使用警語:中文譯文來源為 AI 翻譯,僅供參考,實際內容請以英文原文為主
Operator
Operator
Welcome to the AllianceBernstein fourth quarter 2008 earnings review. At this time, all participants are in a listen-only mode. After the formal remarks, there will be a question-and-answer session. I will give you instructions on how to ask questions at that time. As a reminder, this conference is being recorded and will be replayed for one week.
歡迎收聽 AllianceBernstein 2008 年第四季財報回顧。此刻,所有與會者皆處於僅收聽模式。正式致詞結束後,將進行問答環節。屆時我會提供提問方式的說明。提醒各位,本次會議將被錄音,並將重播一週。
I would now like to turn the conference over to the host for this call, the Director of Investor Relations for AllianceBernstein. Mr. Philip Talamo, please go ahead.
現在我想把會議交給本次電話會議的主持人——AllianceBernstein 投資人關係總監 Philip Talamo 先生。請開始。
- Director of IR
- Director of IR
Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to our fourth quarter 2008 earnings review. As a reminder, this conference call is being webcast and is supported by a slide presentation that can be found in the Investor Relations section of our website at www.AllianceBernstein.com/InvestorRelations.
各位下午好,歡迎參加我們 2008 年第四季財報回顧。提醒各位,本次電話會議將以網路直播方式進行,並搭配投影片簡報;投影片可於我們網站 www.AllianceBernstein.com/InvestorRelations 的投資人關係專區找到。
Presenting our results today is our President and Chief Operating Officer, Gerry Lieberman. Following Gerry's remarks, our Chairman and CEO, Peter Kraus, will provide some additional commentary. Our CFO, Bob Joseph, will also be available to answer questions after the formal remarks.
今天由我們的總裁兼營運長 Gerry Lieberman 報告業績。Gerry 發言後,我們的董事長兼執行長 Peter Kraus 將提供補充評論。我們的財務長 Bob Joseph 也將在正式致詞後回答問題。
I would like to take this opportunity to note that some of the information we present today is forward-looking in nature, and as such is subject to certain SEC rules and regulations regarding disclosure. Our disclosure regarding forward-looking statements can be found on page two of our presentation, as well as in the risk factors section of our 2007 10-K. In light of the SEC's regulation FD, Management is limited to responding to inquiries from investors and analysts in a nonpublic forum. Therefore, we encourage you to ask all questions of a material nature on this call.
我想藉此機會指出,我們今天所呈現的部分資訊屬於前瞻性陳述,因此受特定美國證券交易委員會(SEC)揭露規則與法規之約束。我們關於前瞻性陳述的揭露可見於簡報第二頁,以及我們 2007 年 10-K 的風險因素章節。依據 SEC 的 FD 規範,管理層在非公開場合回應投資人與分析師詢問的範圍受到限制。因此,我們鼓勵您在本次電話會議中提出所有具重大性的問題。
Now I will turn it over to Gerry.
現在我把時間交給 Gerry。
- President, COO
- President, COO
Thank you, Phil, and good afternoon to everyone on the call.
謝謝你,Phil,也向所有在線上的各位致上下午好。
First of all, a belated Happy New Year to all, and let's indeed hope that it will in fact turn out to be a Happy New Year, despite so many dire predictions. Clearly, no tears are being shed for the passing of 2008, the year during which capital market losses and financial sector dislocation led to the loss of tens of trillions of dollars of wealth, and swamped the business dynamics of our industry, and more specifically our firm. Whether you refer to 2008 as the year of the perfect storm, the year of the financial tsunami, the year of the black swan or long tail, it was a year of shock and awe.
首先,向各位補上一句新年快樂,也確實希望儘管有那麼多悲觀預測,這一年最終仍會是個快樂的新年。顯然,沒有人會為 2008 年的結束而落淚;在那一年,資本市場的損失與金融部門的失序導致數以十兆美元計的財富蒸發,並淹沒了我們產業、尤其是我們公司本身的商業動能。無論你把 2008 年稱為「完美風暴」之年、「金融海嘯」之年、「黑天鵝」或「長尾」之年,那都是令人震撼與敬畏的一年。
As you all know too well, 2008 saw widespread carnage in the capital markets. As a firm, it was a year in which we were disappointed that we failed to provide much, if any, of a buffer to the losses of our clients. Furthermore, we underperformed benchmarks, in some cases by substantial amounts, in virtually all of our services, particularly in the fourth quarter. We owe our clients and our unit holders much better, and we are confident that we will do so.
各位都非常清楚,2008 年資本市場出現廣泛的慘烈下跌。就公司而言,我們對於未能為客戶的損失提供太多、甚至任何緩衝而感到失望。此外,在幾乎所有服務上,特別是在第四季,我們的表現落後於基準,有些情況下落後幅度相當大。我們欠客戶與單位持有人更好的成果,而我們有信心能做到。
As shown in displays three and four, equity returns in all corners of the capital markets were dire in 2008, declining a startling 20% or more in the fourth quarter. In fact, the fourth quarter erase would have been analyzed in cumulative three-year gains through the third quarter for all fixed equity indices that we plot on these displays. The S&P 500 posted its worst quarter since the fourth quarter of 1987, and its worst year since 1931, with little discrimination across styles, across geographies or capitalizations, as global equities declined more than 40% for the year. Specifically, 2008 was the worst year for the MSCI EAFE index since its inception in 1969, and emerging markets dropped an astonishing 53%.
如圖表三與圖表四所示,2008 年資本市場各個角落的股票報酬都非常慘淡,第四季更驚人地下跌 20% 以上。事實上,第四季的抹去效應,已把截至第三季為止累積的三年漲幅,從我們在這些圖表中所列示的所有股票指數中一筆勾銷。標普 500 指數創下自 1987 年第四季以來最差單季表現,並創下自 1931 年以來最差年度表現;不論風格、地區或市值大小,幾乎沒有差別,全球股票全年下跌逾 40%。具體而言,2008 年是 MSCI EAFE 指數自 1969 年成立以來最差的一年,而新興市場更驚人地下跌 53%。
Against this backdrop, we as asset managers fared poorly. As displays 27 to 35 in the appendix illustrate, our underperformance was widespread across our sweep of services. However, I would like to put this in context, not as an excuse but as an explanation. Our ability to understand and articulate what has happened, to describe the lessons learned and enhancements put in place, and to dimension the substantial opportunities we perceive, are all critical to retaining client confidence in our ability to recover lost performance.
在此背景下,我們作為資產管理人表現不佳。正如附錄中圖表 27 至 35 所示,我們在各項服務的整體範圍內普遍落後。然而,我希望將其置於脈絡中說明——不是藉口,而是解釋。我們能否理解並清楚闡述發生了什麼、描述汲取的教訓與已採取的改進,以及衡量我們所見的重大機會,對於維持客戶對我們恢復績效能力的信心都至關重要。
Our performance in many services was so poor in 2008, [that was badly] contaminated over once excellent long-term track records. This is visible on display five, which shows year-by-year absolute and relative performance of two of our flagship services, global value and global research growth. It is clear from this display that 2008 was a highly anomalous one, one in which we underestimated the magnitude, the breadth and the duration of the financial crisis, and its ultimate impact on global economics.
我們在 2008 年多項服務的表現如此糟糕,以致於把過去原本優異的長期績效紀錄[嚴重]污染。這在圖表五中可見端倪;該圖表顯示我們兩項旗艦服務——全球價值與全球研究成長——逐年的絕對與相對績效。從該圖表可清楚看出,2008 年極為反常;我們低估了金融危機的規模、廣度與持續時間,以及其對全球經濟的最終影響。
You will note that we have underperformed before; for instance, during the tech bubble in value, and post-bubble in growth. But you will also note that we recovered after these episodes. Today, our portfolios are positioned to balance historic opportunities against the still high levels of risk present in the capital markets. Importantly, we have not shied away from taking advantage of today's extreme dislocations, ensuring that we have sufficient exposure to securities that we expect will outperform as markets anticipate the eventual resolution of this crisis, and the inevitable but perhaps not imminent improvement in global economies.
你會注意到我們過去也曾落後;例如,價值策略在科技泡沫期間,以及成長策略在泡沫破裂後。但你也會注意到,我們在這些事件之後都曾恢復。如今,我們的投資組合定位是在仍然偏高的資本市場風險之下,平衡歷史性的機會。重要的是,我們並未迴避利用當前的極端錯置,確保對我們預期將在市場開始預期本次危機最終解決、以及全球經濟不可避免(但或許不會立即)改善時能跑贏的證券,維持足夠曝險。
I have discussed with you on recent conference calls, as well as with our clients, how important we believe this positioning is. By way of example, I like to share with you our very recent performance in about a dozen or so of our most important investment services as 2008 came to a close. The period starts with November 20th, the lowest point during 2008 in the US equity markets and, for that matter, in many global markets, and the period ends on December 31st. I realize that these dates represent both a very compressed and a very selective period. It nonetheless is illustrative of the fact that our portfolios are constructed to perform during a market recovery, which this actual recent period presents.
我在近期的電話會議以及與客戶的交流中都談到,我們認為這樣的定位有多重要。舉例來說,我想與各位分享 2008 年接近尾聲時,我們約十來項最重要投資服務的最新表現。期間自 11 月 20 日開始——那是 2008 年美國股市、以及許多全球市場的最低點——並於 12 月 31 日結束。我知道這些日期同時代表一段非常壓縮且相當選擇性的期間;但它仍能說明,我們的投資組合是為了在市場復甦時表現而建構,而這段近期實際期間正呈現了這一點。
These last six weeks of the year saw equity indices like the S&P 500 and MSCI World, as well as various retail benchmarks, increase between 18% and 28%; and the Barclay's US and global aggregate fixed income indices increased by 5% and 8% respectively. During this period, many of our equity services outperformed in the range of 200 to 2000 basis points, while two of our flagship fixed income services outperformed by 200 basis points. To be more specific, ten of our most important equity services were up 23% to 39% in this six-week period. And these two bond portfolios, which are heavily exposed to high-grade credit, were up 7% to 10%, thereby outperforming handsomely.
年末最後六週,標普 500 與 MSCI World 等股票指數,以及各種零售基準,上漲介於 18% 至 28%;而 Barclay's 美國與全球綜合債券指數分別上漲 5% 與 8%。在此期間,我們許多股票服務的超額報酬介於 200 至 2000 個基點;而我們兩項旗艦固定收益服務則超越基準 200 個基點。更具體地說,我們十項最重要的股票服務在這六週期間上漲 23% 至 39%。而這兩個債券投資組合因高度配置於高評級信用債,上漲 7% 至 10%,因此表現顯著優於基準。
I offer this only to illustrate how quickly performance deficits can reverse if the extreme risk aversion investors abates even modestly, and how we are positioning our portfolios for this scenario. Finally, I will note that the strongest evidence of our ability to generate superior results for our clients is our nearly 40-year track record of doing so, with disciplines that have been stress-tested before and have delivered, as shown on display three to six.
