Ivan 以徵求任何補充意見或結束意見。

Okay. Well, thank you, everybody, for your time. We're very pleased and patient to wait for this call to really address some of the negative sentiment that existed in the market in the dislocation. We hope by the information that we delivered by the call, most importantly, our performance, it gets to our shareholders in a comfortable position.

好的。好吧，謝謝大家抽出時間來。我們非常高興和耐心地等待這個電話會議真正解決錯位市場中存在的一些負面情緒。我們希望通過電話會議傳遞的信息，最重要的是我們的表現，讓我們的股東處於一個舒適的位置。

Yes, we are sound, we are fundamental, we have great management and a great track record. And I look forward to your continued participation and trust in the company and management. So everybody, have a great day. Have a great weekend, and thank you once again.

是的，我們是健全的，我們是根本的，我們有出色的管理和良好的業績記錄。我期待您繼續參與和信任公司和管理層。所以大家，祝你有美好的一天。祝你周末愉快，再次感謝你。

This does conclude today's program. Thank you for your participation. You may disconnect.

今天的節目到此結束。感謝您的參與。您可能會斷開連接。