我提出這些僅為說明:一旦投資人對極端風險的厭惡即使只是略為緩解,績效缺口就可能迅速反轉,以及我們如何為此情境來定位投資組合。最後我要指出,證明我們有能力為客戶創造優異成果的最有力證據,是我們近 40 年來的實績紀錄;我們的投資紀律過去已經歷壓力測試並交出成果,如圖表三至六所示。
Now, let's turn to our firm's financial and operating results. I doubt I'm surprising anyone when I say the fourth quarter of 2008 was one of, if not the most, difficult quarters in the history of our firm. The collapse of the equity markets in general, and the financial sector companies in particular, resulted in large losses to equity, and in several cases bondholders alike, and in turn had significantly - had a vast impact on our financial results. Our AUM was down 42%, revenues were down 50%, and net income was down 69% when compared to the prior year quarter, even as expenses were cut 40%.
現在,讓我們轉向公司財務與營運結果。我想我不會讓任何人感到意外:2008 年第四季是我們公司歷史上最艱難的季度之一,甚至可能是最艱難的一季。整體股市的崩跌,尤其是金融類股公司的崩跌,導致股票投資人以及在若干情況下債券持有人都遭受重大損失,進而對我們的財務結果造成顯著——造成巨大的影響。與去年同期相比,我們的資產管理規模(AUM)下降 42%,營收下降 50%,淨利下降 69%,即使費用已削減 40%。
Displays six through nine reflect our assets under Management [growth boards] by channel and investment service for both the quarter and the full year. These displays show that our assets have declined by $128 billion or 22% for the quarter, and $338 billion or 42% for the full year 2008. With $462 billion in assets under Management as of December 31st, 2008, we are at our lowest level of AUM since the third quarter of 2003. The decline occurred mostly in our institutional and retail distribution channels, and was overwhelmingly due to market depreciation in both value and growth equities.
圖表六至九反映我們按通路與投資服務劃分的資產管理規模[成長板],涵蓋本季與全年。這些圖表顯示,我們的資產在本季減少 1,280 億美元或 22%,而 2008 全年減少 3,380 億美元或 42%。截至 2008 年 12 月 31 日,我們的資產管理規模為 4,620 億美元,為自 2003 年第三季以來的最低 AUM 水準。下降主要發生在機構與零售通路,且幾乎完全是由價值與成長股票的市場貶值所致。
Net outflows did accelerate in the four quarter to $23 billion, or more than one half of full year net outflows. The fourth quarter of 2008 saw record net outflows at all three channels, and all three equity managed services. I will provide more detail on net outflows in the three channels in just a couple of minutes. However, comparing displays six and seven will provide some insight into the dynamics driving flows. Specifically, you will see, when comparing the fourth quarter to the full year's flows, sales have slowed dramatically in all three channels. You will note an uptick in redemptions and terminations in our institutional and private client channels, with retail relatively in line with the full year. The fact is, we continue to anticipate weakness in flows until the capital markets stabilize, and our performance improves.
淨流出在第四季確實加速至230億美元,超過全年淨流出的一半。2008年第四季在三個通路以及三項股票型主動管理服務上,均出現創紀錄的淨流出。我將在幾分鐘後就三個通路的淨流出提供更多細節。不過,對照圖表六與圖表七,將可對推動資金流動的動態獲得一些洞見。具體而言,當你比較第四季與全年的資金流時,你會看到三個通路的銷售均大幅放緩。你也會注意到,我們的機構與私人客戶通路的贖回與終止有所上升,而零售通路則相對與全年水準一致。事實是,在資本市場趨於穩定且我們的績效改善之前,我們仍預期資金流將持續疲弱。
Now, let's turn to display ten, where I will begin my discussion of channel highlights. Excluding the transfer of assets to our retail channel for servicing, institutional investment assets under Management declined by 20% in the quarter to $291 billion, primarily due to market depreciation. Net outflows did accelerate to $10 billion, or more than two years of the full year outflows, and once again the main cause of increased net outflows is the lack of new sales, which was less than $6 billion in the quarter.
現在,讓我們看圖表十,我將從這裡開始討論各通路的重點。若排除為提供服務而轉入我們零售通路的資產,機構投資管理資產(AUM)在本季下降20%至2,910億美元,主要原因是市場貶值。淨流出加速至100億美元,超過全年淨流出的兩倍;而淨流出增加的主要原因再次是缺乏新的銷售,本季新銷售額不到60億美元。
For the full year, assets in this [shell] declined by 41% excluding transfers, with market depreciation accounting for over 90% of the decrease. A lack of new sales to offset the funding of previously awarded mandates caused our pipeline of one [but] unfunded institutional managed to fall by 43% to $8 billion, over 40% of which was in defined contribution AUM. Meanwhile, consultants have confirmed that search activity has slowed.
就全年而言,該通路的資產(排除轉移)下降41%,其中市場貶值占降幅的90%以上。由於缺乏新的銷售來抵銷先前已獲授權委託案的資金到位,我們已獲授權但尚未到位的機構管理資產管線下降43%至80億美元,其中超過40%為確定提撥(defined contribution)AUM。同時,顧問也已確認,搜尋(search)活動已放緩。
Before moving on to retail highlights, I like to mention that we just notified that we maintain a top ranking in an annual pension survey by a leading independent Japanese industry publication, Newsletter on Pension and Investments. This follows a recent survey in Australia, in which we were rated as the leading global equities manager, as measured by the number of clients, in the 2008 Peter Lee of area consultants. We are also rated number two for overall quality of client service.
在進入零售通路重點之前,我想先提到,我們剛收到通知:在日本一家領先的獨立產業刊物《Newsletter on Pension and Investments》所做的年度退休金調查中,我們仍維持名列前茅。這也延續了我們近期在澳洲的一項調查結果:在2008年Peter Lee顧問機構的評比中,以客戶數量衡量,我們被評為領先的全球股票管理人。我們在整體客戶服務品質方面也排名第二。
On display 11, you can see that our retail channel assets decreased by 27% for the quarter, excluding transfers in from an institutional investment channel. Once again, market depreciation was the principal cause for this decline, with net outflows of $9 billion in line with the prior quarter. While redemption stabilized when compared to the third quarter, already slow sales fell by 27% sequentially. For the full year, assets in this channel were half, excluding transfers. Nearly three quarters of this annual decline was due to market depreciation, and nearly three quarters of full year outflows occurred in the second half of the year.
在圖表11中,你可以看到,若排除自機構投資通路轉入的資產,我們的零售通路資產本季下降27%。同樣地,市場貶值是下降的主要原因,而淨流出90億美元與前一季相當。雖然相較第三季贖回已趨於穩定,但原本就偏弱的銷售額按季再下降27%。就全年而言,該通路資產(排除轉移)減半。這一年度降幅中,近四分之三來自市場貶值,而全年淨流出的近四分之三發生在下半年。
For those of you who plan to ask us a question regarding the potential third huge consolidation of distributors, with the announced Smith Barney/Morgan Stanley joint venture, following the BofA/Merrill Lynch and Wachovia/Wells Fargo mergers, it's a little early to assess the opportunities and risks that these transactions present for AllianceBernstein. With that said, we can - plan to continue our strategy of aligning research and knowledge with the advice delivery platforms of financial institution distributors to improve the investment outcomes for the individual investors we jointly serve. At the same time, we think we can bring still more value for the largest distributors with this strategy.
對於各位可能會就分銷商潛在的第三波大型整併提出問題——在先前BofA/美林(Merrill Lynch)以及Wachovia/富國銀行(Wells Fargo)合併之後,又宣布Smith Barney/摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)合資——目前要評估這些交易對AllianceBernstein帶來的機會與風險仍為時過早。儘管如此,我們可以——並計畫——持續推動我們的策略:將研究與專業知識與金融機構分銷商的建議交付平台對齊,以改善我們共同服務之個人投資人的投資成果。同時,我們也認為,透過此策略,我們能為最大的分銷商帶來更多價值。
Turn to the display 12. You will see that our private client channel AUM fell by 19% during the quarter, as net outflows increased to $4 billion. Additionally, during the quarter we received hedge fund redemption notifications totaling $900 million, redemptions which will be reflected in our January AUM. A portion of these redemptions will remain with the firm, invested in other services.
請看圖表12。你會看到,我們的私人客戶通路AUM在本季下降19%,因淨流出增加至40億美元。此外,本季我們收到對沖基金贖回通知合計9億美元,這些贖回將反映在我們1月的AUM中。其中一部分贖回資金將留在本公司,轉投於其他服務。
Despite one of the most turbulent investment climates in history, we did continue to add new accounts, albeit at a slower rate. Our closed account rate for the year, which did accelerate at the end of the year, was 5%, versus our historical rate of 4%. This compares quite favorably to our peak of 18% for the full year of 2000. And although down from recent years, our gross cash flow, which represents new assets from new and existing clients, still exceeded $13 billion for the year, and is reflective of the continued appeal of our private client value proposition.
儘管面臨史上最動盪的投資環境之一,我們仍持續新增帳戶,只是速度較慢。我們全年關戶率在年底確實加速上升,為5%,相較我們歷史平均的4%。與2000年全年18%的高峰相比,這一數字仍相當有利。且雖較近年下降,我們的總現金流入(gross cash flow)——代表來自新客戶與既有客戶的新資產——全年仍超過130億美元,反映出我們私人客戶價值主張持續具吸引力。
As far as our team of financial advisors is concerned, although we did indeed downsize our staff levels, we did so by carefully keeping both the best and the highest potential professionals that service our private clients. Undesired turnover has been avoided, and we plan to start hiring new advisors shortly.
就我們的理財顧問團隊而言,雖然我們確實縮減了人力規模,但我們是透過審慎方式進行,保留了服務私人客戶的最佳與最具潛力的專業人士。我們避免了非預期的人才流失,並計畫在不久後開始招募新的顧問。
Display 13 shows that during third quarter 2008, the total AUM associated with our suite of alternative services fell by 19% sequentially, due mostly to hedge fund market depreciation. Alternative investment assets fell 32% versus the end of 2007 to $6.6 billion. This market depreciation and net outflows in hedge fund services were partially offset by net inflows in our standalone currency services. To put this in context, it was reported last week that the global hedge fund assets dropped below a trillion dollars for the first time in four years.
圖表13顯示,在2008年第三季,我們一系列另類服務所對應的總AUM按季下降19%,主要由於對沖基金的市場貶值。另類投資資產較2007年底下降32%至66億美元。對沖基金服務的市場貶值與淨流出,部分被我們獨立貨幣服務的淨流入所抵銷。作為背景,上週有報導指出,全球對沖基金資產規模四年來首次跌破1兆美元。
Turning to display 14, you will note that our institutional research services' full year revenue was up 11% to a record of $472 million, with robust growth in the US offsetting a modest decline in Europe. Fourth quarter revenue was flat year-over-year, and down 5% sequentially, as market volumes decelerated significantly in the second half of the quarter. But this has not at all put a damper on an outstanding, and perhaps our best, year with respect to our research trading and sales support.
再看圖表14,你會注意到,我們機構研究服務的全年營收成長11%至創紀錄的4.72億美元,其中美國的強勁成長抵銷了歐洲的小幅下滑。第四季營收與去年同期持平,且按季下降5%,因本季後半段市場成交量顯著放緩。但這絲毫未影響我們在研究交易與銷售支援方面表現出色——或許也是我們最好的一年。
Before turning to our discussion of the P&L, let's turn to display 15, which provides detail behind the changes to the composition of our AUM. As you can see, the events of 2008 not only greatly reduced our AUM but changed its composition. We ended 2007 with three quarters of our assets in equities, and one quarter in fixed incomes. One year later, we are much closer to a 60/40 split in favor of equities. To a lesser degree, but not inconsequential, our mix of US versus global and international services shifted by 500 basis points away from global and international. These trends have exacerbated the impact of lower AUM on our revenues, as our revenue yields as measured by our annual fee base decreased from 44 to 42 basis points at the end of the year.
在進入損益表(P&L)的討論之前,先看圖表15,該圖表提供AUM組成變化的細節。如你所見,2008年的事件不僅大幅降低了我們的AUM,也改變了其組成。我們在2007年底時,資產有四分之三為股票、四分之一為固定收益。一年後,我們更接近以股票為主的60/40配置。程度較小但不可忽視的是,我們美國服務相對於全球與國際服務的組合,也有500個基點的變化,從全球與國際轉向美國。這些趨勢加劇了AUM下降對營收的影響,因以年度費基衡量的營收收益率(revenue yields)在年底由44個基點降至42個基點。
Now, moving to the income statement. I will begin with a discussion of revenues as shown on display 16. Net revenues fell by 50% versus the fourth quarter of 2007 to $581 million. A sharp reduction in advisory fees, and mostly lower base fees resulting from the severe erosion of assets under Management that I discussed earlier, accounted for almost two-thirds of the decline, with a decrease in performance fees and the effect of the exchange that I just covered accounting for the remainder.
現在,轉到損益表。我將從圖表16所示的營收開始。淨營收較2007年第四季下降50%至5.81億美元。顧問費大幅減少,以及主要因我先前提到的管理資產嚴重縮水而導致的基本費用下降,合計約占降幅的三分之二;其餘則來自績效費用下降以及我剛剛說明的匯兌影響。
An $82 million increase in losses on investments, related to early -- related to employee deferred compensation, and a negative $34 million swing to the mark to market of our venture capital fund, contributed to the additional 20% of this decline. Now remember that our mark-to-market losses on the deferred compensation investments have a corresponding offset in current and future incentive compensation expense, and only 10% of the venture capital fund results flow to our bottom line, with 90% offset reflected below the operating income line in our P&L.
與員工遞延薪酬相關的投資損失增加8,200萬美元,以及我們創投基金按市價評價(mark-to-market)出現負3,400萬美元的變動,合計造成額外約20%的降幅。請記住,我們在遞延薪酬投資上的按市價損失,會在當期與未來的獎勵性薪酬費用中有相對應的抵銷;而創投基金的結果只有10%會流入我們的最終損益,另有90%的抵銷會在P&L中營業利益線以下反映。
Distribution revenues were nearly half to $64 million, as retail AUM fell by a similar percentage during 2008. These lower revenues were offset by lower distribution plan payments, which are recorded in promotion and servicing expense, and shown on display 19. The decrease in dividend and interest income reflects lower dividend payments received from mutual fund investments related to employee deferred compensation, as well as the late 2007 outsourcing of our prime brokerage services. Finally, lower interest rates was a primary driver of low - interest expense, but our prime brokerage outsourcing also contributed to this decline, even as the net prime brokage interest a year ago was only $1 million.
分銷收入幾乎減半至6,400萬美元,因2008年零售AUM以相近幅度下滑。這些較低的收入被較低的分銷計畫付款所抵銷;該等付款記錄於推廣與服務費用中,並在圖表19呈現。股利與利息收入的下降,反映了與員工遞延薪酬相關之共同基金投資所收到的股利分配減少,以及我們在2007年底將主經紀(prime brokerage)服務外包。最後,較低的利率是利息費用偏低的主要驅動因素,但主經紀外包也促成了這一下降,儘管一年前主經紀淨利息也僅為100萬美元。
Display 17 provides additional analysis of our advisory fees. Lower base fees represent over 90% of the $381 million or 43% decline in advisory fees, with the lack of performance fees comprising the remainder. Though all three buy-side distribution channels incurred significant declines in revenue, with retail down a full 50%, institutional investments down 43% and private client down 35%, which corresponds to full year AUM declines in each channel shown back on display 7.
圖表17提供了對我們顧問費的進一步分析。較低的基本費用占顧問費下滑3.81億美元(或43%)中的90%以上,其餘則來自缺乏績效費。儘管三個買方分銷通路的收入皆大幅下滑,其中零售下滑整整50%、機構投資下滑43%、私人客戶下滑35%,這與圖表7所示各通路全年AUM下滑幅度相一致。
Before going into a discussion of expenses, let's look at display 18 to see where we closed the year in regards to our reduction in force initiative. You can see on this bar chart our staff levels were down by 663 for the quarter, or just under 12% versus our September 30 levels. These figures did not exclude some staff members who have already been notified of the dismissal, but still on the payroll at year end. In addition, we have announced internally that we have identified approximately 80 positions that will be eliminated later this year as we move that work offshore.
在進入費用討論之前,先看圖表18,了解我們裁員(reduction in force)計畫在年末的進度。從這張長條圖可見,本季員工人數減少663人,較9月30日的水準下降接近12%。這些數字未排除部分已收到解雇通知、但在年末仍列於薪資名冊上的員工。此外,我們已在內部宣布,隨著我們將相關工作移轉至海外,今年稍晚還將再裁撤約80個職位。
While on the topic of expense reduction initiatives, ACTUAL capital expenditure reduced by about 50% below our original 2008 plan, and our 2009 capital plan includes a further 10% reduction from 2008 levels. As Peter remarked in our press release earlier today, if a worsening of economic and market conditions occurs, we may consider additional measures. I will cover the cost of the reduction in force, and the associated savings, in just a couple of minutes.
談到費用削減措施,實際資本支出較我們原先的2008年計畫降低約50%,而我們的2009年資本計畫則在2008年水準上再降低10%。正如Peter今天稍早在新聞稿中所提到的,若經濟與市場狀況進一步惡化,我們可能會考慮採取額外措施。我將在幾分鐘後說明裁員成本及其相關節省效益。
Let's start from the top with my review of expenses. Operating expenses, as shown on display 19, declined by $302 million or 37% year-over-year, with about two-thirds of the decrease coming from employee compensation and benefits, which fell by 44%. I will discuss the changes in employee compensation and benefits in greater detail on the next display. Promotion and servicing expense decreased by 40% or $71 million versus last year's fourth quarter. The lower distribution plan payments referenced to earlier accounted for approximately one-half of this decline. Controlled expenses, primarily travel related costs, but also decreases in printing and mailing, accounted for approximately one-third of this decline. General and administrative expenses were down 14% or $22 million verses the prior year quarter. Incremental foreign exchange gains, as well as lower consulting and legal costs, were the principal causes behind the decline, while infrastructure costs such as rented technology were essentially flat.
我先從費用總覽開始。如圖表19所示,營業費用年減3.02億美元(或37%),其中約三分之二的降幅來自員工薪酬與福利,該項目下降44%。我將在下一張圖表更詳細說明員工薪酬與福利的變動。推廣與服務費用較去年第四季下降40%(或7,100萬美元)。先前提到的較低分銷計畫付款約占此降幅的一半。受控費用(主要為差旅相關成本,亦包括印刷與郵寄費用下降)約占此降幅的三分之一。一般及行政費用較去年同期下降14%(或2,200萬美元)。額外的外匯收益,以及較低的顧問與法律成本,是下降的主要原因;而租用科技等基礎設施成本則大致持平。
Details behind the 44% decrease in employee compensation benefits are shown on display 20. Base compensation was actually up 27% versus last year, due to $40 million in severance associated with work force reduction efforts. We anticipate these reductions will generate annual savings in excess of $70 million in salaries and related fringe costs. In addition, these individuals were rewarded over $40 million in incentive compensation in 2007, thereby reducing the demand on IC for 2008 and going forward. Fourth quarter incentive compensation expense was only $4 million or $174 million lower than last year. The primary causes for this decline was the year end true-ups of our incentive compensation and profit sharing plan accruals to the tune of $113 million. Also, the quarter saw an annual - saw an $80 million credit to the deferred compensation expense, due to the impact of mark-to-market losses and lower dividends for these investments, versus only a $12 million credit in the fourth quarter of 2007.
員工薪酬與福利下降44%的細節列於圖表20。由於與裁員相關的4,000萬美元資遣費,基本薪酬實際上較去年增加27%。我們預期這些裁減將帶來每年超過7,000萬美元的薪資及相關附加成本節省。此外,這些人員在2007年獲得超過4,000萬美元的激勵性薪酬,因此降低了2008年及未來對IC(激勵性薪酬)的需求。第四季激勵性薪酬費用僅400萬美元,較去年減少1.74億美元。此降幅的主要原因是年末對激勵性薪酬與利潤分享計畫應計數的調整(true-ups),金額達1.13億美元。此外,本季—年度—遞延薪酬費用出現8,000萬美元的貸項(credit),係因這些投資的按市價評價(mark-to-market)損失及較低股利所致;相較之下,2007年第四季僅有1,200萬美元的貸項。
These expense reductions were partially offset by an $18 million accrual related to our former Chairman's retirement. Investments related to employee deferred compensation, disclosed on display 37, stood at $306 million at the end of 2008. Total commissions fell by 41%, with year-over-year declines in all three asset management channels, most significantly in institutional investments and private client. Fringes and other expenses fell by 38%, predominantly due to lower payroll taxes, a function of lower year and bonus accruals, as well as lower recruitment expenses.
上述費用削減部分被與我們前任董事長退休相關的1,800萬美元應計費用所抵銷。員工遞延薪酬相關投資(見圖表37)於2008年底為3.06億美元。總佣金下降41%,三個資產管理通路皆呈年減,其中以機構投資與私人客戶降幅最為顯著。附加福利及其他費用下降38%,主要因薪資稅較低(係較低的年度與獎金應計所致),以及招募費用下降。
On display 21, you will find a summary income statement for the operating partnership with quarterly and full year detail. As you can determine from this display, the drop in fourth quarter revenues constituted nearly 60% of the full year decline. Despite aggressive management expenses, which were down 40% and 18% for the quarter and full year respectively, net income fell 69% and operating margin declined by more than 1300 basis points versus fourth quarter 2007. Of course, both of these items include the adverse impact of separation charges that I mentioned earlier. Fourth quarter 2008 income taxes were only $2 million, due primarily to the reversal of approximately $13 million in tax reserves pursuant to FIN 48, as tax examinations were completed without material assessments for those years.
在圖表21中,您將看到營運合夥企業的損益表摘要,包含季度與全年明細。由此可見,第四季營收下滑幾乎占全年降幅的60%。儘管我們積極管理費用,使費用在本季與全年分別下降40%與18%,淨利仍下滑69%,營業利益率較2007年第四季下降逾1,300個基點。當然,這兩項數字都包含我先前提到的分離費用(separation charges)的不利影響。2008年第四季所得稅僅200萬美元,主要因依FIN 48回轉約1,300萬美元的稅務準備金,因稅務查核完成且該等年度未有重大核定補稅。
Display 22 details the holding company's financials. Net income and distributions per unit were down 73% versus the fourth quarter of 2007, a slightly larger decline than at the operating partnership level. As a reminder, the holding company pays a 3.5% Federal tax on its share of the operating partnership's gross revenues, and not net income, thus explaining the holding partnership's increased effective tax rate.
圖表22詳列控股公司的財務數據。每單位淨利與分配金較2007年第四季下降73%,降幅略大於營運合夥企業層級。提醒一下,控股公司就其分攤之營運合夥企業總收入(gross revenues)而非淨利繳納3.5%的聯邦稅,因此可解釋控股合夥企業有效稅率上升。
Before I wrap up, I would like to briefly address the overall health of AllianceBernstein. Our firm is one of the world's largest organizations focused exclusively on investment research and management for our clients. We are not a commercial bank. We do not originate mortgages, hold proprietary positions in mortgage-backed securities, or use our balance sheets for other banking activities that are at the epicenter of the recent problems. Not are we an investment bank or an assurance company that engages in investment banking activities, thereby having direct exposure to troubled assets. Additionally, AllianceBernstein has long maintained a conservative balance sheet, which is reflected in our strong long-term credit ratings of S&P at AA-minus, Moody's at A-1 and Fitch at A-plus, and we have a balance sheet that's backed up with significant committed credit lines.
在結束之前,我想簡要談談AllianceBernstein的整體健康狀況。我們公司是全球最大、專注於為客戶提供投資研究與管理的機構之一。我們不是商業銀行;我們不承作房貸、不持有自營的房貸抵押證券部位,也不使用資產負債表從事其他位於近期問題核心的銀行業務。我們也不是從事投資銀行業務的投資銀行或保險公司,因此不會直接曝險於問題資產。此外,AllianceBernstein長期維持保守的資產負債表,反映在我們強勁的長期信用評等:標普AA-、穆迪A-1、惠譽A+;同時,我們的資產負債表亦有相當規模的承諾性信用額度作為支撐。
Clearly, 2008 will be a remembered as one of the most difficult markets in a lifetime, one in which fundamental considerations were ultimately overwhelmed by fear in driving security prices. Real challenges to the global economy remain, and that will impact the reemergence of investor confidence and a recovery. Yet the deep fear that has overtaken investors has also resulted in potentially historic investment opportunities across the capital markets. Our task remains what it has been throughout our history, to apply deep and objective research, to separate emotion from fact as we assess securities for our clients' portfolios, and the pursuit of long-term investing success. While doing so, Peter and I are confident we will continue to control expenses and invest in a very few select strategic initiatives to strengthen and broaden investment services in order to meet our clients' needs.
顯然,2008年將被記為一生中最艱難的市場之一;在那樣的市場中,基本面考量最終被恐懼所淹沒,並主導了證券價格。全球經濟仍面臨真正的挑戰,這將影響投資人信心的重現與復甦。然而,席捲投資人的深層恐懼,也在資本市場各領域帶來可能具有歷史意義的投資機會。我們的任務一如既往:運用深入且客觀的研究,在為客戶投資組合評估證券時將情緒與事實區分開來,並追求長期投資成功。在此同時,Peter與我有信心,我們將持續控制費用,並僅在少數精選的策略性計畫上投入,以強化並擴展投資服務,滿足客戶需求。
Our balance sheet is strong, our intellectual capital is intact, and our expenses and capital outlays are being aggressively managed, while we continue to invest in our most important strategic initiatives. Therefore, we believe that AllianceBernstein is well positioned for the future, and that our efforts will benefit all of our stakeholders in the long run.
我們的資產負債表強健、智識資本完好無損,費用與資本支出正被積極管理,同時我們仍持續投資於最重要的策略性計畫。因此,我們相信AllianceBernstein已為未來做好良好布局,而我們的努力將在長期使所有利害關係人受益。
Now, I will turn the call over to Peter.
現在,我把電話會議交給Peter。
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
Thank you, Gerry. Good evening to all on the phone.
謝謝你,Gerry。各位電話線上的朋友,晚安。
As all of you know, and I'm sure are experiencing, we are living in an environment characterized by turmoil all around us. The turmoil is changing the landscape, and in some cases dramatically. Our organization, as we have just discussed, has been impacted by this for sure. But AllianceBernstein exhibits three traits that I think will differentiate us from the competition going forward. First, although Gerry mentioned this I want to reiterate it, our financial strength, clean balance sheet, high liquidity and financial flexibility. Specifically $4.3 billion of partner capital, only $285 million of debt, a $1 billion dollar credit facility available to us, ratings of AA-minus and A-1. A majority of our third party assets are custody - of our assets are custodied at a third party, both institutionally and for private clients. Less than $100 million of long-term investments net on the balance sheet. No derivatives and off balance sheet obligations. A very strong financial statement indeed, which will give us the financial flexibility to do things in the future that others may have trouble doing.
各位都知道,而且我相信你們也正親身感受,我們正處於一個四周充滿動盪的環境。這種動盪正在改變局勢,在某些情況下甚至是劇烈地改變。正如我們剛才討論的,我們的組織當然也受到影響。但我認為,AllianceBernstein具備三項特質,將使我們在未來與競爭對手有所區隔。第一,雖然Gerry已提到,但我想再次強調:我們的財務實力、乾淨的資產負債表、高流動性與財務彈性。具體而言:43億美元的合夥人資本、僅2.85億美元的負債、可供使用的10億美元信用額度,評等為AA-與A-1。我們多數第三方資產由第三方保管—我們的資產在機構與私人客戶層面皆由第三方託管。資產負債表上的長期投資(淨額)不到1億美元。沒有衍生性商品與表外義務。這確實是一份非常強健的財務報表,將賦予我們財務彈性,使我們未來能做一些其他人可能難以做到的事。
Secondly, consistency in senior leaders in both the investment and client-facing roles. This longevity in the leaders is buttressed by investment teams that are energized about the opportunity to take advantage of historic dislocations, and client-facing teams, importantly, that are excited by the challenge of creating investment opportunities that will meet the needs of our clients. I assure, we cannot spend enough time with our clients, and our investment teams are excited by the research that they are doing and the opportunities they see.
第二,投資端與客戶端高階領導團隊的穩定一致。這些領導者的長期任職,並由充滿動能的投資團隊所支撐;投資團隊對把握歷史性錯位(dislocations)的機會感到振奮;而客戶面團隊更重要的是,對於創造能滿足客戶需求的投資機會之挑戰感到興奮。我向各位保證,我們與客戶相處的時間再多都不嫌多;而我們的投資團隊也對其正在進行的研究以及所看到的機會感到振奮。
Third, a research-driven culture. The value of research has never been more in evidence. It drives exceptional investment performance, it drives effective advice on asset allocation for private clients and institutional accounts, it drives effective risk budgeting for both current markets and long-term trends, and it drives unique advice for buy-side clients regarding investment themes and specific opportunities. We suspect that markets will continue to be volatile, uncertain, and create significant change in the competitive landscape, but leveraging the three core characteristics that I mentioned, financial strength and resultant flexibility, consistent senior leadership providing reliability to the investment process and sustainability of long-term client relationships, and a research-driven culture, we believe will give AllianceBernstein the competitive edge to grow our business through these difficult markets and outpace the competition.
第三,研究驅動的文化。研究的價值從未如此明顯。它推動卓越的投資績效,推動對私人客戶與機構帳戶在資產配置上的有效建議,推動對當前市場與長期趨勢的有效風險預算,並為買方客戶就投資主題與特定機會提供獨到的建議。我們認為市場將持續波動且充滿不確定性,並在競爭格局中帶來重大變化;但若能運用我提到的三項核心特質——財務實力及由此帶來的彈性、一貫的高階領導為投資流程提供可靠性並確保長期客戶關係的可持續性,以及研究驅動的文化——我們相信將使聯博(AllianceBernstein)在這些艱難市場中取得競爭優勢、推動業務成長並超越競爭對手。
Now let me just say a few words on the capital markets themselves. While we have seen some signs of better credit markets, as stronger corporate credits have been able to access capital markets and credit spreads have tightened somewhat, and the liquidity in those names has improved, economic data continues to deteriorate. Housing data, credit losses, employment statistics, GDP levels, retail data, all continue to show significant weakness. On top of this, financial stress on the balance sheets of the world's banks continue to be acute. New lending is episodic, capital growth in the face of deteriorating asset quality is certainly a challenge, offsetting the affects of deleveraging in the capital markets, and reengaging the unsecured debt market to provide wholesale funding to the balance sheet to these banks has been very hard to do.
現在我想就資本市場本身簡單談幾句。雖然我們已看到信貸市場出現一些改善跡象——較強的企業信用已能進入資本市場、信用利差有所收窄,且這些標的的流動性也有所改善——但經濟數據仍在惡化。房市數據、信貸損失、就業統計、GDP 水準、零售數據等,仍持續顯示顯著疲弱。除此之外,全球銀行資產負債表所承受的金融壓力依然十分嚴峻。新增放貸呈間歇性;在資產品質惡化的情況下要實現資本成長無疑是一項挑戰;要抵消資本市場去槓桿化的影響,以及重新啟動無擔保債務市場以為這些銀行的資產負債表提供批發性資金來源,都非常困難。
Having said this, governments around the globe and related central banks are clearly focused on creating demand for goods and services and stimulating credit. Those actions will ultimately do just that. Although just one anecdote, when looking for where there is evidence of lending growth, China recently has experienced some loan growth in November of '08. Here, the government's very clear attempts to stimulate investment may be taking early root. We would expect similar impacts in the US, and later in Europe over time, as actual dollars and euros are being spent. Of course, the timing for the recovery will depend significantly on when and how these funds are spent.
話雖如此,全球各國政府及相關央行顯然正專注於創造商品與服務需求並刺激信貸。這些行動最終將達成上述目標。雖然只是個別例子,但在尋找放貸成長的證據時,中國在 2008 年 11 月近期確實出現了一些貸款成長。在此,政府非常明確的刺激投資企圖可能已開始初步見效。我們預期隨著實際美元與歐元支出逐步落地,美國也會出現類似影響,而歐洲則會在更晚一些的時間出現。當然,復甦的時點將在很大程度上取決於這些資金何時以及如何被支出。
It's against this backdrop that we continue to believe that deep research focused on broad trends, as well as company-by-company analysis, both fundamental and quantitative, will unearth unusually attractive security selection and drive out performance in our various investment services. While the timeframe for recovery, as I said, remains unclear, that it will occur is irrefutable. We believe we have positioned our portfolios to produce outsized returns that we have historically provided to our clients, and we also believe that the strength of Sanford C. Bernstein Research Platform on the sales side will be rewarded by buy-side clients in significant - to a significant extent.
在這樣的背景下,我們仍然相信,聚焦於宏觀趨勢的深度研究,以及逐家公司進行的分析(包含基本面與量化),將能挖掘出異常具吸引力的選股機會,並推動我們各項投資服務的超額表現。正如我所說,復甦的時間框架仍不明朗,但復甦必然會發生是無可辯駁的。我們相信我們已將投資組合定位於產生我們歷來為客戶提供的超額報酬;同時我們也相信,Sanford C. Bernstein 研究平台在銷售端的實力,將在很大程度上獲得買方客戶的回報。
I wanted to return to one area that when I last addressed all of you we discussed, which is the area of the DC business. It is it a place in which we continue to place a fair bit of focus and investment for us, and while it's still a fledgling business, I wanted to share some facts directly with you. In 2006 the business had less than $1 billion of net inflows. In '07 we won and funded over $4 billion of mandates, and in '08 over $6 billion of mandates. Our current one and unfunded mandates at this date in '09 are $3.5 billion. As of December 31, 2008, we are managing over $12 billion of DC assets. So while we have just begun to talk with our largest clients about our new flexible platform CRF, which DC sponsors can use to create multiple investment options for their participants, we believe that this business will continue to grow at the rapid rate that we seen so far. We are still relatively small in size, and that - but that business will continue to expand and create a meaningful incremental asset growth, and further deepen our relationships with our largest and most important clients, a key objective for us.
我想回到一個領域,也就是我上次向各位發言時我們討論過的——DC 業務。我們持續在此投入相當多的關注與投資;雖然這仍是一項新興業務,但我想直接與各位分享一些事實。2006 年該業務的淨流入不到 10 億美元。2007 年我們贏得並完成資金到位的委託超過 40 億美元;2008 年則超過 60 億美元。截至 2009 年目前這個時點,我們已取得但尚未到位的委託為 35 億美元。截至 2008 年 12 月 31 日,我們管理的 DC 資產超過 120 億美元。因此,雖然我們才剛開始與最大型客戶討論我們新的彈性平台 CRF(DC 方案贊助方可用以為其參與者建立多種投資選項),我們相信該業務將以迄今所見的快速速度持續成長。我們目前規模仍相對較小,但該業務將持續擴張、帶來有意義的增量資產成長,並進一步深化我們與最大且最重要客戶的關係——這是我們的一項關鍵目標。
I would like to turn now, if I might, to some important people changes for us at AllianceBernstein. While I have spent a fair bit of time and we have all focused on our performance and the efficacy of our investment process, in times of financial stress we also want to continue to strengthen the focus on our clients. Clients are first and foremost our most important asset. In that regard, we have asked Marilyn Fedak to take on an expanded role as Vice Chairman of Investment Services. As such, she will focus on our largest and most important institutional and private clients around the world. She will continue to focus on trading, [count] assessment, remain a member of the Executive Committee, and of course stay a valued member of the investment policy group for the value team. Sharon Fay will step up and become the Head of the value business, and lead the value team going forward. We wish both Marilyn and Sharon great success in their new efforts.
如果可以的話,我現在想談談聯博(AllianceBernstein)一些重要的人事變動。雖然我花了不少時間、我們也都聚焦於績效以及投資流程的有效性,但在金融壓力時期,我們也希望持續強化對客戶的關注。客戶是我們首要且最重要的資產。基於此,我們請 Marilyn Fedak 擔任擴大職責的投資服務副董事長(Vice Chairman of Investment Services)。在此職務上,她將聚焦於我們全球最大且最重要的機構與私人客戶。她將持續專注於交易、[count] 評估,仍將是執行委員會成員,並且當然也會繼續擔任價值團隊投資政策小組的重要成員。Sharon Fay 將晉升為價值業務負責人,並在未來領導價值團隊。我們祝福 Marilyn 與 Sharon 在新職務上都能取得巨大成功。
With that, I'm going to turn the conversation over to you to ask questions of Gerry and I. So please, Phil, start that process.
接下來,我把時間交給各位,歡迎向 Gerry 和我提問。所以,Phil,請開始進行。
- Director of IR
- Director of IR
Lynn, we will take our first question.
Lynn,我們將開始第一個提問。
Operator
Operator
(Operator Instructions).
(接線員指示)。
Your first question comes from the line of William Katz with Buckingham Research.
第一個問題來自 Buckingham Research 的 William Katz。
- Analyst
- Analyst
A question before I get into the meat of my question, I wanted to make sure I heard you correctly. On the compensation you mentioned, Gerry, that it was $113 million. Was that all a true-up? In other words, the next quarter would reset $113 million higher? Also in terms of the mark-to-market adjustment, the $80 million, is that sort of the 1/16 we should be thinking about on a go-forward basis, or was anything sort of that comes off that as a potential offset? And then could you clarify the FX gain on the G&A line that may not repeat itself in the next quarter? And I have a more substantive question after that.
在進入我問題的重點之前,我想先確認我是否聽清楚了。關於你提到的薪酬,Gerry,你說是 1.13 億美元。那全部都是一次性的調整(true-up)嗎?換句話說,下一季會以高出 1.13 億美元的水準重新設定嗎?另外,就按市價評估(mark-to-market)調整而言,那 8,000 萬美元是否可視為未來的參考(例如我們應該把它當作往後的 1/16)?或者是否有任何可能抵銷的項目會從中扣除?再者,你能否釐清本季在 G&A(一般及行政費用)項下的外匯收益(FX gain),該收益可能在下一季不會重複出現?之後我還有一個更實質的問題。
- President, COO
- President, COO
Bill, you're going too fast. Let's start with your - what was your second question? I missed that totally.
Bill,你講得太快了。我們先從你的——你的第二個問題是什麼?我完全漏聽了。
- Analyst
- Analyst
I just want to know the FX - the second one was on the mark-to-market impact in fourth quarter, how much I guess repeats in to the new quarter, just as a guidepost?
我想了解外匯——第二個問題是關於第四季按市價評估(mark-to-market)的影響,有多少會延續到新的一季,作為一個指引?
- President, COO
- President, COO
Bill, you had three questions, right? One is $113million. One is the $80 million.
Bill,你有三個問題,對吧?一個是 1.13 億美元;一個是 8,000 萬美元。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Right, and then can you quantify the FX gain that I guess helped G&A this quarter? Those are sort of - I put as clarifying questions. I do have one more substantive question.
對,然後你能否量化外匯收益——我想它在本季幫助了 G&A?這些算是釐清性的問題。我另外還有一個更實質的問題。
- President, COO
- President, COO
Let's start with the 113. What the $113 million true-up does is bring the cash IC for the year to the number we wanted it to be for the year. That's what the 113 did. You with me, Bill?
我們先從 1.13 億開始。這 1.13 億美元的調整(true-up)是把全年現金 IC(現金獎酬/激勵薪酬)拉到我們希望的全年水準。這就是這 1.13 億所做的事。你明白嗎,Bill?
- Analyst
- Analyst
Right.
明白。
- President, COO
- President, COO
All right, so we had accruals every - for the three quarters, every quarter trying to anticipate what would we need for the year, and then we got to the end of the year, obviously with the decrease in earnings. It was just - there is no run rate here, no - but if you want to use a run rate at all, it would be the number for the year against the earnings for that year. You could just use that. But it is - there is nothing to do with that number, other - the 113, other than to realize that is a true-up. Next question was on your --
好,所以我們在前三個季度每一季都有提列應計(accruals),每季都在預估全年需要多少;然後到了年底,顯然因為盈餘下滑,就——這裡沒有任何「常態化水準」(run rate),沒有——但如果你一定要用某種常態化概念,那就是用全年數字對照當年盈餘的比例,你可以直接用那個。但這個數字——也就是 1.13 億——除了反映它是一個調整(true-up)之外,沒有其他含義。下一個問題是你——
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
$80 million.
8,000 萬美元。
- President, COO
- President, COO
Was on the $80 million on deferred compensation credit, on the mark-to-market?
是關於遞延薪酬(deferred compensation)按市價評估(mark-to-market)的 8,000 萬美元入帳(credit)?
- Analyst
- Analyst
Right.
對。
- President, COO
- President, COO
So as you know, part of this is an offset to the mark-to-market that we have on the AUM that we are holding, in order to affectively hedge our deferred compensation. So again there is no run rate here, what we do is give you the amount of liability - I'm sorry, we give you the amount of the assets that we are holding at the end of the year, which is on the balance sheet that we break out separately for you, and for that you can - you get a sense of what our exposure is both to the market, and the fact that that is hedging what is outstanding, what the impact would be and any adjustments going forward. Those are the numbers I would work with, and not this particular adjustment.
如你所知,其中一部分是用來抵銷我們所持有、與 AUM 相關的按市價評估變動,以有效對沖我們的遞延薪酬。因此同樣地,這裡也沒有任何「常態化水準」(run rate)。我們會提供給你的是負債的金額——抱歉,我們提供給你的是我們在年底所持有資產的金額;這些資產在資產負債表上,我們也會為你另外拆分揭露。透過這些,你可以掌握我們對市場的曝險,以及它如何對沖未償付項目;並可推估其影響以及未來任何調整。這些才是我會用來分析的數字,而不是這一筆特定的調整。
- CFO
- CFO
This is Bob. One comment related to that. If you remember, this probably goes back about a year ago, we tried to help people out a little bit with the relationship between what happens on the asset side of the balance sheet and what is happening with the liabilities, and I think we indicated that in a normal quarter about 40% of the mark-to-market gains or losses on the asset side would reflect itself in higher or lower compensation expense, relative to what the ongoing amortization run rate really is, and that relationship has held fairly constant, that really hasn't changed.
我是 Bob。關於那點我補充一句。如果你還記得,這大概可以追溯到一年前,我們曾試著稍微幫大家釐清資產負債表資產端發生的事情,與負債端正在發生的事情之間的關係。我想我們當時指出,在一般的一個季度裡,資產端按市價計量(mark-to-market)的收益或損失,大約有 40% 會反映為較高或較低的薪酬費用,相對於持續攤銷的常態運行水準而言;而這個關係一直相當穩定,基本上沒有改變。
- President, COO
- President, COO
So what that represents, that ratio, is those are the vested comp numbers that our employees have. They have vested so they get in the quarter the impact, and whatever the impact there is on the one quarter of the four year amortization.
所以那個比率所代表的是:那是我們員工已歸屬(vested)的薪酬數字。他們已經歸屬,因此在該季度會認列其影響,以及四年攤銷中其中一個季度的影響。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Okay. And the FX?
好的。那外匯(FX)呢?
- President, COO
- President, COO
You're asking - what you are looking for is to give you what the FX number was?
你的問題是——你想要我們提供外匯的數字是多少嗎?
- Analyst
- Analyst
Right. Was it substantive?
對。影響顯著嗎?
- CFO
- CFO
I would say it was all - it was larger than normal, Bill, and it had to do with the relationship between Euro and sterling; we have Euro balances in the UK, and obviously there was currency movement there, and the P&L impact of that flows through to our consolidated financial statements. I wouldn't think of it as a outsized number necessarily, but enough to change the comparisons a little bit.
我會說——它比平常大,Bill,而且與歐元和英鎊之間的關係有關;我們在英國有歐元餘額,顯然那裡出現了匯率波動,而其對損益表(P&L)的影響會流入我們的合併財務報表。我不會認為那一定是特別誇張的數字,但足以讓比較結果稍微有些變化。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Right. And my more substantive is, Peter, I guess two things. First, you mentioned the financial flexibility to do things that others might not be able to do. I am sort of wondering, what are you alluding to there? Is it transactions, new product development? And secondarily, appreciative of the improvement in performance in the six weeks ending December 31st, if you look at your year-to-date results, at least looking at some of your retail funds on the US side, that out performance seems to reverse itself across many of the portfolios. So what changes are you making to smooth some of out this relative performance?
對。至於我更實質的問題,Peter,我想有兩點。第一,你提到有財務彈性去做一些別人可能做不到的事。我有點想知道你在暗示什麼?是交易、還是新產品開發?第二,感謝你提到截至 12 月 31 日的六週期間績效有所改善;但如果看你們年初至今的結果,至少就美國端的一些零售基金來看,那種超額表現似乎在許多投資組合上又反轉了。那你們正在做哪些改變,來讓這種相對績效更平滑一些?
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
Well, two points. On financial flexibility, I think that it's critical going in to 2009 and further that we be in a position to take advantage of many different things. Point one, talent in the marketplace, to the extent we want to broaden and deepen our bench. Two, the attempt to be able to acquire specific activities or teams, if in fact we so chose to do that. And three, the opportunity to invest in growth in the business, in the activities that we think will bear fruit, in particular when others are leaving the playing field. So there is nothing specific, but there are those three components that I think are quite valuable, and given the opportunity is likely to knock more frequently in a period of time of stress, having flexible opportunity to take advantage of those things, ie dry powder, is we think is a particularly attractive attribute to the Company.
嗯,兩點。關於財務彈性,我認為在進入 2009 年以及更往後,讓我們處於能夠把握許多不同機會的位置是關鍵。第一,市場上的人才——如果我們想擴大並加深我們的人才梯隊。第二,若我們選擇這麼做,能夠收購特定業務活動或團隊。第三,有機會在我們認為會開花結果的業務活動上投資成長,特別是在其他人正在離場的時候。所以沒有特定的單一事項,但我認為這三個組成部分都很有價值;而且在壓力時期,機會更可能頻繁敲門,擁有可靈活運用的資源去把握這些事情——也就是所謂的「乾火藥」(dry powder)——我們認為對公司而言是一項特別具吸引力的特質。
As it relates to performance, what we were trying to point out there was not that a year 40 days makes, because that is clearly not the case, but we were reasonably enthused about the recent outperformance as opposed to recent underperformance. But I want to be cautious to be very clear that that does not imply that we have had some huge turnaround, because we are talking about a very short period of time.
至於績效,我們當時想指出的並不是「40 天就能造就一年」——顯然不是那樣——而是相較於近期的落後表現,我們對近期的超額表現感到相當振奮。但我也要謹慎、非常清楚地說,這並不意味著我們已經出現什麼巨大的扭轉,因為我們談的是非常短的一段時間。
The more important question you asked is what changes did we make. We spent some time talking about a major change for us in personnel, something that is not a shock to the organization because Marilyn and Sharon have been working together for a very long period of time. And this was not a unusual activity or action, but I think it's very important that Marilyn, who is a very strong culture carrier for the Company and has a tremendous amount of substantive capacity in meeting with clients, can now focus, and frankly help me focus, on client opportunities around the world. And Sharon is now able to run the value team in a way in which she is able to direct the business as she sees fit, and I think that that will energize both people. And the early returns I get from both of them and the teams that they work with is everybody is very excited.
你問的更重要的問題是我們做了哪些改變。我們花了一些時間談到我們在人員方面的一項重大變動;這對組織而言並不意外,因為 Marilyn 和 Sharon 已經合作很長一段時間。這不是不尋常的活動或行動,但我認為非常重要的是:Marilyn 作為公司非常強的文化傳承者,且在與客戶會面方面具備非常深厚的實質能力,現在可以把重心放在——坦白說也幫助我把重心放在——全球各地的客戶機會上。而 Sharon 現在能以她認為合適的方式來領導價值(value)團隊、指揮業務,我認為這會讓兩位都更有動能。我從她們兩位以及她們所帶領的團隊得到的早期回饋是:大家都非常興奮。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Helpful, thank you very much.
很有幫助,非常感謝。
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
You're welcome, Bill.
不客氣,Bill。
Operator
Operator
Your next question comes from the line of Robert Lee with KBW.
下一個問題來自 KBW 的 Robert Lee。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Thanks, good afternoon. A couple of questions. First one, if you look at the institutional business, and you mentioned the sequential increase in I guess loss mandates, so can you give us some color on where you think your relationships are right now with consultants, and given that I would expect most institutional investors are going through their asset allocation process looking at what managers to hire or fire, I mean how do you think about the next couple of months and your ability to obtain - given your performance last year, so - the ability to kind of stem the outflow or at least the acceleration in lost mandates?
謝謝,下午好。我有幾個問題。第一個,如果看機構業務,你提到我想是流失委任(lost mandates)在序列上增加,所以你能否多談一些你認為目前你們與顧問之間的關係狀況?另外,考量到我預期多數機構投資人正在進行資產配置流程、檢視要聘用或解聘哪些管理人,你怎麼看接下來幾個月——在你們去年績效的背景下——你們獲取(或爭取)能力如何,來抑制資金流出,或至少抑制流失委任加速?
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
Bob, as you probably know, since in our last call I said that what I said I would be doing in the next 60 to 90 days, and it's 30 days into that, is meeting with clients. I have been doing just that. I have also spent a considerable amount of time with the investing teams and the investing process. I've met with most of the consultants, I've met with many of the large clients. Tonight I fly off to London, I'll be in London for two days; Saturday I fly to Tokyo, I will be there for two days. And that is all to see both large clients, institutional and consultants as well.
Bob,如你可能知道的,在我們上次電話會議時我說過,接下來 60 到 90 天我會做的事——現在已經過了 30 天——就是與客戶會面。我一直在做這件事。我也花了相當多時間在投資團隊與投資流程上。我已經見過大多數顧問,也見過許多大型客戶。今晚我會飛去倫敦,在倫敦待兩天;週六我飛去東京,也會待兩天。這些行程都是為了拜訪大型客戶——包括機構客戶以及顧問。
I feel good about reporting the following. In each and every case, I think our clients understand our investment process, are comfortable that we have been consistently applying that, are happy that we are open-minded about how we might enhance that and have already enhanced that over the course of the year in looking at additional factors and additional research, and feel good about the fact that although the performance has been challenged, that we haven't deviated from our willingness to take risk, our willingness to run appropriately-constructed portfolios that can provide substantial returns when markets do rebound. And I think that we haven't had much in the way of pushback on the issues of there is too much change and there is not enough consistency in the investment process.
我很高興可以回報以下情況:在每一個案例中,我認為我們的客戶都理解我們的投資流程,也放心我們一直一致地在執行;他們也樂見我們對如何強化流程保持開放態度,而且我們在一年當中已經透過納入更多因素與更多研究來加以強化。他們也對這點感到正面:雖然績效面臨挑戰,但我們並未偏離我們承擔風險的意願,也沒有偏離我們運行結構適當的投資組合的意願——這些投資組合在市場反彈時能提供可觀回報。我認為在「變動太多」或「投資流程一致性不足」這些議題上,我們並沒有遭遇太多反彈。
Now that, of course, if investment performance continues to be poor, will continue to be an issue, and clients will appropriately evaluate us if our performance does not turn. I think most of our clients understand that investment performance takes time to turn, that returns - that is, investment returns - are not normally distributed, that they are lumpy, and that if you take too short a horizon, you have a much higher probability of not participating in the significant returns that the investment process is likely to produce. So no guarantees, but all very good conversations, and I will continue to do that the next 60 or so days because I think it's going to take that amount of time for me to physically meet with most of the important clients and consultants.
當然,如果投資績效持續不佳,這仍會是個問題;若我們的績效沒有改善,客戶也會合理地評估我們。我想多數客戶理解投資績效需要時間才能扭轉;報酬——也就是投資報酬——通常不是常態分配,而是呈現跳躍式(lumpy)的;如果你採用太短的觀察期間,你更可能錯過投資流程可能產生的顯著報酬。所以沒有任何保證,但對話都非常正面;而我會在接下來大約 60 天持續這麼做,因為我認為我需要那麼多時間,才能親自與大多數重要客戶與顧問會面。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Great. I also have one follow-up question. This is a little bit, I guess, of follow-up to Bill's earlier question. Historically, if you look in the past, at least the impression from the outside looking at Alliance, is that AXA was a pretty hands-off parent. Listening to comments about whether it makes sense to hire teams if appropriate or acquisitions if appropriate, given that you've probably only been there about a month or so, is it fair to say that AXA has become -
很好。我還有一個追問。這算是對 Bill 先前問題的一點延伸。從歷史來看,至少外界看 Alliance 的印象是 AXA 作為母公司相當放手。聽你提到若合適就聘用團隊、若合適就進行收購等評論,考量到你大概才到任一個月左右,是否可以說 AXA 已經變得——
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
31 days, actually.
其實是 31 天。
- Analyst
- Analyst
31 days, okay. Is it fair to say that AXA is becoming a much more hands-on parent than it had been historically?
31 天,好。是否可以說 AXA 正在成為一個比過去歷史上更積極介入(hands-on)的母公司?
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
No. I'll elaborate, but I think the clear answer is probably satisfactory; no. The comments I made are comments that are emanating from our team and me, and reflect I think our strong competitive position in the marketplace, and our strong financial flexibility, which will allow us to take advantage of some of these things. I think AXA continues to be supportive and a significant shareholder, but they haven't changed the way in which they behave nor do I expect that they will.
不是。我可以再多說一些,但我想清楚的答案就足夠了:不是。我所做的評論是源自我們的團隊與我本人,反映的是我認為我們在市場上的強勁競爭地位,以及我們強大的財務彈性,這將使我們能夠把握其中一些機會。我認為 AXA 仍然是支持我們的重要股東,但他們的行事方式並沒有改變,我也不預期他們會改變。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Great. Thank you very much.
很好。非常感謝。
- President, COO
- President, COO
Let me add something, this is partially in response to Rob and partially back in response to Bill. On the issue of performance, again, that six-week period was trying to show how we are positioned if and when the markets turn favorably. But on the comment about how we've done this year, our performance - and you're looking at some mutual funds. Our performance in our value services and our growth services, there is not significant underperformance in this date through yesterday. In fact, most of our value services are ahead of their relative benchmarks, and our -
我再補充一點,這部分是回應 Rob,也部分回應 Bill。關於績效的議題,再次強調,那六週期間是想展示當市場在有利方向轉向時,我們的定位如何。但至於你提到我們今年的表現——你看的可能是一些共同基金。我們在價值型服務與成長型服務的表現,截至昨天為止的年初至今並沒有顯著落後。事實上,我們大多數價值型服務都領先其相對基準,而我們——
- CFO
- CFO
This year-to-date.
今年迄今。
- President, COO
- President, COO
This year-to-date are ahead - this year-to-date, although the absolute numbers are tough. This is a tough 20 days into 2009, but relatively we haven't given up a lot of performance here. It's actually - our performance, most of it is relative benchmarks, and our growth is - some of our key growth services are slightly underneath their benchmark, but they're ahead of the S&P 500 fairly significantly. So, just a point of fact.
今年迄今是領先的——今年迄今,雖然絕對數字很難看。2009 年才過了 20 天就很艱難,但相對而言,我們在這裡並沒有放棄太多績效。其實——我們的績效多數是相對於基準,而我們的成長——我們一些關鍵的成長型服務略低於其基準,但相較於標普 500 指數則明顯領先不少。所以,這只是陳述事實。
Operator
Operator
Your next question comes from the line of Craig Siegenthaler with Credit Suisse.
您的下一個問題來自 Credit Suisse 的 Craig Siegenthaler。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Thank you. My first question is for Peter. Peter, I was just wondering if your first few weeks on the job, if you could provide some ideas on how you look to upgrade certain areas of the firm, and I was thinking maybe you could start a little bit with the distribution channel?
謝謝。我的第一個問題是問 Peter。Peter,我只是想請教你上任最初幾週,能否分享一些你打算如何提升公司某些領域的想法?我想也許你可以先從通路/銷售渠道談起?
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
Sure, Craig. Obviously, I can't give you specific forward-looking information, and I won't be able to say things that are either related to private investment of funds that we are talking about and/or prospective investment services that we haven't - we're not ready to publicly talk about, so my response will be somewhat limited.
當然,Craig。顯然,我不能提供具體的前瞻性資訊,也不能談及我們正在討論的私募基金投資,和/或我們尚未——尚未準備公開談論的潛在投資服務,因此我的回覆會有所保留。
But let me just talk about distribution, and my reaction to that. First rate, absolutely top grade, institutional and retail distribution business, and the private client business continues to impress me, as it has for the ten years that I have watched it from afar. I think that those are some of the greater strengths of the business. In particular, just let me give you a little bit of detail to that, the length and depth of the relationships that the client-facing personnel have at this firm with their clients is really quite unusual. It's not just that they know the senior person at the client, they know the six people down from the senior person; they don't know them for a year, they know them for five years or ten years. They have dealt with them in many different ways, they understand their objectives, they understand their concerns, and they are trusted and respected by the clients. That doesn't solve all of our problems, but that is one heck of step forward in building relationships and finding ways to create more depth and more breadth with your existing client base, which is assuredly one of the fastest ways to help improve the assets under management and the size of them.
但我先談談通路,以及我對此的看法。一流、絕對頂尖的機構與零售通路業務,而私人客戶業務也持續讓我印象深刻——就像我過去十年在外部觀察時一樣。我認為這些是公司更大的優勢之一。特別是,讓我補充一點細節:本公司面向客戶的人員與客戶之間關係的長度與深度,確實相當罕見。不只是認識客戶端的高層,他們也認識從高層往下六層的人;而且不是認識一年,而是五年或十年。他們以多種不同方式與對方合作過,理解他們的目標,理解他們的顧慮,並且受到客戶的信任與尊重。這不能解決我們所有問題,但在建立關係、並找出方法在既有客戶基礎上創造更深度與更廣度方面,這是非常重要的一大步;而這無疑也是協助提升受託管理資產(AUM)及其規模的最快方式之一。
I don't think, frankly, that there is any specific changes that I see in the distribution side of the house, other than to continue to support the strength of the organization, hire where appropriate and expand where appropriate. And I think our expansion in the DC business is probably at the level it needs to be at the present time, but as this CRS platform continues to take hold, we suspect that we will be able to add people down market in that world. As Gerry mentioned, the consolidation amongst the large retail firms, we suspect that that may also provide us with some opportunity as an independent, objective asset manager, where we can provide service to those retail organizations effectively, with personnel that have long and deep relationships with them. But I think, as Gerry said, that's sort of yet to play out because it's all very new, and people are trying to understand where they should be going.
坦白說,我在通路端並沒有看到需要做任何特定改變,除了持續支持組織的優勢、在適當之處招募並在適當之處擴張。我認為我們在 DC 業務上的擴張,目前大概已達到所需水準;但隨著這個 CRS 平台持續落地,我們預期將能在該領域往更下游市場增補人手。正如 Gerry 提到的,大型零售機構之間的整併,我們推測也可能為我們帶來一些機會——作為一家獨立、客觀的資產管理人,我們可以有效地為那些零售組織提供服務,並由與其擁有長期且深厚關係的人員來承接。但我想,如同 Gerry 所說,這還有待發展,因為一切都很新,大家都在試著理解自己應該往哪裡走。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Peter, BlackRock talked pretty positively about the asset strategy services and advisory services, not really on the product level but kind of taking a step back, and some of the services they provide clients. Does AB offer services in that arena for institutional clients, and is that an area you maybe could expand on the product side?
Peter,BlackRock 對資產策略服務與顧問服務的看法相當正面,不太是從產品層面,而是有點退一步、從他們為客戶提供的服務角度來談。AB 是否也為機構客戶提供那類服務?這是否是你可能在產品端進一步擴展的領域?
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
Yes, you know, one thing we haven't spend much time at, but I would like to spend a little time at, I referred to it briefly in my comments, that the Sanford C. Bernstein research platform is one heck of a platform. I mean you ask anybody, and I'm being a little biased here, but you ask anybody about close your eyes and think of what is the best research platform out there, and it's Sanford C. Bernstein. If you think that investors aren't craving research and scratching and clawing for the best ideas that they can find, you would be mistaken. They in fact are, and in fact that opportunity for us is I think actually quite significant. We are independent, we provide top grade execution service, you can check the surveys, I think we are in the top three or one of the their three different services - there are three different services, I think one of them ranks us number one, the other two in the top three.
是的,你知道,有一件事我們過去談得不多,但我想多花點時間談談。我在評論中簡短提到過:Sanford C. Bernstein 的研究平台是一個非常了不起的平台。我的意思是,你問任何人——我這裡可能有點偏頗——但你問任何人:閉上眼睛想一想,市場上最好的研究平台是什麼?答案就是 Sanford C. Bernstein。如果你以為投資人不渴望研究、不拼命尋找他們能找到的最佳想法,那你就錯了。他們確實非常渴望;而對我們而言,那個機會其實相當可觀。我們是獨立的,我們提供頂級的交易執行服務——你可以去看各種調查,我想我們在前三名之內,或在三項不同服務中——有三項不同服務,我記得其中一項把我們排第一,另外兩項排在前三。
So I actually think that while BlackRock has financial solutions, and that's a terrific service, and we may think about how we take advantage of that, because we do have -pay a lot of assets that are obviously managed by our own - by insurance businesses, and that is something for us to think about, our [anchor to win with] there is actually a fantastic research platform. It's actually more diversified, it's actually a more leveragable opportunity, and it's something that we actually think we can do a lot with in the next year and coming years.
所以我其實認為,雖然 BlackRock 有金融解決方案(financial solutions),那是很棒的服務,我們也可能思考如何加以運用,因為我們確實有——有相當多的資產顯然是由我們自己的——由保險業務所管理,這是我們需要思考的事情;但我們在那裡的 [anchor to win with] 其實是一個極佳的研究平台。它其實更多元,也更具可槓桿化的機會,而這也是我們認為在未來一年以及往後幾年可以做很多事情的領域。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Thanks, Peter. I just had one question, maybe Bob or Jerry could help me out here. When you think about comps sequentially, I'm wondering when did the reductions that happened in fourth quarter occur and hit the P&L? Was it a full-quarter impact? I'm guessing probably it was, and so I'm wondering, should we think about the decline - the quarter decline coming maybe in December or November, or how can we think about the sequential change there?
謝謝,Peter。我還有一個問題,也許 Bob 或 Jerry 可以幫我釐清。當你們按季序列來看可比數(comps)時,我想知道第四季發生的成本削減是在什麼時候發生並反映到損益表(P&L)上的?是整季的影響嗎?我猜可能是,所以我在想,我們是否應該把季度下滑理解為主要發生在 12 月或 11 月?或者我們該如何看待這個序列變化?
- President, COO
- President, COO
I think the best way to think about it, Craig, is I gave you what the annualized savings are in base and in fringes. I would use that number, and as far as when the people left, they left throughout the quarter. We started about mid-October and ran until about mid-December.
Craig,我認為最好的理解方式是:我已經告訴你基本薪資與附加福利(fringes)的年化節省金額。我會用那個數字。至於人員何時離開,他們是在整個季度陸續離開的。我們大約從 10 月中開始,一直持續到 12 月中。
- Analyst
- Analyst
So is that page 20?
所以是在第 20 頁嗎?
- President, COO
- President, COO
I don't know, is that page 20? No, I was referring to -- it was the text I gave you around the decrease, when I spoke about it, and I spoke about the savings -- let me find that for you when we go to the next question, and I'll come back to you. Let me just see if I can find it in the displays. I know it in my text, and I can give it to you, but let me see if it was actually - if it actually shows up in the slides. I don't think it - it may not. I think the number I gave you was $70 million. The number is, on the annual run rate basis, about $70 million.
我不知道,是第 20 頁嗎?不,我指的是——我在談到下降時給你的那段文字說明,當時我提到節省——讓我在下一個問題時幫你找一下,然後再回覆你。我先看看能不能在圖表裡找到。我在我的講稿裡知道那個數字,也可以直接告訴你,但我想確認它是否真的——是否真的出現在投影片上。我想沒有——可能沒有。我認為我給你的數字是 7,000 萬美元。以年度運行率(annual run rate)計,大約是 7,000 萬美元。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Thank you very much.
非常感謝。
- President, COO
- President, COO
That's just salaries. I also mentioned what the impact - not the impact was, but the fact that there is -- instead [on top] of those individuals, but I wouldn't look for that - to run rate it off. I would look at what happened in regards to an annual figure for the salary and fringes of $70 million. And I mentioned it, indeed, in reference to display 20, but there is no bullet point there on the slide. Does that help, Craig?
那只是薪資。我也提到其影響——不是說影響是多少,而是事實上還有——在那些人員之外的部分,但我不會用那個去——把它年化成運行率。我會看薪資與附加福利合計 7,000 萬美元的年度數字。我確實是在提到圖表第 20 頁時說的,但那張投影片上沒有對應的條列。這樣有幫助嗎,Craig?
- Analyst
- Analyst
That helps a lot. Thanks a lot, Gerry.
非常有幫助。非常感謝,Gerry。
Operator
Operator
Your next question comes from the line of Marc Irizarry with Goldman Sachs.
您的下一個問題來自 Goldman Sachs 的 Marc Irizarry。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Great, thanks. Peter, a question for you on the alternative investment strategies, you know about $6 billion or so in AUM. How are you approaching building that business? You know, do you see that as using more internal capabilities or external capabilities, and building out - allowing different managers to - sort of into that platform and maybe opening up the architecture a bit more on the private well side? And then also, how are you thinking about that also in terms of a movement maybe towards more passive investing? You know, I do see it is $10 billion or so in mandates that moved into on the more passive side from active. Maybe you could just square how you are thinking about other managers and how they plan to grow in the business?
很好,謝謝。Peter,我想問你關於另類投資策略的問題,目前大約有 60 億美元左右的受託管理資產(AUM)。你打算如何建立這塊業務?你是傾向更多運用內部能力還是外部能力?以及建立——讓不同的管理人——納入那個平台,並且也許在私人財富端把架構再開放一些(open architecture)?另外,你也如何看待這件事與可能朝向更被動式投資的趨勢之間的關係?我確實看到大約有 100 億美元左右的委託從主動轉到較被動的一端。也許你可以把你對其他管理人以及他們如何規劃成長這項業務的想法,整體說明一下?
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
Sure, Marc. First of all, I think our alternatives are very closely associated with our research in both value and growth. So they reflect a fair bit, if not a lot, of the best ideas in those activities. So effectively what we have is [long-loaning] product and then levered product that basically express those best ideas in a higher-profile way. Those products also include currencies, to some extent commodity, and also macrofactors. So there is additional things going on in those products. They haven't had good performance in the last year, but they have had over time very good performance in '05 and '06, and '07 was basically breakeven, and '08 was a really poor year. So I think that those products have a place in the portfolio as a way of, as I said, expressing our best ideas in a more specific and emphasized manner.
當然,Marc。首先,我認為我們的另類投資與我們在價值與成長兩方面的研究密切相關。因此,它們在相當程度上(如果不是很大程度)反映了這些活動中最好的想法。實際上,我們有一個[long-loaning]產品,然後還有一個加槓桿的產品,基本上是以更高的曝光度來表達那些最佳想法。這些產品也在某種程度上包含貨幣、部分商品,以及宏觀因子。因此,這些產品還有一些額外的因素在運作。它們在過去一年表現不佳,但長期來看表現非常好:在'05與'06表現很好,'07基本上打平,'08則是非常糟的一年。所以我認為,這些產品在投資組合中有其位置,作為一種方式——如我所說——以更具體且更強調的方式表達我們的最佳想法。
Now you raised, I think, two good points that, frankly, we are discussing how to think about. We think that, again given our financial strength and our flexibility, and our credibility as a investing organization, that that plays to the strength of actually identifying managers who ultimately could provide good returns, and doing the due diligence necessary to identify strong operating systems and weak operating systems, and ultimately avoiding the managers who have the blow-ups or the managers whose styles drift and aren't true to form. Having said that, you know, that would be new for us, and it is something that we will debate internally and over the next six months or so, and make some decisions on whether that's an intelligent thing to do or not.
我想你提出了兩個很好的觀點,坦白說,我們正在討論該如何看待。我們認為,再次考量到我們的財務實力、彈性,以及作為投資機構的公信力,這些優勢有助於我們去辨識最終能提供良好報酬的管理人,並進行必要的盡職調查,以辨識強的營運系統與弱的營運系統,並最終避開會爆雷的管理人,或是投資風格漂移、無法維持原本風格的管理人。話雖如此,你知道,這對我們而言會是新的作法,而這也是我們接下來大約六個月內會在內部辯論、並做出一些決策的事情,來判斷這是否是明智之舉。
The same goes for the passive question. Certainly in the DC side, we see demand for passive portfolios. It's something that we now outsource; we could do internally if we so chose, and that's another debate that we would have. So I can't commit to you that we will or we won't, but I will commit to you because we are right now having that debate.
被動投資的問題也是一樣。當然,在DC端,我們看到對被動投資組合的需求。這是我們目前外包的項目;如果我們願意,也可以內部自行執行,這也是我們會討論的另一個議題。所以我無法向你承諾我們會或不會做,但我可以向你承諾的是,我們現在確實正在進行這個討論。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Okay, and can you maybe just talk about the $9 billion that went from active to passive; is that a growth or value mandate? Then it looks like the redemption rates in growth picked up, so can you maybe just hit on that a little bit.
好的,那你能不能談一下那筆從主動轉到被動的90億美元;那是成長還是價值的委託?另外看起來成長的贖回率也上升了,你能不能也稍微說明一下。
- President, COO
- President, COO
Marc, those are totally reflective of variable annuity - services that were contained in variable annuity services of life insurance companies that wanted to move away from the volatility that active management was giving, because it was becoming difficult for them to hedge it. So it was a strategic decision that is being played out quite a bit in the insurance industry, to move from - it's easier to hedge against index products than it is against actively-managed products. So that explains that entire transfer.
Marc,那些完全反映了變額年金——也就是壽險公司的變額年金服務——這些公司希望遠離主動管理帶來的波動性,因為對他們來說,對沖變得很困難。所以這是一個策略性決策,而在保險業中相當普遍地正在發生:從——對沖指數型產品比對沖主動管理產品更容易。這就解釋了整個轉移。
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
I think Marc, by the way, that plays into the question that you're raising, about whether we should provide index. By the way, we say index; we are talking about enhanced index, it's just passive obviously. If it's DTF, it's DTF, if it's [FIDER], it's [FIDER]. We are not going to do that. But there may be a role for enhanced indexed product, but it's going to be tied to how we discuss this with the insurance companies.
Marc,我想順帶一提,這也呼應你提出的問題:我們是否應該提供指數。順帶一提,我們說的指數,是指增強型指數;它本質上仍然是被動的。若是DTF就是DTF,若是[FIDER]就是[FIDER]。我們不會做那個。但增強型指數產品可能有其角色,不過會取決於我們如何與保險公司討論這件事。
And you've heard us talk about the DC business and the guaranteed life withdraw benefits, and if insurance companies feel comfortable with an enhanced index, then I could see us going in that direction. If they just prefer to have straight index with no enhancement, then I can see it being less attractive to us. So I think it's tied up in that conversation.
而且你也聽我們談過DC業務與保證終身提領福利(guaranteed life withdraw benefits),如果保險公司對增強型指數感到放心,那我可以想像我們會往那個方向走。如果他們只是偏好完全不增強的純指數,那我可以想像這對我們的吸引力會比較低。所以我認為這都綁在那個對話裡。
- President, COO
- President, COO
Just for some background, for those of you that haven't been covering us for a long time, we have experience with enhanced products, and we haven't been promoting them the last two years, but now with the new initiative in DC, it puts that topic back on the table that Peter is mentioning.
補充一些背景,給那些沒有長期追蹤我們的人:我們有增強型產品的經驗,過去兩年我們沒有在推廣它們,但現在隨著DC的新倡議,Peter提到的這個議題又回到檯面上。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Great, thanks. I will get back in the queue.
很好,謝謝。我會回到排隊序列。
Operator
Operator
Our final question comes from the line of Cynthia Mayer with Banc of America Securities.
我們最後一個問題來自Banc of America Securities的Cynthia Mayer。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Good afternoon. I was just wondering as you talk to clients, whether fees are a part of that conversation? And given the underperformances, do you think there will be any pressure on fees, or do you feel any pressure to make any kinds of fee concessions?
下午好。我只是想問,當你們與客戶交談時,費用是否會是對話的一部分?另外,鑑於績效落後,你們認為費用會不會面臨任何壓力,或你們是否感受到需要做任何形式的費用讓步的壓力?
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
Cynthia, no and no. That isn't to say that there never will be a discussion about fees, because of course there are. That isn't to say, by the way, that in the past we haven't moved from traditional base fees to base fee and performance, because that will also happen. That's generally a conversation around a inflection point or breakeven point, and we get comfortable that the risk return for us and the client makes sense.
Cynthia,不會,也不會。這並不是說未來永遠不會討論費用,因為當然會有。順帶一提,這也不是說過去我們沒有從傳統的固定管理費改為固定管理費加績效費,因為那也會發生。那通常是在某個轉折點或損益兩平點附近的討論,而我們會在確認對我們與客戶而言的風險報酬是合理的之後,才會覺得安心。
But I think generally what we've found, and I think this is true pretty much across the industry, that this is not really a fee discussion, this is much more about capacity, and Alpha, and investment process, and not about the fees for these kinds of products. Now if we are talking about hedge fund fees 2 and 20, with no clawbacks and no benchmarks, do I think those fees are going to be under pressure? I do. I think that that's for the obvious reasons, because clients are frustrated at paying, you know, yearly fees when there are profits, and then not having any ability to claw that back in future years. I think that people, meaning investors, are now being responsive to that, and I think you will see that in the industry. That's just the industry-wide comment.
但我認為一般而言,我們發現——而且我想這在整個產業大致都成立——這其實不是費用的討論,更多是關於容量、Alpha、投資流程,而不是這類產品的費用。現在,如果我們談的是對沖基金的2和20費率、沒有追索(clawbacks)也沒有基準(benchmarks),你問我那些費用會不會面臨壓力?我認為會。我想原因很明顯,因為客戶對於在有獲利的年份支付年度費用、但在未來年份卻沒有任何方式把它追回來感到挫折。我認為人們——也就是投資人——現在正在對此做出回應,而你會在產業中看到這種變化。這是就整體產業而言的評論。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Okay. And also just more generally, I think in the press release you mentioned if things worsen again you would consider other measures. I'm wondering if you can flesh that out a little bit? Would that just mean more headcount reductions or would you pull back from certain geographies or products?
好的。另外更一般地說,我想在新聞稿中你提到如果情況再次惡化,你們會考慮其他措施。我想知道你能不能更具體說明一下?那是否只是意味著進一步裁減人力,還是你們會從某些地區或產品撤出?
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
I think that more than likely if we see the economy worsen, and we believe our prospects are dimmer, I think our first port of call would be to look at staffing levels and size. I think any organization, this included, would be reluctant to abandon a service or geography; it's hard to go back once you've pulled out. So I rather doubt that. In looking at our geographic breadth and footprint, I don't think there would be a material event or a material place where that could happen. I mean, there may be something small that could happen that I'm just not thinking about, but I think if you were to ask us strategically, we think our strategic footprint would look differently, I think we would say unlikely.
我認為,如果我們看到經濟惡化,而且我們相信前景更黯淡,那麼我們最可能的第一個著手點會是檢視人員編制與規模。我想任何組織——包括我們——都會不願意放棄某項服務或某個地理區域;一旦撤出就很難再回去。所以我相當懷疑會那樣做。就我們的地理廣度與據點來看,我不認為會有重大的事件或重大的地方可以發生那種撤出。我的意思是,可能會有一些小的事情我一時沒想到,但如果你從策略角度問我們:我們是否認為我們的策略版圖會看起來不一樣?我想我們會說不太可能。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Okay. And then just wanted to clarify, Gerry, I think you mentioned the possibility of hiring more FAs, and wondered if there is a target there or, you know, what the timeline is?
好的。然後我想再釐清一下,Gerry,我想你提到可能會再聘用更多FAs,我想知道是否有目標,或是,你知道,時間表是什麼?
- President, COO
- President, COO
Well, it's more than a possibility. We plan on hiring more FAs, and we will look to see how the year rolls out about how large that investment would be.
嗯,這不只是可能性。我們計畫聘用更多FAs,而我們會視今年的進展來看那筆投資會有多大。
- Chairman, CEO
- Chairman, CEO
Cynthia, I think we really believe this an investment in the business, you can't shrink from this, we don't believe you should shrink from this. It takes three-plus years, sometimes five years, for FAs to be productive, and if you bleed the cash flow, meaning that you don't invest in this year to improve the cash flow, you're just stealing from the future. We don't see any reason to do that. We don't think that is in the unit holders' interest, and we certainly don't think that is in the long-term interest of the franchise.
Cynthia,我想我們真的相信這是對業務的投資,你不能在這件事上退縮,我們不認為你應該退縮。FAs要具備生產力需要三年以上,有時甚至五年;如果你讓現金流失血——也就是你今年不投資來改善現金流——你其實是在透支未來。我們看不出有任何理由要那樣做。我們不認為那符合單位持有人(unit holders)的利益,我們當然也不認為那符合這個特許經營(franchise)的長期利益。
- Analyst
- Analyst
Great, thanks.
很好,謝謝。
- Director of IR
- Director of IR
Lynn, this is Phil. Considering the length of our formal remarks, we will give analysts another minute or two to get back in the queue. So, guys, if you want to ask a follow-up, feel free to get back in queue.
Lynn,我是Phil。考量到我們正式發言的長度,我們會再給分析師一到兩分鐘回到排隊序列。所以,各位,如果你們想問追問問題,歡迎回到排隊。
Operator
Operator
(Operator Instructions).
(接線員指示)。
- Director of IR
- Director of IR
All right, looks like that's it. Thank you, Lynn, and thanks, everyone, for joining the call. As always, feel free to call the IR team if you have any follow-up questions, and enjoy the rest of your evening. This concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect.
好,看起來就到這裡了。謝謝你,Lynn,也謝謝各位參與這通電話會議。一如往常,如果你有任何後續問題,歡迎致電IR團隊,祝各位今晚愉快。今天的電話會議到此結束。你現在可以掛線。